Small Wars Journal

COIN Is a Proven Failure

Mon, 12/01/2014 - 1:31pm

COIN Is a Proven Failure by LTC Daniel L. Davis, The American Conservative

In late October MSNBC’s Ronan Farrow asked retired Army Lt. Col. John Nagl to give viewers a deeper understanding of the fight between the Islamic State (ISIS) and Kurdish fighters around Kobane. Widely credited with “writing the book” on successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, Mr. Nagl said, “we’ve got 1,500 guys on the ground, but they’re not as far forward as they need to be to make a real, immediate impact on the battlefield.” He and a number of COIN experts argue that along with 15,000 U.S. ground troops, Iraqi, Kurdish, and Syrian rebel soldiers can defeat ISIS. Before making any decisions, American leaders should first consider this: despite what is often claimed by a host of advocates, the COIN theories upon which these recommendations are based were in fact demonstrable failures in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We must not sacrifice any more American lives and harm American interests any further by acting on theories that are likely to fail again…

Read on.

Comments

RantCorp

Fri, 01/02/2015 - 6:57am

MF,

The evidence establishing the active participation in heroin production by the Pak Gov. can be obtained from USG departments. Relying upon the media is somewhat pointless, unnecessary and often misleading.

The Costa Nostra is a money making business. It has no other objectives. Obviously it cannot/does not operate in a bubble so various other players are needed. As it so happens many folks in the Pak security forces like getting rich as well, but they also like conducting UW for reasons they claim to be in the best interests of their country.

Of all the actors it is only the Costa Nostra who are shamelessly honest about their work and are perceived by everyone for what they are. The ISI, our media, our military, our spooks, defense industries, politicians, priests, mullahs rabbis etc. intertwine and overlay various degrees of deceit/ignorance to further their interests. Our security forces apparently fail to recognize this (unlike the Costa Nostra) and dance to all of the tunes and understandably misdiagnose the problem.

It shouldn't surprise anyone we subsequently prescribed the wrong solutions.

You highlighted various well-known ‘facts’ that reflect this dilemma. Heroin played no part in the defeat of the Soviet Union (besides worsening the drug problems in the ranks of the Red Army). Early days there was an effort to use drug money as a way to explain Muj financing but nobody was stupid enough to believe that. During the Soviet time most if not all of the heroin was grown in Pak. The Taliban did not decrease the growing of poppy. Ask the DEA, they've satellite mapped this stuff for 30 plus years.

You mentioned 9/11 deniers?! If all of the 9/11 hijackers were Sicilian and all the planes hit the DEA HQ in Arlington I might suspect something but initially the fallout 9/11 was bad for business for the Costa Nostra. Obviously the global UW fruitcake got a kick out of it but so what? As you know the numbers of slain on 9/11 are tiny compared to the toil inflicted by heroin.

As a country we have to reconcile a simple equation. Are we willing to accept the control of nuclear weapons by the global heroin dealer? There is no need for speculation, rumor or innuendo. We know the Pak Gov. has nukes and the DEA and other USG dept. know they control the global supply of heroin. Leaving aside the moral argument we can limit our response to strategic defense.

Heroin is unraveling the fabric of Pakistani society and seriously impacting the whole region. Many would argue the Paks sowed the seeds of their own destruction and a plague upon their house. Fair enough, but the fruitcake are there and waiting to pick up the scraps - and they have other fish to fry far beyond the region.

To-date our efforts in the region have been a spectacular disaster. Our flawed prescription is failing because we are distracted by so much ‘noise’ and fail to understand we are facing a powerful mix of political paranoia and criminality. My argument is if we get rid of the heroin, we and they might have a chance of solving the political paranoia problem.

Spray & Pray,

RC

If we understand that counterinsurgency is a long-term process.

And if we understand that -- at some point -- a nation may no longer wish, for various reasons, to be engaged in such a long-term process.

Thinking, for example, that:

a. The price that must be paid for such a long-term effort (in blood, money, political capital, homeland cohesion and support, etc.).

b. This price is now considered to be much too high given (1) what actually might be gained by such an effort and (2) our other/new priorities.

Given such circumstances as these, then should one see the abandonment of the COIN approach in certain areas of the world as a failure of COIN?

Our should one see such an abandonment of the COIN approach as simply:

1. A different decision,

2. Made by the current or a new executive.

3. Based on his/her (the current or new executives') new cost/benefit/other priorities analysis; outlined in my "a" and "b" above?

If this latter approach is considered to be most valid, then the decision to abandon the COIN approach in certain areas of the world; this such decision must be seen -- not as a failure of COIN (it was not given its long-term run) -- but simply as a management action/decision -- based on a new analysis and/or on new and shifting priorities -- which caused the executive to determine that the country had more important things to do with its resources.

Outlaw 09

Fri, 01/02/2015 - 10:21am

In reply to by Miriam

Just a few quick notes--the Iraqi ISF stood at 360K when we pulled out, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior had a far better intelligence system in place than we ever did have from 2003-2010, and we beat into them our version of "COIN" at most levels. And they had the logistics tail that we did as well.

I am confused as well by these comments referencing the Marshall Plan---we did not leave simply because we had beaten Germany in a major war-then NATO was built and we were the leading member and the Cold War kicked in--remember we were "nation building" in Iraq and had stated we were not staying. And remember we were told by Bush 2 we would be repaid for our costs and efforts from Iraqi oil---seen any oil money since then?

AND by the American civilian leadership sent into Iraq by Bush 2 literally turned the country over in the 2005 elections- we lost all ability after that to influence anything--seems we have forgotten that tidbit of info.

So actually these comments are all in all a tad confusing.

Outlaw 09

Fri, 01/02/2015 - 10:06am

In reply to by thedrosophil

You really believe the writings of the Human Terrain side of the house which was the worst boondoggle for taxpayers monies I have ever seen while in Iraq and later when working with them--they never did provide any true insight for longer than it took them to write their reports. Remember these guys were making six digit GS defense contracting salaries--and you really think they were going to write anything "negative" that would place their program and or "COIN" in question---get real.

If you would have gone back into the province he was writing about as well as the more important province next to it--Diyala during the period 09-10 and then asked the question just why actually "both" were so quiet---the answer was surprisingly simple---the insurgency knew we were leaving and wanted to have peace and quiet as they went about their para military training which was ramped up without us ever knowing it, building their training camps and producing massively huge amounts of HME that we could never quiet interdict nor did we really want to.

But they did not forget us and would hit with swarming attacks and IEDs when the opportunity presented itself--which was frequent enough to send home WIAs and KIAs during that same time period.

Remember if I agitate you-- you will respond---if I leave you alone you do not respond and I get peace and quiet in order to continue my insurgent efforts. Human nature my friend human nature at work. Never forget the Sunni insurgency had us under surveillance 24 X7 365.

So if you are a "Human Terrainer" things are looking great for that way overused word "COIN" why because things are "quiet"---but did he provde the "why" things were quiet? No he did not.

Again COIN was a total failure and some "Human Terrain" report in what was perceived to be a "quiet" province will not change that overall failure.

He talks about schools--right now there are far more children being killed in Syria via Assad than the IS has killed in both countries---and yet we somehow ignore that simple fact.

So finally accept the failure of COIN and move on as that dog will not hunt going forward.

Prove to some of us here that you fully understand guerrilla warfare, and the overall concept of UW by either having fought as a guerrilla and or as a counter UW and that you historically understand guerrilla warfare then and only then will your comments get some attention here and since you have not then one gets such comments from myself.

In all of your comments you have failed to successfully provide a list even a short list of "successes" of COIN in Iraq---and yes "success" means we are able to pull out and the ISF was standing on their own fully capable of fighting any aggressor---because if they were not then we "failed" as simple as that.

Remember IS attacked into Mosul with a ISF defense force of well this side of 25,000 with just about 400 fighters acting like light infantry with Toyota pickups---and the ISF broke and ran---well so much for "COIN" as one could say all our training into that 25K must have been what "a failure"?

And along the way be sure to ask the simplest of questions "Why"---the hardest of the five W's and one H to ask and even harder to find the answer to.

Notice even with a six digit GS/Defense contracting salary he forgot to ask it.

That my friend is what "COIN" or just sloppy research?---for a six digit income I as a taxpayer demand a tad more than what he wrote.

Bill M.

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 4:08pm

In reply to by thedrosophil

Links to Secretary Hagel's comments for your consideration. He never cited Clausewitz, but I'm arguing his points are not out of line with Carl. In the 21st Century we no longer have (by choice) the moral authority to impose the amount of force needed to make cultures to conform to our values. If they desire to conform to our values we can use soft power to help them get there. That is very different than imposing our values. I'm not arguing we can't use force to make states change their behavior, but that is very different than making the nation conform to our way of life. The communists did it in the 20th century, but they used a lot of brutality to make it so. ISIL is doing the same now, but we won't play that way (and I'm glad we don't), so our objectives in that realm must be limited.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR20090…

An opinion piece by Hagel in 2009.

http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1903

A recent keynote address on the future of the military by Hagel.

I'll try to reengage tomorrow if you decide to comment on these.

thedrosophil

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 3:37pm

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M.: A few observations.

First, I don't believe I've ever argued that MNF-I was successful in Iraq. They quite obviously weren't. I have consistently argued, and am arguing now, that the failure is not a failure of COIN doctrine, it was a failure to employ COIN doctrine in the first place. Part of that failure came from the precipitous withdrawal at the end of 2011. You yourself acknowledge that "the insurgency was simply dormant and growing", and I am suggesting that the outcome in Iraq may have been different had the recommended force of ~20,000 troops been allowed to stay. A such, your observations about Maliki are baffling, as American commanders in Iraq had already prevented him from attacking his Sunni rivals; as soon as the <A HREF="https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/6537229075/in/photost… were closed</A>, Maliki was following the Iranian playbook and repressing the Sunnis. I was in Kuwait when all of this began to take place.

I differ with your view that "Carl recognized this and noted the character of warfare would change"; yes, Clausewitz noted that the character of <I>warfare</I> would change, but not the character of <I>war</I> - the oft-cited difference between "logic" and "grammar". If you believe that I've maligned Secretary Hagel's quote in order, please provide a reference to it and I'll happily review it and retract my critique if appropriate; however, as you've cited it, I think it reflects the White House's foreign policy rhetoric moreso than it reflects reality.

I don't really see how we're in disagreement with respect to your paragraph beginning "We dedicated time, energy, money (a lot of it)..." We appear to agree that tactics and campaigning were not appropriately matched to coherent ends. You seem very interested in Iraq, and legitimately so; I would point to the counterexample of Afghanistan, where the operation has been lengthy and well resourced, but haphazard and incoherent. So, I'm not sure that we (or Miriam) are actually in such fundamental disagreement on this issue.

With respect to your paragraph beginning "Of course COIN was not applied in any coherent fashion...", again, I'm not sure we're in such fundamental disagreement. Leaving behind our disagreement on Rumsfeld and Cheney, one of my big concerns about Iraq (and Afghanistan), and one for which I suspect we share some common ground, is that the senior commanders on the ground (particularly Generals Sanchez and Casey) were incompetent during the critical early months/years of the conflict. It seems obvious that General Petraeus did much better, and Odierno seems to have done adequately; I could point to General McChrystal's missteps in Afghanistan as well. While acknowledging the "herding cats" nature of these conflicts, I'm of the opinion that OEF and OIF are textbook cases of campaigns going awry because senior leaders have reached their positions by being competent tacticians and staffers evaluated on arbitrary standards, rather than being competent strategists with the capacity to consolidate operational gains.

I agree that colonial era COIN was quite different; my favorite case study (Dhofar) happened during the late colonial era, but was not a colonial campaign itself. One of my biggest criticisms of both OEF and OIF is that the wrong campaigns were studied in depth, and other successful campaigns were studied in passing or not at all. The 2006 COIN manual makes one mention of Dhofar, one of history's few unmitigated COIN successes, in its annotated bibliography; meanwhile, it references the failed campaign in Vietnam sixty times, and the ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq ten and eighty times respectively. Many officers read Alistair Horne's tome on Algeria, a campaign the French lost. So, I think we may be in agreement that the wrong lessons were studied; I agree that the learning was slower than it ought to have been, but I also believe that many of the lessons that were taken onboard were likely the wrong ones. This also feeds into your observation about my scaffolding analogy.

Regarding your final observation about Secretary Hagel, Clausewitz's premise is that war constitutes the conduct of warfare in order to impose one's will (though not necessarily one's values) upon the enemy. Again, you've paraphrased Secretary Hagel, so I may be misreading your paraphrase, but if he believes that "no country today has the power to impose its will and values on other nations" as you've claimed, then I would be interested to see you justify such a statement from Clausewitz. And, in fact, I suspect that a quick review of deterrence theory would suggest that America imposes its will upon a variety of global actors each and every day.

I apologize if I was too "loaded for bear" in my initial response. I stand by those statements, but upon further discussion, perhaps we share more common ground than I initially suspected.

Bill M.

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 2:37pm

In reply to by thedrosophil

I suggest you're the one trying to rewrite history by putting lipstick on a pig. I guess I'm an incompetent strategist in your view, but would counter those who know little about strategy mindlessly quote Clausewitz without understanding his writing. Frankly, I think Carl would agree with me, and laugh at your suggestion we were successful in Iraq. O.K., it was 9 instead of 10 years, and every COIN expert like yourself knows that staying longer is a strategy within itself. We didn't quite hit the 10 year mark, which is why I'm sure Iraq crumbled so quickly.

I probably can't help you if you think warfare and its context hasn't changed from the 20th to the 21st century. If you want to use Clausewitz as crutch you should consider that Carl was no more capable of recognizing how warfare would be waged 50 years in the future than you and I are. Fortunately, Carl recognized this and noted the character of warfare would change. Several factors would impact the character of warfare including, political, ethics, economic systems, technology, culture and so forth. The Secretary whom you insulted because he isn't a so-called COIN expert (a laughable comment) simply acknowledged Carl with his comment that realities shaping the character of warfare today are different than they were in the 20st Century, so applying colonial era COIN best practices won't work in a globalized world.

Please introduce me to a COIN expert? I haven't met one yet. I started studying COIN, UW, and FID in the late 70s, and practiced it in South Asia, SE Asia, Africa, and Middle East until 2010. I certainly wouldn't be foolish enough to label myself an expert, but I did practice with eyes open and over time certain things became apparent that refute the accepted practices in our COIN doctrine. One observation is the military loves to put lipstick on a pig wherever they go, so basically every operation is a resounding success, and the lesson learned is to push the repeat button. No wonder the military is accused of being anti-intellectual. All you have to do is push the I believe button.

Iraq was not stable in 2010 or 2011. I stayed in touch with my friends in the intelligence community, and the insurgency was simply dormant and growing. I'm not blaming the units in the field for that, but most who practiced with their eyes open knew we were betting on a losing horse with Maliki. His abuse of Sunnis was hardly secret, so I'm not convinced leaving 20,000 troops would have accomplished much other than possibly delaying the reemergence of the Sunni insurgency.

Lifting the covers from your comment, "Miriam rightly acknowledges that COIN doctrine/best practices "takes time, energy, money and staying power"

We dedicated time, energy, money (a lot of it), and staying power. Of course we could have stayed longer, and I agree the way we withdrew was very haphazard and driven by politics at home, not realities on the ground. Nonetheless, Carl would acknowledge that is the reality of war, it is subordinate to policy and the policy is what the policy was. My counterargument which is apparently not clear, is that staying power, energy, and money accomplish little if they are not directed at acceptable ends. More of it would make little difference if we're pursuing unobtainable strategic/policy ends.

Of course COIN was not applied in any coherent fashion. Since you claim to be a competent strategist, I suspect you know we have to work within the zone of reality when it comes to human and organizational behavior. You can use Allison's three making models or another set of models as a heuristic to study why things unfolded the way they did. We weren't as joint as we should have been, we had interagency views and approaches that at times were contradictory, we had an incompetent SECDEF and Vice President to denied there was an insurgency when it started, and of course the normal tensions between coalition members, then add the tensions between the Iraqis we were working with. Most operations of this scale are like herding cats, and we can only influence so much from our foxhole.

Colonial era COIN was quite different since the British and French considered the territory they were fighting in their sovereign territory. That makes a big difference, and why the Malaya approach wouldn't and didn't work in Vietnam. It wasn't because we failed to learn, but admittedly we learned slower than we should have.

I like your analogy about the scaffolding team, but disagree they had relevant case studies. We'll simply disagree here, but using case studies from colonial era COIN didn't translate well into the globalized 21st century. Iraq was not just about Iraq, it was much bigger, and that was the Secretary's point I believe, and we no longer have the moral authority to impose our values on others. I suggest Clausewitz would agree.

thedrosophil

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 12:10pm

In reply to by Miriam

Miriam: I think your observations are spot on. Thank you for sharing your experience and observations.

Bill M.: You're rewriting history, ignoring much of what Miriam and others have said, and trying to have it both ways.

First, your insistence that "we turned tail and left after ONLY 10 years" - your words, not hers as you suggest - is inaccurate. OIF lasted slightly less than nine years before the White House spearheaded a precipitous withdrawal. We can draw our own conclusions about the wisdom or folly of that decision, but we must accept the same facts. Iraq was largely stable during the last two to three years of MNF-I's presence there; the President's military advisors recommended a residual force of around 20,000 personnel to continue support for and influence upon the Iraqi government/security forces; COIN doctrine/best practices recommend a slowly dwindling foreign presence; and there's good evidence that the Iraqis would have played ball on a SOFA. As such, your claim that "Ultimately our application of COIN failed, and not because we left" is not supported by the historical record. That record shows instead that the residual force advocates warned that Iraq could devolve back into sectarian violence, and that is what has happened.

Second, Miriam rightly acknowledges that COIN doctrine/best practices "takes time, energy, money and staying power" (consistent with FM 3-24 paragraph 1-124). However, the ISAF and MNF-I coalitions expected short, efficient, Gulf '91 style engagements enabled by such concepts as RMA/"Transformation" capabilities and technologies. They were unprepared and disinterested in long-term COIN engagements, and both coalitions immediately focused on finding "exit strategies" - The Onion was already lampooning the fixation on "exit strategies" less than two years into OIF. So, your observation about leaving a proverbial "plug in a hole to slow the leak" is inconsistent with your critique of COIN theory, because COIN theory advocates for leaving such a "plug", but that "plug" was not, in fact, left.

Third, as I've suggested earlier in this conversation, COIN doctrine/best practices were not applied in any coherent or unified manner in either OEF or OIF, particularly OEF. I've spoken previously about FM 3-24 (2006 edition) paragraphs 8-13 and 8-31, but there are plenty of other examples. You essentially acknowledge that COIN doctrines/best practices (to include leaving your proverbial "plug in a hole to slow the leak") weren't applied; and yet you still blame "a combination of both [incorrect application and failed doctrine]". Either the doctrines weren't applied, or they failed; the two options are mutually exclusive. Your statement that...

<BLOCKQUOTE>"Clearly if we got it right with our COIN principles, Iraq wouldn't have collapsed shortly after our withdrawal. Bottom line it failed."</BLOCKQUOTE>

... continues this obfuscation: our COIN principles advocated against the action that the White House decided to take, so again, your "bottom line" remains unsubstantiated by history. You say that "[a]nybody who suggests we should replicate what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan in the future based on our successes there should have their heads examined", and I would agree with that statement with the necessary caveat that anyone who suggests that what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan in any way resembled COIN doctrine/best practices should also have their head examined.

Fourth, both Miriam and (apparently) you rightly acknowledge that tactical/operational gains were not consolidated at the strategic/political level. Her observation that "COIN does have to be combined with policies to try and help/pressure/influence the actual foreign government to act like a responsible player" is more insightful than much of what I've read on this comment thread. Again, this goes back to the observation that COIN requires a long-term, albeit dwindling, commitment of time and resources. Security forces and competent governments, both required end states in COIN operations, take time to build - in my favorite example of Oman, the Sultanate <I>still</I> hosts a handful of foreign advisors nearly forty years later. To use an allegory, if one team builds a scaffold for the purpose of constructing a boat, and then another team builds a boat that's not seaworthy, you can't then blame the scaffolding team when the boat whose construction they facilitated sinks; the two lines of effort, though related, are ultimately independent of one another. In the case of OIF, I think the scaffolding team (the military) had a lot of good case studies and some good plans for building a good scaffold, but ultimately chose to merge those plans with their existing scaffolding experience to build a sort of hybrid scaffold that wasn't particularly well suited to boats. Meanwhile, the boat building team (civilian leaders) began building an overly ambitious boat that was too big for the scaffold in question, and on too tight a timeline. Eventually, that boat-building team was replaced by a different boat building team that didn't think building a boat was such a good idea in the first place, so they partially redesigned the boat without consulting the engineers, then put the boat in the water, downsized the scaffolding team, and moved on to building something else. I'm not sure the boat is fully submerged, but things aren't looking good.

Finally, while acknowledging and respecting his military service, I also question the wisdom of quoting Secretary Hagel, who is not a strategist, nor a COIN/UW/IW expert, nor even a particularly well received Secretary of Defense. I don't recognize some of the statements you've attributed to him, but the idea that "no country today has the power to impose its will and values on other nations" is absurd, as is the suggestion that "21st century realities are different than 20th century realities". Clausewitz would have had a field day with the first suggestion, and I don't know of any competent strategist who would agree with the latter.

Move Forward

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 2:11pm

In reply to by Bill M.

<blockquote>Also important to differentiate between COIN and FID, so your attempt to compare El Sal, Columbia, and the Philippines to Iraq and Afghanistan is flawed in my opinion.</blockquote>

There was no intent to be critical of those three FID campaigns. But as you say, there is no comparison between them and Iraq and Afghanistan so few lessons translate. It also seems a poor practice to compare historical insurgencies-particularly those involving communism and existing state militaries-to Iraq and Afghanistan.

My point on SW or UW is that it alone could never emerge victorious in a major war such as ISIS/Syria, East Europe, or Korea/Taiwan/Japan attacks by an aggressor. The Russians and Chinese would need more than UW to win. We would need more than SW/UW, COIN, and a small footprint and airpower to win.

Also, in nearly all those and other major and many minor conflicts, some period of Stability Operations involving ground forces would be required or gains never would be consolidated...as we see in Libya and would see in Syria/Iraq if we degraded daesh with airpower alone, yet left Sunnis underrepresented and Assad still in power.

thedrosophil

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 12:15pm

In reply to by Bill M.

Bill M.: FWIW, despite having taken issue with much of your initial response to Miriam, I am mostly in agreement with this post. Very insightful.

Bill M.

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 11:30am

In reply to by Move Forward

MF,

I have frequently critiqued SF propaganda as well as conventional force propaganda. Our small footprint was not decisive in El Salvador, but it did keep the government in power at a reasonable cost until the decisive collapse of the USSR and loss of external support to sustain the insurgency. Columbia has been in an upward trajectory for years, yet the FARC still control vast areas. The current Philippines mission like all others is often over hyped, but successes cannot be denied. Successes will mean little if the government of the Philippines doesn't implement deep reforms to address the drivers of the various insurgencies in that country. A large footprint wouldn't change the equation, it would simply make it more expensive, and any setbacks would be perceived as a major loss of national prestige. That isn't the case with a small footprint.

My thoughts on Special Warfare run contrary to many in the SF community. I remain a supporter of SW and believe it is a viable policy option to achieve limited objectives over time. On the other hand we need to assess the impact of allowing a conflict to drag on for years and its impact on those societies. The new social norms that develop accept violence as part of their daily life resulting in enduring militias, criminal gangs like MS-13, and illicit economies, all of which can and do threaten our interests.

Before we discuss alternatives to COIN, we need to clarify what our goals are for each particular conflict. I believe liberalism is almost as offensive as communism, and as long as we attempt to impose our form of government, our values, and free markets on societies who not want them we'll continue to fail with COIN or another approach.

We focus too much on doctrine, which in the end should be common sense, and not enough on understanding the economic and political dynamics of the areas we're working in to see what is feasible. Will the Afghans determine their own future, or will outside influence from India and Pakistan determine Afghan's future? We prefer to look at problems as things isolated within borders and designated areas of operations, but that is seldom reality.

Also important to differentiate between COIN and FID, so your attempt to compare El Sal, Columbia, and the Philippines to Iraq and Afghanistan is flawed in my opinion.

Move Forward

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 10:21am

In reply to by Bill M.

<blockquote>Throughout history, many people have fooled themselves into believing a particular doctrinal approach works because their use of that doctrine in their small area of operations for a fleeting period of time resulted in improved conditions.</blockquote>

While I understand and agree with many of your points in your response to Miriam, it also seems a bit unfair in some respects. Like many critics of COIN, no viable alternative can be demonstrated without equally questionable analogies to history or unproven claims that light footprint, or airpower alternatives are viable.

Items:

* Airpower advocates could not end Saddam Hussein's rule using no fly zones alone. It is doubtful limited air attacks can end ISIS control of territory.

* Even if airpower did succeed in degrading daesh, Sunni unrest will still exist (as it does in Libya) and Assad will still be in power while Sunnis and Kurds will still feel underrepresented in existing colonial borders.

*SF use the Philippines, Columbia, and El Salvador to argue for a light footprint despite the fact that it epitomizes your quote above.

*SF uses initial victories in Afghanistan to imagine we could have just left, or retained a light footprint, and all would have fixed itself.

* Obviously we did have a light footprint for most of early OEF and it certainly did less to shape the country and transition it to Afghan military control than later parts of the war where we surged forces.

* If you advocate that SF succeeded in their version of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transition (FID) in Afghanistan, I will refer you to this article that previously appeared on the SWJ Blog years ago and briefly showed up again in the old articles section a few days ago:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/bad-guys-vs-worse-guys-in-af…

In that article, note that someone got the idea that it made sense to make a Pashtun group the ALP/VSO force in a primarily Tajik area. As the article points out, it was not working as you would think most clear-minded parties could identify ahead of time. Too often to paraphrase and revise for accuracy your earlier quote "a particular SF doctrinal approach <strong>did not</strong> work because their use of that doctrine in their small area of operations for a fleeting period of time resulted in <strong>questionably</strong> improved conditions." I also would ask you to show me examples where the ALP/VSO approach would continue to work after SF forces depart and payments to ALP ultimately cease.

As for the costs of a COIN larger footprint approach, I hope you will acknowledge that you couldn't get much more remote than Afghanistan as a war location. That obviously drove up costs. Plus, the need to traverse Pakistan, and their possession of nukes required kid glove treatment despite efforts of the ISI to support their so-called "good Taliban."

To dispute some of Miriam's and all of the light footprint advocator's approach I would add that COIN techniques that did work in Iraq only worked because a large footprint provided adequate security. Try performing COIN in Iraq outside the wire today in areas threatened by Daesh. Try it in Helmand province using only USAID, State Department types, and a few hired guns.

Finally, I recently speculated about possible future conflicts against daesh/Syria, providing deterrence against Russia, and defending South Korea/Taiwan/Japan islands. Can someone explain to me how those offensive/deterrence/and defensive actions could remotely be possible with a light footprint, SF/SOF only and airpower approach alone.

War costs money to be sure, particularly when fought far from sea resupply or in areas with little infrastructure and homegrown legal economies. One lesson of recent history is that it makes little sense to cut taxes in the midst of two major wars. A second lesson was we got other nations to pay for Desert Storm. A third lesson that is unknowable is that revision of colonial boundaries might have sped up the process of transitioning to local military control if Sunnis/Shias/Kurds and Pashtuns/Northern Alliance ethnicities had their own territories and armies.

Vietnam and WWII cost considerably more than these conflicts. Vietnam certainly eventually altered a colonial boundary but not in the way we would have liked. Again, perhaps it shows that silly Westphalian notions make little sense if they guarantee a continued source of ethnic or religious conflict.

Finally, if you listened to some of today's isolationists and appeasers, you would believe that WWII was not a war we should have fought because no vital national interest existed. After all, the Japanese and Germans never could have reached our mainland and there wasn't the worldwide interdependency in trade that exists today. If you looked at history and recall the sanctions that led to Pearl Harbor, you might question the wisdom of sanctioning Russia excessively or trying to contain China. Of course, were it not for Pearl Harbor, it is unknowable whether we ever would have gotten involved in WWII. Could the same be said about 9/11 and current wars? Perhaps one key lesson is don't fight <strong>two wars</strong> at the same time over flawed perceptions based on adrenaline-based and poorly thought out responses...something that bit Hitler in the butt too.

Speculate about the possible "butterfly effect" and alternate world outcomes if Germany and Japan had maintained control of their continents, or just as bad the Soviet Union had won it alone and controlled Europe. Similar speculation about what could occur with proliferating WMD in Iran and extremist Sunni hands, and already under North Korean control provide similarly bleak possibilities if we bury our heads in the sand and refuse to consider viable responses to the unthinkable.

Bill M.

Tue, 12/30/2014 - 3:53am

In reply to by Miriam

COIN correctly applied works? I guess war correctly applied works also? Both comments are void of meaning. Throughout history, many people have fooled themselves into believing a particular doctrinal approach works because their use of that doctrine in their small area of operations for a fleeting period of time resulted in improved conditions. In Iraq and Afghanistan many military units pacified the areas they worked in, but ultimately it meant little, because the efforts were little more than a temporary plug in a hole to slow the leak. As you noted, when that plug was removed the insurgency returned in force. This would indicate that COIN neither defeated the insurgents, nor compelled them to reconcile with the government. In fact, what happened was little more than a surge in security temporarily displaced the insurgents. The insurgents simply waited for the right opportunity to strike. Ultimately our application of COIN failed, and not because we left. Failure to recognize this is failure to learn, and failure to learn means we're apt to repeat the same mistake in the future.

Clearly, the COIN doctrine was incorrectly applied, or the doctrine failed. I think it was a combination of both. You seem to believe that if the U.S. maintained combat troops there indefinitely we would have succeeded. If we need to maintain troops there indefinitely we already failed. Using your words, we turn tailed and left after ONLY 10 years of aggressive capacity building and combat operations. Darn, if we only knew it would take 10 more years and another trillion dollars I'm sure we would have stayed. Why not throw more good money after bad? The national debt really isn't that important. We certainly don't have strategic interests elsewhere in the world we need to protect, so why not stay? Apparently staying is now a strategy, the ends, ways, and means to bleed ourselves out, I mean to defeat the adversary.

You compared the staying strategy to our occupation in Germany. What an excellent comparison, why didn't we think about that before we pulled out of Iraq. Was Germany divided ethnically between Shia and Sunni? Did they have hostile neighbors fanning the flames of these ethnic divisions? Did they have a major non-state actor like al-Qaeda that leveraged the post war chaos in Germany to further disrupt U.S. efforts? You seem to arguing that it was our correct use of COIN that resulted in our success? Or was it simply the staying strategy there for decades that pacified the insurgency? Did I get that right, or would you prefer to use another parallel in history to make your point assuming you can one that indicates we should have stayed longer than we did?

Of course there was a lot of well deserved back slapping by many military units for their efforts in Iraq. The military generally gets tactics right after a relatively short period of time, so I have no doubt we had several tactical and operational successes using common sense and adapting to reality on the ground. Nonetheless, we still failed at the policy level, and staying another 10 years would not have changed that, because the political solution was the wrong solution. Clearly if we got it right with our COIN principles, Iraq wouldn't have collapsed shortly after our withdrawal. Bottom line it failed.

Anybody who suggests we should replicate what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan in the future based on our successes there should have their heads examined. They should also be required to take a basic economics course and then write a paper on how spending billions of dollars to continue pursuing a failed policy is in the national interest. If the paper can't convince their mother to commit the money and troops then it fails.

Secretary Hagel was right when he said that no country today has the power to impose its will and values on other nations. 21st century realities are different than 20st century realities, something we are having a hard time adapting too. Our COIN doctrine is based on 20th century realities. Hagel correctly added that bogging down large armies in historically complex, dangerous areas ends in disaster.

I can't think of a time when staying longer worked, but if you can then please share? Nations don't stay longer because they can no longer afford to stay longer, the bottom line return on investment still matters.

Especially telling was Hagel's follow on comment, "In Vietnam, we kept feeding more men, material, and money into a corrupt Vietnamese government as our own leaders continued to deceive themselves and the American people."

Arguing COIN worked in Iraq is simply a continuation of that deception. If you're arguing COIN may work if we get the policy objectives right, then maybe, but a lot of other factors will still come into play.

SWJED

Mon, 12/29/2014 - 6:34pm

In reply to by Miriam

Excellent reply, thanks Miriam - Dave D.

Note: This comment has been cross-posted in the original article that is being reviewed here.

I was in Iraq in '09 and '10 studying the successful application of COIN principles in the BDE I was embedded in (as a researcher). At that time, Iraq (certainly the AO I was in - Saladin Province) - was largely pacified, due to the combined efforts of the US Army and the Iraqi provincial government and security forces, acting in cooperation, as per (correctly applied) COIN principles. What spelled failure was the withdrawal of US troops and support services, leaving the Iraqis on their own without the manpower, intel or supports necessary to maintain the gains that were so hard-won. Terrorism and chaos (ex: bombings where 200+ civilians were killed) were the predictable result. ISIS was also the result of the vacuum that we left. COIN (correctly applied) does work - - but it takes time, energy, money and staying power. When we executed the Marshall Plan post WWII, we didn't turn tail and leave shortly after. As a matter of fact, our bases are still there. And yes, COIN does have to be combined with policies to try and help/pressure/influence the actual foreign government to act like a responsible player. Our abandonment of Iraq, combined with our (previous and ongoing) reluctance to put enough pressure on Iraq to govern responsibly, insured failure. Initially it was the Iraqi people who paid the price (where I was going to attend school openings, now people are being massacred). But with the rise of ISIS (predictably, in the vacuum that we left) it is us that are and will continue to pay the price as well.

Move Forward

Wed, 12/31/2014 - 1:26pm

In reply to by RantCorp

A guy who used to post here named Entropy would have more info about the Reaper and Predator. However, crop-dusters typically fly lower and slower than your A-10 example for instance. The Predator more than the faster Reaper would have the slow part down but that class of medium altitude remotely piloted aircraft does not fly low except on take-off and landing. You would be asking them to do something that likely would lead to frequent ground contact and could disrupt their satellite data link. Crop-dusters also make tight low turns that I doubt a Predator could duplicate despite what you saw early in the movie "Interstellar."

Your post caused me to google "Pakistani ISI and/or drug connections" which brought up a Paul Thompson timeline based on newspaper articles that I don't want to link to since I'm not sure how cyber safe it is. It is very comprehensive but also has hints of 9/11 truthers. A brief film clip watched of him at a "news conference" confirmed that speculation in my mind. Nevertheless he raised several questions about 9/11 plotters KSM and Saeed Sheikh and their links to the ISI. I also did not realize that Daniel Pearl had been involved in investigating the ISI when he was kidnapped and killed.

After reading the Paul Thompson timeline based on news articles, I was puzzled by several questions. Why would Pakistan help us capture KSM if he had close links to the ISI? Why would the ISI head general of the time be in the U.S. at the time of the 9/11 attack (if true) if in fact he provided money to 9/11 plotters? Why would Musharaff subsequently fire him if the Pakistani government and ISI were on the same sheet of music? Why would the ISI cave in to U.S. and pressure the Taliban to drop opium yields from July 2000 until later in 2001 when they supposedly declined from 3656 tons to 185 tons primarily in Northern Alliance territory? By June 2002 they were back up to 4500 tons.

Some article claims 5.5 million kg is grown today which is 12.1 million lbs or 6050 tons despite spending $7.5 billion to reduced poppy production and conversion to heroin. SIGAR apparently did some study that said Afghanistan has 1.3 million heroin users now which is a ten-fold increase since 2005 when there were about 130,000.

I get that the Taliban is financed by taxes on poppies and now reverses its earlier anti-poppy stance to pit the poor Afghan poppy grower against ISAF which would be aggravated if we did more. But couldn't we have done more to eradicate the plant and introduce alternative crops if we really had wanted to and spent $7.5 billion effectively. I also understand why the earier ISI may have wanted to hurt the Soviet Union in the 80s since they then and now get 95% of their heroin from Afghanistan. The elicit trade also helped finance ISI military operations against the Soviets. But is the ISI really that radical to want to kill Westerners in general? Please tell me they don't control any nukes.

RantCorp

Wed, 12/31/2014 - 10:18am

In reply to by Move Forward

MF wrote,

'But I highly doubt the ISI or Pak Sunni are in such collusion'

You are sadly mistaken I'm afraid. They are up to their necks in it and have been for a very long time. The DEA has had evidence regards this for 30 years. I would go far as to say the ISI et al have exclusive rights to the production. The partnership with the Costa Nostra and the Pak Govt is an open secret in Pakistan. I mean to say there are hundreds - if not thousands - of US govt employees whom your Rep or Congressman could question as to the degree this is a reality.

The irony of how more lethal their weapon system is compared to our weapon systems is not lost on anyone who resides in the region. From the highest creep in the ISI down to the toothless peasant in Helmand, all our thunder and noise as we supposedly dominate the tactical and operational battle ecosystem is piss and wind as far as they are concerned.

The biggest laugh isn't the fact that the effect of our guns reach a few klicks whereas theirs' brings death and destruction across the globe. No sir the biggest laugh comes from the fact that back in our homeland the dying pay a great deal of money for the privilege.

On a slightly different subject, do Reaper, Predator etc have the avionics to crop dust? I imagine you're the Go to Guy for performance etc for a agricultural package for the drones.

RC

Move Forward

Sun, 12/28/2014 - 9:59am

In reply to by RantCorp

<blockquote>In terms of deaths, approx 30K people have become casualties of war in AF since 2001. That’s everyone – coalition, enemy and civilians. 30K dead is a year’s worth of death by heroin in the West. Triple that for the rest of the world and it’s not hard to see who is the meanest SOB in the valley.

Add the costs of the tens of millions of functioning junkies and their impact upon family, friends, neighbors, healthcare and law enforcement and the comparative feebleness of our tactical, operational and strategic effort is pathetic.</blockquote>

If you google "Russian heroin deaths annually" you get stats that are even more alarming. First a July 2014 RT article claims up to 100,000 heroin deaths a year. While that is doubtful, multiple other articles cite <strong>30,000 annual heroin deaths in Russia alone</strong> claiming it is one-third of the world total. Add to that the deaths and dysfunction from alcohol addiction and forget communism...it is drugs that keep the Russian economy from functioning more effectively.

If many neighbors of Russia, Russians themselves, and former Soviet satellites are Muslims, you could argue that given Chechnya and other problems past and future, the HWS that you cite is highly effective part of the Muslim conspirator's arsenal. But I highly doubt the ISI or Pakistan Sunnis are in such collusion. Instead, the good old profit motive appears more likely as evidenced by Bill M's citation about Dawood and the D-Company, and the fact that poppy production is by far the most lucrative crop for Afghan farmers.

<blockquote>Go down to the ER of any hospital in America and ask about what junkies are capable of doing.</blockquote>

My own ER doctor daughter would tell you that too many come there seeking legal drugs for concocted or minor pain to relieve other problems in their life. Sounds similar to the Russian problem and current U.S. state attempts at marijuana legalization. A recently watched CNN "Parts Unknown" illustrated that the disappearance of U.S. manufacturing jobs has led to a heroin resurgence and use of Oxycontin. So the problems you mention also could affect the U.S. if permitted to continue.

I liked your suggestions about crop-dusting A-10s. Although it certainly seems a high-cost solution that perhaps Afghan Air Force prop attack plane could perform instead. But rather than pay Afghan farmers for dead poppies and thus encouraging them to grow more, why not pay them to grow legal crops covering some of the difference between what they gain from legal vs poppy crops? The only problem is that it likely would lead to Afghan government theft of funds, or machinery/crops that you suggest using as payment. Add to that the unlikely capacity to get these logistically to the appropriate farmers.

Perhaps you use the A-10s and Afghan prop planes to kill the poppies spraying them at night but also <strong>fertilize the legal crops</strong> in the daytime to build support for the program. This would encourage legal farming by default without incurring issues of other incentives that are unlikely to work due to graft and inefficiency.

RantCorp

Sun, 12/28/2014 - 8:24am

Bill,

Heroin is a weapon system. Unfortunately we don’t recognize it as such for many reasons – all of which are unfathomable to me. Admittedly it’s not painted green and it hasn't got much ‘hell-yeah’ mojo but nonetheless it is a weapon system to be reckoned with.

Break things down to the basic common denominator and it doesn't take a genius to appreciate the heroin weapon system (HWS) is much more lethal than any tactical, operational or strategic weapon system we currently deploy in Afghanistan. I’m the last person to advocate the McNamara/Thornton linear calculus as a measure of military effectiveness but it is the God that drives all of our military hardware design so it is a relevant factor that justifies scrutiny in this instance.

In terms of deaths, approx 30K people have become casualties of war in AF since 2001. That’s everyone – coalition, enemy and civilians. 30K dead is a year’s worth of death by heroin in the West. Triple that for the rest of the world and it’s not hard to see who is the meanest SOB in the valley.

Add the costs of the tens of millions of functioning junkies and their impact upon family, friends, neighbors, healthcare and law enforcement and the comparative feebleness of our tactical, operational and strategic effort is pathetic.

Our failure to recognize the crucial role the HWS plays in the Pak’s UW campaign is symptomatic of our constant failure to believe what our eyes our telling us. Political leadership across all coalition partners cite a desire to reduce coalition casualties as the main reason for draw-down.In the face of this vote-winning sentiment the DEA inform's us that this year’s heroin crop in AF will reach an all-time high.

Even the most dim-witted politician will figure out that record crop will lead to a rise in deaths and related costs in his or her own electorate no matter where he or she lives on the planet. This failure to recognize key elements impacting our strategic goals is not something new.

In Vietnam the oversight was Vietnamese nationalism. We attempted to reverse a War of Independence and we lost. The McNamara/Thornton crowd sold us the ‘business model’ that RMA Mickey Mouse bullshit would overcome this fundamental mistake and they got the morons Westmoreland et al to go with it. 3 million people died before we came to our senses and stopped. Go figure.

So what?

Essentially we have a UW campaign that inflicts death and destruction across the globe. AF is in fact one of the safer places westerners can be located if they you wish to avoid being a victim of this UW campaign. The most likely country in the world in which your chances of falling victim to heroin is Pakistan. Maniacs running around shooting school children with PKMs shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. Go down to the ER of any hospital in America and ask about what junkies are capable of doing.

Add rogue nukes to the mix and you have Ultra UW.

What to do?

We should spray the poppy – convert A10s to crop dusters and I suggest thousands of good old boy pilots from across the globe will volunteer by the New Year to fly a A10 crop-duster.

However unlike previous proposals we should encourage the 2 million households who currently grow poppy to keep doing so. At some point prior to the head of the poppy reaching the maturity to produce resin we should spray herbicide from the air.

We should then offer the to purchase the dead plant at better than the Costa Nostra rate. This cost will be a fraction of the cost we will incur if the Costa Nostra refines it and sells it to us later. A dead immature plant is a dead loss to the Costa Nostra, the UW campaign, the Pak elite and a whole hat full of assholes across the globe.. On the other hand it is a valuable commodity to us for exactly the same reason it is a dead loss to them.

Obviously we couldn't purchase the dead poppy with cash as that would facilitate the UW fighters’ ambition in the first instance. We could barter using rice, soya beans, tractors, plows, water pumps, irrigation pipes, bricks, roofing iron, schools, aid centers etc. – anything that the UW fighters will find difficult to convert into cash to acquire weapons & munitions.

If the farmers refuse to trade with us they can try and sell the dead plants to the Costa Nostra.

Eventually one would hope the farmers would return to what they grew 20 years ago but in the mean time they won’t be idle and their families won’t starve – many will no doubt prosper.

The religious aspect will get a boost as an immature poppy plant could be considered halal in that peculiar Afghan way of looking at such matters. The spiritual benefits of raising a halal crop as opposed to the production of opiate resin that the Koran dictates as punishable by death speaks for itself..

The difference will not escape even the most dogmatic Taliban religious 'zealot'.

Many would suggest the Costa Nostra would move somewhere else – back to the Golden Triangle in northern Thailand for instance. That’s a real possibility but from a strategic point of view, as long as they don’t have nukes where they go, we win.

RC

Should we say that a/the central problem with RantCorps' discussion/argument of December 17th (well below in this thread) is that it focuses on -- and distinguishes between -- the characteristics and motivations of the insurgents and the foreign fighters. And does not, as it should, focus on the characteristics and motivations of the general population?

This, because population-centric COIN is said to be an exercise in (1) using the general population to (2) isolate and overcome both the insurgents and the foreign fighters alike? (Both foreign fighters, and insurgents -- as the earlier version of FM 3-24 pointed out -- being not unique but, indeed, common to insurgencies?)

Thus, in population-centric COIN, what motivates the insurgent is of much less concern, and what motivates the general population is of much greater concern?

Our problem being that, in our version of population-centric COIN, we often:

a. Fail to understand -- or simply ignore -- what the general population wants.

b. Substituting, therefore, what we want (outlying state and societal transformation -- along the often alien and profane lines of our ultra-modern western civilization).

c. This wrong turn having the potential to:

1. Screw up the population-centric approach to COIN, shall we say, by the numbers. And

2. Give aid, comfort and supporters to the enemy?

Bill M.

Sun, 12/21/2014 - 10:39am

@RantCorp

Enjoyed your comments and I'm in general agreement. I would like your thoughts on how we target the Afghanistan's UW problem without putting more pressure on those sponsoring it? We attacked a state (removed the Taliban) to address a non-state actor problem (al-Qaeda). When attacking one state proved not to be sufficient, we attacked another one. Darn, if we could just build stable democratic states all our non-state actor problems would go away. Oddly the two states that actually sponsor terrorism, Iran and Pakistan, got a pass and they conducted UW against our foolish COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Somehow this made strategic sense to our leaders, and eventually I may reach the aha moment where it all makes sense.

You said the Taliban wasn't the Costra Nostra, but they are linked to transnational criminal organizations that are just as dangerous. For those interested they can research more about Dawood and his D-Company online, to include using the FBI's website. This gets to the point of convergence between various actors to include states, insurgents, terrorists, warlords, militias, etc. to use the ever expanding illicit economy, or more accurately the shadow economy to facilitate achieving their objectives whether it is simply power, money, or ideological.

http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/13/bin-laden-joaquin-guzman-dawood-ibrahi…

As noted in other discussions, many of these groups don't want to see the war/conflict end. It has created a shadow economic system that they thrive in. Who wants the burden of actually running a state and conforming to international norms that will limit profits and freedom of movement to respond to market demand for drugs, people, weapons, etc.? j

Everyday I'm more convinced that our large scale occupations and colonial COIN practices are going to lead us to ruin. They simply make our adversaries stronger and weaken us.

Madhu (not verified)

Sat, 12/20/2014 - 1:16pm

@ RantCorp: that comment was amazing. And don't bother trying to get understanding from some others in this thread. It won't take. Some people don't understand and can't. I'm not sure why.

On that note, best to all, best for the holidays, and I've learned a lot. This time I think my vow to stay away from milblogs and FP sites will stick. It really is long past time to go away. The world is too beautiful to be depressed by stupidity.

Shame too, the stuff I've been reading lately is getting interesting but I can read and not share. It's cool:

1. The continued pushing for missile defense from the 80s to today by American arms companies and the relationship to current Russian sanctions.
2. The Chicago and wider midwestern Eastern European voting diaspora and its relationships to current sanctions.
3. Karen Hughes of the Bush administration and her pride on batting back Taliban propaganda while the spokesman was sitting in ISLAMABAD during the initial 2001 invasion. It all seems absurd in hindsight.
4. Various Special Forces airpower books that look more critically at whether air power might have been more blunted than we think in the initial invasion.
5. British Pakistani and British establishment propaganda on Kashmir and South Asia.
6. Revisting American threats toward its allies during the run-up to Iraq 2003 (threats in order to get people in line with the invasion).

And so on.

It's an interesting world. Digging deep, though, is perhaps not for everybody. The military needs to untie its intellectual from think tanks but it won't happen. It's been a disaster, though, those various relationships.

Be well.

Wolverine57

Fri, 12/19/2014 - 6:24pm

I commented on the original but will here also. The COIN doctrine of the present FM 3-24 has some really questionable negative language. It appears that with every positive statement, there is a caveat which negates the positive. I will cheery pick but you will get the idea. The authors of 3-24 created a failure to start if they wanted a warrior to execute it.(6-11) The American way bias may be unhelpful. (7-14) Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their soldiers and marines. (1-151) Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.(A-24) Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work. Movement on foot, sleeping in villages, and night patrolling all seem more dangerous than they are..(A-29) Do not try to crack the hardest nut first. Do not go straight for the main insurgent stronghold. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards (a contradiction). (A-31) An approach using combat patrols to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks is counterproductive. (A-24) The first rule of COIN operations is to establish the forces presence in the AO. (1-149) The ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. (1-113)The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. NOTE: The "Ultimate" is neither the "first rule" nor the "primary objective". (7-6) Senior commanders inculcate tactical cunning in small unit leaders....employing skills of the profession in shrewd and crafty ways to out-think and out-adapt enemies. (A-48) Remember small is beautiful...Keep programs small. This makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable is they fail. (A-50) Only attack insurgents when they get in the way. (1-149) Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. (1-150) Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.(1-152) Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction. (1-156) Tactical Success guarantees nothing. (1-76) The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed in the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in STORY form. (1-67) Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density....depending on the situation. Remember, this is the graduate level of war. You can't make this confused, incoherent, doctrine up. I haven't taken things out of context, because there is no context.

Move Forward

Fri, 12/19/2014 - 10:47pm

In reply to by RantCorp

You have many more interesting comments here and it is indisputable that you know more than just about anybody about the 80's Taliban because you were one of the few who were there. You also were there apparently in 2001 when we first overthrew the Taliban. I have never been there and all I know is from reading extensively, studying videos, and maps both geographic and generated by think tanks such as CSIS.

If you are who I think you are you also were highly placed in one of those 3-letter organizations that should know a lot about the Taliban, but apparently has not always gotten it right. You can blast the U.S. military all you want but several three-letter organizations screwed the pooch too and the state department did little to help our troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan by assuming <strong>any</strong> government could represent all the people under prior colonial borders. How then do you square your understanding of the Pakistan Taliban with this article's version?

http://www.voanews.com/content/peshawar-school-attack-who-are-pakistani…

Is it possible that things change over time? I certainly have expertise on four Afghanistan battles that occurred between 2008-2010 and how the Afghan Taliban, HiG, and foreign fighters who participated fought those battles. However, I doubt they resemble the same Taliban organizations we see today if for no other reason than the extensive leadership turnover. Are the fighters you fought with back in the 80's and 2001 the same as the ones now? This article, written by a journalist for Voice of America, would seem to indicate a change in the Pakistan Taliban from your understanding of them based on the past. What parts of his assessment do you disagree with?

I read none of this article prior to my first response to you and have not done any extensive study of the Pakistan Taliban. But anyone who has followed current events over the past few years has discerned differences between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. The Taliban is not a "one size fits all" organization and TTP clearly is associated with the Pakistan Taliban that attacked the military school in Pakistan. It is illogical to believe even the ISI, let alone the government or Army of Pakistan ordered an attack on the children of Pakistani Soldiers in Peshawar.

RantCorp

Fri, 12/19/2014 - 2:36pm

In reply to by Move Forward

MF,

The fruitcake fighting in Pakistan are a mixed bag of separatists, terrorists, anarchists, misogynists, pedophiles, maniacs, lunatics and anything else that motivates an asshole to unload a PKM GPMG into a crowded classroom of school children. They are not the Taliban.

The Taliban is the Taliban.

Nobody else is the Taliban, not TTP, not GiH, not ALQ, LeT, not Pathan separatists, not IMU, not the IS, not the Baluchis,Kashmiris or Jammus, not even the ISI. The Taliban are a Pak Army creation begun in the early eighties that was stood up to fight UW in Afghanistan. That is what they do. Haqqani is their closest bedfellow but there are significant differences btween the two. ISI facilitates Command Guidance from inside Pakistan.

They have always been heavily involved in the heroin industry but they are not the Costa Nostra. Obviously the lawlessness resulting from the UW goes hand in hand with the massive poppy cultivation but they do not fight in Pakistan.

Some folks believe they are a narco-army first and a UW tool of the Pak Army second. Certainly they are up to their necks in heroin and the elite are well-rewarded by the Costa Nostra. There are times when drug turf wars cause violence in Pakistan but I personally believe it is politics first and drug money second.

IMO the tendency for people such as yourself to group everyone who is the 'other' into the one size fits all is the main reason our 2 million strong, $600 billion a year military struggles to come to grips with our opponents. For nearly fifty years we have been told our massive defense budget was justified to ensure the US could fight two different armies in two separate locations simultaneously. From what I can ascertain we are currently struggling to fight two regiment sized forces of light infantry on two fronts simultaneously.

Only a balanced Pakistani COIN campaign can solve their insurgency problem. We need to focus on the UW problem in AF. Solve that and a Afghan COIN campaign then has a chance of end the AF insurgency.

I used to have sympathy for the Pak Army and their paranoia regards their neighbors but there has been too much senseless violence in AF for way too long. As far as I am concerned the Paks have made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.

RC

Move Forward

Thu, 12/18/2014 - 10:03pm

Rant Corp made many interesting comments below and I’m posting questions/comments to him about some of them here rather than below on his Dec 17th post.
<blockquote>An insurgent is a native, he fights an insurgency that by nature is a domestic political dispute. A UW fighter is a combatant (native or foreign) who is under the command of a foreign government. I suppose UW could be instigated by a non-state command structure but we would call that terrorism. However IMO the belligerents who are currently conducting UW against our interests do not labor under any such flags of ambiguity. The Taliban et al fight UW for the Pak govt. and the IS for the KSA and other Gulf States.</blockquote>
Rant, you are forgetting that the Pakistan Taliban largely could be considered insurgent fighters whose motivation is to create an Islamic State in Pakistan. If they were under Pak government control, they would not be under attack by the Pak Army in some areas for the first time in a decade. If the Pakistan Taliban and TTP were under ISI or Pakistan government or Army control, it would not be conducting attacks in Karachi and TTP would not be outlawed. The Pakistan Taliban also would not be responding to Pak Army attacks on them by blowing up a school breeding future Pak Army officers.

Few would dispute that the Haqqani Network is a UW element under ISI influence that is allowed to attack into Afghanistan. However, the Pak Army has begun attacking them this year for the first time and of course news reports indicate that remotely piloted aircraft attacks have struck the Haqqanis for years inside Pakistan. That would seem to indicate that at least some elements of the Pak Army and/or government allow U.S. use of its airspace and see the need to put down the ISI-fed dog that bit the Pakistani hand via the TTP and recent over-the-top attacks on Pakistan.
<blockquote>An insurgent has a vested interest in the well-being of his native society. Whether it be governance, religion, prosperity, health-care, education, price of bread etc; the insurgent will want all of these societal elements to eventually prosper. Obviously some or all of these social cornerstones are of a configuration the insurgent finds unacceptable - hence the insurgency but the genuine insurgent will ultimately want his version of his native society to bring prosperity to the local population.</blockquote>

Except that Pashtun insurgents have every reason to want greater control of traditionally Pashtun areas. Pashtun insurgents may conduct attacks because they simply want greater local control and governance and want to end the U.S. and foreign presence that is seen to support a largely non-Pashtun government. Pashtuns also appear to be more conservative as Muslims than other ethnicities and may not want the Western modern influences and schooling for girls that other ethnicities may accept. In northern areas with greater control by non-Pashtuns, you probably can make a greater argument for UW and HiG influence in some attacks and shadow governance perhaps under al Qaeda or ISI influence.

<blockquote>An insurgent appreciates the long-term benefits of a new dam, highway, bridge, school, mosque, volley-ball match etc. on the eventual success of the insurgency. A UW fighter considers these developments as an opportunity to impose chaos upon society thru terror and despair. In AF this scorched-earth tactic results in an operational effect that ensures a Pathan hegemony in the region is a strategic impossibility.</blockquote>

I’ve heard you argue in the past that Pakistan would not want a Pathan/Pashtun state within Afghanistan because it could create calls for an expansion of Pathan/Pashtun control across the Durand line into Federally administered territories and would expand calls for a self-run Baluchistan. But doesn’t Pakistan want Pathan/Pashtun control of most of if not all of Afghanistan to counter the Indian and Iranian influences that favor other ethnicities? That sounds like Pathan hegemony to me. Isn’t that why ISI helps the Afghan Taliban and Haqqanis?

<blockquote>The UW fighter is not encumbered by such sensitivities. If his commanders intent parallels the aspirations of the insurgency – well and good. If it does not then that’s too fucking bad. An insurgency can be violent or non-violent but UW is first and foremost kinetic. In AF the Punjabi-centric UW Mission Command drives a tactical approach that is perpetrated on the notion that ‘the only good Pathan is a dead Pathan’ (including school children).</blockquote>
Whoa, so you believe that Punjabi ISIS and Army commanders ordered a TTP attack on the Pakistan military school? Then why is the TTP saying that the attack is in response to new Pakistan Army attacks on the Pakistan Taliban? What proof do you have that the students were Pathans and not Punjabis and even relatives of Pakistan Army officers? If you are talking about the Volleyball game attack in Afghanistan that was probably more of a Haqqani operation which is pure conjecture on my part. I was also somewhat suspicious that some in Afghanistan orchestrated the attack on the Pakistan school as payback for the volleyball attack but then why would the TTP and Pak Taliban take credit?

<blockquote>At a push Pakistan’s command guidance will accept a heroin economy within the Pathan region on the AF/PAK border. This narco-economy damns 2 million Pathan households to a living junkie hell and spiritual damnation, fattens the bank account of the military elite and kills 30,000 Western infidels every year. What not to like?</blockquote>
Your insurgent vs. UW fighter argument forgets about the criminal element. When the Taliban were in control (almost all Pashtuns) the heroin trade dried up due to Taliban decree and punishment. So you are essentially arguing that the new dog will change its spots and now support continued poppy growing when the Taliban retakes areas of southern Afghanistan? Isn’t this disconnect between what Pakistan wants and what the Pashtuns want the whole reason for the TTP and Pakistan Taliban. They don’t want the same things as the Pakistan government or ISI.
<blockquote> In Iraq the IS fighter has a modus operandi that is very similar in nature to Talib UW but has an Arab character. (Outlaw might enlighten you on the insurgent/UW mix but best not mention the ‘C’ word). Rather than Punjabi-centric, you have a KSA Sunni-centric Mission Command that dictates the ‘the only good Shia is a dead Shia’ on the path of the righteous.
Most folks accept there is a mix of UW and insurgent fighter in both theaters. RCJ believes the insurgent’s insurgency is the prime-mover. On this reckoning he suggests we have in the main, Jeffersonian grievances that are fueling the conflict. <strong>I disagree and would argue that in AF 90 % of violence is UW driven and the question of legitimate political grievance is not a determining factor in the violence.</strong>
IMO this was the main reason COIN was a failure.</blockquote>
I read with interest your earlier comments on ISIS and Taliban UW fighter motivations. But many of those are essentially things that motivate men and war in general which is why human history is replete with war. Unique religious motivations exist when so many ISIS fighters are foreign fighters leaving a (more) comfortable U.S. or European existence to go fight in a foreign land for very little pay. If women are the motivation it's kind of hard to see how suicide attacks "get the chicks" who would seem to more accessible in the U.S. and Europe anyway. I don’t buy that 90% of Afghan violence is UW-driven and disagree that Pashtuns who make up the overwhelming majority of the Taliban are not motivated by gaining greater control of governing Pashtun areas.

The head of ISIS uses the “C’” word (Caliphate) quite a bit, and they seem to be killing a heck of lot of Sunnis and other non-Shiites who get in their way or won’t accept their same level of radicalism. That implies not just Sunni control but radical Sunni extremist control that would threaten the very existence of GCC governance and would probably expand into a nuclear arms race with Iran that would in turn make Israel very nervous. ISIS also seems to have robbed banks and is selling black market oil which would not be necessary if KSA and other <strong>state</strong> sponsors (to include Turkey) were fully financing ISIS. Rich radical guys are supporting them to be sure but KSA, GCC, and Turk government support would imply suicidal tendencies since ISIS would look at conquering them next just as the Pakistan Taliban proved to be beyond ISI control.

Madhu (not verified)

Thu, 12/18/2014 - 11:34am

In reply to by Madhu (not verified)

The Coindinistas seemed not to understand how this game worked or if they did (some did and some didn't would be my guess), they did not understand they only contributed to the information operations against us, albeit inadvertently. You shrink it all down to the insurgency, even if you bury hard CT within it, you mess up the larger strategic part and you don't understand what tactics are necessary. A suggestion for discussion.

Madhu (not verified)

Thu, 12/18/2014 - 11:32am

RantCorp writes further down in the thread (Dec. 17):

<blockquote>Most folks accept there is a mix of UW and insurgent fighter in both theaters. RCJ believes the insurgent’s insurgency is the prime-mover. On this reckoning he suggests we have in the main, Jeffersonian grievances that are fueling the conflict. I disagree and would argue that in AF 90 % of violence is UW driven and the question of legitimate political grievance is not a determining factor in the violence.
.
IMO this was the main reason COIN was a failure.</blockquote>

Or it is such a mix of factors that trying to understand what is more important in terms of violence is the first step. The blogger Pundita I am always quoting around here says that "thin the forest first," meaning, how do you know until you kind of deal with the UW and see if the insurgency is still robust. And if it is, does it's locality and local nature mean anything?

What is interesting to me is how the Taliban insurgency came to be the main way in which the region was viewed and not through the UW of many outside parties. I believe this consisted of a combination of bad thinking arising from the standard NATO narrative of violence in the region--and information operations by more than one party.

If you go back and start reading the articles from the very specific period in Sept, Oct., Nov, you find many interesting and fantastical things, sort of like the Saudi Ambassador on air soothingly saying, "but they hate all our values, not any one policy," or something to that effect.

Iraq and WMD wasn't the only smoke being blown around....

Bwilliams

Fri, 12/12/2014 - 2:13pm

In reply to by Paul Kanninen

We should start from the premise that societies build themselves. Problems in societies are normally resolved internal to that society. In certain societies, we may have a national interest in shaping how a society resolves a problem. With those problems, how can we, as outsiders, enable actors within that society so that the evolution of the society achieves our policy goals? That is the key question in most of these conflicts. If asked and answered, we could achieve our goals at much lower costs.

However, we have a basic problem with control and the amount of uncertainty that outlook would involve.

thedrosophil

Fri, 12/12/2014 - 11:18am

In reply to by Paul Kanninen

Paul: I think it's very easy to say "we just shouldn't do this sort of thing anymore". A recent piece at War on the Rocks <A HREF="http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/the-counterinsurgency-paradigm-shift/"… the pitfalls of such an attitude</A>. Rather, I believe America and its allies must address the issue at all three levels of war and warfare: the tactical, the operational/campaign, and the strategic.

On the tactical and operational levels, COIN must be treated in the same way that the DoD is currently treating the chimera of "cyber warfare": as a legitimate phenomenon on the spectrum of warfare which, while not the sole manifestation of warfare in the foreseeable future, is nonetheless an important capability that the DoD (and American allies) must equip, study, and train for. The Army's Regionally Aligned Forces concept is a good start, and has the secondary benefit of serving as a sort of "pre-emptive COIN", but it must be continued and expanded. I'm reminded of the lesson that the DoD took from Vietnam, humorously expressed by Dana Carvey as President Bush 41 on a <A HREF="http://snltranscripts.jt.org/90/90ibush.phtml">1990 episode of SNL</A>: "We learned well the simple lesson of Vietnam, and that is 'Stay out of Vietnam.'" The lesson America <I>should</I> have learned from Vietnam is that sometimes, a nation's strategic interests will <I>require them</I> to go to Vietnam, so preparation is key to achieving those stategic objectives with the least possible expenditure of blood and treasure. (That's a judgment on COIN generally, not Vietnam specifically.)

On the strategic level, the challenges are more difficult, but my impression is that the best underlying solution is to actually start teaching officers strategy. That training must begin early (probably as part of an officer's pre-commissioning course of instruction), and must be reinforced throughout an officer's career; instead, America teaches cadets and company grade officers varying levels of tactics, then trains field grade officers for campaigning. Lawrence Freedman <A HREF="http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/on-strategy-and-strategists">recently opined</A> - correctly, I believe - that, ultimately, the Commander-in-Chief is the source of a nation's strategy. As most heads of government do not come from strategic backgrounds, the C-in-C's senior military officers serve as their strategic advisors. At the risk of validating anything Tom Ricks says, I have been unimpressed with the performance and commentary of most of the recent crop of American officers, the major exceptions being Generals Mattis and Petraeus, and possibly Odierno. I believe I've provided examples elsewhere. If senior generals are meant to advise the "Strategist-in-Chief" in the interest of formulating sound strategic policy, then they must understand strategy.

All of that having been said, I suppose my take on your question is that we should not seek to do something "in its place"; rather, we must institute measures to do it better. I'm quite skeptical that Western/international strategic interests will not call for COIN, regime change, or the unsolicited establishment of international norms in the foreseeable future. America has already employed lacking measures at all three levels of war from ~1964 to 1973/'75, and again from 2001 to present; at this point, American can choose to learn from the mistaken attitude it took after 1973/'75, or it can repeat those mistakes as well. If I were a betting man...

Bill M.

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 5:01pm

In reply to by Paul Kanninen

I think the answer to your last question can only be answered on a case by case basis. The Northern Alliance apparently was a good partner, and perhaps the only partner, we had to work with in 2001/2 when we invaded Afghanistan. However, it was apparent shortly afterwards that Karzai was an ineffectual leader for Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we continued to throw good money after bad in attempting to prop up his government. We did the same with Maliki in Iraq. I'm not a fan of our COIN doctrine, but to be fair we can't assess if our COIN doctrine would have worked because the policy decisions already determined the outcome. For a lot of reasons we unable/unwilling to back away from the bad policy decisions. Making the wrong policy decision is completely understandable due to our ignorance at the time. Not changing our mind after we learned we erred is a bit tougher to deal with. Not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but reportedly our senior leaders stated we couldn't win in Vietnam, but they didn't want to be the ones responsible for losing it, so kept throwing our best and finest at the problem they knew the military couldn't solve. Once we get in a situation like this, it is like running on a treadmill, and no matter how fast we run we're still in the same place. All the while people are dying, and billions of dollars are being spent. COIN die hards tend to believe that we just stay another 10 years we can make an ineffective government legitimate. They believe their doctrine is deterministic, or in other words they confuse tactics with strategy. In my view their arguments are helpful because they mislead decision makers. We don't need to do COIN better as much as we need to do policy better.

Going to your first question, opinions vary, but it appears there was no good reason to invade Iraq and lot of bad reasons. Some of this was only seeable in hindsight, but not all of it. Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S., not the Taliban, so making the focus of our war the Taliban just because they hosted al-Qaeda seems like a bit of a misstep to me. The Taliban certainly aren't likeable, and like most Americans I was glad to see the brutes removed from power, but our real adversary was al-Qaeda and our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq simply made their movement stronger for lots of reasons. Again, some foreseeable, others not.

The answer to your question is it depends on our objectives. Our objectives must feasible, and we must be willing to bear the costs to achieve them. When determine they're not feasible, or the cost is too high, then it is time to change the strategy, not keep clinging to it. The military should be self-critical of its performance, that is how we improve, but military operations don't happen in a void, they operate within a political context. In simple terms, that political context was f'd up.

Bill C.

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 5:18pm

In reply to by Paul Kanninen

Paul:

Considering RantCorp's thoughts below, and my response thereto, your questions here could not have come at a better time.

The long-term solution was/is thought to be:

a. To address what is believed to be the "root cause" of all outlying state and societal problems; these to include: insurgency, terrorism, genocide, civil war, poor response to natural disaster, etc., etc., etc.

b. This "root cause" -- of all these such problems (and others) -- is thought to be that these outlying states and societies are not organized, ordered and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines. Evidence? States and societies that ARE organized, order and oriented more along modern western political, economic and social lines; these such states and societies are -- conspicuously -- NOT plagued with the problems identified in my paragraph "a" above.

This is what made nation-building COIN so attractive (to wit: it addressed the "root causes") and why it, thus, became the modus operandi of our post-9/11 world.

(Using our assets to simply monitor such outlying states and societies -- and only then act against them, only on the margins if our interests were directly threatened or attacked -- this such approach is thought to be what got us 9/11, and a Saddam who was still a pain in the butt well after the 1st Gulf War.)

Thus, considering RantCorp's thoughts immediately below, and my response which followed thereafter, your questions could not be more timely.

Why?

Because, by addressing your questions above, I am able to:

a. Point directly to why nation-building COIN -- rather than some other approach -- became the order of the day. (To wit: it addressed the "root causes.") And

b. Point directly to why one must look:

1. More to the ideas, beliefs and motivations of the West in these matters.

2. And less to the status, ideas, beliefs and/or motivations of our opponents.

3. To determine why one approach or another (example: nation-building COIN) was adopted and implemented.

Paul Kanninen

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 4:18pm

There is a lot of excellent discussion on why when and where COIN has not been successful. I do not see many ideas on what to do in its place. Can we garrison Iraq and Afghanistan and hunt down the insurgent for years on end?

The track record on teaching a people "good" government is poor. What is the long term solution.

Would we be better off if we withdrew and use our assets to monitor and then act only if our interests were threatened or attacked?

Outlaw 09

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 1:48pm

In reply to by Bill C.

Bill--this might explain just why COIN was a failure. Taken from the Torture thread.

In an article in Strife (from KIngs War Studies) a former US Army colonel asks questions that maybe fit here better than the partisan politics in the USA:

Quote:
There are important questions about how the program may have affected the conduct of the wars, including:

1. To what extent did the perceptions and justifications of the program, to include the actual and perceived use of torture, affect our soldiers and their mission?

2. To what extent did senior leaders’ public justifications of the program affect broader policy and strategy options in the conduct of the wars?

3. To what extent did perceptions and justifications of the program promote an ends-justify-the-means mentality within the military in Afghanistan and Iraq?

4. To what extent did the perceptions and justifications foster a belief in the military that such practices were acceptable and could be used by them in combat?

5. To what extent did ‘false positives’ or erroneous reports, perhaps made out of fear of torture, lead to military actions that cost lives (civilian and military) and created unnecessary enemies?

6. To what extent did the actual and perceived use of torture compromise the military’s moral standing in the eyes of the people in Afghanistan and Iraq?

In what ways did that affect the mission and its prospects of success?

Link:http://strifeblog.org/2014/12/11/did...merican-lives/
__________________

Bill C.

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 1:41pm

In reply to by RantCorp

RantCorp said:

"I would flag CvC’s first and foremost question pertaining to the nature of the war on which you wish to embark. IMO if we engage an individual as an insurgent - when in fact he is a UW fighter - our best efforts do not stand a snowflakes chance in hell of prevailing."

Herein, I suggest:

a. That we (the U.S./West) were, quite obviously, embarked upon wars to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines. And herein I suggest:

b. That the Jihadi Joes (JJ), UW fighters, et al, (regardless of their various motivations); these folks tended to get in our way.

Thus, in determining the reason why we adopted the approach that we did to achieve these state and societal transformations (not so much COIN as nation-building?), this, I suggest, has:

1. Much less to do with the nature of the enemy or the status of the individuals noted in my item "b" above,

2. And much more to do with the political objective of the United States/the West (item "a" above) and how it wished to achieve same (in these cases, via "nation-building" poorly disguised as COIN?).

My argument here stated another way:

In questions of this nature (those related to understanding the nature of the war that one wishes to embark upon):

a. It is better to look to the motivations of those who are knowingly and formally contemplating such wars (in our cases above, the motivations of the United States/the West).

b. And less to the motivations of those who, via these aggressors' actions, have (inadvertently or otherwise) found themselves to be involved in such wars.

Outlaw 09

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 10:25am

In reply to by RantCorp

RC---the reason I place greater emphasis on eastern Ukraine ie Russian UW is that it is a willing to use a nuclear tipped "total whole of government approach to UW" in support to political warfare.

And it can stop on a dime, change directions as it needs to and go in an entirely different direction as it has a strategic strategy with a clearly defined end state, and does not have to wait for civilian leaders to make up their minds.

That makes it far more dangerous than what is playing out under IS in Syria and Iraq.

By the way it appears as if the US is getting ready to redeploy back into Europe nuclear tipped cruise missiles and this time there is no peace movement sponsored by the Russians to stop it--as a response to the ongoing violation by the Russians of the INF and Conventional Forces Treaty---ie the disarmament of armored vehicles via OSCE.

Outlaw 09

Thu, 12/11/2014 - 9:02am

In reply to by RantCorp

RantCorp---would agree that your five points did in fact apply to say the 1920 folks---but a majority of Ansar al Sunnah and much of the Salafist side of Islamic Army in Iraq were into not the five points you mention as the individual Emirs tended to hold a religious sway over their individual cells.

There were others that made it into the system via JSOC and or selected BCT targeting where your five reasons for fighting were not their core reasons.

All I heard from well over 1000 detainees were the constant words, torture, Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Americans beat/mishandle Iraqi's and on and on---the Abu Ghraib scandal and Gitmo hurt us badly and still does in Iraq.

What many Americans tend to not know---theses same accusations could be heard coming from the various Sunni tribal leaders and again many Americans tend to think insurgents are somehow not part and parcel of a general Sunni society which they are especially in Iraq where their tribal affiliations are still solid which we can see in their ongoing support to IS.

You almost had to cut through the "perception" chatter in order to get into a conversation and if they were treated with respect and you built a good rapport you would often hear the words---"did not know Americans could be friendly--not what we expected for treatment"---but not many in the TF 134 system displayed the ability to build rapport---remember 2005-2007 was marked by heavy fighting and IED usage-with the Shia side starting to kick in with their EFPs- countered by an equally heavy "let's pay back for 9/11 attitude".

We were in fact in a deep phase two guerrilla war and never really saw it and in a guerrilla environment COIN will never work.

Would even venture the comment that what sufficed as COIN --meaning whose ever definition was used was doomed to fail and did fail due to the Abu Ghraib scandal and everything around Gitmo.

In any UW environment the concept of "perception" plays a massive role among the population and you know as well just how rumors are part and parcel of UW especially in Iraq and in the ME in general.

Well worth the read.

"If there was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no [Islamic State] now. ... It made us all."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story

Background to Camp Bucca---in mid 2006, I had to literally shake the national IC tree in order to get their attention meaning I had strong reporting on the ongoing AQI/IAI insurgent hands on training that was occurring within the Abu Ghraib prison camp and we had absolutely no collection requirements for their ongoing activities ---when I first started writing reports on their insurgent training activities I had to fight to get the reports into the system--after several hit Washington then suddenly everyone realized we had a "Insurgent University" in the middle of Abu Ghraib being supported by the US Army.

Then in typical Army fashion it was decided to simply ship anyone identified as part of the "Insurgent University" to Camp Bucca and there is where this article then picks up on the continuing insurgent education where we the US Army provided shelter, air conditioning, great health care, three great meals, soccer, and flat screen TVs towards the "university's" efforts.

And yet some still continue to "claim COIN was successful"?

The last portion of the article is telling and goes to the heart of why current US policy towards IS will not work.

“It’s not that I don’t believe in Jihad,” he said. “I do,” he continued, his voice trailing away. “But what options do I have? If I leave, I am dead.”

The arc of his involvement with what is now the world’s most menacing terrorist group mirrors many others who now hold senior positions in the group: first a battle against an invading army, then a score to be settled with an ancient sectarian foe, and now, a war that could be acting out an end of days prophecy.

In the world of the Bucca alumni, there is little room for revisionism, or reflection. Abu Ahmed seems to feel himself swept along by events that are now far bigger than him, or anyone else.

“There are others who are not ideologues,” he said, referring to senior Isis members close to Baghdadi. “People who started out in Bucca, like me. And then it got bigger than any of us. This can’t be stopped now. This is out of the control of any man. Not Baghdadi, or anyone else in his circle.”

RantCorp

Wed, 12/17/2014 - 11:54pm

In reply to by thedrosophil

Thedrosophil,

If you don’t mind me saying so you need to separate the insurgent fighter and the UW fighter and reference them as different entities. I suppose they could be one and the same but I can’t imagine how. Certainly in AF they are very different creatures and I imagine in Iraq it to be much the case.

An insurgent is a native, he fights an insurgency that by nature is a domestic political dispute. A UW fighter is a combatant (native or foreign) who is under the command of a foreign government. I suppose UW could be instigated by a non-state command structure but we would call that terrorism. However IMO the belligerents who are currently conducting UW against our interests do not labor under any such flags of ambiguity. The Taliban et al fight UW for the Pak govt. and the IS for the KSA and other Gulf States.

An insurgent has a vested interest in the well-being of his native society. Whether it be governance, religion, prosperity, health-care, education, price of bread etc; the insurgent will want all of these societal elements to eventually prosper. Obviously some or all of these social cornerstones are of a configuration the insurgent finds unacceptable - hence the insurgency but the genuine insurgent will ultimately want his version of his native society to bring prosperity to the local population.

The UW fighter is not encumbered by such sensitivities. If his commanders intent parallels the aspirations of the insurgency – well and good. If it does not then that’s too fucking bad. An insurgency can be violent or non-violent but UW is first and foremost kinetic. In AF the Punjabi-centric UW Mission Command drives a tactical approach that is perpetrated on the notion that ‘the only good Pathan is a dead Pathan’ (including school children).

An insurgent appreciates the long-term benefits of a new dam, highway, bridge, school, mosque, volley-ball match etc. on the eventual success of the insurgency. A UW fighter considers these developments as an opportunity to impose chaos upon society thru terror and despair. In AF this scorched-earth tactic results in an operational effect that ensures a Pathan hegemony in the region is a strategic impossibility.

At a push Pakistan’s command guidance will accept a heroin economy within the Pathan region on the AF/PAK border. This narco-economy damns 2 million Pathan households to a living junkie hell and spiritual damnation, fattens the bank account of the military elite and kills 30,000 Western infidels every year. What not to like?

In Iraq the IS fighter has a modus operandi that is very similar in nature to Talib UW but has an Arab character. (Outlaw might enlighten you on the insurgent/UW mix but best not mention the ‘C’ word). Rather than Punjabi-centric, you have a KSA Sunni-centric Mission Command that dictates the ‘the only good Shia is a dead Shia’ on the path of the righteous.

Most folks accept there is a mix of UW and insurgent fighter in both theaters. RCJ believes the insurgent’s insurgency is the prime-mover. On this reckoning he suggests we have in the main, Jeffersonian grievances that are fueling the conflict. I disagree and would argue that in AF 90 % of violence is UW driven and the question of legitimate political grievance is not a determining factor in the violence.

IMO this was the main reason COIN was a failure.

In Iraq the mix is much more fluid. In hindsight the UW violence reached a point whereby the insurgent mindset – with its profoundly different attitude to the native population’s well-being - reached a tipping point and the insurgent fighters swept away the UW fighters of AQI.

Unfortunately, in a fit of vain-glory, we claimed it was the coming (at the 11th hour) of an American Savior that surged us to victory and snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. Obviously hindsight is a wonderful thing but the insurgent cause; left unacknowledged and under-rewarded (unlike our Savior hero), rapidly weakened in the eyes of the body politic and the UW fighter flooded back into the battle ecosystem.

The KSA Mission Command, stung by the reversals inflicted upon them by the Sons of Iraq Awakening, pushed their UW force back into the battle ecosystem and demanded a ferocious tempo and unspeakable levels of violence to redress the setback.

So what?

My contention is we tolerate violent acts by the Pakistani and KSA governments because we refuse to differentiate between UW and insurgency fighters. Bizarrely this apparent lack of awareness is not lost on the Pak and KSA Command and as such they are actively encouraged to inflict more and more violence upon ourselves and our allies. I mean you couldn't make this shit up.

IMO if the PK and the KSA were persuaded to turn off the support for their respective fighters the UW would fizzle out very rapidly and we would be left with an insurgency. No doubt some of the UW fighters would switch hats and become insurgents, others would return to the West and perhaps blow up our kids in bars and discos. However I believe most would simply stop fighting. The simple reason being that the source of money, excitement, broads, drugs and camaraderie would no longer be forthcoming.

Needless to say the insurgency would continue but the level of violence would be significantly less. More importantly the violence would be of a different nature to the violence sported by the UW. The reduction/removal of UW effects will leave an insurgency that a COIN campaign stands a chance of restoring the State’s monopoly on violence. Once that has been achieved the political grievances that caused the insurgency in the first place would become manageable.

Thedrosophil wrote:

‘However, it also seems obvious that some, and particularly the leaders of these organizations - the bin Ladens, Zawahiris, Mullah Omars, 9/11 hijackers, and such - are true believers’

I’m afraid I have to disagree with you on that list of luminaries with one exception.

OBL Islamic credentials were seriously undermined by his Messianic delusions. The ‘Amir’ possessed all the clichéd mannerisms of the ‘god-person’ that haunt bus depots, train stations, central bazaars, chai shops throughout the Islamic world. His dyed hair and beard, facial make-up, faux humbleness, effeminate voice are characteristics most Muslims (but apparently few Westerners) recognize as the stagecraft of the sidewalk religious charlatan.

There is an Afghan Proverb that refers to their version of our own Broadway Joe –
‘Behind every hilltop there is a Shah and behind every mountain there is a Messiah.’

Despite his frequent eulogizing of the noble quest for martyrdom he cowered in his fortified bedroom as the SEALs spent 15 minutes blasting their way up to him. He never fired a single round from his ubiquitous AKSU in his own defense or that of his wives and children and loyal companions.

Our reluctant martyr did not surprise anyone who had experienced the spectacle of the OBL circus during the 20 years prior to his demise.

IMO Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of his divine presence among us mere mortals started and finished the debate on his spiritual gravitas.

Al-Zarqawi was a psychopath who basically killed anyone - as psychopaths tend to do.

Mullah Omar was/is an illiterate landless peasant who came to prominence by organizing the extrajudicial killing of an alleged child-killer. Nothing wrong with that I suppose but when he decided to drape his shoulders with the relic secured within the Mosque of the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed (shroud of Turin anyone?) the path of his good intentions took a suspect turn.

I was somewhat mystified why that anointed him as the Amir al-Mu’minin. Not bad for a dude who can’t read a word of Arabic, oversees 90% of the world’s heroin production and leads an army whose idea of Jihad means 90% of the victims you kill are women and children.

When it comes to the 9/11 hijackers I take the Saturday Night Live angle. According to SNL only the four pilots knew the purpose of the mission. The remaining hijackers thought they were part of a hostage taking operation and they were flying to the Bahamas to negotiate.

Unfortunately Ayman al-Zawahiri is the odd one out. IMO he is the exception that proves the rule. Unlike the others he is well-traveled, well-educated by Western standards and is surprisingly boorish and direct for an Arab. He pretends to not speak English and listens with a studied bed-side manner of a trusted family physician.

If he does have a weakness it is his hatred of Israel or more precisely the ‘Zionist occupation of Palestine ’. From what I could gather his rage appeared genuine – as opposed to the glib bombast so many ‘true-believers’ effect when the plight of the Palestinians is called into question and a display of moral outrage is desired for an impressionable audience.

Most of our Intelligence community gravitate towards the more charismatic leaders of our foe (like the others on your list) and as such do not rate Doctor AaZ’s leadership. For want of a better description I would describe AaZ as an ‘old school’ Jihad leader - short on charisma and long on wisdom. IMHO his leadership poses more of a strategic threat than all of the other JJ leaders (dead or alive) put together.

We’ve all got one,

RC

thedrosophil

Wed, 12/10/2014 - 7:10pm

In reply to by RantCorp

I'd appreciate it if you'd comment on a couple of thoughts I had when reading your post. Contrary to Robert's suggestion from earlier, I'm actually curious for your thoughts.

1) I think your point that "Jihadi Joe", as you call him, operates on a variety of conflicting and shifting motives is uncontestable. I also agree that many of those who swell the ranks of al Qaeda, or the Taliban, or ISIS/DAESH are unemployed, or mentally ill, or bored out of their skulls, or as Michael Totten noted in a recent column, <A HREF="http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/islamic-state-… plain ol' psychopaths</A>. (With respect to your entirely legitimate statement that "these are the very last sentiments a command would desire in the makeup of its foot-soldiers if it was hoping to inspire/execute/sustain a Islamic Revolution or Resistance", one might respond with former SecDef Rumsfeld's unpopular (albeit usually quoted out of context) statement that "You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.") However, it also seems obvious that some, and particularly the leaders of these organizations - the bin Ladens, Zawahiris, Mullah Omars, 9/11 hijackers, and such - are true believers, often well educated, frequently affluent. As you seem to note, many who decide to join up do so from situations of weakness or vulnerability, and in at least some of those cases their radicalization involves indoctrination into Islam. Do you agree with these observations and, if so, how do they factor into your appraisal of the wider campaign?

2) Following from that acknowledgement of the sort of folks who comprise the rank and file recruits of the organizations in question, I would counter with the point that all COIN doctrine, even the fairly watered-down version seen in current DoD publications, acknowledges that an insurgent force (or UW fighters, if you prefer) will consist of true believers (sometimes dubbed "dead-enders") who will need to be either killed or incarcerated for the long term. However, in many campaigns (to include the more successful phases of Iraq, though less so in Afghanistan; certainly in my favorite example of Dhofar), COIN forces have seen success through both direct payments of insurgents to stop fighting, and through the creation of jobs and overall conditions that hinder recruitment of the sort of unemployed, destitute locals you described. Furthermore, guerrilla warfare doctrine as espoused by Mao, Giap, Zawahiri, and Guevara stresses the need to secure the support of the local populace, thus identifying popular support as <I>a</I> center of gravity (as opposed to <I>the sole</I> center of gravity, in case Bill M. is reading this) to be contested by the insurgent/UW fighter versus the COIN force. I worry that your appraisal above focuses solely on the fighters themselves, overlooking the potential "governed" whose support the insurgent/guerrilla will eventually need in order to succeed. Thoughts?

Again, I appreciated your insight, and would appreciate your further thoughts on the items above if you're able to respond.

RantCorp

Wed, 12/10/2014 - 4:03pm

It is interesting how despite the desire to achieve the same outcome our collective experiences grappling with Jihadi Joe appears to shape wildly different opinion. From my own viewpoint I am constantly perplexed by the widely held notion that Jihadi Joe (JJ) is motivated primarily by Islam in his inclination to take up the fight with us.

On a scale of 10 to 1 (10 being the primary reason and 1 being the minor) I would grade Islamic conviction somewhere between 5 and 1 – wherein 5 was a good pair of boots and 1 being a regular supply of porn magazines.

Of the hundreds of JJs I have questioned and/or observed at close quarters I would argue the top five motivators ( in no sense of order) to be money, getting laid by a women (in marriage), access to drugs, peer/tribal pressure and avoiding soul-destroying refugee boredom.

For reasons as varied as weather, terrain, enemy action, tooth-ache, illicit homosexuality, family crisis etc. the order of priority of the five may change on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. However in my experience these top five would constitute the average JJ’s motive tool-set to get him to the fight and keep him there.

In my experience all five sentiments were openly displayed/discussed at every opportunity amongst the JJ ‘band of brothers’. This openness is one of the reasons I find the Islamic or Jeffersonian motivational based argument so surprising.

I imagine thoughts on the difference of revolutionary or resistance insurgency would have floated around with Islam in the lower 5 but 99% of the JJ’s I entertained grew up in godforsaken refugee shit-holes wherein any semblance of legitimate governance was more abstract than a balanced form of Islamic education.

Most were Afghan or Pak-born Afghans (there is a big difference) but there was a considerable number of Palestinians, Sudanese, Somalis, Saudi, Egyptian and a sprinkling of French, British and Americans. Some of the JJs from Western countries initially came across as a representation of the more ‘conventional’ view of the JJ but upon a closer examination I found many to be suffering from a mental illness.

The exception being Pakistan Army soldiers who had ‘strayed’ across the frontier – they were merely following orders.

Along with Arabs from more affluent backgrounds I came to understand many of these FFs had been recruited whilst sleeping rough or residing within mental institutions back in their homelands. These folks were often primed with opiates and fed a constant stream of ill-founded Islamic dogma that, along with the midday sun , rendered some of the more mentally vulnerable criminally insane.

The recent Brit JJ executioner being a perfect example of the type of individual.

The reason I point out these observations is that an individual who maintains these 5 motivational characteristics represent an ideal recruit for a military command that wishes to execute a UW campaign.

However by the same token these are the very last sentiments a command would desire in the makeup of its foot-soldiers if it was hoping to inspire/execute/sustain a Islamic Revolution or Resistance.

In my long-winded way I arrive at the question of whether Real COIN, US COIN, SAS COIN, Indian COIN, FM 3.24 COIN whatever, is the solution/problem. I would flag CvC’s first and foremost question pertaining to the nature of the war on which you wish to embark. IMO if we engage an individual as an insurgent - when in fact he is a UW fighter - our best efforts do not stand a snowflakes chance in hell of prevailing.

If you attempt to apply COIN to counter the efforts of a proxy army made up of individuals that possess no interest in domestic politics, religion, governance, economics, society or peace you will arrive at a situation much as we have in the ISIL and eastern Afghanistan.

A good example that illustrates the UW mind-set occurred last month in Yahyakhil District in Paktika. The region enjoys considerable buyin from many armed groups from both sides of the GIRoA/Insurgent equation that you could argue resulted in a successful application of COIN. The UW mind-set recognized this as an existential threat and therefore killed 45 people and wounded 60 others who were watching a volley-ball match.

I mean I doubt very few people would advocate the application of Ukrainian COIN in eastern Ukraine. But many lives and much treasure has been wasted doing exactly that in AF because we failed to recognize the difference between an insurgent fighter and a UW fighter.

I agree with Outlaw on the importance of the actions of the vacationing Russians in eastern Ukraine but I would argue the ‘black flag wavers’ are just as important for reasons pointed out by Bill M.

I don’t believe there is anything new about the Russian UW. In fact I get the distinct feeling Putin has lifted a copy of the ISI UW Field Manual and appears to be enjoying as much UW success against the Ukrainians as the ISI has enjoyed against us.

RC

thedrosophil

Wed, 12/10/2014 - 7:21pm

In reply to by Bill C.

Bill C.: As I've noted previously, I feel that your criticism of Cold War COIN doctrine as outlined in item e.1. above, exhibits a harshness not justified by the historical reality of either the Cold War or, perhaps, by recent events. Cold War COIN had its successes, and both successful and failed Cold War COIN doctrine provides relevant lessons which merit evaluation and, in some cases, adoption by post-9/11 COIN forces. Western Cold War COIN practitioners were not always the defenders of the status quo, nor are post-9/11 COIN practitioners always the destroyer of the status quo (at least, not on balance - the drive for regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq arose because the status quo maintained an unacceptable degree of strategic risk, though I don't believe that it's a foregone conclusion that the Taliban/al Qaeda team in Afghanistan or the various insurgent groups in Iraq were less revolutionary than ISAF or MNF-I). I dont think you're entirely off base, but I do think your appraisal is too extreme on that one point. Save for that (slightly) dissenting statement regarding e.1., I agree with your appraisal of the situation: the muddled Western attempt at "Quik-E-COIN" is, based upon the available evidence, a failure.

I am going to, using thedrosophil's and my discussions below, take a stab at suggesting what we may actually mean when we say that COIN is a proven failure today.

What we mean is that:

a. Our efforts to transform Afghanistan and Iraq recently,

b. More along modern western political, economic and social lines,

c. This, via invasion and regime change,

d. And via the immediate forced introduction of our unique way of life, our unique way of governance and our correspondingly unique values, attitudes and beliefs,

e. Herein using:

1. Inappropriate methods (derived from the Cold War; when we were the defenders of conservative values and ways of life and not the destroyers of same as we are today). And/or

2. Flawed techniques (not even consistent with our own SOPs and other understood "best practices").

These such efforts ("a" - "e" above) have, indeed, failed (in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Given any or all of these qualifiers (our recent activities in Afghanistan and Iraq only; the requirement to transform states and societies, immediately after invasion, specifically more along modern western political, economic and social lines; the use of methods derived from a non-similar time (to wit: the Cold War -- when we were the defenders of the status quo -- not the destroyer of same as we are today); and the failure to follow even our own SOPs and otherwise acknowledged "best practices").

Then can we actually say that COIN generally -- and/or COIN specifically as I have described it above -- was/were given a fair shake?

thedrosophil

Wed, 12/10/2014 - 7:27pm

In reply to by Outlaw 09

No one is claiming that "we had a COIN success in Iraq". If you'll actually read anyone else's comments, we're claiming that COIN wasn't actually <I>attempted</I> in Iraq in the first place.

Outlaw 09

Wed, 12/10/2014 - 1:19pm

We had a COIN success in Iraq?

The author wrote this in 2007 and it is one of the main reasons COIN failed. Robert would say it is all about the rule of law and good governance.

We have failed to properly address the abuse of Iraqi detainees. Men like me have refused to tell our stories, and our leaders have refused to own up to the myriad mistakes that have been made. But if we fail to address this problem, there can be no hope of success in Iraq. Regardless of how many young Americans we send to war, or how many militia members we kill, or how many Iraqis we train, or how much money we spend on reconstruction, we will not escape the damage we have done to the people of Iraq in our prisons.

I am desperate to get on with my life and erase my memories of my experiences in Iraq. But those memories and experiences do not belong to me. They belong to history. If we're doomed to repeat the history we forget, what will be the consequences of the history we never knew? The citizens and the leadership of this country have an obligation to revisit what took place in the interrogation booths of Iraq, unpleasant as it may be. The story of Abu Ghraib isn't over. In many ways, we have yet to open the book.

The same author wrote an editorial in the NYTs for today on the same 2007 subject.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/opinion/the-torture-report-reminds-us…?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-must-open-the-book-on-the…

Both are well worth the read and raises the question as to why the investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal was never fully completed.

thedrosophil

Tue, 12/09/2014 - 6:13am

In reply to by Outlaw 09

I would really appreciate it if you'd actually read my comments, instead of looking at them with the singular intent of pulling them apart in order to justify yet another incoherent diatribe such as the one you've just posted.

I'm not arguing that guerrilla warfare or "swarm attacks" are anything new (nor are any of the folks you lambaste trying to do so). My citation of Ecclesiastes, if you'll actually read back, was in reference to the fact that the same tried and tested COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures that were successful in Gaul and Britannia around two thousand years ago were still effective in Dhofar in the 1970's; and, insofar as they were used at the tactical and operational levels before being subsumed by the Army's flawed COIN doctrine at the strategic level, they were successful in Afghanistan and Iraq, too. Conversely, the same flawed COIN TTPs that have been less than successful in Afghanistan and Iraq were unsuccessful in Algeria, Indochina, Tsarist Russia, Revolutionary War era America, and so on and so forth.

I don't see where you've posted any evidence of these theories you espouse; rather, your points about the release of some "IAI" leader only underscore my point that improvised doctrine, combined with tactical and operational mistakes, undermine any effort to consolidate tactical and operational gains into a strategic victory. Insofar as I can even understand the point that you seem to be trying to make, you don't seem to be saying anything new or groundbreaking. Releasing an "IAI" leader qualifies as a tactical mistake (presumably fueled by poor engagement with the Iraqi legal system?) that had strategic consequences. Also, I dismiss the notion that the ISI/AQI offensive in 2007 (do you have a link to any actual sources on that?) was "practice" for what's going on now. Most would agree that the bulk of ISIS/DAESH adherents aren't Iraqis who were biding their time until/since the American withdrawal, but new local and international recruits combined with "veterans" of the Syrian Civil War. If anything, that further undermines your claims that the current situation on the Iraqi-Syrian border represents a failure of American COIN efforts in Iraq, which were largely successful by the time of the precipitous 2011 withdrawal; rather, it's an indictment of the Assad/Khamenei/Putin school of attrition counterinsurgency (which, to bring it back to your area of interest, also hasn't worked in Chechnya, as we saw last week).

Outlaw 09

Tue, 12/09/2014 - 1:17am

In reply to by thedrosophil

See and again you seem to jump over your own comments and not pay much attention to your own words.

The citation from Ecclesiastes on the opening page of my MSc dissertation is apt: "There is nothing new under the sun."

If this is your inner belief then why is it so hard to not fully understand we where knee deep in a phase two guerrilla war and the principles of those you mentioned never once ever seemed to "see it"-- who by the way have made a good amount of money on their thesis's--and when we had the IAI leader in detention and then released out with no charges, and his hand written journal as a written historical document that included literally the names of the Whose Who on the Sunni insurgent side--you still maintain COIN was successful.

By the way during a combined offense by both IAI/AQI in 2007 using multiple "swarm attacks" they had generated a ground energy that are seeing now via IS and yet we the US are wondering why they are good at what they did--practice makes perfect and yet we have always believed insurgents are not great fighters against the US Army.

And yet guerrilla warfare is as old as history---just as is the concept of "swarm attacks" which by the way is part and parcel of the current IS ground campaign and which they together with the IAI started using on us in 2006 to great effect.

The citation from Ecclesiastes on the opening page of my MSc dissertation is apt: "There is nothing new under the sun."

You are correct---just hold to it in your comments.

thedrosophil

Mon, 12/08/2014 - 3:29pm

In reply to by Bill C.

Bill C: I appreciate your thoughtful response. I'd like to offer a couple of points of clarification for your consideration. First, you say:

<BLOCKQUOTE>I appreciate that thedrosophil understands what the mission actually is. To wit: to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and to, thereby, incorporate these outlying states and societies more into the global economy and international community. (These folks, in this way, to become less of a problem for/burden on -- and more of an asset to -- the global economy/international community -- or so the thinking goes.)</BLOCKQUOTE>

I think it's important to note that the missions will typically be different. For example, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were related, but unique; there were points of overlap and points of distinction. This is an extension of the clarification that not all "nails" require a "COIN" hammer, nor is the "combined arms maneuver" hammer appropriate to all "nails". In some cases, but obviously not all, it will be in the interest of America and her allies to effect regime change and to encourage international norms along Western (though I would prefer to call them "internationally recognized" economic, political, and social values. America and her allies face a variety of strategic challenges, which in turn require a variety of strategic remedies, in order to tie up into what will inevitably be a jumbled strategic knot in lieu of a nice, tidy strategic bow.

<BLOCKQUOTE>Example: In classic COIN, one might be happy to only replace a non-cooperating dictator with a cooperating dictator. Understanding here that going straight to democracy may be more than these particular people can reasonably understand and/or deal with. And, thus, be more likely to produce counterproductive rather than productive results. This same argument (don't try to do too much too soon) to often apply to the application of our equally alien and profane "modern" economic and social ideas and norms.</BLOCKQUOTE>

I also think that it's important to remember that democracy is not a "Western" or "American" value. The residents of Hong Kong have been demonstrating in favor of legitimate democracy for the last couple of months. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan host three of the most stable and dynamic democracies in the world. Many of the Arabs who took to the streets from 2010 to the present want democracy; in 2009, it was Persians. Democracy as we know it may have been nurtured by the Western world, but the idea that people would govern themselves directly or through representatives is not distinctly Western. At the same time, it's important to remember that true democracy goes beyond voting - for example, Iranians are afforded an opportunity to vote, but no one would call Iran a democracy. Democracy requires values that have traditionally been called "liberal", but not in the "left wing versus right wing" sense: respect for the rights of minorities, the rule of law, universal education, pluralism, and such. Allowing people to vote is easy; to carry the example forward, the reason why Oman is not a Western-style democracy today is that the Omanis of 1970 had no concept of any of these functions, hence the traditional COIN approach of quickly establishing security in order to slowly demilitarize in favor of a long-term development agenda.

<BLOCKQUOTE>What is to be rejected (because it has indeed failed ) is not COIN, per se, but COIN of the post-Cold War variety</BLOCKQUOTE>

I'd also be careful not to tie legitimate doctrines to a specific time period. To continue with the baby vs. bathwater analogy we seem to have settled on, I believe a great deal of good scholarship on COIN has been generated since 2002/'03. FM 3-24/MCWP 3.33-6 isn't worthless; if anything, it suffers from a sort of myopia. Dr. Nagl, Colonel Kilcullen, Generals Petraeus and Mattis, all have made valuable contributions. And, in point of fact, one of my other interests is the Roman campaigns in Gaul and Brittania, which feature many of the same concepts that have led to success in modern (or rather, much more recent) COIN campaigns. The citation from Ecclesiastes on the opening page of my MSc dissertation is apt: "There is nothing new under the sun."

thedrosophil, in his 8:26am reply-to-comment below, said:

" ... here was a fantastic opportunity in immediate post-Taliban Afghanistan to bring the average Afghan into the eighteenth or nineteenth century, and to gradually advance them toward international norms over twenty or thirty years with an initial military commitment to ensure security, followed by a dwindling military commitment and a slowly increasing development agenda. A similar approach could have been taken in Iraq, which was already ready a twentieth century culture in 2003. Again, the Omani Renaissance - its initial approach, combined with the long game of preparing the populace for a more representative form of government - should be seen as the gold standard. For a variety of reasons, many of which boiled down to either international or American national reticence, these approaches were compromised, and combined with some fairly basic tactical and operational mistakes along the way which ultimately undermined the opportunity for a strategic victory."

I believe I see where thedrosophil is going here. And I think he is right.

First: I appreciate that thedrosophil understands what the mission actually is. To wit: to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and to, thereby, incorporate these outlying states and societies more into the global economy and international community. (These folks, in this way, to become less of a problem for/burden on -- and more of an asset to -- the global economy/international community -- or so the thinking goes.)

Second: thedrosophil seems to suggest that this can be achieved by, shall we say, a more-"classic" COIN approach; one which distinguishes itself from our current "end-of-history/universal values" COIN approach in that it, specifically, does not try to do (a) too much (b) too soon.

Example: In classic COIN, one might be happy to only replace a non-cooperating dictator with a cooperating dictator. Understanding here that going straight to democracy may be more than these particular people can reasonably understand and/or deal with. And, thus, be more likely to produce counterproductive rather than productive results. This same argument (don't try to do too much too soon) to often apply to the application of our equally alien and profane "modern" economic and social ideas and norms.

Thus, "classic" COIN to be seen as simply:

a. Getting rid of a "normal" ruler (say a king or a dictator) -- that we are having trouble working with -- re: our goal to transform his state and society more along modern western lines and

b. Installing a similar ruler (ex: a king or a dictator) in his place; but one that is more likely to do our bidding.

c. Everything else (the move to install western political, economic and social ideas and norms) to be undertaken -- depending specifically on just how "primitive" the population is -- in a subsequent, and in a more gradual, manner.

To sum up:

What is to be rejected (because it has indeed failed ) is not COIN, per se, but COIN of the post-Cold War variety; which, due to its "end of history/universal values" thinking, falsely suggests that:

1. The population is (always) waiting -- with baited breath -- to obtain our way of life, our way of governance, and our values, attitudes and beliefs. And that, accordingly,

2. COIN, to be effective, must introduce these matters (democracy, capitalism, western social norms) immediately after our boots hit the ground.

These are the post-Cold War COIN ideas that are false and that have, accordingly, failed.

And, regarding this argument (not to throw the classic COIN "bath" out, with the post-Cold War COIN bathwater), thedrosophil makes an excellent point/hits the nail directly on its head.

thedrosophil

Tue, 12/09/2014 - 5:56pm

In reply to by Bill C.

Bill C.: I'm in your debt for pointing to an actual citation. I suspect that I spent at least an hour trying different Google searches to try to find it while working on my dissertation, without success. While I have come to take much of Kilcullen's vision of COIN with a grain of salt, I think that these points of Kilcullen's points are valuable; I'm tempted to pick a few bones, but perhaps I'll leave it for now, save for one thought (which is not necessarily a disagreement, so much as observations): I believe that the Cold War era figures he cited - Galula, Thompson, Mao, and others, though specifically excluding Guevara, whose treatise on guerrilla warfare amounts to a summary of Mao for the brain damaged - deserve their rightful place in the corpus of counterinsurgency scholarship. For example, I suspect that Galula's "ink spots" concept could have been used to great effect in Afghanistan had General McChrystal had the presence of mind to realize that, unlike the Algeria of the 1950's, Afghanistan's "center of gravity" is the rural periphery from whence he withdrew his distributed outposts, rather than the cities which he used the redistributed troops to protect. Another example is Thompson, who was the only theorist I know of who stressed the need for the sort of "clear political aim" that might have salvaged the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, I feel that the best approach is to treat what you term "classic COIN" - from the Colonial Era - and what you term "classical COIN" - from the Cold War - as opportunities to deepen the proverbial toolbox, as opposed to contrary theories attempting to displace one another within it. As the Internet and my Kindle have drastically reduced the cost and footprint of my proverbial "bookshelf", and as I've found volumes at least as far back as Thucydides to be of value in understanding COIN and a variety of other problem sets, I'm reticent to bin anything without good cause. And in all honesty, I suspect that none of this conflicts with Kilcullen's point, or with your own thoughts that you've graciously shared over the last few days; rather, it provides a wider perspective on the topic to contrast with his rather specific observations about a subset of recent and ongoing campaigns.