Gentile: Realities of a Syrian Intervention
Writing at The National Interest, Gian Gentile warns those who would imagine that there is an easy way to repair the universe in Syria.
The idea that stopping the civil war in Syria and protecting its population can be done on the cheap—via drones policing enclaves and humanitarian corridors—is military dilettantism gone wild.
The epigraph of my book on Iraq contains the following quotes, which we might heed as well.
I have not lived so long without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. . . . Let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children.
—Archidamus, Spartan king, 432 BC
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy.
—Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian strategist, ca. 1830
The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible.
—Hans Morgenthau, professor of international relations
First off, I am not in favor of intervening in Syria. What I am against is comparing every humanitarian operation, insurgency, or civil war that we may get involved in with Iraq and Afghanistan. COL Gentile writes:
“Ending the internal conflict in Syria and producing a peaceful aftermath would entail a long-term American commitment to armed nation building. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should have made this clear. Armed nation building isn’t done in eight or eleven years but eighty or a hundred years beyond.”
Lets call a spade a spade – the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were not “armed nation building” they were forced democratization, or even more accurately, forced liberalization. The policy end state was pretty clear going in, at least in Iraq. It was an ill-conceived idea based on untested social theory. The policy end state here may be different and therefore involve a more limited response.
Now I don’t know what the subtext of MS Slaughter’s suggestions are, and they my well involve an interest in seeing Syria transform into a liberal democracy, but I think it unwise to compare limited humanitarian interventions to full blown forced democratization.
In our great initiative and mission of the 21st Century, which is — to transform (toward market-democracy) and incorporate (into the global economy) outlier states and societies; this, so that these outlier states and societies might come to cause the modern world fewer problems and come to offer the modern world more utility and usefulness instead — the idea seems to be to allign, configure and employ/deploy our military forces significantly to help achieve these ends.
These ideas, when combined with complementary thinking which suggests that events such as those that are occuring in the Middle East today are not to so much problems as they are magnificent and incredible opportunities; these two factors (mission and opportunity) seem to explain our concept for using military forces (along R2P and/or other lines) today.
The only thing that seems to have changed, of late, is the idea of (1) using the GPF for these purposes (2) as we did in the recent cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.
All other possibilities for the use of military force to help achieve the ends noted above — such as “building partner capacity,” Anne-Marie Slaughters’ version of R2P concepts noted above, and/or more and greater use of such forces as are under the command of Adm McRaven — all these such ideas (to be used in the service of outlier state and societal transformation) seem to still be on the table.
I differ with COL Gentile on his anti-COIN arguments but I think he is right on the mark with his Syria commentary.
Ken White,
I don’t think you and I are as far apart as you might think. I am also not in favor of military intervention in the affairs of others without a compelling national interest. My point was simply that once that decision is made it will not always require 14 BCTs and a MEB for the next ten years to conduct every type of mission. If that is the plan I can’t wait to see the next NEO.
Let us ask ourselves this question: R2P to what end?
To leave the country in the exact same position that we found it and, thus, with the exact same underlying problem that, we believe, gives rise to such things as — not only genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity — but also insurgency and terrorism? If such is the case (we intend to make no fundamental changes to the regime, etc.), then a much less entailed response seems reasonable.
If, however, the intervention is designed to address the underlying “root cause” of these problems, which, we believe, is the lack of more-western-like political, economy and social systems (the achievement of which, we believe, many of these abused populations may be, directly or indirectly, striving for), then a more comprehensive and complete intervention would seem to be required.
(Failure to address the underlying “root cause” problem in these cases suggesting that, until such time as we — or they — do address these matters in a more comprehensive and complete way, then these difficulties should be expected to continue to plague and adversely effect these regions and, potentially, the world as a whole.)
This, I believe, is the thinking.
I think Gian is being too easy on Ms. Slaughter’s plan. It confused me completely. It’s heart is a pretense of being strictly defensive and establishing perimeters called no-kill zones. Anybody who kills in the no-kill zone will be killed but only defensively. And there will be no revenge killings in the no-kill zones. Then once all that is done, the no-kill zones will be expanded. How a perimeter is to be expanded defensively isn’t explained. It also calls for use of drone helicopters for supply explaining that this was done in Afghanistan, but not understanding that that was only an experiment that even if still oncgoing only involved handful of drone helos. And it calls for all sorts of spec ops forces to be used, none of which are American.
The foremost object of her plan seemed to be a desire to be viewed as completely defensive so as to avoid the moral opprobrium of being offensive.
Does anybody have any idea of what she means by “countersniper weapons”?
The underlying reasoning and logic of Anne-Marie Slaughter — and those of her ilk — would seem to be:
a. If one cannot get — from the standing governments of outlier states and societies — more rapid, more enthusiastic and more competent movement toward modernizing the state and society along western lines,
b. Then one must be prepared to achieve these things, instead, via any opportunities presented by populations or population groups.
This understanding dictating and directing how the military forces of the United States and its allies will be designed, configured, deployed and employed in the 21st Century.
Thus, our military forces must be designed, configured, deployed and employed so as to be able to — as the situation requires:
a. Support and defend “friendly” governments against any populations or population groups who would oppose the modernization of their state and society along western lines (example: BPC) and
b. Support and defend potentially “friendly” populations and/or population groups against any governments who prove unwilling — and/or unable — to achieve these desired results (example: R2P).
Note here how the idea of R2P should not be seen as being a wild and/or unusual concept; one which comes from out of “left field” so-to-speak. Rather, as considered within the context offered above, it (R2P) — much like BPC — seems to be both consistent with and servicing of our foreign policy goals and objectives for this century.
Q: So why the need to transform outlier states and societies along western lines in the first place?
A: So as to eliminate what is believed to be (or what is touted to be) the “root cause” of all aberant behavior (genocide, war crimes, wars against humanity, insurgency and terrorism). This “root cause” being said to be: The lack of sufficiently western political, economic and social systems. This factor causing these outlier states and societies to (as the term “outlier” suggests) clash with and detract from — rather than mesh with, benefit from and support — certain of their own citizens and those states and societies of the more-modern world.
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s proposal:
In other words, simply “safe-havens” which we might use — in this case with the shoe being on the other foot — to our and the rebels advantage?
Worked for the N. Viets/VC and for the Taliban; might work for us also given that, in this case, we support the rebels?
Thus, a reasonable, logical and worthwhile proposal?