The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
by Octavian Manea
Download the Full Article: The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
How would you describe the doctrinal mindset of the US Air Force on the eve of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War? To what extent were the WW2 experiences (the air wars against Germany and Japan) the core, formative experiences of the US Air Force doctrinal mindset? What meant “the right use of the air power” for the US Air Force doctrinal Weltanschauung?
The doctrinal mindset of the United States Air Force in 1960 and 1961, on the eve of America’s involvement in the war in Vietnam, was focused on strategic deterrence through atomic and nuclear dominance over the Soviet Union. The efficacy of strategic bombing had its roots in the post-World War I period when people like Italy’s Guilio Douhet, Britain’s Sir Hugh Trenchard, and the American air power advocate Billy Mitchell sought a way to avoid the carnage experienced in ground warfare, especially on the Western Front in France, by going to the enemy’s heartland and destroying both the enemy’s war making capacity and will to fight by strategic bombing to devastate industry and the socio-economic infrastructure of the opposing force. The origins of that strategy can be traced to General William T. Sherman’s “March to the Sea” in the closing months of the American Civil War in 1864 and early 1865.
The atomic bomb made the difference. In theory, the atomic bomb wedded to the delivery system provided by the four-engine, Boeing B-29 bomber, made it possible for air power to be decisive in warfare. That established the foundation for the establishment of a separate United States Air Force, a service enjoying equal status with the US Army and US Navy.
In the immediate post war period, after the U.S. Air Force gained separate service status in September 1947, bomber pilots dominated its leadership and the Strategic Air Command, established in 1946, became the premier command within the US Air Force because its mission epitomized “the right use of air power” (capable of destroying any enemy’s industrial and war-making capacity), in the Air Force’s doctrinal weltanschauung. By 1961, the budget for the Air Force was nearly twice that of the US Army. In fact, the budget for the Strategic Air Command was larger than that allocated for the entire US Army.
Download the Full Article: The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Dr. Earl Tilford is an adjunct professor with the Honors College at the University of Alabama. He was Professor of History at Grove City College (until July 2008) where he taught courses in military history, national security, and international and domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism. A retired Air Force intelligence officer, Dr. Tilford earned his PhD in American and European military history at George Washington University. From 1993 to 2001, he served as Director of Research at the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute. He also authored three books on the Vietnam War and co-edited one book on Operation Desert Storm. He is living in Tuscaloosa, Alabama where he has written a history of the University of Alabama in the 1960s titled, “Turning the Tide: The University of Alabama in the 1960s.”
Editor’s Note: This interview continues Octavian Manea’s counterinsurgency inquiries. Octavian is the Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.
