Winning the Ideological Battle for the Support of the Populace
Winning the Ideological Battle for the Support of the Populace
(Understanding the Role of Ideology in Insurgency)
by Colonel Robert Jones
Download interim version of article as PDF
To date far too much focus has been placed on the nature of the specific (though ever changing) ideology espoused by Bin Laden, and also on the aggrandized, almost mystical, value assessed to the role of ideology in insurgency in general, and for the Global War on Terrorism in particular. To take the position that ideology is the strategic center of gravity (source of all strength and power) of this, or any, insurgency shows a lack of understanding of both the concept of centers of gravity and the nature of insurgency. This is a topic for an entire book in of itself, so this paper will merely address a few key points on the narrower topic of the role of ideology in insurgency.
What is the “Human Domain”? Sure, we’ve read definitions and debates, and perhaps have participated in the same. Army doctrine takes a stab at a definition, but one has to ask: Does the Army own Human Domain and therefore get to tell everyone else what it is, or is the Human Domain something that exists in nature and is what it is. Uncaring of what the Army believes it to be, the Human Domain simply is. If it is the former then we need to toe the line and figure out how to deal with what the Army has provided us. If, on the other hand, it is the latter, then we must all resist the forces of strategic inertia and all work free from intellectual constraint and attempt to understand natural phenomena to the best of our ability for what they actually are.
Personally, I think Human Domain is the four inches between the ears. Human Domain is where influence and understanding take place. It may also be helpful to apply Clausewitz’s Social Trinity of “Government-Army-People” to the concept of Human Domain. Why? Because one may conduct a program of activities designed to affect the Human Domain within the Government to shape governmental decisions. One may do another program of activities to shape security force decisions. Or, one may conduct programs designed to shape perceptions among the general civilian populace.
This is an important construct, because Strategic Land Power or Air-Sea Battle or Diplomatic operations are primarily to create effects in that Government or Army Human Domain. SOF operations and also development operations, however, are more focused on the Human Domain of “the people.”
A similar concept that is currently being bandied about is one of “contesting the ideological space.” To me, the ideological space is the Human Domain.
Attached is an article I published several years ago born of my experience as the J5 and the J3 at Special Operations Command Pacific. I believe the ideas are still sound and are worth considering as we explore new concepts, such as “Human Domain” or “Ideological Space.”
When you say:
the role of ideology in insurgency in general, and for the Global War on Terrorism in particular
does that mean you see “terrorism” as “insurgency”, and the GWOT as “counterinsurgency”?
This I find confusing:
the U.S. State Department and Congress must step up and assume a leading role as the primary agents of counterinsurgency for the West
Where does “the West”, in any generic or specific sense, directly face an insurgency? There may be actual or potential insurgencies in progress where “the West” has a perceived interest, but does that mean that “the West” becomes a counterinsurgent, in either a military or a political role?
Most of the countries we’re discussing actually have governments. The relationship between governments and populaces in many of them is evolving and is often tense. Proposing American or “Western” intervention in these relationships, however, seems a very dubious prospect to me, especially where neither government nor populace seeks it. Assuming that we know what “the populace” or any portion thereof wants seems even more dubious.
What disturbs be about this argument is the ease with which it could be used to support intervention in government/populace relationships in places where it is neither needed nor wanted, which could become a very dangerous prospect. Government-populace relationships may indeed be tense, or even violent, but that does not mean we have any answers to the problems or that our involvement is necessary or useful. Nations have to go through their own evolutionary processes, and the last thing they need is “help” from a burly and well intentioned but too often clumsy and ignorant outsider.
I think the issues you discuss are quite relevant to understanding insurgency (though perhaps less relevant to understanding conflicts that are not insurgency). When they become a basis for attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, they are potentially very risky.
When you write, about the Southern Philippines:
nationalist insurgents are recognized as distinct from terrorist organizations
I think it’s important to note that the organization specifically targeted by US intervention was, by the time of the intervention, less a terrorist group than a criminal syndicate with a rather nominal Islamist ideology. The rapid expansion of the ASG from roughly 2000 had nothing to do with ideology. It was about money, which the ASG was bringing in, in bulk. The US did not at any point compete with a superior ideology, they just assisted the Philippine Forces in cutting off the ASG from their supply of money, which reduced their appeal. Ideologically, the situation is pretty much the same as it was before. The warlords still rule, the rural Muslims still hate the Philippine Government (not so much the Americans). With the ASG splintered and the MNLF moribund, there’s little leadership to take advantage of the disaffection (the Maranao/Maguindanao-dominated MILF has a hard time positioning itself as a representative of the Tausug/Sama populace), but the latent insurgency remains, and there’s little or nothing the US can do about it. The Philippine Government could do something about it… but they won’t and we can’t force them to.
These insurgencies are ultimately between people and their governments, and there’s often little and frequently nothing the US or “the West” can do about them. Suggesting that the US or “the west” can or should try to lead their resolution just invites more meddling.
Actually AQ is attempting to answer just this problem the last few weeks or so.
If the reporting is accurate that in fact AQ has thrown ISIL under Abu al-Bagdadi out of AQ then what is say the “ideological value” of being in AQ or better yet does an AQ affiliate really need to be in AQ?—especially if as ISIL has shown being an affiliate in the past ensured weapons, money and a flow of foreign fighters.
This dispute will in effect impact AQ in a far greater way that anything we the US have done violently or non violently against AQ since 9/11.
It appears that in fact “ideology” no longer drives the affiliates of AQ since they are the one’s with the boots on the ground inside the country being affected—in fact by AQ’s central remaining largely in Pakistan it might have had the affect of actually sidelining AQ central.
AQ affiliates’ due to their actively being engaged within a country now ensues a flow of money, weapons, and fighters simply based on their use of the Internet, monies flowing from third party country’s, and social media—not by being an AQ affiliate.
The various affiliate’s are in fact slowly becoming independent from the “ideological” leadership of AQ—something Bin Laden failed to see happening.
Even if we declare say religion as an “ideology” when looking at Syria we “see” a number of different styles of “Islamic ideology” being used by the various Islamic groups inside Syria—Sufism, Salafists, Takfirist, secular Islamists of several flavors, Muslim Brotherhood being equally supported by Qatar and the KSA—not much coming via AQ outside of “ideological statements” via the Internet.
In the AQ Syrian dispute with ISIL AQ has sided with al Nusra instead of ISIL—BUT al Nusra is being massively supported by the KSA in both money and weapons. There are some indicators floating around that the non AQ Islamists are in effect starting to impact/gain an advantage over ISIL—maybe this is the reason AQ is jumping ship with ISIL—kind of changing horses in mid-stream.
There is still by the way among some of the Syrian Islamists the nagging feeling that it was the Syrian government who actually favored/created/protected the ISIL—1) by releasing the Islamists out of their prisons ISIL growth took off, 2) areas controlled by ISIL have not been bombed or shelled by the Assad military and 3) ISIL has been selling oil from their controlled areas (oil production points)of Syria to the Syrian government. The question still floats out there—did Assad create the ISIL Syrian wing in order to declare to the world that he is under attack from “terrorists”—interesting thought.
So in reality the “ideological” drive of AQ central has no effect what so ever in Syria and or other locations—so is AQ central even “ideologically” relevant going forward?
IMO —actually no.
We have wasted so much time and money attempting to corner/damage AQ central when in effect their affiliate’s are causing more emancipation problems within AQ than we the US have managed to do since 9/11.
i·de·ol·o·gy
1. a system of ideas and ideals, esp. one that forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.
2. archaic. the science of ideas; the study of their origin and nature.
When populations determine that they CANNOT depend on their standing governments, nor on their standing military forces, to protect their time-honored and preferred way of life, and their time-honored and preferred way of governance (which, one might suggest, are based on a time-honored and preferred ideology),
Then these populations may take matters into their own hands and join forces and organize:
a. Outside the bounds of what they now see as ineffective, compromised and/or traitorous state structures,
b. Outside the bounds of what they now see as ineffective, compromised and/or traitorous governments and
c. Outside the bounds of what they now consider to be ineffective, compromised and/or traitorous military forces.
These such actions being taken by the population to try to preserve and protect their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance and their preferred ideology via other ways and other means. (Shall we say via “unconventional means?”)
This, because the normal (“conventional”) means of preserving and protecting their preferred way of life, their preferred way of governance and their preferred ideology (to wit: via the state structure, via one’s own government and via one’s own military) has been denied to these populations.
These such structures and institutions now being essentially owned by, acting in the interests of and working for foreign entities, whose goal is to:
a. Eliminate the preferred way of life and preferred way of governance (and the underlying ideology?) of these “different” populations and to
b. Cause these populations to cleave to and become dependent upon the way of life, way of governance and underlying ideology of the foreign devils.
Thus, in the eyes of the population, very desperate times calling for very desperate measures.
Regarding the role of ideology, the following is provided from Hans Morganthau’s 1967 “To Intervene or Not To Intervene:”
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/morgenthau.htm
“While contemporary interventions serving national power interests have sometimes been masked by the ideologies of communism and anticommunism, these ideologies have been an independent motivating force. This is the fourth factor which we must consider. The United States and the Soviet Union face each other not only as two great powers which in the traditional ways compete for advantage. They also face each other as the fountainheads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. Thus the Cold War has not only been a conflict between two world powers but also a contest between two secular religions. And like the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between communism and democracy does not respect national boundaries. It finds enemies and allies in all countries, opposing the one and supporting the other regardless of the niceties of international law. Here is the dynamic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the globe, sometimes surreptitiously, sometimes openly, sometimes with the accepted methods of diplomatic pressure and propaganda, sometimes with the frowned-upon instruments of covert subversion and open force.”
Today we would seem (minus the obvious differences and with the appropriate substitutions) to be engaged in a somewhat similar battle as that which is described above. This such battle now being between (1) the winner of the contest between the two secular entities noted above and, shall we say, (2) the last religious hold-outs?
There is an interesting discussion of religion (in the following article) ie ideology tied to European history that reflects on the current Shia/Sunni divide where one can see similarities between the two historical events—in some aspects more than similarities.
Since Roberts’ article is a discussion on ideology—it would be an interesting read.
http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/sectarian-wars-looking-back-from-syria-to-europes-age-of-religious-war/
Tell me if you think the explanation offered below is accurate and useful:
As relates to one’s goals and objectives (for example: our goal to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines), if one gets one’s underlying premise wrong, then the strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations that one develops and implements — which are based on such a false premise — these also are likely to be wrong and, therefore, are likely to fail.
Our post-Cold War premise was our belief in:
a. The universal and overwelming power, influence and appeal of our way of life, our way of governance and our ideology. And
b. The corresponding lack of power, influence and appeal of other ways of life, other ways of governance and other ideologies.
From this premise came forth strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations which were based on — and, therefore, depended upon — the accuracy of the premise noted at “a” and “b” above.
This new premise — and the strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations which flowed from it — these were in sharp contrast to our Cold War premise, strategy, foreign policy, etc.; all of which payed significant heed to the formidable nature of different ways of life, different ways of governance and different ideologies.
Once our post-Cold War strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations (based on the premise outlined at “a” and “b” above) had had their trial runs — wherein it was determined that these concepts were, if not faulty, then certainly premature — then the United States moved to discard these initial post-Cold War notions and adopt/re-adopt a premise (and corresponding strategy, foreign policy and military plans and operations) which were more consistent with a more-Cold War-like view of the world.
This such old/new premise and worldview — once again — giving proper heed to the power, influence, appeal and, thus, the exceptionally formidable nature of different ways of life, different ways of governance and different ideologies.
This adoption/re-adoption of a more-Cold War-like premise and world-view helping to explain, for example, why our military forces have come to adopt/re-adopt such concepts as (1) village stability operations, (2) counter-unconventional warfare and (3) the study of the human domain; all of which, one might suggest:
a. Were notably absent in the initial phases of the post-Cold War trial period noted above.
b. Were notably present, in one way or another, during the Cold War (and again today) and all of which:
c. Did not discount but, instead, payed proper heed to the power, influence, appeal and, therefore, the formidable nature of different ways of life, different ways of governance and different ideologies.
(In considering the above offering, please view it in light of not only our disappointing post-Cold War experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria but, more importantly, from the perspective of our disappointing post-Cold War experiences and relations with Russia and China.)