A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part Two)
A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part Two):
Type-I Dark Network: Opportunistic-Mechanical
by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman
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The purpose of this essay is to illustrate an example of a dark network whose design state is defined by moderate environmental hostility and a moderate requirement for secure coordination of work that yields what we call Type-I Opportunistic-Mechanical configuration. Based on our theory of dark network design, the example shows how an Opportunistic-Mechanical dark network is configured to achieve its purpose and how it is vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.
Type-I dark networks can include organized crime, gangs, mass radical movements, drug trafficking organizations, and paramilitary elements. For example, Russian Organized crime groups, such as áþûýÃâ õòÃÂúðàñÃâ¬Ã°Ãâòð (or the Solntsevskaya Brotherhood), conduct a variety of illicit activities that include money laundering, prostitution, human trafficking and arms dealing. This group operates through dozens of small cells at home and abroad. Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel tied to a wide range of criminal activities, such as human trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, operates in a cell-like networked structure to limit information and remain agile in their environment. One report states they are well armed and operate at a higher tactical level than local authorities, which gives them freedom of movement.
For our illustration of a Type-I dark network configuration, we use the transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13). Although MS-13 has degrees of variation within the network, we selected it over the others because of its transnational nature; it most closely illustrates the typological design state of a Type-I dark network; and its prominence provides a rich collection of open-source information on the dark network.
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Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Davis has over 23 years of active duty service with the majority of his career assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in key enlisted and officer operational billets. He is currently conducting an internship with CJSOTF-A en route to his next assignment at 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis. After graduating from the United States Air Force Academy in 1997, Major Worth has accumulated over 4,800 flight hours in assignments throughout AFSOC community. She is currently en route to her next assignment at Special Operations Command Europe.
Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Zimmerman has over 14 years of active duty service and spent the majority of his career supporting Special Operations forces with assignments in the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and USASOC Headquarters. He is currently conducting an internship in the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and the Naval Postgraduate School.
Editor’s Note: This essay is the second in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available here.