A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)
A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)
by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman
Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)
Abstract
This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose. A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state. The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work determine the dark network’s design state. These factors yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc. Each configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark network’s directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity. If a dark network’s configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.
Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)
Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Davis has over 23 years of active duty service with the majority of his career assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in key enlisted and officer operational billets. He is currently conducting an internship with CJSOTF-A en route to his next assignment at 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis. After graduating from the United States Air Force Academy in 1997, Major Worth has accumulated over 4,800 flight hours in assignments throughout AFSOC community. She is currently en route to her next assignment at Special Operations Command Europe.
Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Zimmerman has over 14 years of active duty service and spent the majority of his career supporting Special Operations forces with assignments in the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and USASOC Headquarters. He is currently conducting an internship in the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and the Naval Postgraduate School.
Editor’s Note: This essay is the first in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available at here.