In spite of the outstanding efforts of all our soldiers and civilians in the war in Afghanistan, there are two central problems that continue to reduce our effectiveness there. First, until recently there has been little continuity between the succeeding joint task force headquarters in Afghanistan -- we have had eleven since late 2001. Each succeeding joint task force headquarters tends to have a different vision regarding the character of the fight from the one it replaced. Second, compounding this problem, there is no unity of command in the area of operation (AO) among military units and the various U.S. Government agencies operating on the battlefield, with many of the civilian entities operating without coordinating with the military chain of command. Both of these problems create operational weaknesses affecting continuity of strategy and execution of operations. The combination of these two factors creates a pendulum effect in terms of policy and sends conflicting messages to the Afghan populace as well as our own personnel. Moreover, it creates an unhealthy tension and competitiveness between military and civilian governmental organizations that can cause friction throughout an operation. Both of these problems are solvable if we modify the way we deploy major unit headquarters and eliminate the ambiguity of command relationships in theater that enable side-stepping the critical principle of unity of command. This article will address these problems in more depth, and conclude with recommendations to remedy the issues identified.