Keeping China Out, Bringing India In, Calming Turkey Down
by Tony Corn
Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak
In response to a charge of inconsistency, British economist John Maynard Keynes once famously replied: "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"
Keynes's remark comes to mind when trying to assess the change of heart of the Obama Administration regarding Afghanistan in the past twelve months. At the risk of caricaturing: in December 2009, the Plan was to start withdrawing by July 2011; by December 2010, the Plan seemed to have become, stay "well beyond 2014." While critics were quick to accuse the Administration of inconsistency, a more judicious approach is to ask: What facts may have changed, that led the White House to change its mind?
In Afghanistan itself, not much appears to have changed. At the tactical level, to be sure, the counter-terrorism (CT) component is producing some results. At the operational level, General Caldwell's inspired leadership and management of the security force assistance (SFA) program has led to unexpected progress in a remarkably short period of time. At the strategic level, though, there has not been any noticeable improvement in terms of development and/or governance, be it at the national or the local levels.
The main "fact" that seems to have changed is the realization, on the U.S. part, that a) given the shortage of trainers and infrastructure, the majority of Afghan forces won't be ready to take over until 2014, and b) the majority of Taliban will never be weakened enough to be forced to the negotiating table so long as the AfPak border is not sealed, so long as Pakistan continues its double dealing, and so long as NATO's logistical dependence deprives the U.S. of any significant leverage over Pakistani elites.
In the Afghan neighborhood, by contrast, what has profoundly changed in the past twelve months is the diplomatic dynamics. In such a rapidly changing environment, the "fog of diplomacy" can become thicker still than the proverbial "fog of war," and military analysts will naturally be inclined to confine their assessments to the operational level. In fairness, based on open sources alone, it is often difficult to get more than a fragmentary picture of the moves and countermoves of the various players. Within these limits, though, it should be clear to military analysts that two ongoing developments deserve careful monitoring:
On the one hand, due to China's increasing assertiveness in the region in general, and in India's own backyard (Jammu & Kashmir and the Arabian Sea) in particular, New Delhi seems to have finally realized that the presence of NATO in the area (both on land and at sea) is all benefit to India, and that the time has come to dispense with the Nehruvian theology of "non-alignment." On the other hand, due to Turkey's increasing self-intoxication with the idea of a "Global Turkey" in general, and its assertiveness with regard to the Sino-Pakistani axis in particular, not only has India never been so threatened with marginalization over Afghanistan as today, but America itself is in danger of losing the diplomatic initiative.
To the extent that there is a Plan B for AfPak, then, one could argue it is aimed above all at preserving optimal flexibility for the U.S. in the next three years, while keeping China out, bringing India in, and calming Turkey down.
Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak
Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC. This is a follow-up to two articles: Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics and COIN in Absurdistan: Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater (and Vice-Versa). The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of State.
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In today's New York Times..the issue of the detained US Embassy employee who shot and killed two alleged criminals in Pakistan was front and center. Apparently, this incident has caused great political debate on issues such as funding Pakistan in the future, the sales of weapons or weapon technology..and a host of other sanctions should Pakistan not release the US Embassy employee (operating under diplomatic immunity). In short, the issue has caused the State Department to reassess it relationship with Pakistan.
Although, Pakistan has launched military operations in the tribal areas..the end state is that nothing Pakistan nor the infamous ISI has done to quell the supply of IED making material to Afghanistan, stop the cross border sanctuaries, nor taken substantially actions to thwart Taliban organizational structure within Pakistan.
The Point: Comments like "re-assess our relationship" with Pakistan and such...on the issue of one individual hardly overshadows the deaths of ISAF personnel and the thousands of injuries from weapons, fighters and IED's that originate in Pakistan.
If a "get tougher" attitude by the US does not materialize, then we will see a dilution to all the effort now being placed by the 100,000 or so US Soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan.
Coupled with Pakistan..and the dysfunctional Karzai government, the hope of a stable and security Afghanistan is only a "hope"...regardless of how well things are going in Kandahar or elsewhere.
Paktia/Khost-2003
Not only has money not brought leverage, it has circumvented and thwarted genuine liberal reformers. That is because the Pakistani military colonizes the state, essentially owns many state run businesses, and ensures the bilateral military-feudal family gravy train continues. If a few of your own citizens have to die in the process, well, sometimes you break a few eggs in making an omelette. It's an old joke but an apt one: Pakistan is a military with a state, not the other way around.
That is why it is so sad to see some in the American defense and foreign policy community take such nonsense as "strategic depth" seriously, even if in a "let's humor them" fashion.
Hijacking your entire state apparatus and thwarting all good governance and letting your schools and other public institutions rot for a theoretical future grand land battle with the Indians is beyond foolish.
I don't know what word to use for those in the West that intellectually ratify such chicanery. Well-meaning, I suppose.
And, of course, all of the above in my comments may be wrong and the foreign policy and defense community in the States might be entirely correct. They've done a good job so far.
And, by the way, <strong>Matt S.</strong>, the US <em>is</em> trying some version of a "whole-of-government approach". It's called the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 and attempts to improve governance and whatnot by shuttling aid toward NGOs and civilian institutions. We are encountering difficulties.
Who could have predicted that?
@ <strong>gin, Matt S and others</strong>:
I've pretty much given up on the US having any sense on the topic. Nothing will change in the near term, in my opinion, because of a 60 year relationship with an ally that has never been an ally in the sense of shared values. We had common enemies in the past and worked together toward that end. That's it.
My theory is that in the process, officials in our defense and policy communities romanticized a relationship it ought not to have romanticized. I suppose it made it easier on the conscience to think we gave money to a cause that was noble in intention, if gritty and violent and terrible in reality. Well, it <em>was</em> noble in intention but you can't forgive all bad things because of good intention.
<em>And its worth remembering that American officials and journalists alike have a tendency to become astonishingly credulous upon arriving within Pakistani airspace. (Read David Ignatiuss column in todays Washington Post for a tragicomic example.) This is especially true if said Americans are from the generation that came to Pakistan during the anti-Soviet war and developed passionate affection for the country and its military.</em>
<a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/187912/pakistani-realities/jonatha…;
Unfortunately, 60 years of "statecraft" creates a lot of deadweight, intellectually and personally. Remember: in DC there must be a lot of well-meaning personal relationships developed over time. Bad habits and bad ideas about South Asia, India, and Pakistan will have to be unlearned. It's 2011, not 1985, but that is a bridge too far for some.
We have never really had leverage. How much leverage do you have when the main plotter of the murder of three thousand of your citizens sets up shop - by invitation - within the borders of said ally?
Said ally has issues, it seems, and so do we. I have sympathy, by the way, for the Pakistanis, even if it seems like I don't. We enabled a lot of the madness. How could genuine good quality representative government arise in such a hothouse mess financed by IMF and American aid dollars?
Here is an excerpt from a very good FP "we don't have leverage" article (such articles will make no difference, I wager, but we shall see):
<em>U.S. policymakers should note well this series of events and remember a simple lesson. Billions of dollars of U.S. assistance-and a sustained diplomatic focus on the reform agenda-have not given the United States the ability to dictate the outcomes of Pakistan's political process. This is inconvenient for the United States, but not surprising. For the United States and for other major donors in Pakistan, money has never brought leverage.</em>
<a href="http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/20/pakistan_s_political_cr…;
(I know I said I'd stop commenting here. Turns out I am a terrible creature of habit. And I don't watch football :) Appreciate the articles on training of the ANSF, btw.)
some of the benefits
1. not another anti-amriki govt.(O.K. this is questionable, but still) ala iran in the region.
2. they do fight the ttp who are attacking our men. thats what the whole pakistani offense in s. waziristan was about. ttp has attacked even the isi headquarters in rawalpindi, so i guess that is one common enemy we have.
3. even if they dont want to go into north waziristhan where the haqqanis are, at least they give us airspace.
We have been using my diplo and mil leverage over Pak. for a decade now, but still they do not deliver. That is the failed strategy, it is not enough to make the Pak mil. stop supporting the Afghan and Punjabi Taliban. A new strategy altogether is needed, something fresh. And ASAP. First of all the leverage should be used to free "Raymond Davis".
The problem is that we had no real coherent policy (diplomatic or otherwise) coming from the POTUS level on down regarding AfPak or Central Asia in particular until relatively recently. Even now, Pakistan is not exactly a completely sincere or able partner.
Even after 9/11, and years into the war in Afghanistan, we had no real comprehensive policy regarding Pakistan and their dual dealing with the Taliban. Unfortunately, Bush either believed Musharraf or tolerated his dual-dealing with the Taliban and extremists in Pakistan. Their reasoning was because they believed India was encroaching on their turf (Afghanistan), and the ISI has for decades co-opted and even provided training and sanctuary for extremist groups that are anti-Indian. For instance Lakshar e-Taibba was one of the extremist groups that they supported. They figured that as long as they had the extremists, they had some semblance of influence in Afghanistan, and a way to covertly strike back at Indian elements both there and in India.
Now, after Musharraf, we still have to deal with Pakistan's dual dealing, because the civilian government is either unwilling or unable to force the ISI to cut ties to extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban. Who knows how duplicitous their head of the ISI is? Even if he is completely sincere, there is only so much he can do to stop the not-insignificant percentage of his subordinates who are pro-Islamic extremist (after all, many of them have worked alongside the extremists for decades).
It is a damn tough situation both militarily as well as diplomatically, and a comprehensive review of our strategies, tactics, and goals, both military and diplomatic should be done, and see if can find a whole-of-government approach to this situation. As it is, SECDEF Gates and SECSTATE Clinton are on the same page, which is a good first step. In my opinion, Obama needs to use our diplomatic and military leverage over Pakistan to further our goals there. Progress has been made, but more needs to be done.
Source:
-- Descent into Chaos, by Ahmed Rashid.
-- Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda.
While concepts such as "Global-NATO" or bringing India into Afghanistan in a major way both trouble me deeply, I can only lend my whole hearted concurrence to the Author's conclusion regarding the Constitution:
"In and of itself, though, supporting civil society does not amount to a political strategy. Worse still, the call to support new players overlooks the fact that what is needed first of all are new institutions. If thirty years of academic research on democratic transition has proved anything, it is that 1) a parliamentary regime is more conducive to democracy than a presidential regime, and 2) the politics of constitution-making matters as much as the final product itself. Like it or not, the current constitution will have to be changed at some point between now and 2014, or else Afghanistan will continue to go nowhere fast, with or without Karzai.
If Karzai is smart enough, he will try to have Washington agree to drop its opposition to a third mandate in exchange for his active support for a constitutional devolution toward both greater parliamentarization and decentralization, along the lines of the 1978 Spanish constitution. Surprising as it may seem, then, it is still not too late for Karzai to go down in history as the ââ¬â¢Juan Carlos of Afghanistan."