Small Wars Journal

Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Sun, 10/31/2010 - 12:16pm
Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations:

Where, When, and Why Should the U.S. Intervene?

by Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Abstract. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding its international stability and reconstruction involvements expanding. But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting S&R in more than a few key locales. So why does intervention benefit the U.S.? What are the factors most effective in predicting where S&R may become necessary? How can the U.S. assess the degree of threat when deciding whether to intervene or not?

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Carol E. B. Choksy is adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University. She also is CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is a professor of Central Eurasian, International, Iranian, and Islamic Studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. Additionally, he is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities.

This research was supported by the Indiana Complex Operations Partnership (InCOP) through Indiana University, Bloomington.

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Comments

While I enjoyed the article and found it very informative, I think it failed to deliver no providing a methodology for prioritizing on where we need to intervene and conduct S&R operations. I also thought some of their assessments were a bit shallow. For example, they stated the USG had no interest in intervening in Sri Lanka because the LTTE wasn't targeting the U.S.. From that perspective the rational is sound, but to defeat the LTTE the government required substantial foreign aid, most of which was provided by China, so now China has significant influence in Sri Lanka (bought and paid for) and potential future naval bases to support operations in the Indian ocean. Our interests cannot be limited to the potential of terrorism threats directed agianst the U.S..

Although the purpose of the article was not intended to tell us how to conduct effective S&R operations, I'm still left wondering how we would "effectively" engage all the areas they identified as U.S. interests? It seems to me our efforts are often an expensive artificial life support system that we have to maintain indefinitely, or until a cure is developed. In short, I question the feasibility of the U.S. and its partners conducting S&R globally to achieve stability. It one of ideas that sounds logical, but looks quite different in practice.