by Stan Wiechnik
According to the FM 3-24 legitimacy is the “main objective” in a political insurgency. Whichever side is seen as being legitimate by the population, government or insurgent, has a distinct advantage in the conflict. Legitimacy is not directly defined in the manual. Instead the manual simply says that “[g]overnments described as ‘legitimate’ rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as ‘illegitimate’ tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion”[1]. The manual further states that “[c]ommanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the [host nation] population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations”[2]. Yet the manual spends less than a paragraph on the types of legitimacy and no time on how to identify which type the population accepts. Instead the manual assumes that the population will accept the form of legitimacy offered by the COIN force, one provided via elections and essential services. This is a major flaw in the document and can lead to a COIN operation that is doomed to failure from its inception.
Political Legitimacy
Unfortunately, legitimacy is not easily defined. For simplicity I will conform to the objective description used in the FM; that political legitimacy manifests itself by a willingness of the population to acquiesce to the rule of the government. When looked at from this perspective legitimacy is a form of social contract between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers are granted their authority by the population. In democratic societies this grant is provided via the mechanism of elections. In non-democratic societies identity serves as the basis for legitimacy, either in the form of religion, ethnicity, or ideology[3]. In both cases the foundation of legitimacy is found in the norms and values of a society[4]. A government will be seen as illegitimately formed and the population will actively resist it if it does not conform to their accepted norms and values.
Democratic systems see the right to govern as granted by the people. The people are the source of a government’s legitimacy. The people create the government by the form of a social contract usually taking the form of a constitution. The constitution defines the rights of the individual citizen and those of the government. The citizens ultimate power rests in institution of suffrage; the right to vote to decide who shall govern. This system can exist because it conforms to the social norm held by the majority of the population. This social norm is founded on an individualistic value system. The individual’s rights are superior to the rights of the government. It is reflected in ideas like it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict an innocent man. This common ideal or social norm allows the group to agree on what type of leader they will follow as well as who they will resist. In societies that have an individualistic social norm the population will not accept a leader who simply declares himself their sovereign ruler without an election or some other traditionally accepted form of succession.
Non-democratic societies have a different set of social norms and values that they use to gain legitimacy. Their values are based on the community as a whole. Group survival and group identity are valued above individual identity. Personal identity within the group defines the obligations of the individual and those of the group. The five most common are religion, ethnicity, ideology, tradition, and the provision of benefits to the population[5]. The first three form a basis for legitimacy while the last two seem to support a specific regime. Religion is often cited as a basis for political legitimacy in non-democratic states. The FM 3-24 acknowledges religion as a potential basis for legitimacy citing medieval Europe, ancient China, and modern Iran as examples of states that used religion to legitimize their rule. Many other Middle Eastern states use religion to help bolster their legitimacy, usually in the form of a connection between the Prophet Mohammed and the ruling family. For example, the kings of both Jordan and Morocco present themselves as direct descendants of the Prophet[6]. Ethnicity can also form the basis of legitimacy in a non-democratic system. Being a member of the right clan, tribe, or ethnic group may be looked at as a prerequisite for leadership. Iraqi Kurds essentially run an independent country unwilling to accept the legitimacy of rule from the non-Kurdish Iraqi central government. Collectivist ideologies can be used by non-democratic governments as a basis of legitimacy. These will usually take the form of an extreme version of nationalism like fascism or communism. They can sometimes be hybrid regimes where the façade of elections support regime legitimacy. Often they are supported by a combination of a common identity and a charismatic personality. Examples would include Nazi Germany built on Hitler’s charisma and Arian identity or Nasser’s presidency in Egypt which was built on the combination of his personality and Arab nationalism.[7] Tradition has more to do with who has traditionally been the leader within the communal group when a new leader was required. Hereditary succession would be a form of tradition. Provision of benefits to the population is considered important in maintaining (or, is some cases gaining) legitimate leadership status. Tradition and provision of benefits to the population are also seen as important in individualistic/democratic societies.
Comparison with FM 3-24
The FM 3-24 offers no guidance on how to determine which value set the local population is using or which form of legitimacy they are likely to accept. The sole method of gaining legitimacy offered by the FM is the provision of benefits to the society. While not openly stating it the only form of legitimacy offered is constitutional governance appears to be via elections. I base this comment on the observation that the logical lines of operations for governance end in elections. It totally disregards any form of legitimacy normally associated with non-democratic governments. This may well be a policy choice since the spread of democracy is a policy goal. However, there needs to be recognition of the other types of legitimacy and how to deal with them.
If the policy goal is the spread of democracy (as opposed to state stability via a non-democratic form of legitimacy) then the FM needs to include guidance on how to transition a society from one form of legitimacy to another. It needs to provide commanders guidance on how to change an entire society’s value system. If no clear guidance is provided the operations are not going to succeed. Whichever host nation government we help support will only last as long as we are on the ground providing security and financial support. If the system created does not adhere to the historical form of legitimacy accepted by the population then it will probably fail. It will be replaced by a system more to the liking of the people.
Conclusion
The ideas presented in the FM 3-24 regarding fighting a counterinsurgency campaign are basically sound. However the lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem. If the stated goal of the operation is stability then recognizing which forms of stability are acceptable to the population in a historically non-democratic country is critical. If the stated goal is transition to democracy then the FM needs to include guidance on how to change the population’s value system. Future versions of the document should provide more information on legitimacy as well as how to either conform with the current form of legitimacy or to transition to the preferred form.
[1]United States. Dept. of the Army. and United States. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006). Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24/Mcwp 3-33.5. Washington, D.C., Headquarters Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Schlumberger, O. (2010). "Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East." Middle East Critique 19(3): 233-250.
[4] Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, Inc.; Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York,, Free Press.; Wiechnik, S. (2011) Introduction to the Locus of Legitimacy and State Stability. Small Wars Journal Vol. 7, 13
[5] Ibid. 3
[6] Ibid. 3
[7] Cook, D. (2011). "The Arab Spring and Failed Political Legitimacy." Hedgehog Review 13(3): 37-46.; Schlumberger, O. (2010). "Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East." Middle East Critique 19(3): 233-250.
About the Author
Major Stan Wiechnik enlisted in the Army in 1982 and received his commission in 1993. He has served in the Military Police Corp, Air Defense Artillery, and the Engineers. He deployed to Afghanistan as a company commander and Iraq as a battalion executive officer. He is a graduate of CGSC, Indiana University, and Vermont Law School. Currently, he serves in the ROTC Department at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts.
Comments
in my mind the only thing worse than a foreign power occupying your country is a foreign power occupying your country and doing nothing to meet immediate requirements because it is wedded to high-minded ideals of having the host nation do it based on the perception of "legitimacy."
I always cringe when people back up their arguments using their perspectives on why population groups do x or y. Unfortunately this type of thinking is killing us in Afghanistan- as we rarely question the assumptions that drive our actions. We assume the Afghans are just like us or the Malays or the Nicaraguans and then we blame Pakistan or the lack of troops or the the impatience of our leaders on a lack of progress.
BG Kelly busted a hole in this line of reasoning much better than I could have done here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/fighting-small-wars-in-the-new-century
BL: it sometimes makes no sense to protect the people from the insurgents if the people don't want protection from them. That we think all Afghans do is, IME, an invalid and self-destructive assumption.
In terms of FID vs. COIN- COIN is a subset of FID and COIN can be undertaken without an "industrial" effort- in fact, why we think it has to be industrial is beyond me. THAT is the real takeaway- that we don't have to do COIN with massive amounts of conventional troops. We should be more creative than that. I fault the campaign planning ability at our COCOMs and SOCs for that.
So Mike, if Don's post represents the "revolution," who, or what, is the establishment against which the revolution is rebelling?
thanks, happy new year bro
gian
Gian, it's time to take the power back.
Obviously a puppet government established by the U.S. to replace a legitimate government can't be legitimate, and just as obviously the citizens who resist that change are not insurgents, extremists or terrorists. The U.S, would have you think otherwise, of course.
So the whole "Host Nation" construct in FM 3-24, in the above scenario, is bogus, and therefore COIN is also bogus because according to 3-24 "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government." You don't do that by overthrowing the existing government.
Was the Vichy government legitimate? Was the French Resistance an insurgency? Of course not. Case closed.
Want some real insurgencies? Look at Libya, Egypt and Syria -- where the U.S, supported the insurgents. So we need an FM 3-25 -- Proinsurgency (POIN).
Welcome to the Revolution Don :).
Don,
Agree with much, but not regarding the French resistance. Of course it was an insurgency. Classic resistance. But the larger point is that the government is always "legal" often (as in the Vichy in France then, or GIRoA in Afghanistan today) not "legitimate" (recognized be the governed as having the right to govern them) by a significant segment of the populace forced to submit to such externally imposed governance.
Our own Declaration of Independence is based upon the premise of the right and duty of a populace to wage illegal challenge to government when no legal options are present or effective. The insurgent is always illegal, but he is not always wrong.
Our problem is that we intervene. The problem is exacerbated in that we intervene to help one side or the other prevail. Rather than focusing on facilitatiing a solution that will most likely lead to a situation that improves governance across the populace, we press the solution we believe will create a government most likely to support OUR interests in that region.
My position is that in the emerging environment of empowered populaces we need to dump the old Colonial playbook we have embedded into our doctrine and write new doctrine built upon the concept that a win in insurgency is when conditions improve for the entire populace, not nation building, but in terms of perceptions of critical concepts of Sovereignty, Legitmacy, Justice, Respect and Trust as assessed by the affected populaces. This means dumping the "Insurgency is war" mantra that says preserving the government is a win, and defeating the insurgent is the critical task. Not war, not the measure of success.
Small states can't hurt the US. Small populaces can. We must evolve to realize that if we feel we must intervene, we do so better as a Mediator to a more balanced solution worked out by the parties than we do by helping one side put a beat down on the other.
Cheers!
Bob
OIF was not only a failure of concept but also of execution and now Iraqis are celebrating the US withdrawal.
news report:
Thousands of Iraqis gathered in the capital Baghdad on Friday to celebrate the withdrawal of US troops from the country after nearly nine years of military involvement. Led by clergy, they chanted slogans against the "occupation" that started in 2003 and called the pullout earlier this month a "day of liberation and evacuation."
Why? Perhaps Iraqis are saying "tanks for the memories" (okay, I'm reaching) as seen here, here and here.
Bob,
No. The French resistance was refered to by Germans as "der französische Widerstand" (the French resistance). Also quite often resistance fighters were referred to as 'Partisaner'.
The US revolution, technically, was not an insurgency against local governments, which were colonial, it was an anti-colonial war of the type we've seen recently in Iraq and Afghanistan and earlier in India. In Afghanistan particularly it has been a staple for many years against the British (several times) and Soviets and so was always anti-colonial and not insurgency. This is why Iraqis today are celebrating the US colonial withdrawal.
So I basically agree with Stan Wiechnik (with one modification):
Again: Obviously a puppet government established by the U.S. to replace a legitimate government can't be legitimate. It is hogwash to pretend that that puppet government is somehow a 3-24 "Host Nation".
Stan correctly makes the point that this is not mere semantics, it "can lead to a COIN operation that is doomed to failure." I would go further than him though. Not, this major flaw CAN lead to a COIN operation that is doomed to failure from its inception -- it WILL lead to failure, as as been amply and repeatedly demonstrated in practice.
Best, Don
Again, agree with you main point, but in regard to the French WWII experience ( a classic resistance insurgency. The government and military had surrendered, it was therefore illegal for the populace to continue to resist the new legal government formed for them by the victorious Germans who occupied their country.) and the US (classic separatist insurgency, breaking a section free from the whole to place under new and sovereign government of our own choosing). You appear to focus on distinctions without difference, and I am not sure how it helps your arguement in regards to the presumption of illegitimacy of any government formed, or empowered to form, through external support.
Much of Israel's historic troubles with their Arab neighbors is also due to such a presumption of illegitimacy due to the rational perception that "but for Western help" they could not have created or defended their current state. This is why I advocate that we help Israel most by helping them less.
These governments must compromise the excessive control they took through such external help, share governance and opportunity equitably across their populaces, and stand upon their own two feet to ever grow a true popular legitimacy. A recognition by the President of the US as legitimate might help you get a seat at the UN, but it won't help you stabilize your populace. Any government or country formed in such a way has a long, hard struggle before it, particularly if it sets out to exclude or discriminate against the prior group as a matter of offical practice.
No, it's not a distinction w/o a difference, which is Stan Wiechnik's main point also. It's not a question of legalese, it's more visceral. Legitimacy is the problem, as the man said.
What form of legitimacy does a population recognize? -- he asks. My point is that legitimacy can not come from a puppet government installed by another country, purple fingers notwithstanding. That's been proven. So COIN is out. Gone. It's a farce based on a fiction (Host Nation).
People everywhere around our world differ in many respects. They have different languages and customs, different religions, forms of government, etc. But one trait they all share, and many Americans have trouble comprehending this, is a sense of patriotism which motivates them to resist outside influences in their government.
I will fight George Bush and Barack Obama, peacefully, as earnestly as I am able but let a foreign power come into this country with troops and try to influence Bush/Obama and the musket comes down off the mantle. I don't care what the Canadians or Mexicans feel about it (your Israel example) it's Katy bar the door time.
That's how Vietnamese, Iraqis and Afghans react too. That explains the familiar plaint: Why don't our guys fight like their guys? Because their guys fight for their country and our guys fight for us. Hey we set up this "Host Nation" for you -- what's the praaablem? "The problem is you" -- they respond. Get the hell out of my country.
That illustrates the farcical nature of COIN right there. If to make COIN work it's necessary to "change the population’s value system" then it's listen-to-Gian time, kiddies. Burn the field manual. It was never followed anyhow.
On that last point, perhaps we could get into the evaluation of "progress" spelled out in 3-24 and how it hasn't been followed -- a whole 'nother subject.
Datroy said,
"If we're ever going to be faced with a full blown COIN situation on an industrial scale like Iraq or Afghanistan again (and it's foolish to think we won't even if we hope to not have to), we have to understand the conceptual difference between that and FID and understand the difference each situation requires in short and long term objectives."
Regardless of any enduring lessons or tactical insights, he is spot on. It's just like learning the basic fundamentals of marksmanship or the shoothouse and room-clearing. If you start with bad habits in your foundation, everything else will fall apart.
As per Datroy and using Afghanistan and Iraq as examples:
The distinction being that with COIN, in these instances, it is really still "our" -- not "their" (our installed host-nation government's) -- fight?
To wit: (1) Our initiative (we invaded) and, thus, (2) our responsibility to see through to a proper end.
Thus, simply a follow-on phase to the state-on-state war that we entered into/began.
It's seems that it is not just FM 3-24 that contains the flaw noted by the Major, but also, as noted in my comment further below, the "U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual" and, indeed, the document entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America."
These items also seem to indicate that only Western-style governments are considered legitimate and, by implication, that only Western-style governments are to be considered "sovereign."
Such a distinct, specific and extremely limited articulation of what constitutes legitimacy (and, by implication, what constitutes sovereignty) would seem to leave the U.S. military with no choice but to do "nation-building" before it could rightfully depart the scene of a conflict.
(Working with/leaving something other than a Western-type government -- by our definition noted above -- constitutes working with/leaving a country with an illegitimate/non-sovereign governing entity.)
Talk about painting oneself into a corner!
When did the objective of an insurgency become legitimacy? I always thought the objective of an insurgency was domination by political and military means. Sounds like the real issue here is a sub-optimizing military manual.
I think the failure is not so much FM3-24 as it is our failure to practice what we preach and allowing clients like Karzia to run his own show against all common sense and our own concept of right and wrong. In Afghanistan there exists a near perfect Greek style democracy at the village level yet, Afghans can't vote for district or provincial governors. We let Karzia steel the election in 2009. Were is legitimacy in a system like that?
Sadly, this line of thinking has be present in our operations since late 2001. I didn't hear it much in the Balkans, but upon my arrival in Afghanistan in early 2002, I heard much about "legitimate" and "non-legitimate" forms of Afghan governance. The latter description applied most often to the shuras and elders that held sway over much of rural Afghanistan much as they had for a thousand years. I was taken aback that we were ready to sweep away traditions and standards developed over centuries because they didn't meet our western standard of legitimacy.
The first briefing I received from a beleaguered CPA staff member in Baghdad upon arriving in Iraq in late 2003 suggested that we didn't consider the local tribal leaders to have any "legitimate" authority. We later, after the insurgency was in full-swing, reversed this obviously misguided policy.
The arrogance we too often carry with us wherever we go which suggests our way of life is implantable if the people we wish to change would just adopt our values isn't helping us win wars, and it's leading us on the path to COIN becoming our strategy.
First, morally defined legitimacy matters little when the government lacks the capacity to provide security and services. We have a hard time understanding this.
Second, we in the military have no business trying "to change an entire society’s value system." This sort of nonsense needs to be banished from our heads. While Stan likely does not overtly mean it, the level of arrogance behind this sort of thought is breathtaking and counterproductive. We are not the morality police and must have no role in changing a society's value system. This is exactly why people around the world are rightly afraid of and hostile to our policies. We freak out about "social engineering" in the military, but then think we have the moral superiority to dictate what values systems others should use? I heard someone of rank recently refer to our efforts in Afghanistan as "God's work." Do we really think we are doing God's work? Is that why we think it is ok for us to foist our morals on others?
Societal values change slowly, generally stemming from changes in socio-economic structures. Trying to change values and impose democracy before these structures have begun to change is an exercise in futility. We need to do less and let others do for themselves more.
I really hope the Major does not honestly believe we can or should change the population's value system I strongly agree that it is critical to understand the population (and the entire situation) but to think that the military (or any external entity) can conduct operations to change the population's value system is truly a flight of fancy and I think one of our fundamentally false assumptions of the past 10 years.
I am hoping that the Major is really offering a cautionary note so that we draw the right conclusion from the fallacies of the arguments within the paper, e.g.,
"If the policy goal is the spread of democracy (as opposed to state stability via a non-democratic form of legitimacy) then the FM needs to include guidance on how to transition a society from one form of legitimacy to another. It needs to provide commanders guidance on how to change an entire society’s value system. If no clear guidance is provided the operations are not going to succeed. Whichever host nation government we help support will only last as long as we are on the ground providing security and financial support. If the system created does not adhere to the historical form of legitimacy accepted by the population then it will probably fail. It will be replaced by a system more to the liking of the people."
At best we can help a host nation provide security and financial support but as the last sentence says a system will be put in place more to the liking of the people. This paper should be advocating against trying to change a population's values and instead arguing that we should deal with them as they really are and not as we would wish them to be and allow them to govern themselves rather than impose what we think is best for them. Even based on our alleged (or perhaps self-delusional) ability to understand their historical forms of acceptable legitimacy – because despite our supposed understanding if we have the policy goal of spreading democracy we will end up trying to create a system in our image.
As the saying goes: "Stop the insanity" (e.g., attempts at nation building)
The Major (it has always been my experience that when someone is reminding me of my rank I am being admonished) believes that it is possible to set the conditions to allow a society to change its values on its own, but this is a multi-generational effort that is generally beyond the scope of a COIN fight. My comments were meant as a cautionary note. In some situations it might be advisable to seek stability. To do that we need to be able to recognize alternative versions of legitimacy.
That being said I do believe there are situations where the legitimacy of the insurgent is based on identity and the government can still win. The Basque Separatist movement is an example. Here the government dealt with the situation by recognizing past infractions and allowing limited autonomy with integration as the long term goal. The permanent cease fire called by the separatist last year was a recognition of the failure of ETA to maintain the support of the people; to maintain a separate legitimacy. So yes, there are situations where a separatists group's legitimacy can be removed by actions of the government. Since legitimacy is based in part on values systems then it is possible, given time, to alter the population's values. But these situations are going to depend on a greater depth of analysis than we give under the current doctrine.
In other situations, like Afghanistan, it is probably beyond the capability of our efforts to change this society's value system to comport with democracy. Here stability might be the best we can achieve. What the doctrine needs is a better understanding of the underlying difference between the two situations.
Major, I do not disagree with the need to understand the cultural foundation of legitimacy in societies. But your qualifying comments reinforce my concerns - the idea that we can have a policy that "spreads democracy" which might take generations to change the population's values which, as you correctly say, is generally beyond the scope of a COIN fight (certainly the US COIN fight as envisioned by most US proponents of COIN, but in my opinion the COIN fight should be waged by the host nation and not by the US but that is for another discussion). Yes, undercutting the legitimacy of the insurgents is critically important for the host nation to successfully defend itself from lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorisms. Again, I agree that more understanding of legitimacy is required but when we combine that understanding with the idea that it will make us able to better spread democracy or change the population's values we risk getting mired into future Afghanistans and Iraqs. We do not need an FM 3-24 that will reinforce the desires of those who are political crusaders who will tout 3-24 (without ever having read it) as the way of the future. 3-24 needs to be updated with all the best practices from Iraq, Afghanistan, and everywhere else, to allow the Army and Marine Corps to be able to understand insurgency and train to be able to help others conduct COIN as necessary but it should not be the "bible" for social re-engineering of entire nation-states. My fear is that by trying to write in concepts to have the military change the population's value systems over generations we will make that a self fulfilling prophecy as those political crusaders will seize on this and say "see the military has he capability to re-engineer societies and spread democracy and create societies in our image. I know that is not what you necessarily have in mind (at least I hope not), but I fear that that is how such concepts will be interpreted. We need to say that it is not the military's place to re-engineer societies or change the values of another nation's population. They have to do that themselves on their own timeline - if they want to do it at all. Political change comes from within and cannot be externally imposed unless you want to occupy a country in perpetuity.
V/R
Dave
Sir,
I understand your fear of having the FM 3-24 be the document that serves to act as the evidence that "the military has he capability to re-engineer societies and spread democracy and create societies in our image". My fear is that, with only one form of legitimacy offered as the solution to all political problems, that is exactly what it is. If the document offers realistic alternatives based on sound social and political theory that work for the HN population that do not require social engineering then I think they need to be added. We should not hamstring commanders by offering only one form of legitimacy as the solution to every problem. If, in order to do that, we include the reality of the time and effort it would take to conduct a multi-generational social engineering operation to create a liberal democracy where only rudimentary social and economic institutions exist (assuming It could even be done) then at least we have given the military leaders the ammunition to argue against such plans.
v/r
MAJ Wiechnik
MAJ Wiechnik,
How much more evidence do we need than to look at the countries in Eastern Europe that were forced to adapt communism for years. The USSR established their institutions, their education system taught the values of communism, their economy was based on communism, etc., and shortly after they achieved their freedom they quickly shed the "imposed" social/political changes. If 45 years of occupation and forced social/poltical changes didn't hold, how long do we think our "imposed" changes will hold? Obviously we're talking about two different political systems, so it isn't fair to compare them as equals, but the common denominator is imposed change. It rarely works, we need to let the country change at its own speed in its own way. The best way for us to change countries is to engage them peacefully and share our ideas, to allow their students to attend our schools, to open businesses in their countries, so they can compare different management systems, etc. They'll take what they like and integrate it in a way that makes it theirs, or in other words legitimate. We're trying to hasten that process, and in so doing not allowing the locals to choose what they think is right for them. We don't determine legitimacy, they do. Our problem is that their legitimacy may constrast signficantly with our value system and we believe we failed if we don't transform them. Instead of accepting their norms we end up in a bloody occupation that distracted us from our initial military objectives. This type of activity doesn't serve the occupied or occupier well.
My vote of concurrence to Bill's stated postion above.
The very concept of externally created legitimacy is an oxymoron. It must come from within, and it must be on terms established and accepted across the affected populace. While no populace is homogenous, and complete concurrence is an impossiblity, they can agree to broad principles and to some system of checks and balances based upon their shared culture that allows them to trust that those differences will not somehow grow to create unacceptable conditions in their future.
Any external solution, regardless of how smart, will undoubtedly struggle for acceptance. Likewise for any internal solution by any partial segment of the affected popualce elevated and protected artificially by some external power to the exclusion of others (think Afghanistan here). Our guidebooks are written for a bygone era. Time to adjust to the realities of the emerging environment.
Fortunately for Americans that is as simple as allowing in others the same principles we demand for ourself.
I am not advocating any externally imposed legitimacy. The manual is correct when it says that coercion cannot be used as a substitute for legitimacy. To the contrary, I am trying to provide commanders a realistic idea of what legitimacy is. As written the manual says we can buy legitimacy through the provision of services. I disagree. But what is the alternative? Unless we provide commanders with something else we have no viable doctrine.
If I may, and using the U.S. Army Stability Operations Manual, in this instance, as the reference, Chapter 1 (the Strategic Context), paragraph 1-28 (Legitimacy) of my 2009 University of Michigan Press edition, which states:
... "It (legitimacy) reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups: the local populace, individuals serving in the civil institutions of the host nation government, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public."
Paragraph 1-29 states:
... "In addition, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (known as the National Security Strategy) lists four traits that characterize a legitimate, effective state in which the consent of the governed prevails:
o Honors and upholds basic human rights and fundamental fredoms. Respects freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press.
o Responds to their citizens. Submits to the will of the people, especially when the people vote to change their government.
o Exercises effective sovereignty. Maintains order within its borders, protects impartial and independent systems of justice, punishes crime, embraces the rule of law, and resists corruption.
o Limits the reach of government. Protects the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy."
All other arrangements, it would seem, we consider -- and look to have declared -- as illegitimate; allowing for our interference and intervention, in one form or another, to "fix" said problem.
Thus, sovereignty, in the classic sense, is gone; in that today this distinction requires (1) the endorsement of such foreign/alien actors as "neighboring states, the international community, and the American public" and (2) a government that must mirror -- exactly -- that of the Western world.
"Although policy drives strategy, the capabilities and limitations of the military instrument also shapes policy. As Clausewitz wrote, the political aim 'must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it'" (BAYLIS, J.; WIRTZ, J.; COHEN, E.; GRAY, C. S., Strategy in the Contemporary World, 2002, UK : Oxford University Press, p. 71).
This is true only where the military can articulate their argument to the policymakers.
Stan, it is not a function of if you think your actions are "coercive" or merely "persuasive," it is your very presence and influence over the changes that makes them presumptively illegitimate.
This is part of the colonial context that must be purged from our doctrine. At a very minumum we must least appreciate that regardless of how soft our touch (like putting a Robin's egg back in her nest), it is our very touch that renders our efforts illegitimate, regardless of good intent. If we appreciate the truth and importance of this we can guard against negative effects, but never mitigate them completely.
We should expect Iraq to undergo changes now that we are gone, and not see that as dangerous, but rather as healthy. If we helped them to design mechanisms to explore such changes legally and in a manner that includes the entire popualce, then we have been successful. If instead, we have been so sure of what right looks like that we locked them into a single course that can only be changed through insurgency, then we should expect insurgency.
In Afghanistan this is the current fate under the current Constitution. If not of the Nothern Alliance one's only hope for equity and opportunity is through insurgency. With that reality added to the reality of the inherent illegitimacy of GIRoA and the Karzai presidency, we should not be surprised by the durability of the insurgency there.
Don't define outcomes. Don't deem who is appropriate and who is "beyond the pale," and ensure that trusted, legal and certain vehicles consistent with the culture and people they are applied to are in place. That is the best we can do to shape "legitimacy" as an outsider. If Star Trek is an indicator, we will apparently understand this better in the future than we do today...
Sir,
In my mind the only thing worse than a foreign power occupying your country is a foreign power occupying your country and doing nothing to meet immediate requirements because it is wedded to high-minded ideals of having the host nation do it based on the perception of "legitimacy." When the insurgents are threatening to kill you and/or your family you are probably happy with whoever comes to your aid. You might even be willing to grant a little leeway to the foreign power that is willing to aid you in this way, at least until your own government is able to do it themselves. You're not likely to give a fig that your own government will be able to do this in two or three years time (as with Iraq or Afghanistan) if you or your family will be dead anyway by then.
Our problem in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we too often ignored this short term imperative in our belief that only the host nation could do this job in the name of "legitimacy." So we'd fly the Afghan flag high over Marja or wherever else American and coalition forces actually did the fighting and pretend like the Iraqis or Afghans somehoe pulled off major miracles against the insurgents. This fooled nobody, and our insistence that the host nation government do all this themselves at the expense of establishing short-term security hurt our cause with a lot of locals.
Part of this "hands-off occupation" approach - something of an oxymoron - came from the overuse of cliches like the "graveyard of empires" and this belief that our simple presence there was what drove the insurgency, and that we could never do anything that could actually win the good will of the population and buy us some time to train the local forces. This idea is ahistorical. During our occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s, for example, we desperately tried to find someone we could install as President. Unable to find one, we established a military government, but were unwilling to really do anything, particularly about the worsening security situation. It was THAT, not our mere presence, that really turned the population against us, and it was based on Henry Stimson's argument along the same lines - that our mere presence there is what will inflame opinion against us.
We were (and still are) much more comfortable with the fantasy that we are there in support of governments we created, and so we try to fit the square FID peg into the round COIN hole. Being there is not alone going to drive the insurgency. Being there and not doing anything to help the people with what they really need and what their government can't provide them yet - that is sure to piss off every last member of the population and make it inevitable that they would then side with the insurgents instead in hopes that that decision will keep them alive.
If we're ever going to be faced with a full blown COIN situation on an industrial scale like Iraq or Afghanistan again (and it's foolish to think we won't even if we hope to not have to), we have to understand the conceptual difference between that and FID and understand the difference each situation requires in short and long term objectives. Resigning ourself to the idea that being there at all will contribute to failure, and that there is nothing we can do, that the government cannot, in the short term to win the goodwill of the people is not historically accurate or conducive to clarity in strategic decision-making.
This response and the article beg the question, are we really doing COIN? I'm not making reference to the FID/COIN discussion, there certainly are times when we conduct COIN unilaterally or as part of FID program in some cases. I am referring to the practice of countering an insurgency, or in a strictly security force lane are we focused on countering insurgents (counter guerrilla operations)? While "some" of the methods employed can and need to be indirect (focused on the population to garner support to provide freedom of movement and generate needed intelligence to C/K or force the insurgents to capitulate), it appears that with the exception of some special operations organizations and the occassional GPF clear, hold and build effort that our real focus is on re-engineering societies (to include their political and value systems). It will be difficult to determine the best lessons for COIN from our recent hubris, and like you I'm concerned that FM 3-24 as written (and as popularly perceived by those who haven't read it) will encourage politicians to pursue these actions in the future once the smell of the current fiascos fade over time.
Stan,
This is a very important topic. The biggest problem Westerners have is that we tend to view the topic of legitimacy far too much through our lens. We overly focus on legal definitions of legitimacy (Diem as the "legitimate" leader of South Vietnam; Karzai as the "legitimate" leader of Afghanistan per official legal vehicles of Western recognition); Western forms of bestowing such legitimacy (get rid of those messy war lords who rise to power of their own actions or Shuras/councils applying some process incompressible to us but seen as inherently legitimate by the populace, and replace with a nice, official election that is seen as more inherently legitimate to us); and as importantly, not appreciating that Western processes can only work in an environment where the culture not only understands, but more importantly, trusts in the results.
As I look at this topic in my studies on insurgency I see Legitimacy as one of the 5 primary drivers of the conditions that insurgency springs from. The definition I have come to is one of "recognition in the eyes of the governed of the right of government to govern them." But populaces are complex, and if only the populace served by the Northern Alliance recognizes the legitimacy of Mr. Karzai and his government one can reasonable expect the remainder of the populace to be ripe for insurgency.
No amount of increased military capacity sent out from the Northern Alliance to subdue the remainder will likely create such legitimacy (particularly when the suppressed fully appreciate that capacity to be an artificial creation of some external power and can continue to cling to the hope that once that artificial force is gone they will once again be able to achieve a true resolution of this debate.
No amount of ground cleared, night raids conducted, or development projects executed will create this legitimacy either. Again, all know that these are the acts of foreigners and not a reflection of the intent or capacity of the illegitimate power over them. They also see those within that illegitimate powersystem benefiting the most from all of the above. Growing in wealth, growing in power, and having traditional competitors eliminated for them by their foreign helpers.
Keep digging at this Stan, as our biased perspective on this topic must evolve if we are to become more effective, or at least more realistic, in what our intervening efforts might produce.
Cheers!
Bob