by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Donovan, Ms Karma Job, Lieutenant Colonel John Kolasheski, Colonel Richard Lacquement, Colonel Michael McMahon. Colonel Don Roach. Colonel Sean Swindell and Lieutenant Colonel Curt Van De Walle, Small Wars Journal
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving US SFA Efforts (Full PDF Article)
Current operations, the demands of persistent conflict, and the enduring national security interests of the United States underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve US Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout US history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since 9/11, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper recommends the creation of a new organization as a means of overcoming current bureaucratic impediments and providing a coherent focus on SFA challenges.
Previous US advisory experience with similar requirements did not result in institutionalized capabilities that would have forestalled major problems. Instead, US SFA efforts have been largely ad hoc ventures. The United States should have had expertise, plans, authorities, and organizational solutions readily at hand to address the full range of partnership activities when the inevitable crises arose. The Department of Defense (DoD) must act now to avoid future SFA difficulties and to ensure that it does not squander the hard-won lessons of recent experience. DoD is long overdue for a comprehensive approach to SFA that supports Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) and contingency operations in a manner that integrates US military assistance activities from ministerial through tactical levels, while providing strong links to complementary interagency and multinational activities.
This paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within DoD to create a comprehensive approach to improve US Security Force Assistance. At the heart of our recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to effectively institutionalize SFA activities and facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization. Expertise in key SFA activities, massed and integrated within a DoD-level organization, offers the best opportunity to improve hitherto disjointed efforts. This single integrator can be successful only with simultaneous change to DoD's authorities and policies.
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving US SFA Efforts (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
This proposal seems to echo an organization advocated by Thomas P.M. Barnett in his book "The Pentagon's New Map"; specifically his "System-Administration Force" or SysAdmin Force that does everything else that the regular military (the Leviathan force) doesn't.
Given that our National Defense Strategy states in part, "The best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the international system. Our national strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long term security", establishing an organization that focuses on SFA as well as retaining the lessons learned from our PRTs, ADTs, and the like (as well as the capacity to reestablish and expand those teams as well), may help us in accomplishing those strategic goals. If building partner capacity is to be one of the keys to ensuring that wars do not start or at least are contained, and partner states are assisted and become true allies, the DSFAA could become the basis for the SysAdmin organization that assists failing states in avoiding complete collapse, helps to coordinate disaster/ humanitarian relief (instead of leaving it corrupt governments or warlords) through ministerial-level advisors, and provides training in governance and national level management, what Barnett calls "Development-in-a-Box". This might be a bit ambitious, but I wouldn't be surprised if we see something like this within the next decade or two.
I agree that an institutionalized capability needs to occur, however I also agree with Rob's comments.
There are also a lot of "rice bowls" out there (we all know that), paradigms, institutionalize attitudes, misconceptions and down right ignorance wrt SFA, that need to change as well as legalities before something like this were to become a reality.
Good paper but don't agree on what they propose wrt structure or what service would head this.
Lastly lumping the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard into "maritime" services division really comes across as not doing your homework to put it mildly. All three services are closely connected but have distinct missions and abilities.
Get the "ad hoc" out and professional organizations in.
Boot
I think institutionalization itself goes beyond any one single aspect of the DOTMLPF equation. Ultimately it is manifested by the incorporation of the subject into your programs, policies and most importantly your values. Institutionalization of this type is why a proponent should exist, after it gets to that point, where its value is inherent into whatever type of organization they are the proponent for, then those resources that were allocated to the proponent can be retasked or reallocated to some new or existing requirement (allowing for some minimal functions that can not be integrated into existing structures). The proponent should work toward institutionalization across the scope of their responsibilities, not just pieces. It may be good to have a strategy toward institutionalization that is able to establish relevant objectives in across the entire DOTMLPF (or some other relevant framework) and determine how those objectives support institutionalization, e.g. not all things vying for your attention are equal, some are more valuable with respect to institutionalization.
With respect to SFA, institutionalization translates to relevant capabilities generated and available to be employed by an operating force who knows how to use them. It means that rather than wedge or massage another capability into an operational requirement, the right capability is available to enable a preferred COA and minimize the risk by getting round pegs into round holes. If we cannot generate those capabilities to be available when and where they are needed by the operational force, we fail. It the reason the generating force exists.
This requires a dialogue between those who will employ those capabilities, and those who will generate them. Im not sure our current KM practices or the M&S methodology we use to examine capability gaps support this, but it is certainly a two way street. Part of problem is articulating requirements in terms of capability and capacity - both sides have to ask the right questions.
Creating an agency such as that the authors advocate may have some value, but Im also cautious about it. Like other organizational approaches Im not sure it really gets at what institutionalization is (although it might facilitate it). Ive often remarked that until a BDE CDR turns to one of his Company CDRs during his Senior Rater counseling and says "Joe, you should consider advising foreign security forces as your next assignment, it will make you a better officer and a better commander", we will not have institutionalized SFA. That is because we value command and leadership positions above all else. Nothing wrong with that - I believe that is as it should be. Command is about responsibility as much as authority and we trust our commanders to look after our most treasured resource. However, much like the fictional Sam Damon (and many other non-fictional leaders), advising FSF can teach you allot you can use later own, of equal or greater value to anything else I think you can learn. When we understand and believe that advising FSF makes better commanders, and start sitting commanders who believe that on promotion and command boards we will turn the corner. Like it or not, we tend to identify with those who look most like ourselves - human nature I guess.
Even if we stand up something in the JIIM generating force (and there is allot of overhead and some risk to do it considering our generator is operating at less than optimal capacity these days) the ultimate test is how it is implemented on the ground. If we can not do that well, Im not sure it matters.
Best, Rob