The concept of dynamic insurgencies is well known, but poorly understood. I enjoyed the article, although I disagree with the authors’ use of three poles (terrorism, guerrilla, conventional) to describe the spectrum of insurgency, it is much more complex. However, the take away is that foes can and will adapt to one another, especially a conflict with irregulars.

The relevant take away for the military is to develop better situational awareness of the ebb and flow of irregular warfare, and not to elude ourselves into assuming that tactical victory in battle is significant, yet if we lose a tactical battle (the wrong perception from Somalia) it is a strategic set back for us far from the battlefield.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan we were slow to adapt an appropriate strategy as we transitioned from conventional conflict to irregular warfare, which made us vulnerable and allowed the insurgents to develop a strong base of coerced or willing support.

Terrorism, guerrilla tactics and conventional maneuver are tactics that can be applied unilaterally or in combination as required to achieve their objectives. A wise foe will adapt his tactics in response to our tactics to exploit any weaknesses; then we adapt; thus the so called Red Queen effect (co-evolution). Defeating their ability to conduct guerrilla warfare through increased security measures may prompt them to conduct more terrorist acts, or to go further underground and focus more on subversion while waiting for security conditions to relax; then the cycle starts again unless we neutralize their underground organization.

We’re waging a war of attrition and they’re waging a war of exhaustion. To effectively attrite the enemy we need to not only defeat his visible forces (fielded forces of guerrillas and terrorist operators), but more importantly we need to defeat his (which is often invisible) underground political apparatus. This requires understanding that it exists, developing the appropriate intelligence structure to identify it, and then applying the right mix of tools to eradicate it ranging from overt / covert operations to neutralize key personnel to implementing appropriate security programs, civil development and PSYOP programs. Failure to neutralize the insurgent political apparatus will allow the insurgency to continue to ebb and flow tactically from subversion, terrorism, guerrilla tactics to conventional maneuver in their pursuit to exhaust us. I am a strong advocate for studying the pacification program we implemented in Vietnam. It was highly effective, despite the misinformed media comments to the contrary, which unfortunately has skewed our historical documents as well. The war we’re fighting now is more complex, the political apparatus in many cases may be another country or countries. Our goal is to understand it, identify it, and neutralize it.