A well written article. One takeaway I think is important is the observation that the focus must be on building capacity and capability within that HN with regard to its security challenges.

I would add that our efforts to assist a given HN must be placed in a regional context. There are two potential reasons for BPC I think - the first is to improve stability within a specific HN to make it more resistant to extremism; the second is to potentially build exportable capability and capacity from that HN that could improve regional stability. Neither should be viewed as purely military efforts, just that security provides much of the foundation through which other efforts can grow. Our policy ends with respect to both a given HN and a region must be broad enough to accommodate those of our partners, at the very least we must find common ground, or there is not much of a partnership worth investing in.

I would disagree a bit with:

"There seems to be a major assumption among many planners that the level of effort in Iraq and Afghanistan will need to be sustained indefinitely in areas beyond those two countries and the focus is how to develop a force (some say an “Advisor Corps”) to be able to continue such large scale and continuous deployments. Before we develop such a force I think it is necessary to correctly frame the challenge we face, look at existing doctrine, training and organizations, and determine what is appropriate to sustain and what is appropriate for adaptation."

I don't think the anticipated level of demand needs to be exclusively associated with a focus on organizational solutions. While the various organizational fixes that have been solicited may be in response to anticipated demand, the focus should be on identification of capability and capacity gaps across the IA if BPC (e.g.in security, development, or economic) is the "way" we go after the end. After the gaps needed to operationalize the strategy have been identified, then we'd start turning the wheels to turn out additional means.

Right now a significant challenge is assessing demand. There are probably multiple approaches to assessing demand, but two come to mind - a bottom up one that comes in from the GCCs and/or country teams, and a top down one that could come from specific policy direction, often they come from both. I realize that description is simplistic since there are other injects - treaties, alliances, crises, etc., but the point is there are more then one. As mentioned, Iraq and Afghanistan have created an impediment to getting an indication from either as our supply is struggling to keep up with demand in those locations.

I think this is important to note, as the idea of BPC as a way to defeat global extremism and improve stability has only taken on the importance that we see now since we began to do a more detailed analysis of the enemy and the conditions which facilitate his (re)generation and operations, as well as the security environment we see evolving.

What I do think is a takeaway from Iraq and Afghanistan is that if the broad concept of BPC as a way is adopted, then the scope of the effort will vary on a number of levels, and it will probably be enduring in many cases (at least in the sense of political time). In some cases greater means with the right capabilities applied to the problem will shorten the duration required to build sufficient capability and capacity, but sometimes the conditions surrounding the problem will just require time. This builds a requirement to regenerate and sustain the means and if we don't have sufficient capacity in an area for whatever reason, then we assume operational and strategic risk somewhere.

Its a tough call, but I think until the civilian leadership outlines how important they believe BPC is to achieving the ends, and what risk they are willing to assume in other areas then these efforts will remain ad hoc in nature, and while being OK at many things, will not necessarily do anything as well as they could while the enemy continues to foment instability. Once the policy and strategy are in place, then we can get past rolling the egg around the table, work toward aligning our capabilities toward achieving unity of effort, and move forward on a national level.

Best, Rob