Small Wars Journal

11/10/2020 News & Commentary - National Security

Tue, 11/10/2020 - 2:30pm

News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.

1. Exclusive: Esper, on his way out, says he was no yes man

2. Here’s what you need to know about Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller

3. Trump's new military hire raises fears of last-minute military plans overseas

4. The danger of treating national security like a political sideshow

5. What do Chinese people think of the US election?

6. What today’s generals could learn from George Washington's evolution

7. 21st-century proxy wars

8.  International institutions still matter to the US

9. US Marines officially training in Taiwan for 1st time since 1979

10. Belt and road stakeholders don’t believe China uses ‘debt-trap diplomacy’

11. Why tough is not enough in foreign policy

12. COVID-19 and the U.S. military

13. Breaking the cycle: America’s challenges combatting irregular warfare in the 21st century

14. An Obama restoration on foreign policy? Familiar faces could fill Biden’s team

15. From Prussia with love: the origins of the modern profession of arms

16. Covid-19 may not have emerged in Wuhan, says leading virus hunter

17. Siege mentality: a tale of two Wus

 

1. Exclusive: Esper, on his way out, says he was no yes man

Military Times · Meghann Myers · November 10, 2020

Certainly, Secretary Esper has turned out to be a controversial SECDEF. The true test of a leader is how well an organization functions when he is no longer there. His leadership will be judged by how well DOD functions in the coming days, weeks, and months.

 

2. Here’s what you need to know about Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller

Task & Purpose · Jeff Schogol · November 10, 2020

My comments are below. As noted, I have confidence in Chris. 

As an aside I participated in a conference last evening and I heard a former senior defense official criticize Chris' appointment, saying he was a former Lieutenant Colonel (inaccurate as he retired as  full Colonel) and that he would not be able to make the service chiefs do anything because they would look on him with natural disdain. Such a comment is an insult to Chris as well as the service chiefs. But the implication is that they would not respect the Acting SECDEF because he did not attain sufficient uniformed rank is just incredible. First, there is likely no incoming SECDEFE who knows and understands the National Security and National Defense Strategies better than Chris. But what is really fascinating is that Esper retired as a Lieutenant Colonel who served the majority of his military career in the reserve components? Did the Service chiefs consider him simply a Lieutenant Colonel in civilian clothes? I think not. We should look at some of the past SECDEFs. Was Rumsfeld more qualified to be SECDEF (his first time) at 45 years old after being a Navy Lieutenant? Of course, the argument is while they might have been junior officers (or NCOs in Vietnam), their life experiences more than compensate for not having a career in the military (did McNamara's life and business experiences translate into making him a good SECDEF?). I would put Chris's experiences up against some of the SECDEFs. Of course, not every SECDEF can be a Marshall, Forrestal, or Mattis.

 

3. Trump's new military hire raises fears of last-minute military plans overseas

Sydney Morning Herald · David S. Cloud · November 10, 2020

I was unaware of this issue. I guess I assumed that only applied to general officers.

Another possible barrier to Miller's appointment is a law that prohibits anyone who has served as an officer in a regular branch of the armed services in the past seven years from becoming defense secretary.

Miller left the army in 2014, but it's not clear if the restriction applies. Legal experts said the statute does not distinguish between appointments as acting and permanent secretary. The law can be waived but only by the Senate.

 

4. The danger of treating national security like a political sideshow

Defense One · Kevin Baron · November 9, 2020

Scathing critique.

 

5. What do Chinese people think of the US election?

Diplomat · Aadil Brar · November 10, 2020

A useful survey of Chinese media (propaganda outlets) and social media.

 

6. What today’s generals could learn from George Washington's evolution

Defense One · Thomas E. Ricks · November 9, 2020

Are there any US generals in the modern era that Tom Ricks likes?  But the ability to "observe, reflect, and adjust" is sage advice.

As an aside, I do look forward to Ricks' new book. I will be interested in reading his take on the influence that Greek and Roman philosophers and leaders had on our founding fathers. While so many tout the influence of Judeo-Christianity, I think Greek and Roman philosophy had more influence on the development of US political philosophy than religion did.

 

7. 21st-century proxy wars

USNI · Captain Michael Hanson · November 2020

Interesting thesis.

Congress best describes what we need from irregular warfare in the 2018 NDAA: irregular warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”

 

8. International institutions still matter to the US

Strategist · Joseph S. Nye · November 10, 2020

Yes, they do. Like our alliances are key to our national security, effective work within international institutions is key to exercising US national power.

 

9. US Marines officially training in Taiwan for 1st time since 1979

Taiwan News · Keoni Everington · November 11, 2020

SOF leading the way on engagement with Taiwan (MARSOC and SF). Economy of force use of SOF as well as for strategic messaging.

 

10. Belt and road stakeholders don’t believe China uses ‘debt-trap diplomacy’

Diplomat · Pradumna B Rana & Xianbai Ji · November 6, 2020

 

11. Why Tough is Not Enough in Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy Research Institute · Margaret Seymour · November 9, 2020

Some interesting food for thought.

 

12. COVID-19 and the U.S. military

War On the Rocks · Mark Cancian · November 10, 2020

USFK is a model.

 

13. Breaking the cycle: America’s challenges combatting irregular warfare in the 21st century

Small Wars Journal · Will Corry · November 9, 2020

 

14. An Obama restoration on foreign policy? Familiar faces could fill Biden’s team

New York Times · by Michael Crowley · November 9, 2020

 

15. From Prussia with love: The origins of the modern profession of arms

Modern War Institute · Mick Ryan · November 10, 2020

 

16. Covid-19 may not have emerged in Wuhan, says leading virus hunter

Telegraph · Nicola Smith · November 10, 2020

This must be taken with a grain of salt.

 

17.  Siege mentality: a tale of two Wus

Strategy Bridge · John F. Sullivan · November 10, 2020

More on Sun Tzu and his peers or contemporaries.

But do not miss this footnote:

[26] For instance, Colin Gray ranks Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Thucydides in the “First Division” (out of a total of four) of strategic theory classics, and notes that “membership in the First Division is beyond sensible argument.” Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 240-1.

 

“You have attributed conditions to villainy that simply result from stupidity.”

- Robert A. Heinlein, The Green Hills of Earth

“Living beings everywhere compete for the means of existence. Competition takes the more intense form we call conflict when … contenders try to hamper, disable, or destroy rivals.”

- Jack Hirshleifer, The Handbook of Defense Economics, vol 1,  Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, (eds).

“Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us therefore study the incidents in this [war] as philosophy to learn wisdom from and none of them as wrongs to be avenged.”

- Abraham Lincoln, November 10, 1864

11/10/2020 News & Commentary - Korea

Tue, 11/10/2020 - 12:23pm

News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.

1. Seoul must revamp North Korea policy under Biden era

2. Moon hopes to continue Trump's engagement with N. Korea

3. ‘Squeezing’ N. Korea for nuclear talks could backfire: experts

4. S. Korean lawmakers planning visits to U.S. to form ties with Biden

5. Defense experts predict quick cost-sharing deal between South Korea, Biden administration

6. 21 USFK-affiliated individuals test positive for COVID-19

7. China and North Korea are allies, but what happens if Kim Jong-Un goes too far?

8. New virus cases in triple digits for 3rd day; authorities warn of upping social distancing level

9. Why Joe Biden could face a North Korean nuclear standoff before he even takes office

10. S. Korea considering arranging Moon-Biden phone talks at 'appropriate time': foreign ministry

11. A simple strategy for negotiating with North Korea in the next administration

12. New challenges and potential for the U.S.-South Korea alliance under Biden And Moon

13. For South Korea’s president, Biden's win is both good news and bad news

14. Activists call for U.N. probe of 'voluntary' North Korea repatriation from Japan'

15. South Korea investigation ongoing into North Korean man's defection

16. Late Pres. Kim Dae-jung exchanged letters with Biden in the 1980s

17. Authorities in locked down Hyesan sell rice to hungry families

 

1. Seoul must revamp North Korea policy under Biden era

Dong-A Ilbo · November 10, 2020

It is critical that Seoul re-examine its assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and its objectives to dominate the Korean peninsula. And there needs to be combined (ROK/US) analysis and strategy development.

 Here is my recommendation from a forthcoming paper assessing the last four years and making recommendations for the future (yes, brace yourselves for all the think tanks offering advice to the next administration):

On October 30th President-elect Biden published a special contribution to Yonhap News Service outlining his views on the ROK/U.S. alliance and security on the Korean peninsula:

“Words matter -- and a president's words matter even more. As President, I'll stand with South Korea, strengthening our alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia and beyond, rather than extorting Seoul with reckless threats to remove our troops. I'll engage in principled diplomacy and keep pressing toward a denuclearized North Korea and a unified Korean Peninsula, while working to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades.”[1]

Develop an Alliance Strategy for the Korean Peninsula: Through the existing State Department-Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategy working group[2] reassess the strategic assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and its objective to dominate the Korean peninsula.  Develop a combined strategy with a long-term focus on solving the “Korea question,” e.g., unification, in addition to deterrence, defense, and denuclearization.[3]

[1] Vice President Joe Biden, “Special contribution by U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden,” Yonhap News, October 30, 2020, (https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201030000500325)

[2] David Maxwell, “Strategic Working Group Strengthens U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies Policy Brief, January 19, 2020,( https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/01/03/strategic-working-group-strengthens-u-s-south-korea-alliance/)

[3] The Korean War Armistice Agreement, Panmunjom, July 27, 1953, (https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf) See Paragraph 60 for the “Korea question.”

 

2. Moon hopes to continue Trump's engagement with N. Korea

Chosun Ilbo · Kim Jin-myung & Ahn Jun-yong · November 10, 2020

Please, President Moon, re-examine your strategic assumptions about North Korea. The past four years (and the past 7 decades) provides irrefutable evidence that your assumptions (that Kim Jong-Un wants peace, is willing to reconcile, will negotiate in good faith, and will denuclearize if he receives security guarantees and sufficient concessions) are false. You cannot base strategy on these false assumptions. Furthermore, it is time to develop a combined ROK/US alliance strategy for dealing with North Korea as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.

 

3. ‘Squeezing’ N. Korea for nuclear talks could backfire: experts

Korea Herald · Choi Si-young · November 10, 2020

Will they turn these words into action?

I hope the incoming Biden administration will listen to the advice of its advisors rather than dangerous recommendations of simple appeasement.

 

4. S. Korean lawmakers planning visits to U.S. to form ties with Biden

Yonhap News Agency · 김나영 · November 10, 2020

Four years ago, I participated in similar events with Korean legislators and government officials asking to figure out the incoming Trump administration. The thing that is ingrained in my memory is this assessment from an American scholar who said there are three things that guide then President-elect Trump and his decision making: 1) his personal satisfaction, well-being, and how a decision affects him; 2) his family; and 3) his perception that he is winning (everything is judged in terms of "I win, you lose").   I also remember the advice on how to deal with SMA negotiations (cost sharing). To meet the future demands for funding US troops in Korea known to be forthcoming, an American recommended that South Korea simply reduce the amount of US defense articles it buys and shift those funds to the cost sharing agreement. US defense companies would see reduced revenue, but it would be judged a win because the Koreans would be "forced" to pay more for US troops. This was in November 2016.

 

5. Defense experts predict quick cost-sharing deal between South Korea, Biden administration

Stars & Stripes · Seth Robson · November 10, 2020

I think Koreans would make a mistake in thinking that a new administration will simply agree to current proposals. I am sure they are going to thoroughly examine the issues. Yes, it will not make exorbitant demands. But it will want to ensure a fair and equitable sharing of costs and there are some costs (unique to US forces stationed in Korea) that are rising. These costs, such as declining access to adequate training facilities, will drive up training costs if US forces have to train off-peninsula to maintain qualifications in accordance with regulations.

 

6. 21 USFK-affiliated individuals test positive for COVID-19

Yonhap News Agency · 최수향 · November 10, 2020

This is troubling on one hand and yet also gives us confidence in the US military in Korea and how it is handling the pandemic. I worry the Korean government could make demands for more testing or some other mitigating actions before USFK affiliated personnel depart the US. However, it is good these 21 infected personnel were identified and properly processed and isolated to reduce risk.

 

7. China and North Korea are allies, but what happens if Kim Jong-Un goes too far?

National Interest · Robert Farley · November 10, 2020

One of the many $64,000 questions about North Korea (and China)

 

8. New virus cases in triple digits for 3rd day; authorities warn of upping social distancing level

Yonhap News Agency · 강윤승 · November 10, 2020

 

9. Why Joe Biden could face a North Korean nuclear standoff before he even takes office

Time · Steven Borowiec · November 9, 2020

The danger is if Kim thinks the transition chaos provides him an opportunity to advance his political warfare strategy. If he thinks there will be no serious response from the US and that his actions will result in the incoming administration giving into demands for sanctions relief, he could be sorely mistaken.

 

10. S. Korea considering arranging Moon-Biden phone talks at 'appropriate time': foreign ministry

Yonhap News Agency ·송상호 · November 10, 2020

What is the appropriate time? I would have thought Foreign Minister Kang would be carrying a letter of congratulations on her trip to DC.

 

11. A simple strategy for negotiating with North Korea in the next administration

CSPS (GMU) · George Hutchinson · November 10, 2020

My good friend, George Hutchinson, offers sage advice that I can summarize with Sun Tzu: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” I just hope we don't need 100 battles to solve the "Korea question."

 

12. New challenges and potential for the U.S.-South Korea alliance under Biden And Moon

Forbes · Scott Snyder · November 9, 2020

Key point from eminent Korea watcher, Scott Snyder. The incoming Biden administration does not mean automatic alignment on North Korea policy.

 

13. For South Korea’s president, Biden's win is both good news and bad news

Foreign Policy · Morten Soendergaard Larsen · November 9, 2020

The fundamental problem will be the difference in strategic assumptions about the nature and objectives of the Kim family regime. We must align our assumptions and then develop a coherent integrated combined strategy to focus on deterrence, defense, denuclearization and solving the "Korea question" (unification).

 

14. Activists call for U.N. probe of ‘voluntary’ North Korea repatriation from Japan’

UPI · Elizabeth Shim · November 9, 2020

The ROK, US, and Japan (and the international community) must focus on North Korean human rights as a basic part of foreign policy and not an exception.

 

15. South Korea investigation ongoing into North Korean man's defection

UPI · Elizabeth Shim · November 9, 2020

I do not know in what part of the DMZ this occurred, but we should keep in mind that, in accordance with the Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018, at least 12 guard posts within the DMZ have been dismantled and destroyed. I am not sure if that had an effect on this incident. But I would say the over dependence on technology to replace soldiers' boots on the ground increases vulnerability.

 

16. Late Pres. Kim Dae-jung exchanged letters with Biden in the 1980s

Dong-A Ilbo · ksy@donga.com · November 10, 2020

I would attribute this to some young advisors who were unfamiliar with Korea, and Korean culture, and naming conventions.

 

17. Authorities in locked down Hyesan sell rice to hungry families

Daily NK · Lee Chae Un · November 10, 2020

Corruption, dwindling government funds, food shortages, draconian population and resources control measures:  all indicators.

 

“You have attributed conditions to villainy that simply result from stupidity.”

- Robert A. Heinlein, The Green Hills of Earth

“Living beings everywhere compete for the means of existence. Competition takes the more intense form we call conflict when … contenders try to hamper, disable, or destroy rivals.”

- Jack Hirshleifer, The Handbook of Defense Economics, vol 1,  Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, (eds).

“Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us therefore study the incidents in this [war] as philosophy to learn wisdom from and none of them as wrongs to be avenged.”

- Abraham Lincoln, November 10, 1864

11/9/2020 News & Commentary - National Security

Mon, 11/09/2020 - 12:40pm

News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.

1. Leaders slowest to congratulate Biden may be his big worries

2. Covid infections in animals prompt scientific concern

3. Growing Sino-American military rivalry - interview

4. Decorated Afghan pilot who protected US airmen is in hiding after Pentagon reverses approval to come to US

5. U.S. adversaries mum on Biden win, anticipate return to Obama-era policies

6. Meet 39 people on Biden's transition team ready to demolish Trump's legacy

7. Top cyber espionage groups that have India in their crosshairs

8. Covid-19 vaccine from Pfizer and BioNTech is strongly effective, data show

9. Assessing the role of civil government agencies in irregular warfare

10. The operational environment: now through 2028

11. In plain sight: how an alleged Chinese spy tried to build an Australian business empire

12. Michèle Flournoy could become the first woman to run the Pentagon. Here’s what would change.

13. Philippines to back China judge for top UN court

14. New White House unlikely to drastically alter defense budget

15. Campaign planning for unconventional warfare: thoughts on a new approach to indirect action

16. Where President-elect Joe Biden stands on national security issues

17. A preview of Biden’s foreign policy

18. Army wants smaller brigades, stronger divisions & lots of robots

19. Putting combatant commanders on a demand signal diet

20. U.S.-Japan joint exercise, involving 46,000 troops, called a success

21. Pfizer’s early data shows vaccine is more than 90% effective

 

1. Leaders slowest to congratulate Biden may be his big worries

Bloomberg · Iain Marlow · November 9, 2020

All these leaders may believe in "actions speak louder than words," though their actions may vary.

 

2. Covid infections in animals prompt scientific concern

New York Times · James Gorman · November 8, 2020

I am listening to reports that Pfizer is reporting their vaccine in development is 90% effective. But what if COVID-19 is mutating? Can the vaccine be adjusted to account for mutations?

 

3. Growing Sino-American Military Rivalry - Interview

Eurasia Review · Gateway House · November 9, 2020

 

4. Decorated Afghan pilot who protected US airmen is in hiding after Pentagon reverses approval to come to US

Stars & Stripes · J.P. Lawrence · November 7, 2020

Huh???? Not a good look for the Pentagon if this is accurate reporting.

 

5. U.S. adversaries mum on Biden win, anticipate return to Obama-era policies

Washington Times · Guy Taylor · November 9, 2020

I think we might find that Biden is his own man and I would think he is not going to simply return to Obama policies. Conditions have changed a lot since Obama was president.

 

6. Meet 39 people on Biden's transition team ready to demolish Trump's legacy

Business Insider · Robin Bravender · November 8, 2020

I certainly cannot vouch for the accuracy of this list. The last name on the list is certainly interesting.

 

7. Top cyber espionage groups that have India in their crosshairs

Business Insider · Prabhjote Gill · November 9, 2020

Probably a partial target list for Cybercom and NSA.

 

8. Covid-19 vaccine from Pfizer and BioNTech is strongly effective, data show

STAT · Matthew Herper · November 9, 2020

I hope this comes to fruition and soon. I hate to be Moriarty and put out "negative waves," but my pessimistic thought is "first reports are always wrong."

 

9. Assessing the role of civil government agencies in irregular warfare

Divergent Options · Damimola Olawuyi & Paul Jemitola · November 9, 2020

I will keep beating the drum on this:

The Two "SOF Trinities:"

  • Irregular Warfare
  • Unconventional Warfare
  • Support to Political Warfare

The Comparative advantage of SOF:

  • Governance
  • Influence
  • Support to indigenous forces and populations
  • With exquisite capabilities for the no fail CT and CP national missions

I can feel the authors foot stomping their conclusion here and I can hear a chorus of "amens" across the national security community.

 

10. The operational environment: now through 2028

Mad Scientist Laboratory · user · November 9, 2020

 

11. In plain sight: how an alleged Chinese spy tried to build an Australian business empire

Guardian · Nino Bucci · November 7, 2020

Any country with a "united front" department must be assumed to be implementing a strategy of subversion about the world.

 

12. Michèle Flournoy could become the first woman to run the Pentagon. Here’s what would change.

Defense News · Aaron Mehta · November 8, 2020

I would say she is one of the very most qualified candidates for Secretary of Defense, regardless of gender. I cannot recall any SECDEF who has as much experience in various levels of responsibility working in the Pentagon than Ms. Flournoy (save for someone like General Mattis or Rumsfeld, who did it twice!). I just hope these speculative reports do not "jinx" her possible appointment as SECDEF.

 

13. Philippines to back China judge for top UN court

Straits Times · Reuters, Bloomberg · November 9, 2020

What kind of strong arm or subversive influence took place to convince the Philippines to provide this support?

 

14. New White House unlikely to drastically alter defense budget

Law360 · Daniel Wilson· November 8, 2020

I think others may be advocating for significant cuts in defense spending, particularly those from the progressive wing of the Democratic party. Will the president-elect try to fend them off?

 

15. Campaign planning for unconventional warfare: thoughts on a new approach to indirect action

Small Wars Journal · Paul W. Taylor · November 8, 2020

Can we learn to conduct UW campaigns?

 

16. Where President-elect Joe Biden stands on national security issues

Defense News · Aaron Mehta & Joe Gould · November 8, 2020

 

17. A preview of Biden’s foreign policy

Bloomberg · James Stavridis · November 8, 2020

 

18. Army wants smaller brigades, stronger divisions, & lots of robots

Breaking Defense · Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · November 6, 2020

I hope this is not the promise of less is more. Some missions the Army must conduct will always be manpower intensive. I am all for technology as a force multiplier, but we must recognize that sometimes there is not a substitute for boots on the ground (that belong to a living breathing human being).

 

19. Putting combatant commanders on a demand signal diet

War On the Rocks · Mackenzie Eaglen · November 9, 2020

Because you cannot say no to a warfighter (especially one that has troops in harm's way). I am reminded of a story when I was the G3 of USASOC. Our forward deployed units continue to request more special operations aviation capabilities. We were told to tell them to stop making the demands because there were none available. Months later they started requesting any type of helicopter to support operations. But because they had stopped making the requests for special operations aviation there was no demand signal that they needed additional airlift capabilities. We showed them all the previous requests and that we were told to cease making the requests but that did not worry the bean counters. So, when you stop providing a demand signal when you make a future request the bean counters will say, "but there is no demand signal." 

 

20. U.S.-Japan joint exercise, involving 46,000 troops, called a success

UPI · Ed Admaczyk · November 6, 2020

Well done in the time of COVID 19.

 

21. Pfizer’s early data shows vaccine is more than 90% effective

New York Times · Katie Thomas · November 9, 2020

I hope this works.

 

“Always listen to experts. They'll tell you what can't be done, and why. Then do it.”

- Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough for Love

"Voters don't decide issues, they decide who will decide issues."

- George Will

 "The will to win, the desire to succeed, the urge to reach your full potential... these are the keys that will unlock the door to personal excellence."

- Confucius

11/9/2020 News & Commentary - Korea

Mon, 11/09/2020 - 10:27am

News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.

1. A worried Asia wonders: what will Joe Biden do?

2. N. Korea keeps mum on Biden's victory

3. Biden urged to avoid repeating Obama’s mistakes in Asia

4. N. Korean authorities order state security agency to "secretly" arrest defectors overseas

5. Biden sees step-by-step approach to disarming N. Korea: experts

6. U.S. Congress warns anti-China initiative alienates Korea

7. FM Kang arrives in U.S. for talks with Pompeo after Biden victory

8. Moon vows close communication with Biden, efforts to prevent any 'vacuum' in alliance, Korea peace process

9. It's not just over there: the American commitment to the Korean Peninsula

10. Defense ministry vows to continue close work with Pentagon under Biden

11. Joe Biden on North Korea: will he build on Donald Trump's legacy?

12. New virus cases above 100 for 2nd day; cluster infections veer out of control

13. FEATURE: Animated film shines light into North Korea's darkest corners

14. Time to hit the reset button (South Korea)

15. Japanese abductees' kin ask Biden to press issue with North Korea

 

1. A worried Asia wonders: what will Joe Biden do?

AP · Foster Klug · November 9, 2020

NK News is already reporting on the Biden priorities and lamenting that North Korea is not one of the four priorities: COVID 19, economic recovery, racial equality, and climate change. All the pundits are looking for their niche issue to be on the priority list.

First of all, strategy is about priorities. Everything cannot be a priority. To paraphrase, "he who prioritizes everything, prioritizes nothing." 

On North Korea not being on the priority list: if it was on the list, China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremist organizations (to name a few) must be, too. So would the Quad and Quad Plus. So would Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and many more.

No one should feel slighted because their niche issue is not on the list. No one should read too much into this initial priority list. I am sure there are members of the Biden national security team working on all these issues. Some things may be better left to be worked behind the scenes.

Now if the pundits make too big a deal about North Korea not being on this priority list, it might cause Kim to feel slighted and he might lash out to make sure he is noticed. He, more than any of the Korean pundits, will want to be on the priority list.

On the other hand, as I have written many times, North Korea is a long-term problem to be managed and solved through resolution of the Korea question. The ROK/US alliance has to be sustained with deterrence and defense capabilities to prevent war and to be prepared to address the full range of contingencies. But it is going to take a long-term political warfare strategy in conjunction with coordination with South Korea to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula. The first step toward that outcome is the requirement that South Korea re-examine its assumption about the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategies and objectives.

But Korea watchers should take heart from Biden's Yonhap op-ed. I do not think he published anything similar in any other allied country. This letter seems to ensure the Korean peninsula has sufficient visibility to the president-elect.

 

2. N. Korea keeps mum on Biden's victory

Yonhap News Agency · 이원주 · November 9, 2020

I am afraid that Kim may intend to follow the adage that actions speak louder than words. And the 70+ days of the transition period is an especially vulnerable time.

 

3. Biden urged to avoid repeating Obama’s mistakes in Asia

Financial Times · Edward White et al. · November 8, 2020

I do not understand why some think there may be an automatic return to "strategic patience." I think we might find the new national security team will be looking for opportunities to build on what the current national security team has accomplished. For all the likely criticism, the ball has been advanced and conditions have changed—some good and some less good. But there needs to be the examination of the fundamental assumptions about Kim's willingness to denuclearize. I think we have a lot of useful information from the past four years that will contribute to an objective analysis.

 

4. N. Korean authorities order state security agency to "secretly" arrest defectors overseas

Daily NK · Kim Yoo Jin · November 9, 2020

If China and Russia turn a blind eye to this issue, they become complicit in North Korea's human rights abuses and must be held accountable right along with North Korea.

 

5. Biden sees step-by-step approach to disarming N. Korea: experts

Korea Herald · Choi Si-young · November 9, 2020

This reporter asked me to respond to 7 questions and the only quote he used is only half in context. For those with an interest, here is my entire Q&A exchange with the reporter.

(1) So, do you see a potentially more effective, coherent North Korea policy being drafted by Seoul and Washington this time, or is it just a wishful thinking that that could happen anytime soon?

There will be no coherent ROK/US alliance policy and strategy unless there is an agreement on the fundamental nature of the Kim family regime, its strategies, and objectives. The Moon administration is laboring under the false assumption that Kim Jong-Un shares his vision for peace and reconciliation and will engage and negotiate like a responsible member of the international community if sanctions are lifted and concessions are provided. If he continues ROK policy and strategy based on those assumptions, there is unlikely to be a coherent alliance strategy toward North Korea. President-elect Biden will want to base US strategy on what President Moon said in his congratulatory tweet: a "rock-solid alliance" and shared values. He will want to ensure there is a strong foundation of military deterrence and defense so that negotiations can occur from a position of strength, not one of appeasement. He will encourage President Moon to seek engagement based on strength, not weakness or the appearance of wanting engagement more than Kim Jong-Un does.

(2) President Moon is adamant on signing a peace declaration, which he says will usher in North Korea disarmament. The Trump administration is saying no to that, saying NK denuclearization leads to the peace declaration. Would the Biden administration get on board with Moon with that?

The two important questions to ask are: 1) What evidence is there that a peace declaration (or end of war declaration) will result in a change in Kim Jong-Un's behavior and decision making? 2) How will such a peace or end of war declaration ensure the security of the ROK when it faces a 1.2 million-man, active duty military posture for offensive operations across the DMZ? We have seen the North's military modernization on October 10th of not only a possible new ICBM and SLBM but also improved and advanced conventional military capabilities that have been developed over the past few years despite the maximum pressure of sanctions. This is an indication of the regime's true intent, which is to dominate the entire Korean peninsula. A declaration of the end war will be symbolic only. There must be a legal peace treaty between North and South Korea (the two designated belligerents in UN Security Council Resolutions of 1950). But this can only occur after there is a significant threat reduction on the Korean peninsula. We have seen the Compressive Military Agreement fail to bring about any threat reductions from the North while the South has faithfully implemented the one-sided confidence and trust building measures of the agreement. The North has not reciprocated and instead has conducted more than 20 missile and rocket tests of new systems that range US and South Korea military bases. Until North Korea negotiates in good faith and reduces its threat to the South, it should not be rewarded with the symbolic gesture of an end of war declaration.

(3) North Korea appears set to stage a provocation (a missile launch perhaps) early next year as Biden will be reading his new cabinet. Experts project leader Kim Jong-un would want to set the tone and dictate the terms of the stalled nuclear talks when America would be least ready to respond to threat. How would the Biden government react to that and what impact would that have on the stalled nuclear talks?

The key to understanding the regime's blackmail diplomacy and "long con" (to get political and economic concessions as a result of provocations and increased tensions without giving up its nuclear and missile programs) can be seen in the October 10th military display during the Korean Workers Party 75th anniversary celebration. The two new missile systems (SLBM and ICBM) that have never been tested may have been deployed to set the groundwork for negation. Kim may very well conduct a test with the intention of causing fear in the ROK/US alliance and, in particular, the US due to the potential threat to the US homeland. Then Kim will negotiate and attempt to bargain away the new ICBM and/or SLBM in return for sanctions relief and concessions. This is typical North Korean negotiating behavior through which it attempts to get something for nothing. If the new ICBM and SLBM are not actually weapons that can or will be produced, Kim can bargain them away and not give up any of his current proven capabilities in return for concessions. We should expect some kind of missile or other significant test during the 70 days or so of the upcoming US administration transition process.

(4) Many speculate Biden will prefer a series of working-level talks to one big summit which Trump has favored to tackle North Korea disarmament. How would that bring a traction to the deadlocked nuclear talks? And what’s the downside to the approach?

Trump's national security team tried to implement substantive working level talks and it is likely the Biden administration will, too. However, it is Kim Jong-Un who has prevented them from occurring. Kim has been and will likely continue to be the barrier to progress. On the one hand, I do not recommend any president meet with Kim (whether Trump had been re-elected or now with President-elect Biden) unless substantive working level talks are held that develop the details of an agreement that can then be brought to the two leaders for approval. But this cannot happen unless Kim makes the choice to allow it to happen. On the other hand, I very doubt that Kim will want a summit meeting unless he has guarantees that sanctions, at least in part, will be lifted. He has failed to get sanctions relief from President Trump and this fact has put him under enormous internal pressure, because he raised expectations in Pyongyang that he could "play" Trump and get sanctions relief while maintaining his nuclear and missile systems. It would be a mistake for the ROK, the US, or the UN to lift sanctions merely to have talks—whether at the working-level or the summit level. Kim Jong-Un has to continue to feel the pressure from inside Pyongyang for his failure to get sanctions relief. When the pressure is sufficient, he may then make the choice to allow substantive working level negotiations. The ROK and the US must never again make the mistake of providing concessions in return for promises or talks. Kim Jong-Un will only view that as weakness and he will make more demands and continue to conduct his political warfare with Juche characteristics.

(5) Biden said in a contribution sent to a local news agency here that he would not leverage a troop pullout to extort Korea but would make stronger the alliance. But some say the Pentagon is making adjustments in American troop deployment worldwide, so a troop cut isn’t off the table entirely. Do you share that view?

These are two separate issues. Yes, President-elect Biden will not use the level of US troops in the ROK as part of a negotiating strategy. He sincerely wants to ensure the foundation of a strong ROK/US alliance. While he will work to resolve the SMA stalemate as quickly as possible, he will not give the ROK a pass and his national security team will seek to negotiate a fair SMA agreement that strengthens the alliance.

However, the US military continually assesses its global force posture as it has global responsibilities. It may assess that, in order to best support US national security interests, it may have to make adjustments to the size, capability, and stationing locations of US forces. This is unrelated to the SMA and will not be used as negotiating level. The US has to determine what is the proper force posture to meet its global responsibilities and protect US national interests. The US, both the incoming administration and the American people, is committed to deterrence and defense on the Korean peninsula and it will honor that commitment. However, it will do that in the way that best suits protection of US interests in accordance with strategy, funding constraints, and resource availability,

As the alliance evolves through OPCON transition, there will be changes that need to be made in US forces structure and posture. One of the ways to ensure US forces remain on the peninsula will be a shift from USFK as a "committed force" available for only one mission. The ROK will have to come to accept that US forces need "strategic flexibility" to train and operate throughout the INDOPACIFIC to ensure readiness of US forces (because of the declining availability of training areas for US forces due to ROK government decisions such as support for the Comprehensive Military Agreement as well as civilian encroachment on training areas traditionally used by US forces).

(6) The US has not been enthusiastic about handing over the wartime operational command back to Korea, which is looking to secure that by 2022. The US military chief in Korea isn’t either. But the US seems interested in adding up more of its Terminal High Altitude-Area Defense (THAAD) batteries here. Do you think Washington would transfer the wartime role to Seoul when Biden is president, and would Biden go for more THAAD missile shields while in office?

The US fully supports OPCON transition. It is not trying to block the process in any way. The process must be conditions based and those conditions must be met for one reason: to ensure the security of the ROK. If those conditions are not met, the security of the ROK and the Korean people will face increased risk. Second, President Moon has expressed a desire to complete the process during his administration, but he has given no such order for that to happen. The process has been hindered by two factors. One, the reduction in combined training since the Singapore Summit and the COVID 19 outbreak (a major training event was cancelled this past March due to COVID). Because of that, August's training had to be focused on readiness of the ROK/US CFC and could not allocate the time and resources for the FOC evaluation.

The US desires to deploy the most effective missile defense capabilities to ensure the defense of the ROK from North Korean attack. THAAD is an effective system for destroying North Korean missiles that threaten all of South Korea. Ideally, a missile defense system would be completely integrated between the ROK and US, orchestrating all radars, command and control, and firing systems to provide the most effective defense of South Korea. In the best case the ROK, US, and Japan would integrate their missile defense systems. But given the political friction between the ROK and Japan, that is not likely in the near term at least.

But the bottom line is the US is committed to deterrence and defense and doing that in the most militarily effective manner. It supports OPCON transition as a natural evolution of the alliance, but the conditions for transition must be met or the ROK and the Korean people will be at risk.

(7) Last, Seoul and Washington have yet to agree on the defense cost-sharing talks. They don’t agree on how much Seoul should pay more this time to keep 28,500 American troops here. Trump insisted on a dramatic hike in Seoul’s contributions because America was being taken advantage of keeping the “rich” country safe. Would Biden stick to that same strategy?

I think the Biden national security will want to resolve the SMA stalemate in accordance with the SOFA process and ensure the incremental costs for the stationing of US troops in Korea are properly distributed between the US and the ROK. The proper amount of funding will be determined through negotiation and not through demands.  But there are increasing costs for the stationing of US troops that are caused by the reduction in access to training areas for  US forces and the necessity for some US forces to have to conduct training outside of Korea or back in the US.  negotiations will work out these issues.

President-elect Biden will not take a transactional view of alliance but instead will return to a view that is based on shared interests, shared values, and shared strategy.  The US troops are in South Korea because it is in the US interests to deter war on the Korean peninsula.  They are not there simply to defend South Korea.  It is an important US interest to deter war and if deterrence fails to support the ROK in its defense of freedom.  The costs for doing so can and must be properly distributed but the US will not be "selling" its services" to the ROK.  It will continue to be committed to the alliance partnership of mutual defense.

 

6. U.S. Congress warns anti-China initiative alienates Korea

Chosun Ilbo · Roh Suk-jo · November 9, 2020

While it may "alienate" South Korea, it does not mean the concept of the Quad and Quad Plus is wrong, especially for South Korea. South Korea is not really feeling alienated—it is being held as an economic hostage by China. It is going to have to figure out the best way to protect its national interests (security and economic), and it is going to have to decide what kind of relationship it should have with China.

I previously sent out this CRS report. It can be accessed here: The "Quad": Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.

 

7. FM Kang arrives in U.S. for talks with Pompeo after Biden victory

Yonhap News Agency · by 변덕근 · November 9, 2020

Here is my assessment of the issues for Minister Kang's visit.

I think Foreign Minister Kang will likely be making her last visit to the US as there are rumors that she will be replaced in the Moon Administration. This will likely be her last opportunity to try to repair some of the friction within the alliance.

  • The Moon Administration likely hopes that the election will be decided by the time she visits so she may engage with the right people, who will be influential in the next administration: either those currently in DOS or those advisors to an incoming administration.
  • Her number one priority is likely to re-engage on the SMA statement (cost-sharing of US forces).  This is a major diplomatic issue and the negotiations are led by State and MOFA (not the military).
  • She will likely inform the US that President Moon wants to double down on North-South engagement activities and continue to pursue an end of war declaration and steps toward a peace regime.
  • She will want to explain how the Moon Administration’s “Southern Strategy” is complementary to the US strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
  • She will be trying to "thread the needle" on US-China great power competition, noting that, while South Korea is a committed security partner to the US, it is an "economic hostage" to China (though she will not use those words) and asking the US to be respectful of the tightrope South Korea is walking between the two great powers.
  • She will likely discuss the US desire for a Quad Plus. She likely will not be able to offer any commitments to joining it overtly but she is likely to inform her counterparts that, while the South supports it in principle, it is difficult for it to publicly support it (the ROK fears renewed economic warfare by China just as was conducted when the US deployed the THAAD missile defense system to the peninsula).
  • She will likely not address this issue, but I expect she will be asked about Korea-Japan friction and the impact it has on the two US bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia.
  • Other issues that she may address peripherally because they are not directly in her portfolio: OPCON transition process (conditions-based versus time-based) and support to US forces manning the THAAD battery (local protests inhibit support).

 

8. Moon vows close communication with Biden, efforts to prevent any ‘vacuum’ in alliance, Korea peace process

Yonhap News Agency · Lee Chi-dong · November 9, 2020

I am scratching my head on the "vacuum" in the alliance comment. We have in place multiple channels of communication from the Security and Military Consultative meetings, the Military Committee, multiple lines of communication in South through the embassy, the military, and, of course, the MOFA-State strategy working group. It is this last channel that I think is most important and has done important work in coordinating ROK/US policy and strategy toward North Korea. However, it has come under unwarranted criticism by uniformed politicos and pundits in South Korea. So, if the president does not want a vacuum, he needs to make sure his administration supports and uses these multiple communications channels, and he should not listen to the uninformed criticism from his pundits.

 

9. It's not just over there: the American commitment to the Korean Peninsula

War On the Rocks · Gen. (Ret.) Vincent Brooks, Sheena Greitens, & Clink Work · November 6, 2020

 

10. Defense ministry vows to continue close work with Pentagon under Biden

Yonhap News Agency ·최수향 · November 9, 2020

 

11. Joe Biden on North Korea: will he build on Donald Trump's legacy?

National Interest · William Jeynes · November 6, 2020

He would be wrong to adopt a "not invented here" policy and throw out all the past work even as he develops "new" policies and strategies (as someone once remarked, every course of action and strategy on North Korea has been tried over the past 2 or 3 decades… though I would argue the one policy we have never pursued is aggressive pursuit of the solution to the Korea question). I think we also need to separate the public rhetoric from the behind the scenes work that has been done. Biden and his team should not throw the baby out with the bath water.

 

12. New virus cases above 100 for 2nd day; cluster infections veer out of control

Yonhap News Agency ·강윤승 · November 9, 2020

 

13. FEATURE: Animated film shines light into North Korea's darkest corners

Kyodo News · Donican Lam · November 8, 2020

 

14. Time to hit the reset button (South Korea)

Korea Joong Ang Daily · November 8, 2020

Yes, South Korea needs to reset its policies. As I have written, the Moon administration needs to conduct a thorough review of its assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and the North's strategy to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

 

15. Japanese abductees' kin ask Biden to press issue with North Korea

Kyodo News · November 8, 2020

Japan will never waiver on the abduction issue.

 

“Always listen to experts. They'll tell you what can't be done, and why. Then do it.”

- Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough for Love

"Voters don't decide issues, they decide who will decide issues."

- George Will

 "The will to win, the desire to succeed, the urge to reach your full potential... these are the keys that will unlock the door to personal excellence."

- Confucius

11/08/2020 News & Commentary - National Security

Sun, 11/08/2020 - 10:03am

News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.

 

1. Reports: Biden’s top pick for Defense Secretary is Michèle Flournoy; would be first woman SECDEF

2. New Law Would Let Chinese Coast Guard Use Weapons in South China Sea

3. US must defeat China's 'D-Day' trade attack on Australia

4. Krach overstates Clean Network initiative claims

5. The Army Has Officially Selected The Navy's SM-6 Missile To Be Used In A Strike Role

6. The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,Japan, India, and Australia

7. Philippines Shelves Plan for South China Sea Fishing Militia

8. Lam Says Next US President Should Not Interfere in Hong Kong

9. Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 For Mid-Range Missiles

10. Worries grow about rudderless post-election Pentagon

11. How President Biden Presidency Could Reshape U.S. National Security

12. The U.S. Army Wants a New Way to Fight in a Twenty-First Century War

13. Two ‘Boogaloo Bois’ Indicted In Plot To Supply Weapons To Terrorists For Attacks On U.S. Soldiers

 

1.  Reports: Biden’s top pick for Defense Secretary is Michèle Flournoy; would be first woman SECDEF

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/11/reports-bidens-top-pick-for-defense-secretary-is-michele-flournoy-would-be-first-woman-secdef/?utm – by Ryan Morgan – 7 November 2020

I expect this will be positive for the ROK/US alliance. I know she understands the alliance and its importance (which does not mean our current national security team does not because I know they do). 

Back in the 1990's when Ms. Flournoy was the PDAS for strategy, Bob Collins and I worked with her on the initial training implementation of PDD 56 - The Management of Complex Contingency Operations. (https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm) which used a north Korean collapse scenario. We were working on CONPLAN 5029 and General Tilelli suggested to the SECDEF we use a Korean collapse scenario as the complex contingency.  She and Kurt Campbell (DASD at the time I believe) were main participants in the training.  I hope a modernized PDD 56 will be resurrected to better orchestrate interagency activities.

 

2. New Law Would Let Chinese Coast Guard Use Weapons in South China Sea

benarnews.org – by Drake Long – 6 November 2020

 

3. US must defeat China's 'D-Day' trade attack on Australia

Washington Examiner · by Tom Rogan · November 5, 2020

Conclusion: "President Trump has made his mark on the world by finally unleashing American power to counter China's imperialism. Joe Biden often speaks of the need to restore alliances and America's global credibility. Witnessing what China is now doing to one of our closest allies, each man has reason to act in Australia's support. China is banking on Washington's distraction. Instead, Trump and Biden should pledge to impose immediate new and reciprocal tariffs on China, should Beijing's D-Day attack go forward."

 

4. Krach overstates Clean Network initiative claims

globaltimes.cn

Criticism from a CCP mouthpiece.

 

5. The Army Has Officially Selected The Navy's SM-6 Missile To Be Used In A Strike Role

thedrive.com · by Tyler Rogoway · November 7, 2020

Seems like a smart move.

 

6. The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia

The 3 page report from the Congressional Research Service can be downloaded at the link below.

 

The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11678

 

7. Philippines Shelves Plan for South China Sea Fishing Militia

thediplomat.com · by Sebastian Strangio · November 6, 2020

Was there pressure from China or just fear of pressure?

 

8. Lam Says Next US President Should Not Interfere in Hong Kong

thediplomat.com · by Associated Press · November 7, 2020

Words I am sure the CCP wanted expressed.

 

9. Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 For Mid-Range Missiles

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

And the Tomahawk too (in addition to the SM-6).  But I thought we were going to halt production of the Tomahawk?  I guess not.

 

10. Worries grow about rudderless post-election Pentagon

The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · November 7, 2020

We have professionals running the pentagon and the national security team. Our adversaries should not get the wrong idea and think they have an opportunity during this transition period.

 

11. How President Biden Presidency Could Reshape U.S. National Security

Forbes · by Sebastien Roblin · November 7, 2020

Obviously, any incoming president will reshape foreign policy whether of the same party or the opposition party to the outgoing president.

The buried lede and troubling point: Defense spending likely to remain flat or decrease

 

12. The U.S. Army Wants a New Way to Fight in a Twenty-First Century War

The National Interest · by Kris Osborn · November 7, 2020

Some amazing capabilities.  Seems like the infantry soldier on the ground will have as complicated data management issues as a fighter pilot.

 

13. Two ‘Boogaloo Bois’ Indicted In Plot To Supply Weapons To Terrorists For Attacks On U.S. Soldiers

https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/11/06/two-boogaloo-bois-indicted-in-plot-to-supply-weapons-to-terrorists-for-attacks-on-us-soldiers/?sh=63a31baaf6ae – by Nicholas Reimann – 6 November 2020

Left and right, liberal and conservative, do not define these extremists who simply seek to bring harm to the US despite their avowed causes.

 

"Nothing in life is to be feared. It is only to be understood.

Be less curious about people and more curious about ideas.

I was taught that the way of progress is neither swift nor easy.

All my life through, the new sights of Nature make me rejoice like a child.”

-Madame Marie Curie

 

“You can have peace. Or you can have freedom. Don't ever count on having both at once.”

- Robert A. Heinlein

 

Seventy-three years ago this week—on November 11, 1947:

"Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.

Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

 

Ever since, however, this observation has been presented in a simplified way:

 

"Democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

- Winston Churchill

11/08/2020 News & Commentary - Korea

Sun, 11/08/2020 - 9:50am

News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.

 

1. North Korea and leader Kim Jong Un yet to react to Joe Biden's victory

2. Moon sends congratulatory message to Biden, says he has 'great expectations' for alliance's future

3. Moon to seek new teamwork with Biden over N. Korea, 'top-down' diplomacy in doubt

4. Biden to give S. Korea more 'room' in inter-Korean policy: experts

5. Biden's victory raises hope for swift defense cost-sharing deal, stable USFK presence

6. How might Biden deal with Korea?  Ambassador Robert R. King

7. Foreign ministry vows continued efforts with incoming U.S. gov't for stronger alliance

8. Kim Yo-Jong Involved in Statement About Shooting of South Korean Official: Report

9. North Koreans Reject New Anti-Smoking Law, Criticize Leader Kim Jong Un as Chain Smoker

10. Amidst The Pandemic, Korea Ensures That The Grand Show Goes On! – COMEUP 2020 Organizing Committee Announces The Final Plan

11. Korean politicians to strengthen ties with Biden

 

1. North Korea and leader Kim Jong Un yet to react to Joe Biden's victory

straitstimes.com

I do not think his reaction will be a tweet or a letter.  It may be something more visible.  What happens when he conducts some kind of test during the transition period?  Are we prepared to deal with that?

 

2. Moon sends congratulatory message to Biden, says he has 'great expectations' for alliance's future

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · November 8, 2020

Here is my retweet of President Moon's congratulatory tweet.  The intent of my comments is to advocate for the Moon administration to re-examine (and revise) its assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and to focus on a solution to the  "Korea question" which is the unnatural division of the potential as the only way we are going to see an end to north Korea's nuclear program and its crimes against humanities and finally free the Korean people living in the north.

 

3. Moon to seek new teamwork with Biden over N. Korea, 'top-down' diplomacy in doubt

en.yna.co.kr · by 이치동 · November 8, 2020

I think we must remember that Kim Jong-un has a vote.  In many ways he has THE vote on what happens in terms of negotiations and diplomacy.  The US nor the ROK can produce a magic or silver bullet that will cause the Kim family regime to change its spots and become some that it is not - such as a responsible member of the international community.  While Moon and perhaps the Biden team might want to pursue a bottom up diplomatic approach, we cannot forget the nature of the Kim family regime is about central control and everything in the north is "top-down."

 

4. Biden to give S. Korea more 'room' in inter-Korean policy: experts

en.yna.co.kr · by 고병준 · November 8, 2020

This: "Experts said South Korea should mobilize every possible diplomatic capacity before Washington's North Korea policy shapes up, to persuade Biden to engage with the North and keep the momentum for cross-border exchanges and cooperation alive."

Actually, the Moon administration needs to re-examine its north Korea policy, and as I will continue to emphasize, especially its assumptions about north Korea.  It needs to spend less time trying to influence or shape a Biden Korea policy and instead get its house in order.

 

5. Biden's victory raises hope for swift defense cost-sharing deal, stable USFK presence

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · November 8, 2020

The Moon administration must refrain from unrealistic wishful thinking. There are alliance issues that must be solved and just because there will be a change in a US administration they are not going to disappear.  Yes the SMA stalemate is a huge one but there are issues that impact on it such as the decline in available use of training areas (e.g., Rodriguez range) that is going to increase US training costs if US forces have to leave the peninsula to conduct qualification training.  I am sure the Biden national security team like the Trump national security team will continue to emphasize the importance of the conditions based OPCON transition process.  The THAAD issue and logistic support to the soldiers manning the battery must be resolved.  A new Biden national security team will not hand wave these issues.  They need to be resolved through comprehensive negotiations keeping our shared interests, shared values, and shared strategy in the forefront. 

 

6. How might Biden deal with Korea?  Ambassador Robert R. King

asiatimes.com · by Robert R King · November 8, 2020

Interesting anecdote.  I have to admit that I never watched West Wing.

 

7. Foreign ministry vows continued efforts with incoming U.S. gov't for stronger alliance

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 8, 2020

Minister Kang will have an interesting visit to DC this week.  But there are still 73 days of transition and she will need to work closely with the current national security team because we should not forget that Kim Jong-un may very well act out during this time.

 

8. Kim Yo-Jong Involved in Statement About Shooting of South Korean Official: Report

The National Interest · by Stephen Silver · November 7, 2020

So how much political power does she really have?

 

9. North Koreans Reject New Anti-Smoking Law, Criticize Leader Kim Jong Un as Chain Smoker

rfa.org – 6 November 2020

Could an anti-smoking law contribute to resistance potential inside north Korea?

 

10. Amidst The Pandemic, Korea Ensures That The Grand Show Goes On! – COMEUP 2020 Organizing Committee Announces The Final Plan

asiatechdaily.com · by AsiaTechDaily Writer · November 7, 2020

Interesting concept.

 

11. Korean politicians to strengthen ties with Biden

The Korea Times · November 8, 2020

My caution to the Biden national security team, beware Moon Chung-uin.  He does not have the best interests of the ROK/US alliance at heart.  He truly wants US forces to leave the peninsula and he wants to appease north Korea.  Do not be taken in by how well he speaks English and his charisma. 

 

"Nothing in life is to be feared. It is only to be understood.

Be less curious about people and more curious about ideas.

I was taught that the way of progress is neither swift nor easy.

All my life through, the new sights of Nature make me rejoice like a child.”

-Madame Marie Curie

 

“You can have peace. Or you can have freedom. Don't ever count on having both at once.”

- Robert A. Heinlein

 

Seventy-three years ago this week—on November 11, 1947:

"Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.

Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

 

Ever since, however, this observation has been presented in a simplified way:

 

"Democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

- Winston Churchill

11/07/2020 News & Commentary - National Security

Sat, 11/07/2020 - 11:23am

News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.

 

1. What Chinese and Asian soft power teaches the West

2. Report on World Geography and U.S. Strategy

3. 2020 election reveals two broad voting coalitions fundamentally at odds

4. Chaotic US election stress tests global economy

5. Fighting the CENTCOM OIF Campaign Plan: Lessons for the Future Battlefield

6. AFP, Facebook team up vs terror (Philippines)

7. Western Economies Embrace State Intervention, Emulating Asia

8. Can the world stop China's surge into biological warfare?

9. Cancel culture vs. toleration: The consequences of punishing dissent

10. Head of nuclear weapons agency unexpectedly resigns

11. USAID deputy leader ousted in staff shakeup amid vote counting

12. QAnon Is Winning: Conspiracy thinking in America had a huge night on Tuesday.

13. Capitalism After the Pandemic: Getting the Recovery Right

14. Incendiary texts traced to outfit run by top Trump aide

15. Shuttering Asymmetric Warfare Group and Red Team is the 'wrong direction,' retired Army three-star says

16. Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, Explained

 

1. What Chinese and Asian soft power teaches the West

asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · November 7, 2020

Excerpts:

While digital China looks set to remain walled off from the globe, the rest of cybersphere is seeing digital frontiers evaporate. "We are seeing the rise of a borderless culture and economy, and young people don't care about the nation it's from. They say, 'That is so cool, I am now a fan'," Bang said.

But speaking geographically, Bang likes the look of Southeast Asia.

"ASEAN is the next place that is going to rise, it is a huge market, it is not to be scoffed at," she said, citing the Malaysian animation Egen Ali. "He is this Muslim detective who is loved all over the region," she said. "And we are seeing some great Malaysian hip hop."

 

2. Report on World Geography and U.S. Strategy

news.usni.org · November 6, 2020

The CRS report can be accessed here: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20402600/if10485.pdf

Key excerpts from report: 

Consistent with a goal of being able to conduct sustained, large-scale military operations in Eurasia or the oceans and airspace surrounding Eurasia, the United States also stations significant numbers of forces and supplies in forward locations in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific.

The United States is the only country in the world that designs its military to depart one hemisphere, cross broad expanses of ocean and air space, and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival in another hemisphere. The other countries in the Western Hemisphere do not design their forces to do this because they cannot afford to, and because the United States is, in effect, doing it for them. Countries in the other hemisphere do not design their forces to do this for the very basic reason that they are already in the other hemisphere, and consequently instead spend their defense money primarily on forces that are tailored largely for influencing events in their own local regions of that hemisphere. (Some countries, such as Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France, have an ability to deploy forces to distant locations, but only on a much smaller scale.)

 

3. 2020 election reveals two broad voting coalitions fundamentally at odds

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/06/2020-election-reveals-two-broad-voting-coalitions-fundamentally-at-odds/?utm_source – by Claudia Deane and John Gramlich – 6 November 2020

We should think hard about this and, regardless of which camp or tribe you fall into or are a part of, ask if we are still committed to making our great American experiment work?  Are we committed to the true and fundamental ideals and ideas upon which our nation was founded (not the ideas and ideals espoused by the revisionists)?

 

4. Chaotic US election stress tests global economy

asiatimes.com – by William Pesek

Conclusion: "All this means markets hoping for clarity in Washington could be in for a long, stressful and financially turbulent Trumpian wait."

 

5. Fighting the CENTCOM OIF Campaign Plan: Lessons for the Future Battlefield

mwi.usma.edu · by Kevin Benson · November 6, 2020

We can always learn something about campaign planning and campaigning from Kevin Benson.

 

6. AFP, Facebook team up vs terror (Philippines)

philstar.com · by Romina Cabrera

 

7. Western Economies Embrace State Intervention, Emulating Asia

WSJ · by Tom Fairless and Stella Yifan Xie

Is this really something new?  I think governments have been pretty interventionist for a long time... (forever?)

 

8. Can the world stop China's surge into biological warfare?

http://www.washingtontimes.com

Short answer. No.

Excerpt: We have to take seriously China's thinking about military applications of biological warfare, including specific "ethnic genetic attacks." By broadening the concept of biowarfare - which it labels one of the principal domains of war - into fields such as genomics, the study of human DNA, China intends to create weapons based on genomic data. The concept is not fanciful.

 

9. Cancel culture vs. toleration: The consequences of punishing dissent

Big Think · November 4, 2020

Cancel culture must stop.

Conclusion: This is what cancel culture robs society of - the healthy and essential practice of toleration, without which pluralism and a peaceful society cannot be sustained.

 

10. Head of nuclear weapons agency unexpectedly resigns

Defense News · by Aaron Mehta · November 6, 2020

 

11. USAID deputy leader ousted in staff shakeup amid vote counting

The Hill · by Laura Kelly · November 6, 2020

 

12. QAnon Is Winning: Conspiracy thinking in America had a huge night on Tuesday.

defenseone.com · by Kaitlyn Tiffany – 7 November 2020

It so pains me to read this: "QAnon is not just on the internet anymore; it's in the U.S. Capitol. It is not just a conspiracy theory anymore; it's a voting bloc. And it is not going anywhere."

 

13. Capitalism After the Pandemic: Getting the Recovery Right

Foreign Affairs · by Mariana Mazzucato · October 28, 2020

Excerpts:

When the public and private sectors come together in pursuit of a common mission, they can do extraordinary things. This is how the United States got to the moon and back in 1969. For eight years, NASA and private companies in sectors as varied as aerospace, textiles, and electronics collaborated on the Apollo program, investing and innovating together. Through boldness and experimentation, they achieved what President John F. Kennedy called "the most hazardous and dangerous and greatest adventure on which man has ever embarked." The point was not to commercialize certain technologies or even to boost economic growth; it was to get something done together.

More than 50 years later, in the midst of a global pandemic, the world has a chance to attempt an even more ambitious moonshot: the creation of a better economy. This economy would be more inclusive and sustainable. It would emit less carbon, generate less inequality, build modern public transport, provide digital access for all, and offer universal health care. More immediately, it would make a COVID-19 vaccine available to everyone. Creating this type of economy will require a type of public-private collaboration that hasn't been seen in decades.

Some who talk about recovering from the pandemic cite an appealing goal: a return to normalcy. But that is the wrong target; normal is broken. Rather, the goal should be, as many have put it, to "build back better." Twelve years ago, the financial crisis offered a rare opportunity to change capitalism, but it was squandered. Now, another crisis has presented another chance for renewal. This time, the world cannot afford to let it go to waste.

 

14. Incendiary texts traced to outfit run by top Trump aide

AP · by FRANK BAJAK and GARANCE BURKE · November 7, 2020

Of course if I were advising a subversive organization that was in opposition to the Trump campaign, I might contract this service and send out inflammatory messages that appear to be in support of the campaign in order to try to discredit it.  And of course, if I were advising supporters of the Trump campaign, I would advise them not do something like this that is so blatantly obvious and wrong.

 

15.  Shuttering Asymmetric Warfare Group and Red Team is the 'wrong direction,' retired Army three-star says

armytimes.com · by Kyle Rempfer · November 4, 2020

It seems to me the AWG and the Red Team course are organizations and programs that apply well to both IW and traditional warfare.  And I am sure they are worth the very minimal investment to sustain them.  The title mentions Red Team, but the text discussed the Rapid Equipping Force.  We know the Army is closing the Red Team program at Ft Leavenworth as well

 

This is from 2007 and is reaffirmed in the new IW annex to the NDS.

It is DoD policy that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be

proportionally greater. (DoDD 3000.07 "Irregular Warfare")

 

16.  Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, Explained

thediplomat.com · November 3, 2020

I was fortunate to attend a working group with the Taiwan Army that was led by our Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group.  Taiwan absolutely must take an asymmetric approach to its defense.

 

"Never appeal to a man's better nature. He may not have one. Invoking his self-interest gives you more leverage."

- Robert A. Heinlein

 

Helmuth von Moltke: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."

Bob Leonhard: "A plan that doesn't survive first contact with the enemy is called 'a bad plan.' You shouldn't be a planner. Fire your G2. Learn about decision matrices."

 

"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than is a riot."

- Robert A. Heinlein, Friday

11/07/2020 News & Commentary - Korea

Sat, 11/07/2020 - 11:09am

News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.

 

1. Pyonghattanite: Why I Left North Korea?

2. North Korea and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Evidence

3. Peeking under the shroud of North Korea's Monster Missile

4. Suspected North Korean hackers who targeted job applicants prove more ambitious than first believed

5. Unification minister urges N.K. not to heighten tensions to test incoming U.S. administration

6. Experts call for new U.S. gov't to craft viable approach to N.K. nukes

7. 'Biden fully ready to invest in N. Korea denuclearization'

8. South Korea Lost Track of North Korean Defector Who Crossed DMZ

9. S. Korea, China agree to cut fishing in EEZs

10.  S. Korea's new coronavirus cases reduced to double digits

11. Defense minister meets brother of S. Korean official killed by N. Korea

12. U.N. chief Guterres calls for intensified efforts to engage with N. Korea

13. How Did a Floating Australian "Party Resort" End Up in North Korea?

14. South Korea, Japan, US discuss Korean peninsula, US election & COVID in recent talks

 

1. Pyonghattanite: Why I Left North Korea?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5AoGDxLGuU

Another powerful video from our friend Seo Hyun Lee in which she describes the truly evil nature of the Kim Family Regime.  Please take 5 minutes to watch this.  We will never truly understand what it is like to live in north Korea but Ms. Lee can help us to have some knowledge about it.

 

2. North Korea and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Evidence

38north.org · by Elisa D. Harris

The 18 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/38-North-SR-2011-Elisa-Harris_North-Korea-Biological-Weapons-Assessment.pdf

Sigh.... this conclusion makes me think of Sun Tzu - "Never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible."

In the final analysis, North Korea may once have had and may still be pursuing a biological weapons capability. It is also possible that North Korea never moved beyond R&D on biological agents and the establishment of a biotechnical infrastructure that could support future BW production. It is also possible that the North Korean program never moved beyond planning or, whatever its previous nature, the program has essentially ended. But one thing seems clear-nothing in the official public record to date indicates that North Korea has an advanced BW program, notwithstanding media reports to the contrary.

This may be correct (it does provide enough waffling to be correct whether they have a bio program or had one and stopped it).  But after witnessing the global pandemics and the response to it, especially in countries like the US I suspect the revisionist and rogue powers of the world are re-evaluating the efficacy of developing deliberate bio weapons that might give them an advantage.  Perhaps they did not intend to initiate a global pandemic, but they are surely observing how military forces "fight through" the pandemic to discern lessons as to how forces may react to a biological attack.

 

3. Peeking under the shroud of North Korea's Monster Missile

armscontrolwonk.com · by Joshua Pollack

More intelligence analysis is required.  Joshua Pollack provides some useful insights and this important conclusion.  What are we going to do if the regime tests such an ICBM during the transition? (assuming Biden is elected).  I doubt we are going to do any bargaining for the reaffirmation of Kim Jong-un's 2018 pledge" during the transition period.

 

4. Suspected North Korean hackers who targeted job applicants prove more ambitious than first believed

cyberscoop.com · by Tim Starks · November 6, 2020

"Operation dream Job." When something seems too good to be true it probably is.  But I think we should never underestimate the capabilities of the north Koran all purpose sword.

 

5. Unification minister urges N.K. not to heighten tensions to test incoming U.S. administration

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · November 6, 2020

Somehow, I do not think the regime is going to heed anything from the Minister of Unification.

 

6. Experts call for new U.S. gov't to craft viable approach to N.K. nukes

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 7, 2020

I would ask both the South Korean and US governments to first conduct a thorough review of their strategic assumptions about the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategy and objectives.  I would love to see a joint review by senior ROK and US government officials and an alliance agreement on the fundamental assumptions the alliance upon which the alliance will base policy and strategy.

 

7. 'Biden fully ready to invest in N. Korea denuclearization'

koreaherald.com · by The Korea Herald · November 6, 2020

I am still thinking about Vice President Biden's unprecedented Yonhap OpEd.  In what other country's media did he publish an OpEd?  

Here is a challenge to Vice President Biden’s national security team from our good friend Shin Beom-chul.  If he is elected, I hope they can be ready before July though I suppose he is anticipating a long confirmation process in a Republican majority Senate.  But I am sure there is a national security team working behind the scenes below the level of confirmation required positions that is conducting (and likely has conducted) assessments and policy and strategy review and development.

 

8. South Korea Lost Track of North Korean Defector Who Crossed DMZ

WSJ · by Andrew Jeong

I do not know this for sure, but my sense is the ROK military is too dependent on technology and is not executing the basic "blocking and tackling" fundamentals of daylight reconnaissance and nighttime ambush patrols. I assume the DMZ south of the MDL is no longer saturated with patrols but rather only has sensors and troops in guard posts monitoring them as in the photo below the "patrols" take place along the South Barrier Fence of the DMZ.  I suspect the military is operating under politically imposed rules of engagement to not conduct aggressive patrols in the DMZ in the misguided belief that this will somehow have a positive effect on north Korea.  Instead it simply communicates a military weakness.   If you want to prevent infiltration and track infiltrators in the DMZ, you have to conduct aggressive patrolling.   There is no effective technological replacement though the technology can be a useful force multiplier.  Give me the enduring fundamentals.

 

9. S. Korea, China agree to cut fishing in EEZs

en.yna.co.kr · by 남광식 · November 6, 2020

???? reduction of 50 fishing boats?

Excerpt: "Under the agreement, which was reached during a meeting of fisheries officials, the number of boats allowed to fish in each other's EEZs will be reduced to 1,350 next year from this year's 1,400, according to South Korea's Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries."

 

10. S. Korea's new coronavirus cases reduced to double digits

en.yna.co.kr · by 김광태 · November 7, 2020

It is all relative - 89 in South Korea - 121,000 in the US.  27,284 total cases in the ROK and 9+ million in the US.  Just saying.  Where you stand depends on where you sit.

And then there is this: "Of the 17 imported cases, 11 were foreigners and six were South Koreans. They came from the United States, Russia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, France, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Algeria, Liberia and Ghana."  The company we keep.

 

11. Defense minister meets brother of S. Korean official killed by N. Korea

en.yna.co.kr · by 최수향 · November 6, 2020

This wound is going to fester in South Korea for some time to come and may never heal.

 

12. U.N. chief Guterres calls for intensified efforts to engage with N. Korea

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · November 6, 2020

Unfortunately, the criteria for engagement with north Korea is concessions to the regime.  The Secretary General and the Presidents of South Korea and the US and most of the entire international community want to sincerely engage with north Korea to bring peace and stability and denuclearization to the peninsula.  Unfortunately, the regime will continue to conduct its political warfare with Juche characteristics.

 

13. How Did a Floating Australian "Party Resort" End Up in North Korea?

insidehook.com · by Tanner Garrity

Another truth is stranger than fiction account.

 

14. South Korea, Japan, US discuss Korean peninsula, US election & COVID in recent talks

republicworld.com – by Vishal Tiwari – 6 November 2020

Three different ways to handle COVID and three different (ongoing) outcomes:

The three sides discussed the COVID-19 pandemic situation in their respective countries and agreed to strengthen cooperation when it comes to vaccine development programmes. COVID-19 situation is particularly grim in the United States, where more than over 9 million have been infected and over 2,35,000 have died. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have managed to control the pandemic, reporting just 27,000 and 1,05,000 cases respectively and fewer than 2,000 deaths when combined.

South Korea, Japan, US discuss Korean peninsula, US election & COVID in recent talks

 

"Never appeal to a man's better nature. He may not have one. Invoking his self-interest gives you more leverage."

- Robert A. Heinlein

 

Helmuth von Moltke: "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."

Bob Leonhard: "A plan that doesn't survive first contact with the enemy is called 'a bad plan.' You shouldn't be a planner. Fire your G2. Learn about decision matrices."

 

"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than is a riot."

- Robert A. Heinlein, Friday