Several odds and ends from the Small Wars Journal and Council...

Bing West is off to Iraq again to research his next OIF / Telic book -- Do or Die. The third in his Iraq 'trilogy' (The March Up and No True Glory are one and two), Do or Die will focus on recent developments concerning our counterinsurgency efforts and prospects for the future. Here is a link to a recent National Review commentary by Bing also titled Do or Die. We are anticipating several blog reports from Bing while in-country.

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Bill Nagle (my SWJ / SWC partner in crime) and I spent a pleasant afternoon several weeks ago in the Washington D.C. radio studio of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. We were there to be interviewed by Stan Correy of Background Briefing on a range of Small Wars related subjects to include on-line 'communities of interest', lessons learned -- or not learned, Dave Kilcullen, counterinsurgency... Our segment is part of a show scheduled to be broadcast on 15 April - Iraq: New Team, New Strategy, New Tensions.

"America has a new policy for Iraq: soft power. It's cultural counterinsurgency. Possibly too little too late, it may even be impossible. Americans don't speak the language, and don't understand the many cultures."

We have no idea on which portions (if any) of our interview may be used.

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Recent Small Wars Council threads you should be reading -- and sharing your insights on:

Fighting for the Soul of Islam

3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

Attitudes Towards the Media

Islamic Army of Iraq Denounces Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Beyond Lies in American Food Aid: The Dead Bodies

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And for those who have never visited our About page, here is who we are and what we do:

Small Wars Journal facilitates and supports the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars in the interest of self-determination, freedom, and prosperity for the population in the area of operations.

We believe that Small Wars are an enduring feature of modern politics. We do not believe that true effectiveness in Small Wars is a 'lesser included capability' of a force tailored for major theater war. And we never believed that 'bypass built-up areas' was a tenable position warranting the doctrinal primacy it has held for too long -- this site is an evolution of the MOUT Homepage, Urban Operations Journal, and urbanoperations.com, all formerly run by the Small Wars Journal's Editor-in-Chief.

The characteristics of Small Wars have evolved since the Banana Wars and Gunboat Diplomacy. War is never purely military, but today's Small Wars are even less pure with the greater inter-connectedness of the 21st century. Their conduct typically involves the projection and employment of the full spectrum of national and coalition power by a broad community of practitioners. The military is still generally the biggest part of the pack, but there a lot of other wolves. The strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

The Small Wars Journal's founders come from the Marine Corps. Like Marines deserve to be, we are very proud of this; we are also conscious and cautious of it. This site seeks to transcend any viewpoint that is single service, and any that is purely military or naively U.S.-centric. We pursue a comprehensive approach to Small Wars, integrating the full joint, allied, and coalition military with their governments' federal or national agencies, non-governmental agencies, and private organizations. Small Wars are big undertakings, demanding a coordinated effort from a huge community of interest.

We thank our contributors for sharing their knowledge and experience, and hope you will continue to join us as we build a resource for our community of interest to engage in a professional dialog on this painfully relevant topic. Share your thoughts, ideas, successes, and mistakes; make us all stronger.

"...I know it when I see it."

"Small Wars" is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn't, there isn't necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term "Small War" either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The "three block war" construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

We'd like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.

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Small Wars Journal is a private site. It is run by Small Wars Journal, LLC, a private company formed in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Its principals are Dave Dilegge (Editor-in-Chief) and Bill Nagle (Publisher). We do this in our spare time, because we want to. McDonald's pays more. But we'd rather work to advance our noble profession than try to super-size your order or interest you in a delicious hot apple pie. If and when you're not flipping burgers, please join us.

To the Iraqi People:

Monday, April 9, 2007 will mark the 4th anniversary of the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein's regime. For many in Iraq and around the world, it will be a time for reflection on the early days after liberation in 2003 and on what has transpired since then.

As one of those who was part of the "fight to Baghdad," I remember well the hopes and dreams of the Iraqi people when coalition soldiers pulled down Saddam's statue in Firdos Square in April 2003. Looking back, I recall a sense of enormous promise -- promise that, in many respects and for a variety of reasons, has yet to be fully realized. If we are honest with each other, in fact, we will acknowledge that while there have been substantial accomplishments in Iraq since 2003, the past four years have also been disappointing, frustrating, and increasingly dangerous in many parts of Iraq for those who have been involved in helping to build a new state in this ancient land.

On this April 9th, some Iraqis reportedly may demonstrate against the coalition force presence in Iraq. That is their right in the new Iraq. It would only be fair, however, to note that they will be able to exercise that right because coalition forces liberated them from a tyrannical, barbaric regime that never would have permitted such freedom of expression.

Those who take to the streets should recall, moreover, that were it not for the actions of coalition forces in 2003 (and, to be sure, actions by Iraqi, as well as coalition, forces since then), they also would not have been able to celebrate the recent religious holidays as they did in such massive numbers. Nor would they have been able to select their leaders by free and democratic elections, vote on their constitution, or take at least the initial steps toward establishment of a government that is representative of, and responsive to, all Iraqis.

It is particularly important to me that "Najafis," the citizens of Najaf, recall these facts, for in 2003 I was privileged to command the 101st Airborne Division, the unit that liberated the holy city of Najaf and its sister city, Kufa. The battle of Najaf was, in fact, our first significant combat action in Iraq. Following its conclusion, we went on to defeat the elements of Saddam's army and the Saddam Fedayeen that fought us in Kifl, Karbala, and Al Hillah, before securing and stabilizing southern Baghdad, Haditha, and, eventually, Mosul and Ninevah Province. Our soldiers sacrificed greatly to give the Najafis and millions of other Iraqis the freedoms, however imperfect they may be, that they enjoy today.

While the establishment of the new Iraq has included a number of noteworthy achievements, it has also had its share of setbacks. Indeed, the coalition's efforts have not been without mistakes. I acknowledged a number of them during my appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January.

I would add, however, that the coalition has, at the least, consistently sought to learn from its mistakes. And, when those mistakes have involved unacceptable conduct, coalition authorities have taken administrative and legal action against those responsible. The coalition has, despite its occasional missteps, worked hard to serve all Iraqis and to bolster those who support a new Iraq founded on the principles now enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution.

Iraq, four years after liberation, faces serious challenges. The sectarian violence that escalated after the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006 was an enormous setback. Indeed, it tore the very fabric of Iraqi society. The damage done is still readily apparent in various neighborhoods of Baghdad and in many areas outside the capital.

Now Iraqi and coalition security forces are engaged in a renewed effort to improve security for the Iraqi people and to provide Iraq's leaders an opportunity to come to grips with the tough issues that must be dealt with to help foster reconciliation among the people of Iraq and to enable achievement of conditions that permit the withdrawal of coalition forces.

As the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq, and having given some 2-1/2 years of my life to this endeavor, I would like to take this opportunity to call for support of the new security plan. I ask all Iraqis to reject violence and the foreigners who fuel it with their money, arms, ammunition, training, and misguided young men. Beyond that, I ask, as well, for all Iraqis to notify Iraqi or coalition forces when those who would perpetrate violence on their fellow citizens or security forces enter their neighborhoods.

Coalition soldiers liberated Iraq from Saddam's "Republic of Fear." Now Iraqis must reject those who seek to drive wedges between people who have, in the past, lived in harmony in the Land of the Two Rivers. This is a time for Iraqis to demonstrate to the world their innate goodness, their desire to respect those of other sects and ethnic groups, and their wish to stitch back together the fabric of Iraqi society. Only in this way can Iraqis make the most of the opportunity that Iraqi and coalition security forces are striving to give them. And only in this way can the dreams of those who live in a country so rich in blessings and promise be fully realized.

With respect,

David H. Petraeus, General, United States Army, Commander Multi-National Force-Iraq

SWJ friend Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute e-mailed us his latest Words Have Meaning related commentary.

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Peter Beinert's "The War of the Words" essay in the Washington Post (Op-ed, April 1) is seriously lacking on several counts. He demonstrates the same blind spots and faulty analysis as the Pelosi-Murtha House Democrats do when they issue a cut-and-run document which, along with other nonsense, condemns use of the "Global War on Terrorism" label.

First, what has been going on in Iraq for over four years is, indeed, a War -- as opposed to a mere effort at crime control or law enforcement. The same was true of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, both of which were once mistakenly (but are no longer ever) called mere "Conflicts."

Second, all of this country's "Death to America" enemies are delighted to call it "war" -- beginning with al Qaeda's preposterous claim that it is a Holy War "Jihad" and continuing apace with all the "Illegal War" and "Bush's War" and "Immoral War" condemnations which have long been voiced by the President's cut-and-run detractors in this country, in Europe and elsewhere.

(Never have you heard or will ever hear these critics complaining of Bush's "law enforcement" surge or his augmented "Peacekeeping" efforts in Iraq. Such correct terms do not demonize the man sufficiently.)

Third, while Mr. Beinart spends several paragraphs concluding that "war" label is "increasingly problematic," he admits to having no preferred alternative. He then proceeds to reject the word "terror" -- which is, indeed, grammatically wrong but whose correct replacement is simply the word "Terrorism," al Qaeda-style and Hizballah-style Terrorism. (Recall, please, that the Cold War was not a war on communes but on fascist-Left, Soviet-style Communism.)

Fourth, a useful alternative label might be the "War on Irhabism" -- Irhab being the Arabic word for Terrorism, which even after five and a half years of same remains virtually unknown, unwritten and unspoken by any of us. Are we asleep at the linguistic switch, or what?!

Fifth, both Mr. Beinart's and our own "war of words" efforts -- and surely the Poop-on-Petraeus Democrats' pathetic postulations -- would be much better spent branding and loudly condemning al Qaeda's (and al-Sadr's and Hizballah's) suicide mass murderers

(1) NOT as waging so-called "Jihad" (Holy War) but ungodly "Hirabah" (unholy war, war against society) and forbidden "Irhab" (Terrorism), instead;

(2) NOT as the "jihadis" and the "mujahideen" they falsely claim to be but as the irhabis (terrorists) and the mufsiduun (evildoers, mortal sinners and corrupters) they really are;

(3) NOT as the Godly heroes of "Jihadi martyrdom" they falsely claim to be but as the Satanic perpetrators of "Irhabi Murderdom" (terroristic genocide) they really are;

(4) NOT as destined for a virgin-filled Paradise for killing all of us so-called kuffar (infidels) but to a demon-filled Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) for killing so many thousands of innocents, fellow Muslims, "People of the Book" and "Sons of Abraham," instead;

(5) NOT as the abd'al-Allah (Servants of Allah) they falsely claim to be but as the abd'al-Shaitan (Servants of Satan), the murtadduun (apostates) and the khawarij (outside-the-religion deviants) they really are.

Clearly, when we counterattack al Qaeda's pseudo-Islamic scam of so-called "Jihadi Martyrdom" in Western secular words only -- criminals, thugs, killers, bring to justice, etc. -- we are simply shooting with blanks.

Worse yet, when we parrot the Terrorists' own words of self-sanctification, we even shoot ourselves -- by the perverse effects of "semantic infiltration," which the late great Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan defined thirty years in a Cold War context as follows:

"Semantic infiltration is the process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in describing political reality. The most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements.' [Just as today's AQ-style Terrorists call themselves 'holy warriors']. It is perfectly predictable that they should misuse words to conceal their real nature. But must we aid them in that effort by repeating those words? Worse, do we begin to influence our own perceptions by using them?"

Both in his op-ed writing for the Washington Post and in his own excellent The New Republic magazine, Mr. Beinart (and the Post, as well) would do well to call our enemies the "Irhabis" and the "mufsiduun" they so desperately do NOT want to be called -- and to avoid anointing them as the holy-guy "Jihadis," the brave "martyrs," the "mujahideen" and the "Mahdi Army" saviors of Islam they so fervently DO want to be called.

Finally, to abandon the derisive term "Terrorism" (and perhaps the word "terrorist," as well...??!!) would place us squarely in bed with Reuters, the BBC and Al Jezeera . These far-left foreign news organizations have always avoided applying either of these powerfully negative terms to al Qaeda and other suicide assassins -- and have relied, instead, on the patently false and pro-UBL language of so-called "Jihadi martyrdom."

Thinking ahead to the media's, the terrorists' and the Bush-haters' likely reactions to a conclusion that the enemy is not really Global "Terrorism" after all, one can imagine an endless line of cynical comments and questions such as:

"Mr. President, you have been calling Terrorism the enemy for almost four years. But now you concede that this was wrong. You used to call al Qaeda's suicide mass murderers "evildoers," but now your own State Department has persuaded you that was wrong, too. Are there still other negative and erroneous labels for the al Qaeda, Hizballah and al-Sadr martyrs that you might also be changing? And if the proper word is 'Extremism,' what about the partisan Democrats and the Euro-Leftists who routinely condemn your policies as 'extremist,' also?"

To the "War on Bush" (but not on Terrorism) Democrats' delight, the propaganda barrage could become as unrelenting as the answers would be difficult for the Administration -- and most dangerously confusing to the American public, Western World opinion and the Muslim World (the Umma), as well.

Surely, that is not what either Mr. Beinart or the Post would want, particularly not at a time of War and of deadly threat to the national security. As for the "AWOL" and "ACE" -- Always Weak On Liberty and Aid and Comfort to the Enemy -- House and Senate Democrats, ons ne sais jamais. (This is French for the wartime unreliability of those who George Washington derisively referred to as "Sunshine Patriots.")

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Jim Guirard -- TrueSpeak Institute 703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com

A Washington, DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-terrrism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief-of-Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long of Louisiana. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-history and truth-in-language in public discourse.

Sunni Tribes Battle al Qaeda Terrorists in the Insurgency's Stronghold

Last fall, President Bush, citing the violence in Baghdad, said that the U.S. strategy in Iraq was "slowly failing." At that time, though, more Americans were dying in Anbar Province, stronghold of the Sunni insurgency. About the size of Utah, Anbar has the savagery, lawlessness and violence of America's Wild West in the 1870s. The two most lethal cities in Iraq are Fallujah and Ramadi, and the 25-mile swath of farmlands between them is Indian Country.

Imagine the surprise of the veteran Iraqi battalion last November when a young sheik, leader of a local tribe outside Ramadi, offered to point out the insurgents hiding in his hometown. "We have decided that by helping you," he said, "we are helping God."

For years, the tribes had supported the insurgents who claimed to be waging jihad. Now, citing the same religion, a tribe wanted to switch sides. Col. Mohammed, the battalion commander, accepted the offer. "The irhabi (terrorists) call themselves martyrs. They are liars," he said. "I lost a soldier and when I pulled off his armor, there was the blood of a martyr."

With Iraqi soldiers and Marines providing protection, the sheik and his tribesmen rolled through town, pointing at various men. The sweep netted 30 insurgents, including "Abu Muslim," who was wanted for the murder of a jundi (Iraqi soldier). "He was just standing there waving at us with all the others," one jundi said during the minor celebration at the detention facility.

Six months ago, American intelligence reports about Anbar were dire. Although the Marines won the firefights, insurgents controlled the population--the classic guerrilla pattern. Among the groups, the extremists called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had achieved dominance. In 2004, AQI briefly held Fallujah, where they whipped teenagers who talked back, bludgeoned women who wore lipstick and beheaded "collaborators"--hapless passersby and truckers. AQI preached a persuasive message: Our way or the grave.

In Anbar, AQI became the occupier, shaking down truck drivers and extorting shop owners. In the young sheik's zone, AQI controlled the fuel market. Each month, 10 trucks with 80,000 gallons of heavily subsidized gasoline and five trucks with kerosene were due to arrive. Instead, AQI diverted most shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices were higher, netting $10,000 per shipment and antagonizing 30,000 shivering townspeople. No local cop dared to make an arrest. The tribal power structure, built over centuries, was shoved aside. Sheiks who objected were shot or blown up, while others fled.

In late 2005, acceptably-trained Iraqi battalions began to join the persistent Americans in Anbar. AQI resorted to suicide attacks and roadside bombs, and avoided direct fights. Sub-tribes began to kill AQI members in retaliation for individual crimes, and discovered that AQI was ruthless, but not tough. Near the Syrian border, an entire tribe joined forces with the Marines and drove AQI from the city of al Qaim.

By the fall of 2006 AQI had become the oppressor, careless in its destructive swath, while the American and Iraqi forces persisted with their mix of force of arms and civil engagement. When an AQI suicide car bomb attacked an Anbar market in November, killing a Marine and nine civilians, the Marine battalion commander and his Iraqi counterpart offered medical care at the local clinic for the entire town, including the first gynecological examinations many local women had seen. This was not an isolated event, and the people noticed.

With a war-weary population buoying them, 25 of the 31 Anbar sub-tribes have pledged to fight the insurgents over the past five months, sending thousands of tribesmen into the police and army. Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners.

Politics in Baghdad have swirled around reinstating former Baathists to their prior jobs, thereby supposedly diminishing the insurgency. The central government, though, has given Anbar such paltry funds that jobs are scant, Baathist or not. In Anbar, reconciliation theories count far less than that eternal adage: Show me the money.

When the sheiks delivered thousands of police recruits, they consolidated their patrimonial power by providing jobs, plus pocketing a fee rumored at $400 paid by each recruit. The tribal police then provided security that permitted American civic action projects profitable to contractors connected, of course, to the sheiks. Our Congress has just appropriated an emergency supplemental for our troops that included millions to grow spinach and store peanuts; in Anbar, the sheiks are filling potholes that can conceal IEDs.

There remain problems that require military solutions, however. Neither the coalition nor the Iraqi government is prepared to imprison the sharp increase in killers like Abu Muslim who are being netted in the surge in Baghdad and the tribal awakening in Anbar. No one wants to take the heat from the mainstream press that would accompany the construction of prisons and the indefinite incarceration of several tens of thousands of insurgents.

In response to the 2003 abuses at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military and the Iraqi government instituted a catch-and-release system that Sweden would find too liberal. Unlike uniformed prisoners who in past wars were held until the war was over, in Iraq most detainees are released within a few months. To some, this represents a scrupulous adherence to the rule of law, with every insurgent provided the right of habeas corpus.

To the sheiks, it is both naïve and deadly. The Iraqi judicial system in Anbar is nonexistent. Locals are quick to relate stories of killers who returned to murder those who snitched. So it's no surprise that while most insurgents are arrested, some simply disappear. The American command in Anbar has issued a clear order barring support to any unauthorized militia. But guidance from the Iraqi ministries has been vague. If the insurgents have a complaint, they can take it up with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

In recent weeks, al Qaeda has struck back with suicide bombers, blowing up a Sunni mosque in the young sheik's area, killing 40 worshipers, and then detonating a series of chlorine truck bombs in residential neighborhoods outside Fallujah. They hope that if they murder random groups of women and children, the tribes will fall back in line. These tactics have locked AQI in a fight to the death against the tribal leaders. It reflects an enemy who has lost popular support for his jihad, clinging to fear alone. Had any American analyst predicted AQI would attack local Sunnis with weaponized chemicals nine months ago, he would have been laughed at.

In itself, the tribal shift is significant but not decisive. The intensity of tribal loyalty varies across the province and is weakest in the cities. While perhaps only a quarter of the males in Anbar heed the orders of the sheiks, their cohesion gives them larger sway. Others will follow their lead, provide tips or stay out of their way. Numerical estimates aren't possible because there has been no systematic effort to identify via biometrics the military-age males in the Sunni Triangle, a gross military error in combating an insurgency. The tribes aren't trained fighters. They occasionally engage AQI in a melee, but they need American or Iraqi soldiers to destroy insurgent bands, especially when holed up in houses that serve as concrete pillboxes.

The real value of the tribes lies in providing specific information and recruits for the police and army. The tribes openly acknowledge that it has been the personal behavior, strength of arms and persistence ofthe American forces that convinced them to join the fight. "The American coalition is the only thing," Sheik Abureeshah of Ramadi said, "that makes the Iraqi government give anything to Anbar."

The tribes want their share of oil revenues, more power and a cut of the American contracts. With American combat forces likely to leave within a year or two, it is the Iraqi Government that must determine the modesty of the demands. But to put the state of the province in perspective, six months ago the head of Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid, told the Congress that "Anbar was not under control." Last week the U.S. commander in Anbar, Maj. Gen. Walt Gaskin, said he was "very, very optimistic."

Gen. David Petraeus, the top general in Iraq, recently persuaded Mr. Maliki to visit Ramadi and meet with the tribes. That was the start of the bargaining. The Iraqi government faces a classic risk-versus-reward calculation. The reward is that the tribes will provide the information, recruits and local policing that shrinks the area where AQI operates. With less area to search, the Iraqi Army can concentrate wherever al Qaeda tries to rest or regroup, eventually drying up the swamp. The risk is that, if the Shiite-dominated government refuses reasonable terms, the tribes use their military muscle to reach a truce with AQI and the province reverts.

Baghdad is the critical battleground. But it is only in Anbar that the Congress agrees with the president that U.S. forces must combat the AQI terrorists. The tribes will learn to play that card to keep pressure onthe central government not to neglect them. Civil war between the Sunni tribes and the extremists has broken out in Anbar Province, the stronghold of the insurgency, and the U.S. and Iraqi government should support it. Anbar is like the American West in the 1870s. Security will come to towns in Anbar as it came to Tombstone--by the emergence of tough, local sheriffs with guns, local power and local laws.

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SWJ Blog Note: Bing's post is co-authored by his son Owen West who recently returned from Anbar where he was a U.S. Marine Corps adviser.

U.S. Army Captain John Shermer e-mailed us his thoughts on Operation Tigris Waves as seen through the lens of Dr. David Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles : Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency. CPT Shermer is a Military Intelligence Officer who served two tours in Iraq. Both tours were with 1-66 Armor Battalion as their intelligence officer. He is currently in command of a tactical intelligence company at Fort Hood, Texas.

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Victory and Defeat - Operation Tigris Waves and the Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency

Captain John Shermer

In March 2006, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division planned and executed Operation Tigris Waves to stabilize the city of Tarmiyah, Iraq, set the conditions to create a local security force capable of protecting the populace of Tarmiyah, and to integrate the town government into the Shia dominated government of Iraq. This operation ultimately failed. Not for lack of planning, or allocation of military and interagency resources, but because early successes in the operation changed the environment to such a degree that other priorities in 1st Brigade's Area of Responsibility (AOR) began to pull resources away from the Tarmiyah area. Eventually security could no longer be maintained, and the coalition initiative was again lost. This essay examines Operation Tigris Waves, the successes and failures of the operation, and provides commentary on how well the operation utilized the Twenty Eight Articles : Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Background

Tarmiyah, a city of largely Sunni Muslims (who were, or remain, Ba'ath Party members) of Iraqi descent with a significant, though dwindling, minority of Shia Muslims, is located 20 miles north of Baghdad along the western bank of the Tigris River. Population estimates of the urban area ranged from 50,000 - 200,000. The agricultural area surrounding Tarmiyah is largely palm and orange groves, with scattered raised-berm fish farms. Goats, cattle, and poultry and other livestock are farmed to a lesser extent. Several significant government complexes from the Saddam Regime are in the area; the largely rubbled Ibn Sinna Chemical Plant and the Karkh Water Treatment Facility, which continues to supply the majority of fresh water to upper class and government facilities in the Karkh area of Baghdad. Tarmiyah is located only 6-7 miles from Highway One (Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa), a heavily patrolled U.S. Army Corps MSR route; but despite the relative proximity to near constant transient U.S. and Iraqi Army patrols, it is isolated enough to need dedicated security from insurgent attacks.

Insurgent attacks on U.S. forces and non-local Iraqi security forces persisted since the end of high intensity combat operations in 2003. Route (RTE) Coyotes, the main improved road linking Tarmiyah to the rest of Iraq, experienced improvised explosive device (IED) attacks or attempted attacks daily. Attacks on U.S. forces and security forces inside of Tarmiyah were less persistent, but tended to be of higher complexity and intensity than attacks on the roads, particularly attacks against fixed facilities, like the Tarmiyah Police Station, or U.S. checkpoints. Prior to 1st Brigade involvement, security in the city consisted of a police station with approximately 10 individuals "on duty." Supporting the police station were intermittent U.S. patrols. In early 2006, the Tarmiyah Police Station was abandoned by U.S. forces following coordinated attacks on a monthly basis.

A Joint Operational Graphic from 2000 placed an "approximate boundary for the Baghdad area" just north of Tarmiyah. These operational graphics were used by Corps planners in delineating division boundaries. These boundaries effectively sealed off the Albiyachi area from U.S. patrols in 1st Brigade and created an area north of Tarmiyah not patrolled by U.S. forces. This insurgent sanctuary north of Tarmiyah played a role in the outcome Operation Tigris Waves.

Operation Tigris Waves involved placing an Iraqi battalion and U.S. company in a fixed facility inside the city and sealing it off the with concertina wire. There were two entry control points for all traffic entering the city. From a patrol base, joint patrols were conducted in order to secure the populace and build indigenous combat power. Figuring prominently in the operation was the addition of local projects to increase the standard of living of the populace and a focus on information operations to inform the populace of the projects and the actions of their local government. Also included in the patrol base were combat support assets, such as local intelligence collectors and signal support. The base was supplied regularly from Camp Taji, 12 miles away.

The operation was, initially, a resounding success. Security in the city quickly increased, and Tarmiyah went from being one of the most feared places for U.S. forces to being the location showcased for VIPs. During the first few months of Operation Tigris Waves it was not unusual to see patrols shopping on the streets of Tarmiyah or eating in cafes. Locals hesitantly embraced the security that coalition forces brought to the city despite the inconvenience of a semi-sealed city and commerce flourished. Drives to recruit police officers were successful and locals were sent to police training. Multiple governance meetings were held and the city was deluged with projects to assist in rebuilding destroyed or neglected public areas in the city. U.S. leadership was invited to mosques, schools, and other events. Insurgents, wary of the U.S. presence in the city and fearful of U.S. operations, fled the area to either Albiyachi, villages south of Tarmiyah, or Baghdad. Intelligence collection initially surged as individuals previously too intimidated to come forward to provide information were now comfortable talking with U.S. patrols or at the Joint Patrol Base.

As 2006 continued conditions in other portions of the 1st Brigade sector changed. The Brigade focus shifted from stabilizing Sunni insurgent strongholds to patrolling Sunni/Shia demographic fault lines and combating a rise in IEDs on MSR Tampa near the town of Mushada. With the return of police recruits and a change in focus on other areas of the brigade sector, security forces began to be pulled away from Tarmiyah. The first drawdown was a relief in place of a U.S. infantry company by a U.S. engineer company half the size of the infantry company. Following this reduction was the displacement of the Iraqi army battalion in Tarmiyah to Baghdad. Insurgents, biding their time in non-U.S. controlled Albiyachi, saw an opportunity to reestablish dominance in Tarmiyah. Killings against citizens in Tarmiyah rose, and an infantry company was again brought in to regain control. Despite a lack of adequate security in the city, project money continued to flow. Consistent, unconfirmed reports emerged of project money flowing into insurgent hands to protect city officials from reprisal attacks from insurgents.

By the winter of 2006 the infantry company was removed leaving only a small contingent of U.S. military police assisting with the security of Tarmiyah. The local Iraqi police, recognizing that the security situation favored the insurgents and fearful of reprisal attacks on their families, quit. By late February 2007, Tarmiyah had come full circle, with U.S. forces manning an empty Iraqi police station, a lone outpost in enemy held territory and vulnerable to attack.

What Went Right

U.S. forces did a remarkable job of stabilizing the populace and, if judged by Dr. Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles on Company Level Counterinsurgency, did very well at a number of his precepts. U.S. Forces knew the land they were going to operate on, diagnosed the problems in the area, and did passably well organizing for intelligence, by dedicating a human intelligence team to augment the company commander's organization. A local patrol base meant light walking patrols, easily augmented with reach-back combat power from the patrol base. Though a political advisor was not dedicated to the company at the patrol base, there was a dedicated brigade command and control node that furnished information operations support on a daily basis. The game plan of building a local security network through the police force was valid and well executed.

The most important dictate of Dr. Kilcullen, that of "being there" was executed daily. Networks were built slowly, over time, as patrol leaders interacted daily with the populace. Deterrent patrolling was done daily by both U.S. and Iraqi patrols through all areas of the city. Armed civil affairs operations were conducted through a series of projects, from relatively minor medical operations to large projects such as adding a distribution pipeline from the Karkh Water Treatment Plant to Tarmiyah. All of these facets of Operation Tigris Waves were well within the tenants of the Twenty-Eight Articles. This, in itself, was a remarkable accomplishment for a U.S. brigade tooled, not for counterinsurgency, but for high intensity warfare.

What Went Wrong

Operation Tigris Waves also failed on several of the precepts of the Twenty-Eight Articles. U.S. Forces did not ever truly organize for interagency operations. A brigade staff section was selected to oversee civil-military operations but at the company level there were no dedicated individuals to develop relationships with civilian agencies. Even if the company could have developed these relationships, they would have been lost as the U.S. components were forced to conduct relief in place operations to facilitate directives to other portions of the brigade AOR.

Another area that failed the Twenty-Eight Articles was that by starting in Tarmiyah, an insurgent stronghold, U.S. forces did not "start easy," as Article 14 suggests. This meant U.S. forces did not have an area to re-cock from when the Tarmiyah security situation disintegrated. However, Article 14 was hard to apply to Iraq in late 2005 and early 2006 as some estimates suggested that 80% of the Iraqi populace had the potential to act as a mass base for the insurgency and 45% of the Iraqi populace believed that attacking U.S. forces was justified. Given these statistics, a suitable location to begin focused counterinsurgency operations was difficult to identify at best.

Another article that was not implemented was Article 22, "local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves." In this, there appears to be a divergence from Dr. Kilcullen's beliefs, as U.S. forces have, and continue to be, focused on raising an Iraqi security apparatus that looks very similar to western military and police forces in doctrine and organization. In the microcosm that was Tarmiyah in 2005-2007, this Article played out in both victory and defeat as Iraqi reconnaissance squads were very successful at retooling into a paramilitary-like force that did their best work in civilian clothes in marketplaces, mosques, and other social circles, while Iraqi tank battalions were not particularly efficient uses of combat power in combating the Sunni insurgency in the area.

Perhaps the biggest deviation from the Articles was in Article 25, "fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces." As Operation Tigris Waves achieved its first objective of providing security to the built-up area of Tarmiyah, attacks in other portions of the brigade AOR increased, particularly in mixed Sunni/Shia areas. Over time, a focus on this rise in activity led to retasking of combat power out of the city of Tarmiyah, ultimately undermining the operation as a whole. In order to fight the Shia insurgency, U.S. forces ceded power to the Sunni insurgency.

Operational Security (OPSEC) is a very difficult problem in Iraq, and it is frustrated on an even higher scale by clockwork troop rotation plans, and the rise of internet and cell phone use. Because of this, Article 27, "keep your extraction plan secret," was another article that U.S. forces had difficulty with. Civilian leaders in Tarmiyah knew the end of 1st Brigade's troop rotation just as well the troops did.

Troop rotations are a particularly poignant problem in Iraq. Just when military leaders have a good handle on the civilian leadership and have built relationships, the entire area's U.S. military leadership changes hands. This seems to violate the last article of Dr. Kilcullen, "whatever else you do, keep the initiative." Months pass before the elements of operational friction from the troop rotation are overcome, ceding time to the Iraqi insurgencies to reengage the population and make up for lost ground due to previous coalition victories.

Despite applying most of the 28 articles to the security in Tarmiyah, ultimately it was the success of Operation Tigris Waves that led to its downfall. Tarmiyah was perceived as secure, and security forces initially dedicated to the operation were moved away from the center of gravity of the Sunni insurgency in 1st Brigade's AOR to contend with the other Iraq insurgency: the Shia insurgency in Baghdad and other enclaves. As stated previously, a superficial resemblance to coming full circle was perceived with the security situation in Tarmiyah, but this is not entirely true. Much like a biological organism will recover from a transient disease with a new resistance, so did the insurgency in Tarmiyah. A sporadic approach to security, with rapid task-organization changes and shifts in focus acts to harden an insurgency and the local populace against U.S. involvement. Coalition forces are perceived as transient. The superficial resemblance of the security situation in Tarmiyah in early 2007 to the security situation in Tarmiyah in 2006 is false. It is not the same. It is worse. The insurgency has come through another on-slaught from U.S. forces. The insurgent capabilities that were not able to make it through the security environment were destroyed; the insurgent capabilities and relationships in the community that survived are now stronger. Evolution has occurred, and not in the coalition's favor.

The U.S. Army will continue to contend with Dr. Kilcullen's' 28 Articles, as they are now doctrine (FM 3-24, Appendix A) and in time the Army may improve in the execution of these articles.

However, without significantly restructuring combat forces for counterinsurgency, realizing that withdraw or drawdown of forces currently in place is not possible until conditions affecting the targeted populace fundamentally change, and providing a sufficient force to address limited objectives in an increasingly prohibitive operating environment, decisive victory for U.S. objectives in Iraq remains in jeopardy.

The latest in our 'posts of note' series.

Posted by Maximus on the Small Wars Council and Marine Corps Gazette discussion boards, I thought this Q&A with a Marine Corps lieutenant would be of interest to SWJ Blog readers.

Council member Maximus is an active duty Marine Corps captain (infantry). He served in Iraq as a rifle platoon commander, rifle company executive officer, and as a combined anti-armor team platoon commander.

Where a military acronym is used I have inserted an explanation or edited the original term for clarity sake.

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I thought you'd be interested in an After Action Review-type discussion with a Marine Corps lieutenant recently back from Ramadi:

Q: What was your billet?

A: Initially I was the 4th Platoon Commander / Mobile Assault / Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Platoon Commander for my company. I held this billet for 2 months until taking over a rifle platoon. I held that billet for 5 months.

Q: What was your Area of Operations (AO)?

A: Initially the northeast sector of Ramadi, but as my company had success our AO expanded to where we had most of the area north of Route Michigan and some areas to the south by the time we left.

Q What do you mean by success? My perception is that many folks think

all Iraqis in Ramadi hate Americans. Is this true?

A: Initially my company had a rough time and minimal positive relations with the people. This changed though right around the 2-month mark as we began using less aggressive tactics. For example, while serving as the MAP (Mobile Assault Platoon) Commander, I executed most of the raids for the company. At first our TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) involved locking the target area down and then going into the building hard, sometimes using an explosive breach. After a while though, I / we began to realize that our intelligence was rarely 100% correct and even when it was we almost never found anything of significance at the target site or we messed up doing site exploitation / filling out paperwork. So we'd end up detaining a bunch of military age males with little evidence to justify detaining them only to have them released and back at their houses days or weeks later.

At about the 2-month mark, my company changed tactics. For example, unless given very specific intelligence that described an immediate threat, whenever conducting a raid or cordon and search, I'd still lock the target area down, but rather than kick down the door, break / blow open the gate, rush the building, etc., I tried knocking on the door and waiting for the family to answer. After all, I had the objective isolated and also had a lot of Marines / firepower with me. Once the home owner came to the door I asked to come in, took off my helmet and shook hands and then began asking him questions. Sometimes I spoke about random things for 5-10 minutes just to get a feel for whether the intelligence was legit. If yes, after 10 minutes I'd have my interpreter explain that I had to detain him for questioning from higher. I also calmly explained what was happening to his family.

Q: Did you search the houses?

A: At first yes, but after doing so many times we realized the insurgents aren't stupid; rarely will you find illegal weapons, IED (Improvised Explosive Device) making material, etc. in a house. They know by now to hide this stuff elsewhere. So, again, after the first 2 months we stopped searching houses for the most part. My thought process was for the 1 in 100 houses where we would actually find something chances are we'd piss off the other 99 families and thus create more enemies.

Q: How bad was the IED threat?

A: You're going to start noticing a trend. First 2 months real bad. Lots of QRF missions for casualty evacuations. The IED threat significantly decreased when we started doing things differently. For example, when I got the rifle platoon we generally operated out of a company firm base located in the middle of the town. From this position we were almost always out as individual squads or 3 squads operating separately doing ambush operations in the vicinity of known or suspected IED / ambush locations. This played a large role in reducing the IED threat.

Q: Please explain urban ambush ops more. What'd they look like? How'd

you occupy? What'd you bring with you?

A: Depends on whether going in an abandoned structure or a house with a family inside.

Abandoned structure: stepped off on a foot patrol in the dark and didn't occupy until late at night. Once inside we'd clear using NVGs (Night Vision Goggles) in order to maintain the element of surprise (white light equals immediate compromise) and then establish eyes-on with a fire team, 1 team would be responsible for security and 1 team on rest. We rarely occupied a platoon-sized ambush position. (After he said this I asked him about distributed ops and whether he had multiple squads out at the same time and if yes how they communicated). We often had squads occupying different buildings because angles in the urban environment usually only allowed Marines to observe a NAI (Named Area of Interest) from 1 or 2 windows. By occupying multiple squad-sized ambush sites that mutually supported each other, the platoon had much better observation. Each squad had plenty of communications capability.

If occupying a house with a family present: much like lessons learned from above, we would still occupy late at night but do our best to quietly get through gates before quietly knocking on doors and asking / politely telling owner that we were coming in. If lights were off in the house, we'd only use NVGs to do a cursory search before occupying. Again, 1 team eyes-on, 1 on rest / engaging family with squad leader and interpreter (critical asset that we didn't always have), and 1 on security. At first we separated the family and forced them to stay in specific rooms and also prevented them from going to work, school, etc. After a few days though we realized this wasn't helping our cause so we simply explained the ground rules and then let the family go about its normal life. My logic was let the father go to work. Chances are he's not going to tell the enemy that we're in his house because he doesn't want his family caught in a cross fire and / or house destroyed. Plus, by not letting parents work and kids go to school you're automatically raising suspicion levels. Worst case, someone tells that we're in the house so insurgents don't plant an IED or we get attacked while we're in a position of advantage. In a sense this is still a win for us.

Q: How'd the people respond to your living in their houses for multiple days?

A: We never had a problem. In fact, in every case the family offered us food and plenty of chai (tea) and eventually Marines not on security or maintaining eyes-on the NAI ended up having conversations with the older males and playing with the children. Operating in this way proved to be a great way to get to know the people and to build relationships with them.

(As he said this he remembered one particular ambush op....)

One night we occupied a little early, call it around 2000-2100. As I walked in the house I looked into a room and saw 30-40 middle aged to older men. Initial thought was what have we walked into! After having a short discussion with the home owner I found out that the men were in the house because they had just returned from a funeral. As I was expressing my sorrow for the loss the men began to explain that an IED had inadvertently killed a member of their family. Through sheer luck or simply because I treated them like human beings, the men then told me where 2 other IEDs were located and also who was responsible for planting them. I quickly called EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) and they eliminated the IEDs. We also detained the guys who set them up. Big picture - this taught me that the average person in Ramadi is fed up with the fighting and will help us if we give him reason to.

Q: Did your company ever kill / capture insurgents laying in IEDs or other

types of ambushes?

A: Yes, I don't recall exactly how many but at least 3 or 4 insurgents. As we did these ops though fewer and fewer IEDs were set-up in our AO so the opportunities decreased. That said it's critical that you do everything possible to maintain the element of surprise throughout the operation.

Q: What gear did you bring with you on these patrols?

A: Normally 80-90 pounds of gear. Operated a lot in the summer so we needed lots of water, enough food for 3 days, ammo, night optics, digital cameras, IR (Infra Red) marking devices, radios and extra batteries and we also often took 40-50 lbs pieces of ballistic glass (HMMWV windshield glass) with us. I had to force my Marines to take the glass initially but when we were compromised once and a sniper hit the glass directly in front of one of my Marines, the complaints ceased.

Q: After observing a recent DO (Distributed Operations) communications training package where Marines were taught to take pictures with digital cameras, download on small tough-book computers and then send imagery over their radios, I asked if he had this capability and if not would he have wanted it in order to get imagery / data to higher headquarters ASAP?

A: No we didn't have this capability. And, yes I definitely would have wanted it. There were multiple times where we had pictures / other intelligence that we wanted to get to higher but didn't want to leave the positions in daylight or before mission completion.

I was impressed with the lieutenant's ability and willingness to adapt, understanding of the nature of the fight, etc., as I am disappointed that we keep learning the same lessons over and over again - at great cost. Success in COIN (counterinsurgency) has proven in so many ways nothing more than understanding human relations 101.

I've gotten lots of feedback on this National Public Radio (Future Iraqi Advisers Face Hard Lessons) piece that ran this week in which Steve Inskeep and I discussed the moral dilemmas that often confront counterinsurgents. Situations like the one described below are why one of the paradoxes of counterinsurgency is that "Sometimes the best action is to do nothing" and why we put a chapter on ethics and leadership in COIN into Field Manual 3-24.

From the NPR article:

Lt. Col. John Nagl wrote a book about fighting insurgents called Learning to

Eat Soup with a Knife.

He remembers working closely with an Iraqi police chief who provided

valuable intelligence. Then, he learned that the man he had trusted was supporting the enemy -- "providing weapons, ammunition, body armor to the insurgents in Fallujah who were then fighting the Marines. And against some of my soldiers."

Nagl said he found himself "faced with a horrible dilemma."

"What do I do to this police chief who has clearly risked his life to help

us? Every time I think about it, I wonder if I did the right thing. But ultimately what I decided to do was -- nothing. My assessment was that for Ishmael to stay alive this is the minimum he had to do -- this is the minimum tax he had to pay to the insurgents."

Part One of the NPR series: Training the Trainers at Fort Riley.

US Army Captain and Small Wars Council member Captain Ryan Kranc e-mailed us yesterday with his thoughts on advising indigenous forces. CPT Kranc is a two-tour Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran who served as a platoon and troop commander with the 3rd Armored Regiment.

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Advising Indigenous Forces

Captain Ryan T. Kranc

Introduction

As the Long War continues, reaching its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives requires training and advising the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan to take control of their country from insurgents, sectarian violence, and lawlessness. General George Casey said in September 2005 that "The sooner we can shift [to Iraqi security forces] the better. A smaller U.S. footprint, that is allowed to decline gradually as Iraqi forces get stronger, actually helps us." The November 2005 National Security Council publication, The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq emphasized that point, quantifying victory in Iraq according to three distinct time metrics:

In the short term:

• An Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency, meeting political milestones; building democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.

In the medium term:

• An Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security, with a constitutional, elected government in place, providing an inspiring example to reformers in the region, and well on its way to achieving its economic potential.

In the longer term:

• An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency.

• An Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.

• An Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.

The result of this command emphasis on developing indigenous forces capable of taking the lead in security and stability operations within their country stimulated the parallel development of 200 Military Transition Teams (MiTT) by February of 2005. Each MiTT has 12 officers and NCOs advising Iraq battalions, brigades, and divisions. According to a February 2006 media event regarding MiTT structure and future, there were somewhere in the arena of 2000 US soldiers on MiTTs, with 5,000 as "a fair estimate" for those who will eventually serve in the MiTT capacity.

We have done this before. On 1 July 1949 the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was established in order to replace the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) and tasked with continuing to improve the competence of the Republic of Korea Army. In September 1950 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was established to advise the French in their fight with the Viet Minh. By 1968, the peak of the Vietnam conflict, the number of advisors at the battalion or below level had reached an apex of 9,430 soldiers. Additionally, before deployment, potential advisors were schooled through the Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) course, a four-week course that incorporated both language and counterinsurgency training. Indeed, the United States has in excess of fifty years experience as advisors in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and a number of other countries around the globe.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines the US Army Special Forces (SF) mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society."

Given the need for SF units outside the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan and the tremendous need for FID/IDAD inside those theaters, conventional forces and conventional Soldiers have had to take on what was an unconventional role, training and advising foreign security forces. Moreover this has become a role for joint conventional forces with JCISFA serving as it the DoD proponent. Certainly conventional forces faced a steep learning curve in the past four years taking on missions that in the past centered on SF's core competencies of intercultural communications (to include both language proficiency and area and cultural orientation), warfighting, and training of foreign security forces. The establishment of consolidated MiTT training facilities at Fort Riley, Kansas under one command boosted progress in this arena over the past few years. Shifting that MiTT training to the Joint Readiness Training Center so that MiTTs can train alongside their U.S. conventional unit partners will further improve it.

But no matter how good the training, nothing can match the value of actual advisor experience when it comes to training and advising another human being in a cross-cultural environment. You cannot train "experience"; you can share that experience in training others. In this paper, I will share of my experiences as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade and as the commander of a multi-national troop containing one Iraqi Army platoon.

The Law of Realistic Expectations

Realistic is defined by Merriam-Webster as "interested in, concerned with, or based on what is real or practical." Expectation is defined as "the degree of probability that something will occur." To compare a 6th grade geometry student with a high school senior calculus student is mixing apples and oranges. Chances are the indigenous force you have been tasked to advise (the apples) through no fault of their own are not of the caliber you would expect in US Army units (the oranges). Clearly one can make a nice dessert using both; just don't expect pure orange juice.

The advisor's role, as Dr. David Kilcullen has so eloquently stated, is not to have the indigenous force mirror our forces, but for them to mirror the enemy. The Law of Realistic Expectation calls for progress, however slight, over a period of time; the objective is improvement. This law recognizes that the infantry battalion you advise during your tour will not transform into SEAL Team 6 or 3-325 AIR at the end of your 12- month advisory tour. Violating this Law by thinking in those terms will not only frustrate the advisor, but the advised force as well. The Law of Realistic Expectations focuses on the improvement and refinement of procedures as a vehicle to the desired end state without sacrificing standards. Forward progress is the engine. A good working relationship and partnership is the fuel. In our eagerness to do well, often we will place unrealistic expectations upon our partnership unit, which turns out to be unfair and frustrating. Understanding where you wish to be in twelve months will place into perspective where you should go with your training tomorrow.

Ignorance is Not Stupidity -- Don't Stupidly Assume They Are Ignorant

Often, we Americans erroneously equate ignorance with lack of intelligence. Ignorant people can learn and be taught; stupid people cannot be taught and will not learn. The wise advisor separates these two fundamentals to reduce misinterpretation or stereotyping by either advisor or advised. Understand that the ignorance you perceive in the partner unit is nothing compared to your actual ignorance of their way of life. It is virtually certain that those who you have been tasked to advise do not come from the same social, religious, political, or economic background as do you. It so follows that their customs and everyday activities will be dissimilar to anything you have seen before. As such, remember that in your everyday activities you will probably make mistakes that may be termed offensive to your partner force. The higher the quality of pre-deployment training is, the lower the proportionality or frequency of these occasions. Understand that they are much more tolerant of your inevitable social mistakes in their country than you will be of their tactical mistakes in training.

You Will Learn More Than You Teach

If you approach your advisory role with the misconception that you know it all and are there exclusively for the purpose of teaching anyone who will listen, you will have a disappointing and unproductive year. A method of introduction is to tell your partner force commander up front that you look forward to learning as much from him as you can. Advisory roles can be flipped quite easily. As a young captain advising battalion and brigade commanders in Iraq, I would have been foolish and arrogant to assume that I could learn nothing from them. Truthfully, at the end of my time with my partner unit, I had learned far more from them than I ever could have taught them.

Al-tikrar yi'allim al-shuttar -- Repetition Teaches the Clever

The quoted Arabic proverb has as much application for an advisor as it does on the high school football field. Repeating any act over and over instills muscle and behavioral memory. Rehearsals are the most overt method of teaching, which require both advisor and partner unit to go through the steps to achieve a task. In repetitive actions good and bad habits are formed. Repeating the same drills not only will increase your partnership unit's proficiency, the unit will begin to correct its own mistakes. Few successes will be as sweet as seeing your partner unit begin to train to standard on tasks that you have been training their leaders.

Treat Them as You Would Your Own Soldiers

Understand that your success as an advisor is directly proportionate to the success of those around you, much like the success of the platoon leader is directly tied to the abilities of his or her platoon. Taking ownership, though not in a command role or relationship, vests interest into the well being and totality of the unit. Shortcomings, when taken personally, are apt to receive greater concentration so that they are not repeated. Additionally, success shared is sweeter than private satisfaction. When pointing out the successes of others, ensure that achievement is recognized. If one of your partner unit jundis (soldiers) does well, make sure that his leadership, peers, and subordinates know that he did well. Recognize him in public, making a point to reward his hard work and dedication. Conversely, correct in private, particularly those in leadership positions. Consider how you would want to be treated if you erred and knew it. Consider how you have felt in the past when corrected. Implement lessons learned from your own past into tangible and usable lessons in your advisory role.

Rapport and Relationships Build Progress

Your abilities to connect with your partner unit on a level transcending your professional military relationship will allow both of you to accomplish more together. We played soccer with our counterparts, watched television, drank chai, talked of our families (after a period of time), played ping pong, air hockey, and told old war stories. We connected in ways outside of our official capacities; in turn, these growing personal relationships fostered significant progress over time. Think of your relationships, particularly those friendships bred from an initial working relationship. How did those friendships support better working relationships? How did you get to that point? How will you incorporate lessons learned in this arena throughout your life into your advisory role? You will be amazed at how much impact getting to know your advisory partner will have both personally and professionally.

Mistakes are Training Tools

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." Chances are that as a child or teenager, there was a time of your life where you were told that a particular action would cause some sort of negative reaction. If you were like me, and your parents told you this, chances are you did not listen. And like me, you probably found out the hard way that doing something incorrectly precipitated a reflex mechanism meant to teach you never to repeat said action again. Just as these formative experiences from our youth have conditioned us to, perhaps, the correct path, mistakes made by the partner unit may have significant consequences.

The following is a summary of an article that will appear in Volume 8 of the Small Wars Journal online magazine to be published in April. Scott Swanson is an intelligence specialist who advises military and government special projects in the area of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. He can be reached at s2@delphiresearch.us.

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Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System

By Scott Swanson

Extremist groups, insurgents, and resistance elements continue to use Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to attack coalition forces to thwart "infidel Crusaders'" occupation activities and assault rival sectarian factions. The effective and low-cost IED weapon in Iraq hides as a tool created within an elusive social network system and its use will persist in opportunistic attacks if the status quo does not shift. This IED system further devastates Iraq with evolving ambush accuracy and component sophistication, creates supply-chain income opportunities within the community, and beckons the youth who require a social-psychological outlet. Regrettably, IEDs will continue to be a weapon to channel the three "Rs" attributed to insurgencies: resentment, resistance, and revenge, unless social improvements can be rapidly implemented or the supporting networks can be debilitated.

Cutting off the regenerative hydra- heads of disparate insurgent networks is nearly impossible. Excessive direct action without timely intelligence runs the risk of civil infringements and insurgent propaganda opportunities. Capture and kill counter-IED solutions being used today have significant counter-effects of alienating and angering many Iraqis. The perceived social infractions create more discontent within the Iraqi communities and increases resistance participation.

Iraq's IED use persists as a highly effective weapon against coalition forces. Many counter-IED solutions appear to be focused on reactive tactics (sniffers, frequency jammers, convoy procedure changes, etc.) and conventional mindset, with an outcome of specific incident successes. To change the counterinsurgency advantage, a full understanding of the IED's complex system is required to shift from reactive conventional approaches to more aggressive small-war initiatives that stun and damage the IED sources.

Most reading this would agree that social networks enable resistance activities, and outsider military forces soon find an inability to penetrate tight family, tribe, and clan relationships. The IED system in Iraq leverages this network requiring a solution to destroy elusive alliances from within without adding to insurgency growth. Viral network penetration built on adversarial insights is a disruptive tool that can change COIN targeting.

This seemingly germ-warfare associated "viral" attack does not actually use bio weaponary but is built on similar physiological weaknesses.

In short, social and psychological information operations are conducted to push misperceptions and rumor carried by a human communication "virus" in a lytic cycle similar to a biological or computer system attack. The virus is created by a contrived solution that directly correlates to the target and damages or ostracizes the group from within. While it damages individuals' credibility and trust, it also decelerates the flow of knowledge and information, creates some bottlenecks, and reduces IED innovation enablers.

Viral targeting is highly effective in counterinsurgency for a number of reasons. First of all, it directly concentrates on the human factors that are involved in resistance activities: demographics, culture, tribes, clans, class, ethnicity, and key actors. Second, threats are often indistinguishable between insurgents, active/tacit supporters and general population, so a solution must not inflict irreparable "friendly casualties" to incite more sympathy towards resistance. Third, and only the final for this particular argument, is the targeting follows decentralized operations that can slip outside of pattern and incident network analysis used to formulate typical COIN tactical missions. All of these reasons are contrary to most Conventional Operations and a conventional solution to the current IED threat.

The white paper, "Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System" assesses the IED system and further defines this unconventional method of disruption.

It has been an interesting few weeks here in Baghdad. Myself and the other advisors felt that a comment on recent developments might be in order. It is still early days for Fardh al-Qanoon (a.k.a the "Baghdad Security Plan") and thus too soon to tell for sure how things will play out. But, though the challenges remain extremely severe, early trends are quite positive. Counter-intuitively, the latest series of car bombings includes some encouraging signs.

On March 17th Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) set off a truck bomb, including chlorine gas canisters, in a Sunni marketplace. Though everyone affected by the gas walked away, there were about 250 injured, and the attack happened on the 19th anniversary, to the day, of Saddam's use of poison gas against the Kurds at Halabja. Local Sunnis were appalled and furious.

Think about that for a moment. If insurgents are the fish, and the community is the sea in which they swim, then AQI just showed an incredible level of desperation -- attacking its own potential constituents, applying a uniquely repellent form of attack, and emulating Saddam on the anniversary of one of his worst atrocities, into the bargain. What were they thinking?

Or consider another recent attack, where extremists bombed a Sunni moderate mosque because its Imam dared to suggest that maybe it's time to stop fighting, that there is an honorable path of resistance through political participation and the ballot box rather than pointless violence. Many Sunnis were killed -- again, extremists targeting moderates for fear that they are about to lose the influence conferred by intimidation.

Both of these attacks were political "own goals" for the terrorists - the mask is slipping, and people are seeing the real face beneath.

With this kind of inept political action by the insurgents, it's small wonder that in al Anbar, where only one out of 18 major tribes supported the Iraqi government a year ago, today 14 out of the 18 tribes are actively securing their people, providing recruits to the Iraqi police and hunting down al Qa'ida.

And then there are the car bombings in market places. Since the cooperative coalition-Iraqi effort to secure Baghdad's population, extremists have continued trying to target Shi'a communities, particularly markets. But efforts to harden market places and public areas have paid dividends -- almost all the recent bombs exploded at checkpoints well away from their intended targets, killing far fewer people than intended, and far fewer than in similar attacks last year. And several failed to explode at all, showing a loss of skill as key bomb-makers are taken off the streets.

To cap it off, this week coalition forces captured the leader of the Rusafa car bomb network, the AQI organization responsible for some of the most horrific recent bombings in East Baghdad. Along with captures of bomb-making gear, explosives, and a vehicle rigged as a bomb, this puts a severe dent in the network's capabilities.

What does this all mean? Well, as I have previously said, car bombs -- in terms of size and frequency -- are not a good indicator of progress since it will always remain possible to pull off an attack, even when all other aspects of security have developed fully. So as professionals we need to be wary of rushing to judgment, either positive or negative, here. But events of the past few weeks tend to suggest that the extremists have begun targeting their own potential supporters, indicating a degree of political desperation, and a likely drop in support. And the attacks -- though still atrocious -- have become less effective. Both of these are significant indicators, independent of the bombings themselves.

Though we still need to be extremely cautious and realistic about progress, these are positive signs. We are into the fifth year of the war, and only the fifth week of this operation - so it is still very early days. Tough times and setbacks undoubtedly lie ahead. But the general trajectory of the campaign seems to be changing, in subtle ways that may yet prove decisive.

David Kilcullen is Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor, Multi-National Force -- Iraq. These are his personal views.