------------

New York Times, May 24: Mr. Bush said he envisioned a time when the added troops had brought violence to a low enough level that he could pursue a scaled-down strategy similar to that recommended by the Iraq Study Group. "The recommendations of Baker-Hamilton appeal to me," Mr. Bush said, referring to the study group's co-chairmen, James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton. "And that is to be embedded..."

------------

The Adviser Model: We have to stay in Iraq for a decade. Here's how to do it.

By Bing West and Owen West

Now that Democrats have stripped their troop-withdrawal timetable from the war funding bill, it's clear that American forces will remain in Iraq through 2008. It also seems likely that they will stay much, much longer. The leading presidential candidates in both parties recognize the dangers of a rapid pullout, and achieving stability in Iraq is going to take a decade.

How can U.S. soldiers stay in Iraq and accomplish what needs to be done? Our best hope is the Adviser Model. With the surge still under way, Gen. David Petraeus obviously cannot discuss a Plan B. But given U.S. public opinion, a Plan B for 2008 and beyond is a certainty. Its central feature is likely to be the buildup of a combat-advisory corps as our combat units are drawn down.

Americans need to understand who those advisers are, what they will do, and how many we will need. There is little to indicate that most citizens, or even politicians, are well-educated on the subject. A recent proposal from House Democrats, for example, distinguished between advisers, whom they allowed to remain in Iraq, and the "combat troops" they sought to withdraw. This indicates a gap of understanding that must be bridged before any such transition can occur.

Advisers have been a U.S. military staple for 70 years. American advisers augmented allied forces in World War II and Korea, but were most prominent in Vietnam. While initially prohibited from direct combat, advisers in Vietnam became increasingly combat-oriented as our involvement increased. The first infantry advisers were special-forces soldiers designed for the domino theory and trained to aid "indigs." By the time Nixon's Vietnamization policy was announced in 1969, there were almost 12,000 military advisers in Vietnam, mostly officers and senior NCOs from traditional ranks. When the conventional forces withdrew, the advisers were the remaining link to American firepower, bolstering the defense—and morale—of the South Vietnamese army until they, too, were pulled out.

Today, the military has a mission statement for advisers that is too broad to be informative. Advisers are told to "advise, coach, teach and mentor." Every Iraqi army and police unit has between 10 and 25 advisers, called "transition teams," living with them. While some advisers perform as drill instructors for recruits and others work with Iraqi staffs behind barriers of American concrete, the majority do their job by setting the example outside the wire in combat. Many battalion advisers accompany Iraqi patrols twice a day, setting a much higher operational tempo than most American units.

This aggressive willingness to share risk makes the Advisory Model viable. The heart of the relationship between the American adviser and his Iraqi counterpart is a quid pro quo: The transition team leader brings logistics and a lifeline to American forces and firepower. In return, the Iraqi commander listens to advice about basic tactics and planning. It is the adviser's performance under stress and willingness to share risk side by side with Iraqi troops that yields the true leverage: the ability to influence operations.

Danger is part of the job. It would be misleading to assume that the number of American casualties will drop precipitously if most combat units are withdrawn and advisers stay. The improvised explosive devices that account for more than 65 percent of U.S. casualties will still lurk in waiting every time a mounted patrol leaves the wire. This is especially true as the advisers persist with the current counterinsurgency emphasis of living in the neighborhoods instead of on large bases.

The Advisory Model represents America's best chance to influence the fight for Iraq while pulling our troops out, but to do it the military must make three changes.

First, the military must select its best troops for these assignments. Currently, there is a marked variance in the performance of adviser teams. Though advisers have been labeled as our most important Iraq effort, the selection policy reveals the underlying truth: Leadership and key staff billets in conventional units such as battalions are much more prized than are assignments to advisory teams. The same held true in Vietnam.

Second, the military needs a new model for its advisers' tour lengths. Most advisers say that 12 months in-country is too long, especially given the small size of the unit and its outsized responsibilities. But most also agree that relationships take time to cement and that seven-month Marine tours—and even 13-month Army tours—are too short to see a local plan through to a conclusion. A better alternative, albeit at higher support and travel costs, is to copy the model used by special-operations teams. This would extend the assignment to specific Iraqi units up to two years, enlarging the teams while permitting team members back to the United States for 30 days every four months.

Finally, the military needs a new management model for its advisory corps. Advisers are like entrepreneurs, each tinkering with their own startup projects. This is unusual in a military that still uses a Napoleonic, hierarchical management structure, and the results so far have been mixed. One transition team may do what's called "active advising," spending the bulk of its time patrolling, while 5 kilometers away another may choose to remain inside the base, focused on staff planning. The military needs to adopt risk controls similar to those employed by Wall Street firms and other large companies that encourage risk-taking by entrepreneurial units. It must strike a better balance between nationwide unity of effort, local relationships, and individual risk-reward profiles.

A full-fledged Plan B would leave about 80,000 U.S. troops in Iraq in 2009, about half as many as will be in-country at the height of the surge. The adviser corps would nearly quadruple, to 20,000 troops, with another 25,000 in four combat brigades and special-forces units, plus 30,000 logistics troops. Another 5,000 Americans will live on the grounds of the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad, where they will rarely venture out. A comparative handful of American diplomats, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams, currently live with U.S. brigades. Far more are needed. Another 15,000 American contractors would provide security and training functions, up from 10,000 today. In addition, the number of foreign contractors who provide food and logistics to the U.S. military would remain steady at 90,000 or drop.

Equally as important: Over the next two years, the Iraqis need to build to 60,000 soldiers and police in Anbar province, 80,000 in Baghdad, and another 40,000 in the rest of the Sunni Triangle. This represents an increase of 25 percent over current plans.

Can an Adviser Model work as Plan B? At the grass roots, yes. An aggressive corps of advisers and their Iraqi brethren can prevent the country from cratering. However, stability in Iraq depends on two other factors. The first is the commitment to national unity on the part of the ministries and political parties. On May 17, Ambassador Ryan Crocker said, "What I see is an awareness and focus on the part of the Iraqi leadership that reconciliation is key to Iraq's success." Obviously, Crocker has to be proved right in his judgment. To date, the top Iraqi leadership has been much weaker—and more selfish—than the bottom.

The second factor is U.S. steadfastness. There is no full exit or abrupt departure without serious adverse consequences. "If you leave quickly, we'll redistribute our units and go back to where we have local support," Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan, commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces, told us in a recent interview. Such consolidation, which seems logical, is the adjustment President Nguyen Van Thieu tried to make in South Vietnam in 1975. But once South Vietnamese units began to pull out of the more remote areas, panic set in and events cascaded out of control. South Vietnam had a very experienced army; for the Iraqi army to try such adjusting—meaning, pulling out of the tough Sunni areas like Qaim or Fallujah—risks total chaos.

This war will be fought for another 10 years because there is no central authority controlling the extremist groups among the dozens of gangs that compose the Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. This is a bottom-up war that will be fought out in dozens of cities, towns, and farming communities. The core strength of the Iraqi security forces lies at the battalion level of the army, which is the least sectarian institution in Iraq. These battalions, paired with police departments, are the key to the war. Left abruptly on their own, they would fall apart. Like Afghanistan—where we have 30,000 soldiers fighting and advising—Iraq is a commitment for a decade.

Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and author of two books on the war, recently returned from his 13th trip to Iraq.

Owen West, a trader at Goldman, Sachs, recently returned from his second tour with the Marines in Iraq.

Neither does Dr. Kilcullen, nor mil doctrine, state that religion is a, 'trivial actor in the struggle', as implied by Herschel Smith in his response to Dr. Kilcullen's Small Wars Journal Blog piece from 12 May 2007, "Religion and Insurgencies". In fact, Dr. Kilcullen succinctly provides guidance that,

"The bottom line is that no handbook relieves a professional counterinsurgent from the personal obligation to study, internalize and interpret the physical, human, informational and ideological setting in which the conflict takes place. Conflict ethnography is key; to borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a "close reading" of the environment."

While I am not prepared with empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, I believe that the positions between the non-religious insurgency and religious insurgency schools of thought lies in the deeper theory of what religion means to the human condition. The discussion between the two schools really centers on the purpose of religion and the basic theological and ontological questions that can not be answered through empirical science at the present time. Given that no epistemological basis exists to unify the issue of religion across all of humanity, seeking to define a form of social conflict on those terms creates a condition where there will be as many definitions of conflict as there are religions in the world. On the other hand, if in an attempt to find a common ground that allows near unity of purpose, if not perfect unity of purpose, one believes that religion serves primarily a 'political' role in human society then the two schools can find common terms to help unify understanding to guide designs for counter insurgent strategies.

Religion as political structure of the human culture is well accepted in the vast majority of schools spanning all sides of the human condition. Even before Aristotle defined politics as a structure in modern human society, religion as spiritual belief structures that unified and provided organizational structure to distinct cultural segments of human societies, is well accepted. The emergence of the 'state' correlates roughly with the introduction of 'politics' by Aristotle, as the art and science of government or 'affairs of the state'. The history of mankind since the emergence of the state, and arguably likewise before, has been most definitively marked as a struggle between the faith based spiritual belief structures of human culture and political organizational structures, both vying for the ultimate unifying quest for power over people and resources. In this sense the issue becomes not one of religion or politics, but for power.

Viewed in this way, it is not critical to accept that insurgencies are 'religious insurgencies' or not, but that all insurgencies are an expression of political struggle for power. Religion may or may not be an element requiring strong consideration in the 'conflict ethnography' that Dr. Kilcullen speaks of, this being determined by the nature of the humans involved in the conflict, and determined after the 'close read' on the ground that Dr. Kilcullen prescribes. Albeit, ignoring religion as an important component of the dynamics operating in the structures of the insurgent quest for power, when such a component exists would be ill advised. Interestingly, Dr. Kilcullens 'close read' reference runs akin to the 'thick description' prescribed by Clifford Gertz, an Anthropologist / Social Scientist whose ethnographic methods prescribed deep study of culture to define not just the behaviour but the context of the behaviour as well. The context of the extremist Islamist insurgent is the important matter here. Islam in a moderate context does not condone suicide bombing, killing of innocent victims and destruction of other societies.

The Islamic belief structures specifically mark the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan distinctively, with some similarities and some specific differences between them as well. Without getting into irresolvable discussions involving some notion concerning the 'sui generis' nature of religion as satisfying a spiritual requirement of the human condition, current social science recognizes the role that religion serves in political organization of a society. Accepting this, Islam is marked as a faith based belief structure that includes rules and concepts for political organization, rule making and civil governance. As such, Islam can be viewed as a political structure with ready made sets of solutions for political organization that extremists exploit by appealing to the religious structures that resonate with members of the broader faith, while seeking to obtain the broader objectives of power over people and their resources. The insurgents use Islam not so much as a religious structure but as a political structure in their quest for power. In this vein, the religion of Islam is employed by the extremists, much to the chagrin of more moderate followers of the faith, as a tool just as they use acts of terror, intimidation of individuals and segments of societies, torture and all the other litany of tools used by insurgents.

Categorizing fundamentalist Islamist structures, as actualized by extremist insurgent elements, as a political structure that seeks to organize people and resources toward objectives of centralized power, makes discussion and categorization of 'religious insurgencies' less amplifying and not terribly meaningful. There is a possibility that deeper study and exploration of the phenomenon may yield that there could be a psychological component operating within the individual extremist Islamist insurgent's psyche that allows him to distance himself from the more moderate and unifying aspects of 'Religious Islam' that he violates through his actions, by viewing the faith through a more 'Political Islam' lens that insulates him from the more enlightened spiritual religious edicts of the faith. In other words, by viewing Islam through the pragmatic though extreme political filter, the individual extremist may have less trouble justifying the means versus ends dilemma that a more moderate religious interpretation could never justify. The political component that Islam serves is central to the issues of insurgency, especially in the current forms experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, though by viewing those cases as 'religious insurgencies' does little to illuminate resolution. In this light, the current military doctrine correctly approaches the subject by refraining from getting tangled in the issue of 'religious insurgencies', focusing instead on the more important components concerning how insurgents organize to influence the people in their quest for power.

Speaking from inside the AO and as one who has been immersed in the theory and application of counter-insurgent and insurgent conflict for several years, my observations and experience converge in a strong urge to simplify the counter-insurgent/insurgent dynamic as defined by the simple notion that, whoever best cares for the basic subsistence and security needs of the people first and most enduringly, wins. I am resisting this urge to simplify, but the needs of the people are great and our solutions have become very complex. Conditions such as this most often require the simplicity of the elegant solution, and I am cognizant of the counter-insurgent dynamic defined by the concept that one often fortifies the resistance in proportion to the power that one wields in the peoples defense. The needs of the people, and counter-insurgent strategic endstates, may best be met by the power that one yields to their service.

I think this weekend it is important to remember the hard things. It is what we owe our fallen, and we owe the nation as it's the most precious of treasures we spend in our profession. I'd encourage others here to write their remembrances of those who are not coming back, and what we lost in their deaths. I think by remembering them, we can assure ourselves and their memories that they did not pass unnoticed, and that we honor their sacrifice.

Our pastor, as I'm sure many pastors across the United States did this Sunday, started off his sermon with recognition of those whose service to our freedom cost them their lives. It got me thinking about how we memorialize our fallen and who we memorialize and why. When this war started, the first person I knew who was killed was a former IOBC instructor working at the Pentagon. Ironically it was at IOBC in 1996 where a visiting speaker on leadership stated with finality that as we progress through our careers we will see some of our friends and peers killed in service to the nation. Up until 2001, there were few serious injuries, and no deaths that I was aware of.

When 1-24th deployed to Mosul, I had finished my command time and was moving on to whatever it is that you do after command -- mainly clear out for the next guy. I'd had a rifle company and a HHC, and I had thoroughly enjoyed my time as a CDR -- up until that time it was the high point of my time as an officer. I had helped to build two very good teams, and as such to build the larger teams of the BN and BDE. I say helped because there were so many truly good officers and men, but it was time to move on and after almost 4 years at Fort Lewis the face of the organization was changing.

You don't invest a large part of yourself in people and an organization though without having concerns. One of the last things I remember there was the BN CSM Tom Adams opening up one of the first deployment briefings explaining why getting your personal life in order was so important before deploying to war. There was silence and a few nervous laughs when the CSM reminded the men that some of them and their buddies would not return -- they would die in combat.

From my follow on job, I kept tabs on the BN and most important to me, those I had special bonds with -- the ones who I had sat on a range with and talked about shooting, knew where they were from, had shared coffee with, discussed some personal problem I might help them solve, or just BS'd with on the stairs to the company or in their platoon CP. I had friends and my old boss, who when they found time could shoot me an email with news.

It was not too long before the first deaths occurred. The first occurred when a suicide bomber infiltrated the Mosul Dining Facility. From my job in Fort Knox I tried to imagine how it happened, even with some details from friends I could not wrap my mind around it. I thought of the families that were left behind, the potential that was lost and I was empty about how to feel. Just too many lost at once. Over the year there were more. Some came about in two way engagements to a cunning enemy, some the result of sudden and violent ambush where the enemy probably withdrew quickly, not even waiting to see what he'd accomplished. All were people I would not have expected to be killed, they were all at the top of their game, and all were professional soldiers.

Almost a year after 1-24th returned home, I found myself headed to Mosul, in the same exact area where my old BN had served. I was working with many of the same Iraqi soldiers the 1-24 had served with when it was just the ING. As I wrote my buddies from the BN they were able to provide me some insights to the area, and even joke about things such as the COP I was living in -- my old XO told me to be on the look out for an ASIP radio that one of my old SFCs had lost there -- but not to worry since he'd already been charged for it. In turn I would tell them how things were there going -- they were much better then when the BN had been there -- their efforts and sacrifices were paying off for Mosul. Another thing was interesting; many of the IA officers and senior NCOs knew many of the same people I did. They had a high reputation of the BN and the 1/25th Lancer BDE. Their impression of the leadership shown by the men of 1-24th had provided them the means by which they persevered through the hardest times. Even now they could look back on the American examples and find the moral fiber to see it through.

This IA BN and our MiTT grew to be the family you hear about when men & women share combat together. We were risking our lives together, sharing our thoughts, hopes and expectations. We ate, drank tea, smoked cigarettes, patrolled, got shot at, mortared, etc. all together -- just like any other unit. I lost some good Iraqi friends over that year, and of course I expect to lose more friends. While many of my friends and I myself will rotate back through somewhere in this long war, the people who live in these places must contest it day in and day out, they don't rotate back. Their families are there, so that is what they must do. They are pragmatic and resigned to struggle. I memorialize those dead in that family as well -- we all fight for the same thing.

It is important to grieve. Its may be more important on a national level that we remember and acknowledge. It provides the perspective of ice water in regards to the cost of war and the knowledge that war is a gamble and the stakes are often higher then we concede. War is about people, and it entails sacrifice. We should not approach it lightly, and we should always be prepared so that sacrifice is minimized when the object of war dictates violence. For most of us here, war is our business. We will remember our friends and family who have fallen. It is probably not coincidence that our pastor followed his thoughts on Memorial Day with a sermon on the Mustard Seed. One man or woman can make a difference -- Good bye to our friends, they did not die for naught.

Bing West on CSPAN's Washington Journal discusses the current situation and outlook for Iraq and why we have to stay for a decade (and how to do it) at Slate (with Owen West).

Bing's SWJ Iraq trip report in the North County Times - What's Working, What's Not, and the Way Forward for U.S. and Iraqi Troops.

A must read by Huba Wass de Czege - Lessons from the Past: Making the Army's Doctrine "Right Enough" Today.

An excerpt:

No doctrine is perfect, but getting it "right enough" is strategically important. Dire consequences followed for France in the spring of 1940 because heavy investments in its high-tech Maginot Line failed against the German Blitzkrieg. French doctrine was based on flawed post-World War I interpretations of technological change and its impact on the nature of war. We also have learned from recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq that operating without applicable doctrine can have strategic consequences, and that the intuition of senior generals is of little value in the councils of state today. The quickly submerged November 2002 public dispute between Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz about the number of Soldiers required for the coming invasion of Iraq is often recalled to vilify the civilian side, but no one can claim that the resulting campaign violated accepted joint or Army doctrinal precepts. In fact, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted according to widely supported emerging concepts within the Department of Defense (DoD). We should take little comfort that events are proving the former Army Chief more right than wrong. Politicians are more likely to respect the intuition of senior Army leaders when they render judgments backed by a sound body of doctrine, especially one that is also respected and supported by the other services...

ZenPundit -- Mil Theory Goes Mainstream.

It's rather nice to see the esoteric theory topics I kick around here in conjunction with sites like The Small Wars Council, DNI, Tom Barnett and John Robb's blogs and the circle of related bloggers, are penetrating the mainstream press. Some recent examples:

William Lind in UPI.

Max Boot citing the Small Wars Journal.

"War without limits" by Christopher Shea in the Boston Globe (hat tip to Dr.Ralph Luker).

Thomas Barnett's frequent appearances in columns by David Ignatius going back several years.

The Belmont Club - "The Total Blurring of Crime and War".

The Small Wars Journal (Robert Bunker and John Sullivan) describes 3rd Generation Gang Warfare. Iraq may lead, but Latin America and parts of the USA are following hard behind.

Whether or not the Small Wars Journal article is overstating the case, the fact remains that traditional tools of statecraft such as the United Nations, foreign aid, diplomacy and even armies have proven very ineffective against this mode of warfare -- if warfare it is. But given the potency of subnational groups like Hezbollah which squared off against the IDF, or Hamas which threatens to take over Gaza, or al-Qaeda which aims to devour the world and actually attacked Manhattan or even Ansar al-Islam which is rampaging in the Lebanese refugee camps it would be Jesuitic to split semantic hairs...

Jules Crittenden on "Non Cents" at his Forward Movement blog.

Frank Hoffman at Small Wars Journal shoots down USAF Gen. Charles Dunlap as Dunlap attempts to execute a strafing run on ground forces engaged in counter-insurgency. Hoffman reckons its a fit of pique over air power being relegated to a supporting role. Great mudwrestling at SWJ as always, though I disagree with both Dunlap and Hoffman on the idea that a " 'traditional land component solution' ... is too costly for America, and is far too late for Iraq."

John Robb's long anticipated book is finally out, and I have to say that I think it's an important contribution to anyone trying to make sense of today's evolving security challenges. It's a rather brilliant synthesis of Fourth Generation Warfare, net war, swarming and global insurgency. For those of you who not routinely read the Global Guerillas blog, Robb is a former counter-terrorism officer with the U.S. Air Force, and is now based out of Boston as a consultant. His blog has been highly regarded by forward thinking analysts as evidenced in the warm foreword written by the prescient James Fallows of The Atlantic Monthly. For those who are familiar with Robb's main themes Brave New War offers a book length treatment of the problem and a number of recommendations for dealing with today's religiously inspired, globally networked urban terrorists.

The author's major projection in Brave New War is a world facing a "global bazaar of violence" as terrorists and would be insurgents around the world learn from and adopt the tactics, techniques and procedures of success in Iraq. The concept of a bazaar is part of Robb's conception of future terrorism and irregular war. In this interconnection bazaar individuals are continually trading techniques, sharing past experiences or recipes, adopting original ideas from one group and merging them with plans or weapons from another era or another theater. In the marketplace of the global guerrilla, there is a lot of trading and few copyright laws being enforced. Rapid adaptation by the community and mimicking is not only condoned, it is often encouraged. In some ways, Robb's conception is very similar to the Wikipedia encyclopedia.

The fast growing informal encyclopedia operates like a large cooperative with many contributions and improvements from a community of interest, which self-polices itself but constantly improves the product. In conflicts around the globe, Robb sees these same phenomena occurring regularly which he calls Open Source Warfare. In the computer development world in business, open source (sometimes called open architecture) is a means of both designing and building systems using common or free software and components that are not copyrighted or tightly controlled. Instead, anyone can use the code and system pieces to create and constantly adapt new programs or capabilities. For Robb, Open Source Warfare is available for any actor interested in adopting, adapting, and improving on new tactics and techniques, globally and in real time. Obviously the World Wide Web and other collaborative tools are facilitating Open Source Warfare or what might become known as Wikiwar. Maybe Tom Friedman is right, and that collaborative tools will create a truly flat world. I just suspect, as in most of the New York Times journalists latest work, is that the dark side of collaboration is going to become more and more of a problem for us.

As evidenced by 9/11 and in Iraq part of the kit bag of today's global insurgent is the deliberate targeting of critical infrastructure or systems to inflict incremental damage and cumulative economic costs on a government. Robb calls this approach systems disruption, as the global guerrillas' fundamental strategy for bringing nation states to their knees. Our increasingly interconnected society and our vulnerable tightly coupled networks afford any terrorist many relatively easy targets. Today's guerrilla is becoming adept at identifying the key nodes in these systems, and generating large cascading effects. But the global guerrilla tries to operate beneath the threshold of a punative or overwhelming governmental response. Partial disruptions, as opposed to catastrophic destruction, maximizes the long term economic attrition against the state, paralyzes the government and undercuts it legitimacy.

For devoted readers of Robb's popular Global Guerrilla blog, this text will serve as an integrated summation and extension of his key themes. For new readers, Brave New War offers a tightly organized and concisely packaged course in modern irregular warfare. Rather than looking backward and trying to graft old models to new times, the author has intelligently recognized what today's thinking enemy has harnessed from our own technology. Robb deftly synthesizes a number of concepts drawn from the old Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) literature with the fresh insights of John Arguilla, David Ronfeldt, and Colonel Thomas Hammes. Robb offers a great list of recommended readings, to which I would add Professor Bruce Hoffman's updated Inside Terrorism and any of Ralph Peters' insightful anthologies (Beyond Baghdad, Beyond Terror, and Never Quit the Fight). Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force is also a necessary addition. These authors would add depth to the human motivations underlying the actions and behaviors Robb captures so succinctly. The latter's grasp of the dueling narratives of competing commander's and the literal "theater" of operations nicely complements Robb's systems disruption. The importance of the imagery of acts of violence today cannot be separated from the acts themselves.

Iraq and Afghanistan have showed how effective our enemies are at learning. They've ruthless proven to be cunning and opportunistic in every dimension of the fight, and they are completely —to share their ideas and success in real time. On the other hand, we are still catching up, even as they constantly exploit Open Source Warfare's long menu of lessons learned. There are still folks in the Pentagon who think that transformation, RMA's and Shock and Awe are still relevant and deserving of additional funding. State on state warfare may not be entirely a thing of the past, but Open Source Warfare and deliberate partial systemic disruption is as well. Without reservation Brave New War is for professional students of irregular warfare and for any citizen who wants to understand emerging trends and the dark potential of 4GW.

Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine and Washington-based national security consultant.

There is another reason to listen. I know Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor personally, and they are in the top few percentiles points of their respective generations in intellect and passion for the profession of arms. I suspect Paul Yingling is too. Intellect and passion for our business should be cultivated.

There is a third reason to listen closely, and that is to encourage others to share their views. I think these discussions are healthy, actually they are a sign of hope for the institution. It was exactly these kinds of discussions that led to the Post Vietnam Army Reforms of the 1980's. And during the mid to late 70's general officers had to face tough questions from Leavenworth and War College students. Most bore our criticisms with good grace. I suspect those of the present day will do so as well.

Having said this, let me add some thoughts of my own based on what I read and what the serving O-4 to O-6 crowd tells me. I'll not be nearly as eloquent as Yingling, Cushman, and McGregor. But I may be as controversial.

Serving O4-O6 officers today have far more sustained combat experience than the younger generation of retirees acting as contractors or serving on CGSC and War College faculties. They have also been commanded by general officers from two stars on up without combat experience at the battalion level. They feel they have much relevant experience those senior to them lack, and their less experienced seniors have not listened to them. My generation held this view during and just after Vietnam.

This crowd also complains about the same old US Army tendencies of over centralization at the top, broad formulas indiscriminately applied, and staff arrogance at high levels. You can over-manage a counterinsurgency. And you simply can't make up for too few battalions by micro managing the few you have.

The counter-insurgency business is about winning at the battalion AOR level, and every battalion has a unique problem. It requires disciplined soldiers, crafty sergeants, quick minded lieutenants, flexible captains, broadly educated majors and wise lieutenant colonels. It requires battalions that are led from the front by leaders who are open-minded enough to learn from others; with the time to train as a team and learn good habits. Their leaders possess common sense, understand human nature, and figure out the best way to win their war in their unique AOR -- making measurable progress, suffering fewer casualties, and keeping high unit morale. It is at the battalion level that they began figuring out that the key to success is to understand the native tribal structure. It took several years before "higher" helped them with a comprehensive study of tribal relationships in Baghdad and Anbar province.

Too much micro-management from on-high gets in the way. The complaint most often heard is that "higher" is thinking too tactical and near term, imposing controls and process, rather than enabling subordinates with their designs.

Counterinsurgencies benefit when the vision from the top is continually challenged by the view from the bottom. Best results occur when colonels get around to talk to company commanders, brigadier and major generals walk the ground and talk frequently to battalion commanders and corps commanders talk frequently to brigade commanders and so on. What the circulating commanders really should want to know is whether they and their subordinates are really working the "right" problem. The question they need to ask is "What is your re-stated mission and commander's intent?" From this he learns two important things. A restated mission and intent together define how the commander who owns the AOR has framed his problem. The exchange of views over this helps them both discover and then work the right one. The visiting higher commander can learn more details about the relevant forces and factors at work in his bigger AOR. This then will lead to a better problem framing at his level. And the exchange can coach the subordinate into a better understanding of his.

In counter insurgency work the kind of thinking we have called "operational art" is required down at battalion level as well. The crux of the problem in our Army is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems. Operational art is really the art of taking an unstructured problem and giving it enough structure so that planning can lead to useful action. I find officers up to O-6 (in some cases higher) who are excellent at analyzing a structured problem - reducing it into its elements- but are lousy at synthesis - creating a construct that explains how parts relate. That's usually the difficulty in counterinsurgencies -- the "design" end of solution development requires inductive thinking. (SAMS helps with this in most cases. Some SAMS grads tell me that their background in history and theory helps them be more creative. I'm not sure what matters more, the self-selection of officers into SAMS, or what they learn while at SAMS. It's probably both.)

I also think we have muddled our thinking with code. Take the terms "kinetic" and "non-kinetic" for instance. In COIN we are now big on the "non-kinetic" but we may have substituted new formulas for clear thinking.

Human nature responds to rewards and punishments. Our attempts at "rewarding" must result in real rewards the recipient values. Our measures of success are often how many "rewards" we have dispensed, rather than how suitable they were, much less what behavioral change those rewards have produced. But even suitable rewards need to overcome the enemy's punishing those who accept them. And sometimes "the people" must fear our coercion more than the enemy's. This latter piece of logic has often been the key to counterinsurgency -- think Malaya. When you can't coerce because of the open information environment, you have to compensate in two ways. BOTH OF THESE ARE DIFFICULT TO DO. You have to take the fight to the insurgent and get him reacting to you, and you have to mount extra measures to protect the people from the insurgent's coercion.

The first, taking the fight to the insurgent, is difficult because you really have to know your opponent, where we have been ignorant, and you have to be creative, where we rather like pat methods and formulas. We have also lacked the courage to be as hard with our opponents as we've needed to be to win.

The second, protecting the people from the insurgent's coercion, is difficult because this requires large levels of manpower for a long time, and it requires large numbers of disciplined and savvy manpower (not to mention a working justice system the people trust and respect). We have harbored myths about these things and we have not owned up to the difficulties and consequences of the truth in these matters.

Of our errors, Abu Ghuraib may have been the biggest disaster of them all. Any one who has served for even a short while in troop command realizes how "not much good happens" after midnight when young bored troops go unsupervised and are open to temptation. It's simply inconceivable how any experienced commander could have left this flank unguarded. He should have had his "trusted agents" visit at all hours of the day and night.

While others have lectured on the responsibility of generals, the rank immediately below them should not be spared. If you want to block reforms, install a "council of colonels" to guard the gates of change. No one is as conservative and arrogant as a staff colonel in the comfort zone of his expertise. During my time on active duty this was the most conservative rank. Had I not gotten around older and more entrenched colonels at Ft. Leavenworth both the AirLand Battle reforms and the creation of SAMS would have been stillborn. And sometimes no one is as hesitant to speak truth to power than an O-6 commander. It's a matter of incentives and risks. The jump from O-6 to O-7 is a huge prize, the cut is so severe, and the process is shrouded in mystery.

We humans are fallible. I have made my share of grave mistakes. Our saving grace is learning from them. Of one thing I'm sure, there are no grand formulas. Progress results from hard work on many fronts. And hard work is only motivated by discomfort with the status quo.

-----

SWJ Editors Note - Related Small Wars Council Discussions:

Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures'

Of "Intellectual and Moral" Failures

General Dunlap opens with a tart observation that the Army/Marine Corps got a lot of publicity with the publication of the new field manual. Newsweek called it "The Book" on Iraq, which I think is a stretch but a natural reaction. He goes on to suggest that the publicity exceeded notable events such as the airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last summer or the "yet more debilitating air attacks against al Qaeda havens in Somalia." This gives the reader an early hint about where our Air Force counterinsurgency theory is coming from.

General Dunlap goes on to lambaste the manual as the product of the nation's ground forces and a thinly veiled attempt to establish a Joint/national approach that is protracted, costly, manpower intensive, and inherently a "traditional land component solution." Such an approach is too costly for America, and is far too late for Iraq, the General adds.

While I happen to agree with his assessment about Iraq, the simple fact remains that the manual wasn't written or intended to satisfy one of today's insurgencies. It fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon's insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage. My normally coherent Air Force partner would like to continue that trend despite consistent historical evidence to the contrary. The field manual is simply operational level doctrine for two Services, no strategic agenda other than ensuring that today's ground warriors are ready for the most probable types of war that nation will face for some time.

My Air Force friends don't accept that assessment of future conflict. If you have any doubts, read this, "Real innovation for 21st century conflict calls for devising techniques that avoid exposing thousands of young Americans to the hazards of combat." Instead, General Dunlap argues that we should be seeking to exploit our technological genius and the "air and naval component's way of war" which are high tech and low cost. This is the same way Admiral Owens used to sell his "systems of systems" model as well. It's very attractive to naí¯ve politicians who do not know better and want to eliminate risk. The problem is that these approaches have great applications in high intensity conventional combat, and have worked in Kosovo, Afghanistan and in Somalia when matched with some ground forces.

General Dunlap's positive references to kinetic strikes in Somalia and Kosovo conveniently ignores a lot of history dating back to Britain's ineffective applications of airborne killing power in Mesopotamia 80 odd years ago, and more recently in Afghanistan. Kosovo was simply high tech, high cost, and extremely low in effectiveness. Yes, airpower was decisive in toppling the Taliban in 2001, with ground forces from the Northern Alliance helping force the Taliban to mass in defensive positions. But the record goes both ways, as on April 29 and May 9 this year a number of air strikes were conducted to counter the Taliban's preparations for an anticipated spring offensive. These strikes produced unexpected civilian casualties that have angered President Karzai and undercut NATO and Coalition efforts to secure the population's allegiance. (Of course, ground units have also produced accidental collateral damage as well.) General Dunlap is confusing regime destruction with the more constructive requirements of COIN. This approach certainly didn't do much for the IDF last summer against Hezbollah.

Down at Maxwell, the Marine and Army officers got an earful about the FM's purported ground centricity. The Air Force, which made a belated and limited attempt to participate in the manual's development, was unhappy that air power was relegated to an appendix vice a separate chapter. Frankly, I don't think it rates a distinct chapter or an appendix.

Airpower, properly understood, is an invaluable contributor to successful counter-insurgency operations as it is to most other forms of conflict. Most Marines understand their own Small Wars history and recognize the early innovative applications of aviation in Nicaragua in the 1920s as a form of fire support, logistics, and medical evacuation, and reconnaissance. It is not an accident that Jim Corum and Wray Johnson's Airpower in Small Wars is on the Commandant's PME reading list, or that Professor Johnson (a retired Air Force officer) is the course director for irregular warfare at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. A larger number of Marines have served in either OEF or OIF certainly recognize the critical contributions that airpower made to their own military tasks in theater. Aviation was critical to operational success in both fights for Fallujah and well as Najaf in 2004, including Air Force strike contributions. Many a Marine unit commander has told me that the sound of an AC-130 overhead at night is the best lullaby they've ever heard. Other forms of aerospace capability, like unmanned aerial vehicles, have also been noteworthy in both OEF and OIF. Marine commanders and their staffs recognize that air power is fundamental to the conduct of intelligence, fires, maneuver, and logistics in warfare in general, and to irregular conflicts as well.

Could that recognition have been more explicitly made in key chapters in the new field manual--sure. Was it critical to the Army and Marine generals and their respective doctrinal teams or school houses, apparently not. Senior Marines don't consider themselves ground centric, and embrace a more comprehensive view of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

The Marines and our Army brethren also understand that the center of gravity for a host nation under attack by an insurgency is generally the population. It's not about killing insurgents, or putting "warheads on foreheads." COIN requires constructive and indirect approaches, not just strike sorties. This has led American, French and British doctrine to focus on principles and parameters for the conduct of irregular conflicts that center on controlling or securing the population from harm or interaction with the insurgent. It's very difficult to do that from space or from a bomber. If success is ultimately tied to the people, I am sorry but they live on the ground. Their government operates on the ground, and people need to be secure to go about their lives. Until civilian populations take up residence in space or start to raise families at 10,000 feet, there will be limitations as to what airpower writ large, or the Air Force more specially, can accomplish.

Equally disturbing at Maxwell were comments from Air Force officers who bemoaned the nature of the fight in Iraq. I heard criticisms about Army dominance of the war's conduct, too little apportionment of sorties to "deep battle" targets, and about the Air Force being relegated to an Army Air Corps. Some worried that decentralized and flexible command practices resulted in "penny packed" uses of airpower. What I never heard was a constructive argument for another way of doing business, strategically or operationally. Nor did I sense that most Air Force officers understood the fluid nature of the competition or the need to adapt. Does airpower have to be employed the same manner across the full spectrum of combat, or can the Air Force adapt its tool sets and mindset to a wider range than just optimized for interdiction into "kill boxes."?

To advance its own development, as well as to better articulate its unique contributions to America's security interests I think my airpower friends need to change tack. Instead of badly mischaracterizing the Army/Marine Corps efforts to prepare their warriors for the complexities of modern counterinsurgency, I strongly suggest they devote their intellectual energy to developing its own Service doctrine, to engaging OSD/Joint forums where IW and COIN concepts are being debated, and in ensuring that Air Force perspectives are voiced. Right now it's living in a glass house. The Air Force should be more candid, it needs to catch up to what is now year six of a long war. A thorough articulation of Air Force contributions in irregular warfare, now in draft form, is obviously needed to ensure that it thoroughly understands and is intellectually prepared for the realities of modern irregular warfare. Until then, we don't have a COIN shortage, just a lack of common cents.

Frank Hoffman is a frequent contributor to most military journals, and was a contributing author to FM 3-24.

-----

SWJ Editors Note - Related Small Wars Council Discussions:

"Non Cents"

Punitive Ops Revisited

New AF COIN Doctrine

America's Asymmetric Advantage

Mediterranean Constabulary Forces: Theory, Practice, Solution?

Karina Paulina Marczuk

Contemporary American and European international relations researchers, security analysts and strategists have noted the importance of maintaining security, inside traditional nation-states and during operations abroad. The larger part of modern literature notes that only police forces with military status (known as paramilitary forces, gendarmerie-type forces or constabulary forces) can provide security and public order management, especially during the stabilization phase of peacekeeping operations.

The issue of maintaining public security and public order within states and during interventions abroad by police forces with military status is discussed in my soon-to-be-published book Mediterranean Constabulary Forces -- Theory, Practice, Solution?

The subject of the book is constabulary forces in several Mediterranean countries (French National Gendarmerie, Italian Carabineers Army, Portuguese National Republican Guard, Romanian Gendarmerie, Spanish Civil Guard and Turkish Gendarmerie). I attempt to answer such questions as: Does only one, common and universal definition of gendarmerie-type forces exist? What should we call them, according to the rules of European (dominated by French and Italian researchers) and American schools? What were the common features of Mediterranean constabulary forces in the past and what are they now? How have national, internal and public security and public order conceptions changed in the post-Cold War period? What is the role of the so-called Barry Buzan Copenhagen School (broad security conception) of security in this process? What does the broad conception of security mean for modern constabulary forces? What is the position of gendarmeries in the national security systems of the states? Are the constabulary forces a new tool to provide public order and security inside the country and during peacekeeping operations? And finally, does the international cooperation of Mediterranean police forces with military status form a basis for European cooperation in the internal security field?

In attempting to answer these questions, my book provides a brief description of the French, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian and Turkish constabulary forces. I also explore the American system for keeping order and tranquility inside and outside the country -- the activity of the US Army National Guard, which is a de facto reserve army. Last but not least, I address the Polish Gendarmerie history and the changes in the Polish system of internal security after 1989, when former President Lech Walesa intended to create a National Guard of the Republic of Poland.

The first part of the book consists of two theoretical chapters. Chapter I - The Nature of Mediterranean Constabulary Forces: Police Forces with Military Status, discusses the unique nature of the constabulary forces, based on historical and contemporary backgrounds in the selected Mediterranean countries. I seek common features among these gendarmeries and attempt to establish a common name for them, using both European and American approaches. To compare Mediterranean gendarmeries with the American system, the chapter contains a short analysis of the American Army National Guard as an example of a reserve arm. Comparing all the mentioned schools, I establish a new title for modern constabulary using the phrase "auxiliary forces" -- derived from the Latin word auxilia. Auxila troops were expeditionary forces used by the Roman Empire to keep order in its colonies.

Chapter II is devoted to the role of Constabulary forces in the national security systems of states. It concerns contemporary definitions of security, national security and international security and the relations between them. The lesson here is a new approach to security matters which today means a broad security concept (the so-called Copenhagen School by Barry Buzan) that is developing into a human security theory. I also address the internal aspect of security, including public order and public security management. It is necessary to note that the borderline between internal and external security is blurring. That is why some researchers start to talk about intermestic security (a neologism made from two words: inter and domestic) because of the threats posed by trans-national groups (organized crime and terrorists).

The second part of the book (Chapters III -- VI) provides descriptions of French, Portuguese, Romanian, Italian, Spanish and Turkish gendarmerie forces. These descriptions are based on official publications, as well as on internal documents which the I received from Polish and foreign governmental institutions.

In Chapter III I stress that in France, Portugal and Romania a similar model of the internal security structure exists, based on the Napoleonic gendarmerie-type force. Here we can find a comparison between these three formations, including their history, contemporary tasks and competence. The purpose is to explore common features.

Chapter IV - The Army of Carabineers as the Fourth Kind of Italian Armed Force, gives examples from the history of Italian Carabineers, their contemporary tasks and position in the national security system of Italy. The history of this formation and the history of Italian small states resulted in the Carabineers becoming the fourth pillar of the Italian Armed Forces. Being a militarized institution, the Carabineers were able to serve as one of the important factors during the unification process of Italy in the 19th century. Their present tasks include the fight against the mafia and participation in peacekeeping operations.

Chapter V - The Civil Guard in Spain: A Return to Civilian Police Forces discusses the present changes in the structure and organization of the Spanish Civil Guard. In September 2006, the Spanish Government established that the Guardia Civil (GC) must have the same Director General as the Spanish National Police - the type of reform made in Belgium and Austria, where gendarmerie-type forces no longer exist. Today, the Civil Guard is the main formation devoted to the fight against Basque terrorism and illegal immigrants.

Chapter VI - The Turkish Gendarmerie: The Concept of Military Police Units, provides a description of this formation. It is necessary to stress that Jandarma is the most militarized gendarmerie in the Mediterranean region. This section discusses its history, the role played by the father of the modern Turkish state Mustafa Kemal Atatí¼rk and finally, it examines the changes in the structure of its formation in Turkey's attempt to become a member of the European Union.

Chapter VI is Institutionalization of the Cooperation of Mediterranean Constabulary Forces and explores a system for European co-operation in the internal security field.

-----

Dear SWJ Blog,

David Kilcullen of General David Petraeus' staff in Baghdad makes a fine start but has much farther to go in attacking the pseudo-religious scam of al Qaeda-style Terrorism (AQST) in Islamic religious terms.

To date, the State Department, the White House and the Defense Department -- and even the otherwise excellent new COIN Manual itself -- have studiously avoided this approach in favor of Western secular words only. This is because of an understandable but, I think, inordinate fear of making mistakes (as indeed we would from time to time) if we were to begin combating AQST in religious terms and frames of reference.

Such favored Western secular and law enforcement terms as criminals, thugs, bring to justice, killers and even terrorists are quite true but are little better than shooting with blanks when it comes to their impact on hearts, minds and souls (don't forget the "and souls" element) in the Muslim and Arab worlds where --

First, the ever deceitful enemy is incessantly talking in terms of "Jihad" (Holy War) by "mujahideen" and "shahideen" (martyrs) destined for "Jennah" (Paradise) as a proper reward for killing all of us "kuffar" -- us alleged "infidels" and "unbelievers" -- and where

Second, all too many of us tend to confirm the validity of such pro-al Qaeda terms -- and thus to polish Osams bin Laden's and Ayman al-Zawahiri's haloes -- either by repeating these words of self-sanctification or by failing to contest their validity, or both.

Enter now David Kilcullen, who calmly breaks stride by correctly, prudently and one-word-at-a-time referring to these suicide mass murderers as ungodly "munafiquun (hypocrites) who pose as defenders of the faith while simultaneously perverting it." Great!

He then recounts that in the bloody battle for Ramadi "The gangsters called themselves 'mujahideen'' but there was nothing holy about their war." Great, again!

In both cases he challenges the patently false religious claims of the terrorists and implies that they are enemies of Quranic Islam who are using "religion as cynical cover for carnage," a reference which sounds very much like "apostasy" (murtadd) to this reader. Great, for a third time!

In all three of these assertions the man is leveling serious religious charges, not against Islam itself but against a pseudo-Islamic ideology which is in fact the antithesis of the "peaceful, compassionate, merciful, beneficent and just" Allah who is repeatedly so described by the Quran. But to complete the job, both he and those who would follow his example need several additional semantic tools by which to portray these evildoers and their so-called "religious insurgency"

(a) NOT as constituting so-called "Jihad" (Holy War) but ungodly "Hirabah" (unholy war, war against society) and forbidden "Irhab" (Terrorism), instead;

(b) NOT as the "jihadis" and the "mujahideen" they falsely claim to be but as the irhabis (terrorists) and the mufsiduun (evildoers, mortal sinners and corrupters) they really are;

(c) NOT as the Godly heroes of "Jihadi Martyrdom" they falsely claim to be but as the Satanic perpetrators of "Irhabi Murderdom" (Genocidal Terrorism) they really are;

(d) NOT as destined for a virgin-filled Paradise for killing all of us so-called kuffar (infidels) but to a demon-filled Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) for killing so many thousands of innocents, fellow Muslims, "People of the Book" and "Sons of Abraham," instead;

(e) NOT as the abd'al-Allah (Servants of Allah) they falsely claim to be but as the abd'al-Shaitan (Servants of Satan), the murtadduun (apostates) and the khawarij (outside-the-religion deviants) they really are.

Only once we know such correctly condemnatory words and begin to use them -- prudently but insistently, as well -- might we then begin to undermine the so-called "Jihadi Martyrdom" imagery by which these ruthless killers live, die and expect to enter Paradise as a reward for defeating "The Great Satan." (Realize, please, that according to today's AQ-concocted and universally parroted lexicon, that is who we are. For who other than TGS himself would go about killing "holy guys" and "martyrs" on their way to Paradise?)

While such truth-in-language will not persuade all or even most of today's terrorists of the apostate and satanic nature of their ways, it will in time greatly erode the certainty of their "jihadi" resolve. Those who posit that such killers are "impervious to counter methods" of a religious nature and are "not susceptible to having their hearts and minds won over" may be right. But how will we ever know if we never even try?

In addition to whatever impact such an initiative has on the Hell-bound Terrorists themselves, it will help to strengthen the anti-murderdom resolve of most truly faithful Muslims -- many of whom, like so many of us, are quite thoroughly hoodwinked by AQST's false labeling, by habit of language, by brainwashing, by pseudo-Islamic preachings and by a wide variety of peer pressures into a 'round-the-clock parroting of al Qaeda's seductive but patently false language of self-sanctification.

By painting the truthful alternative image of Irhabi Murderdom (of Genocidal Terrorism), we will begin to expose al Qaeda's grandiose promises as a monumental satanic scam which entices religiously motivated young Muslims into becoming irhabis, mufsiduun, munafiquun, murtadduun and khawarij -- and dispatches them in due course not into Allah's Paradise but into Shaitan's demon-filled Hellfire, instead.

And in that truthful RELIGIOUS frame of reference we might begin to find the much-needed disincentive to the suicide mass murder by which al Qaeda, al Sadr, Hizballah, the Afghan Taliban and their genocidal ilk are now attempting to inflict a "death by a thousand cuts" catastrophe on the entire civilized world.

Of course, those true believers in the al Qaeda Apostasy -- as well as those individuals who are simply criminals, psychopaths, mercenaries, thugs and Caliphate-hungry imperialists -- and will still have to be hunted down and either be killed or be captured and imprisoned.

But is it not also time, as David Kilcullen (and maybe Gen. Petraeus himself?) seems to be recommending, that we at least "GIVE A BLOODY GOOD TRY," as the British and as Kilcullen's own Australians would say, to these long-avoided strategies, operations and tactics for saving not only ourselves but Islam itself from those deviants who would turn that huge and growing religion into nothing but a perpetual killing machine of all Christians, of all Jews and of all Muslims, as well, who happen to disagree?

Finally, as a means of assessing the anti-Terrorism utility of the "war of words" and "war for hearts, minds and souls" recommendations explained above, one might try to picture what the late Osama bin Laden's reaction to each might have been before he was so deservedly cast into Eternal Hellfire some time ago.

(And how is that for a somewhat speculative but quite possibly true "psyop" ending to this story about AQST's satanic mastermind?)

-----

Jim Guirard -- TrueSpeak Institute 703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com ... and Truespeak.org

A DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-Terrorism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief of Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-language and truth-in-history in public discourse.

The problem is that the insurgency in Iraq and elsewhere is fueled, if not based on an Islamic jihad. The element most intransigent and so far impervious to counter methods is the suicide bomber who believes that he goes to heaven for killing men, women and children in the name and the cause of an extreme religiosity.

The counterinsurgency (COIN) manual was based on selective abstracts from past insurgencies that were at base political movements, where the allegiance of the people could be swayed by one side or the other. In Iraq, no Sunni is going to convert and become a Shiite, or vice versa. Granted, the Baathists behind the curtain believe they can manipulate the jihad extremists, but AQI has displaced them as the field leaders. And AQI does intend a caliphate based on its interpretation of religion.

The COIN manual was based on a different model, one that does not apply to the root cause of the insurgency - a radical religion whose adherents are not susceptible to having their hearts or minds won over.

Many of the TTPs in the COIN manual do apply. But no country has written the manual for eradicating the virulent disease of Islamic jihad based on a twisted interpretation of religion, God and the kingdom of heaven.