I thought I’d share with SWJ readership an article recently published in Army magazine (May 2008). In particular - I draw your attention to discussion of our infatuation with the term “Irregular Warfare” - US Forces Do Not Conduct "Irregular War".

What is it about the US Military that tends to produce sound, pragmatic, and common sense ideas about the concrete present, and tends toward illogic, faddish paradigms and hyperbole when dealing with the abstract future? Joint Operating Concepts for dealing with post cold war security problems have proven difficult to "get right." This is because they begin from the wrong logical starting point and thus define the problem incorrectly. It is also because of inattention to historical fact, definitional subtlety and the theoretical logic within which military forces must operate. This inattention overlooks key logical inconsistencies in such documents crafted more to "sell" to constituencies within the Washington "Beltway" the capabilities and programs championed by one military interest group or another rather than to inform current decisions in the field. For this reason those who nag about these things tend to be ignored by the practical people dealing with near term problems. When the future becomes the present, the consequences of illogic, faddish paradigms, and hyperbole in abstract concepts can pose insurmountable problems for pragmatic common sense. For one, "Beltway" constituencies have been educated to think according to the attractive new paradigms military professionals have used to buttress their budget arguments. The new "Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept" signed by the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense on 11 September 2007 deals with the abstract future and exhibits the usual tendencies. We have been here before, and are still suffering the consequences.

Continue reading "A Reflection on the Illogic of New Military Concepts" »

With some interest I have been tracking these exchanges over what Paul Yingling, Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor have had to say about our military operations since 9/11. It takes a great deal of courage to say things that are sure to be unpopular whether you are beyond the reach of those who might be offended or not, and therefore we ought to listen for that reason alone. And Paul Yingling is most at risk, therefore his message interests me the most.

There is another reason to listen. I know Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor personally, and they are in the top few percentiles points of their respective generations in intellect and passion for the profession of arms. I suspect Paul Yingling is too. Intellect and passion for our business should be cultivated.

There is a third reason to listen closely, and that is to encourage others to share their views. I think these discussions are healthy, actually they are a sign of hope for the institution. It was exactly these kinds of discussions that led to the Post Vietnam Army Reforms of the 1980's. And during the mid to late 70's general officers had to face tough questions from Leavenworth and War College students. Most bore our criticisms with good grace. I suspect those of the present day will do so as well.

Continue reading "Of "Intellectual and Moral" Failures" »