Taking inspiration from Dave's "Back Off" post, I was disturbed to read this Huffington Post commentary highlighted at the always readable Abu Muqawama. The assessment comes from a human rights researcher in Kabul asserting the Taliban effectively control Kandahar outside the gates of our bases. It would be presumptuous to rule on the accuracy of the claim, but the assessment (echoed elsewhere) sparks an interesting set of questions about our potential courses of action in Afghanistan.

Noted classical counterinsurgency author and Vietnam War veteran Jack McCuen argued in his excellent book The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War that chasing guerrillas around the countryside while leaving the critical provincial and national population centers uncovered played into the hands of the insurgent. McCuen argued allowing the insurgent to establish networks, shadow governments, recruitment cells, and support networks in the cities created a far greater risk than the loss of rural hamlets. Motivated by McCuen's book and some other reads, I suggested consideration of a city based approach in a Small Wars Council thread about a year ago. COIN savant David Kilcullen suggested the same strategy in a New Yorker interview not long thereafter. Kilcullen articulated the problem far better than I:

"Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key."

Although some have disputed his eighty percent figure, the question remains -- should the bulk of our forces conducting "clear, hold, build" efforts be spread among outposts in the Korengal Valley and Helmand province, or focused on securing the cities while conducting precision raids on the outside?

The disruption of security in the capital and major cities is a major information narrative victory for those who oppose the government. After all, if a government cannot secure its own provincial capitals and government officials, can it reasonably be expected to gain the allegiance and confidence of its citizens? We saw a major confidence setback in the infamous daylight Kandahar prison break last year, which shook the confidence of the entire nation. The Taliban have increasingly mounted multiple suicide attacks in the major cities to undermine confidence in the government. When combined with the rampant corruption alleged in Kandahar, is it any wonder the Taliban are gaining ground?

On the flip side, one can argue that a defensive orientation doesn't win wars. Such a discussion is beyond this blog post, but I was impressed with the statement from Lieutenant Colonel Chris Cavoli in Chapter 2 of the Accidental Guerrilla that "defensive" COIN operations were the best way of seizing the initiative from the enemy. (p. 96) Would we better off with a "cities first" COIN strategy, or does the rural character of Afghanistan demand our main effort focus in the rural areas? Sound off in the comments or at the Council.

Image credit and background - U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Newman, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe, watches the sunrise after a dismounted patrol mission near Forward Operating Base Baylough, Zabul, Afghanistan, March 19, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini/Released)

Okay, everyone who's anyone - and many who think they're someone -- inside and outside the beltway - has chimed in - did I miss anyone? Speak now or forever hold your peace.

The Afghanistan affair is quite complicated; we know that, we also can study it to death and comment until the cows come home.

How about a novel approach at this particular point in time - give the Commander in Chief, the National Command Authority, State... and most importantly, the Commanding General and his staff in Afghanistan some efing breathing room to sort this out? The guys on the ground - get it?

How much is too much?

For the all the hype about the benefits of instantaneous global communications and Web 2.0 - of which we most certainly are a part - we've never really examined the tipping point - the place where we become part of the problem, rather than the solution.

My two cents - and while it may come across as way, way too simplistic to many of the 2K-pound brainiacs I run into around town - you can take it to the bank that a general backing off of the noise level would be most beneficial right now.

Thoughts?

Update: A reader e-mailed that not everyone will get my reference to General Jack Keane and suggested ...just like Jack Keane became the insider for President Bush with the answer to Iraq in 2007 now everybody who is anybody today with regard to Astan want to play the role of a Jack Keane.

By Lisa Schlein

Voice of America

The International Committee of the Red Cross is calling for greater compliance with the rules of war by states and armed groups around the world. As the ICRC marks the 60th anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions on August 12, the Swiss humanitarian agency warns that many of the laws enacted in 1949 to protect civilians and other vulnerable people caught in war are not being respected. The Conventions set out rules governing the conduct of international wars. But since 1949, these wars have increasingly given way to civil conflicts and few of the rules in the Conventions apply to them.

International Committee of the Red Cross President Jakob Kellenberger, says the Geneva Conventions are still relevant. But he agrees that far too many of the laws of war are being violated.

Although Kellenberger says Red Cross delegates in the field regularly witness violations ranging from the mass displacement of civilians to indiscriminate attacks and ill treatment of civilians, he notes it is not the norm.

"I would simply like to say it would be quite a wrong impression if one were to think that the violations are the rule and the respect of the law is the exception," Kellenberger said.

Kellenberger says Red Cross delegates intervene in conflicts all over the world and they are instrumental in improving conditions of detention and preventing the forcible return of displaced people to their homes.

He says more and more armed conflicts are taking place in civilian areas, not in separate battlefields. This not only increases the risk to civilians, he says, but it makes it more difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians.

Kellenberger says it is vitally important that this distinction be made because a growing number of civilians are being deliberately targeted due to their supposed involvement in hostilities.

"If you are interpreting this concept too widely, far too many civilians become lawful targets," Kellenberger said. "So if you want to maximize the protection of civilians, it is very important to have a very clear and narrow definition of direct participation of hostilities."

Kellenberger says he does not think that respect for international humanitarian law has weakened globally. But he acknowledges that in some respects the Geneva Conventions have been undermined since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001.

Analysts say the relevance of international humanitarian law is supported by the findings of a recent opinion poll that surveyed 4,000 people across eight war-torn countries. The survey indicates that while people believe the Geneva Conventions are important and should be respected, rules of war should be better enforced.

The Air Force will train more pilots to fly unmanned aerial systems from ground operations centers this year than pilots to fly fighter or bomber aircraft, Gen. Stephen R. Lorenz, the commander of Air Education and Training Command, told an audience Friday.

Lorentz's remark illustrates the major transformation occurring within that service. In a Pentagon session last month, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Will Fraser told reporters that the unmanned systems are "delivering game-changing capabilities today, and ones that I'm confident will continue to be invaluable in the future."

At that July 23 briefing, Air Force officers spelled out the growth of what they call the "ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] transformation" of their service...

More at The Washington Post.

This is a one minute video that illustrates the nature of the fighting in the flatlands / villages of the '"Green Zone". This is typical of the fighting I observed day after day. We have the firepower. Body armor and gear weigh about 70 pounds per man on patrol. The Taliban gangs have the mobility and concealment. They initiate most firefights. We cannot locate their firing positions with sufficient precision to apply accurate killing fires. This is a serious operational-level issue, not a tactical hurdle. If we cannot fix and finish them, they can choose when to fight and extend the war.

Via the New America Foundation - Starting today, Foreign Policy magazine and the New America Foundation are launching The AfPak Channel, a special project taking readers inside the war for South Asia. The site features daily news reports, original features, blogging, and analysis from prominent journalists and experts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world. It's available at www.foreignpolicy.com/afpak.

As the regional crisis heats up and the U.S. administration pours additional resources into the most dangerous and complex challenge facing American foreign policy, the AfPak Channel will become a daily repository of sharp thinking, information, and debate helping shape the conversation. Regular features include: the AfPak Daily Brief, a sharp morning compendium of the most important news coverage coming out of the region, available on the site or by e-mail to your inbox and a daily blog moderated by New America senior fellow Peter Bergen, the journalist and author of The Osama Bin Laden I Know. Contributors include some of the world's leading authorities on South Asia.

With Afghan presidential elections approaching on Aug. 20, the AfPak Channel will be a go-to place for election coverage, starting with a guide to the candidates by Jean MacKenzie of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Afghanistan. New America's extensive - and regularly updated - research presenting a portrait of the unfolding conflict will also be featured in the site's Jihadistan section. And every day on the AfPak Channel, look for original articles and blog posts from ForeignPolicy.com's acclaimed stable of writers.

Readers can sign up for RSS feeds for the site, follow the AfPak Channel on Twitter, and participate in the conversation by commenting.

What is The Database? The 9/11 Commission concluded that al Qaeda succeeded in 2001 because various parts of the U.S. government mismanaged, failed to creatively use, and failed to share their databases of terror suspects. The U.S. government has presumably fixed that problem by empowering the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), successor to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), to establish and maintain The Database, formally known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As of January 2009, TIDE had 564,000 names in it, 95% of which are non-U.S. persons. According to NCTC, more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks contribute to TIDE. TIDE then distributes information back to the intelligence community, military commands, State Department consular offices, DHS, TSA, FBI, state and local police, etc. The result is "no-fly" lists, watch lists, surveillance of suspected financial transactions, and much, much more.

So what are the activities enabled by The Database that have thus far prevented al Qaeda or its like from again striking the U.S. homeland?

1) The Database prevents terror suspects from getting past passport control, or even getting on an airplane.

2) Analysts use the Database to prompt various forms of electronic surveillance.

3) Analysts employ The Database to monitor global financial transactions by terror suspects.

4) Analysts use The Database and other forms of analysis techniques to watch for domestic terror conspiracies. At a recent event at CSIS, John Brennan, President Obama's assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism, did not deny using The Database for domestic surveillance when he was director of NCTC (see page 18 of this transcript).

Since 95% of the names in The Database are non-U.S. persons, non-U.S. sources, most importantly foreign governments, are vital for improving The Database. What contribution does Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) make to improving The Database? Does intelligence gathered up from raids (computers, cell phones, notebooks, financial records, pocket litter, interrogations, etc.) make significant contributions to The Database, contributions relevant to U.S. homeland security?

What about all of the other aspects of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan? Does that presence significantly help The Database? Have U.S. military operations in Afghanistan foiled any specific conspiracies to attack the U.S. homeland? If the U.S. presence in Afghanistan significantly improves The Database and thus U.S. homeland security, does it then make sense for the U.S. to establish a military presence in other poorly governed spaces (such as Somalia) in order to improve The Database?

Should the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan result in a reasonably effective Afghan central government, hardly anyone disputes that there will remain spaces inside Afghanistan unsupervised by the Afghan government or forces friendly to the U.S. The government in Pakistan is unable to achieve such supervision over all of its territory. Even a successful end to OEF will result in the possibility of terror sanctuaries remaining. Terror suspects from these possible sanctuaries would theoretically attempt to travel to Kabul or Islamabad and attempt to get a visa and airplane ticket to the West. It will be up to The Database to prevent this. Thus, success in Afghanistan will not diminish the need for a robust and even intrusive Database and surveillance programs.

It is The Database and its exploitation by a wide variety of agencies and techniques that has thus far prevented a repetition of 9/11. Al Qaeda has no ICBMs; it must outmaneuver The Database in order to get to the U.S. homeland. In order to continue to be useful, The Database requires continuous improvement from high-quality sources. Is the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan resulting in important improvements to The Database? Are these improvements, if they exist, worth the cost of the campaign?

A report to be published this month by the US government's prestigious National Defense University warns that the Iraqi army and police are becoming pawns of sectarian political parties - a trend that it calls "a recipe for civil war."

The report by Najim Abed al-Jabouri, a former Iraqi mayor and police chief who helped run the first successful counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq after the US invasion, also concludes that US forces have failed to use their remaining leverage as trainers to insulate the Iraqi army and police from the influence of powerful Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim and Kurdish parties.

"US efforts to rebuild the [Iraqi security forces] have focused on much needed training and equipment, but have neglected the greatest challenge facing the forces' ability to maintain security upon US withdrawal: an ISF politicized by ethno-sectarian parties," he wrote...

More at The Washington Times.

In Afghanistan Nato/ISAF faces challenges that go far beyond the normal limits of counter-insurgency and military strategy. It must carry out the equivalent of armed nation building, and simultaneously defeat the Taleban and al-Qaeda. It must change its strategy and tactics after years in which member countries, particularly the United States, failed to react to the seriousness of the emerging insurgency. The nations of the alliance lacked a unity of purpose, failed to provide enough troops and placed serious national caveats and limits on their use. They let the enemy take the initiative for more than half a decade.

The result is that the Taleban have been winning the war for control of Afghanistan's territory and population while Nato/ISAF has focused on the tactical and combat aspects. The insurgents may have lost virtually every military clash, but they have expanded their areas of influence from 30 of Afghanistan's 364 districts in 2003 to some 160 districts by the end of 2008, while insurgent attacks increased by 60 per cent between October 2008 and April 2009 alone...

First, it must change its strategy to continue to defeat the insurgency in tactical terms, but also eliminate Taleban, Hekmatyar and Haqqani control and influence...

Second, to be effective, it must eliminate as many national caveats and restrictions on troops as possible, and add a substantial number of additional US combat brigades...

More at The Times.