SWJ thanks General Martin Dempsey and crew for their kind invitation to attend the SLC this week and for the opportunity to address the conference during the closing remarks on issues concerning SWJ, social networking / Web 2.0 and our impressions from the week. The experience was rewarding and educational...

Comparisons between our current efforts in Afghanistan and the Soviet intervention that led to the collapse of the USSR are natural and can be helpful, but only with great care. Below are a number of key points to keep in mind when thinking about the Soviet operations, especially when considering the size of the US or international military footprint.

War did not begin in 1979 when the Soviets invaded. It started in 1978 following the Saur Revolution in which Nur M. Taraki seized power from Mohammad Daoud. Taraki declared the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and set about bringing real socialism to the country.

Soviet advisors recommended that Taraki proceed slowly with social and economic reforms. They recognized that the socialist party (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA) had the support of a tiny minority. They feared that Taraki's plans for aggressive "modernization" would generate an awful backlash. They were right...

More at The Weekly Standard.

As Afghan officials counted ballots from Thursday's key election, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan was making his way through the Jalrez Valley on Friday, conducting an on-the-ground assessment of the troubled nation.

The journey has brought Gen. Stanley McChrystal to the site of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) - a pilot effort begun under his predecessor Gen. David D. McKiernan - in which Green Berets have been recruiting and training local Afghans to police their own neighborhoods since March...

Gen. McChrystal made it clear that one of the main issues that he wants to address is increasing the Afghans' ability to secure themselves.

"We're working to grow the Afghan National Security Forces more quickly," he said, asking the AP3 commander, Sayad Ali Abbas, what he would need to help recruit more AP3 guards.

"We get one meal a day but we are a 24-hour on-call force. If we could improve our food [situation], that would help," answered Mr. Abbas.

"That's what I hear everywhere," nodded Gen. McChrystal.

The general, who was tapped by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gatesin May to take over command in Afghanistan, has been working on a set of recommendations on the strategy to stabilize Afghanistan...

More at The Washington Times.

Both the subject of your post, and that you posted it here, demonstrate the Army's commitment to the importance of leveraging collaboration, social media and Web 2.0 technologies.

A quick scan of the linked discussion thread at the Small Wars Journal clearly indicated anticipation and appreciation for the ability to observe, and perhaps even participate indirectly through providing questions, the Senior Leader Conference (SLC).

The remainder of my comments are not directly related to the SLC, rather this venue itself and my own personal observations.

I first saw your post a few hours after it was made, commenting to my colleagues that the TRADOC Commander posting on the CAC blogs was yet another indication of the Army's support for and embracement of collaboration. Returning to your post this afternoon, I was slightly surprised that no one else had taken the opportunity to respond and engage you. After all, how often does one get such an opportunity?

Notice I did not say "completely" surprised, but only "slightly" surprised. I attribute that lack of surprise to my experience observing Army Majors over the last eight years at CGSC (1 year as a student, followed by 7 years as an instructor). During that time, I personally noted a prevailing culture of "keep your head down & don't make waves." This is not only an anecdotal observation, but was supported by a custom designed critical thinking exercise I presented on more than a dozen occasions.

My decision to respond to your blog today prompted me to write up and document that exercise and the observed results. By no means is this the first time I shared the exercise, I frequently sent it to faculty members within my own department for their use if they chose to execute it. (Below my remarks I've provided links to the referenced presentation.)

I'm reminded of GEN Casey's remarks in June, via a video message, at the CGSC graduation. He explained how one of his former mentors taught him to carry an index card with one question:

-- When was the last time you allowed a subordinate to change your mind?

Upon hearing him say that, my ears perked up and I wrote it down. For what he said supported my own beliefs and the exercise I've been conducting for years. However, with all due respect to the CSA, I'd postulate that card needs to have a second question on it. And, perhaps, that second question may even be more pertinent and significant than the one he mentioned:

-- When was the last time a subordinate TRIED to change your mind?

I pose that question not as an indictment of any person's leadership style - certainly not that of the person holding the card or answering the question. Rather, I suggest that if the answer to my question is "rarely, if ever", there may be a prevailing cultural barrier preventing them from doing so.

V/R

Bob King

An Exercise in Critical Thinking - Thought Spray

Critical Thinking Exercise - Slideshare

Disclaimer: As I am no longer an Army CGSC instructor, I desire to make it clear that the above words are my own personal opinion, made on my own time and do not represent my current employer or sponsor.

Joshua Foust of Registan.net and Michael Cohen of The New America Foundation debate and discuss Afghanistan to include optimism vs. pessimism on Afghanistan, vague goals, uncertain metrics, failing to capitalize on success, mission-creeping into a drug war, which lessons should we take from Iraq; if the Taliban returns to power, will America be cool with that; and can the US still fight wars effectively?

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://adobe.harmonieweb.org/coinvtc/ and participate via Adobe Connect as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

Let me pull out some of the limitations and potentials of this "new" type of training.

First of all, a case study method works best in an interactive environment with a highly skilled and motivated facilitator. Done well, such methods can produce significant learning. But this particular format is being looked at as both an in-class and at-home learning tool. The value of the case study method usually lies in the interaction of different opinions and inputs, a situation that tends to be absent in a stand-alone download form. The lessons aren't "learned" in such a setting since the students perceptions are not challenged. TRADOC might wish to think about deploying these in either a network configuration similar to real-time gaming, a la WarCraft, or they may think about tying it in with an online discussion board.

Second, case study methods rarely allow one to "game" what they would have done and see the (probable) effects of what their choices would have been. This pedagogical style does not allow people to learn from failure. This is a crucial problem for students, especially when they will be placed in situations where "failure" translates into deaths. Case study methodology, however, can easily be extended based on most likely choice potentials and costs. Again, the prototype for this comes out of the gaming world with the old "pick your path" adventures. Unlike these older games, real world events can be used as the basis for assigning probable consequences for individual choices.

Third, there are always limitations established within any teaching methodology. Case study methodologies tend to handle this problem via discussion between participants, but the potentials are limited by the knowledge and perceptions of those participants. In order to overcome some of this limitation, there was a very interesting form of case based education started by McMaster University that used learning groups from diverse backgrounds.

All of these limitations and opportunities became evident to me as I watched the scenario and thought "how am I reacting" and "how would my [civilian] students react?". Given my own background as an Anthropologist, the questions I was asking at the start of the scenario differed significantly from the questions being asked in the room, here at the TRADOC SLC. What I found quite interesting, was that many of my questions were never asked and yet, if they had been asked, the scenario would have been less likely to play out the way it did in real life.

Stephen Biddle is the single best defense analyst working today. His arguments are usually carefully considered and well supported empirically. For a generation of younger defense intellectuals, he is very much the gold standard, the model to emulate.

His recent essay in the American Interest (Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan) has been widely cited as the best defense for expanding the American commitment there. The problem is that while Biddle claims that the decision is a close call, it is only close by virtue of what can only be described as sloppy reasoning.

There are three key problems with Biddle's essay. First, his definition of American interests in Afghanistan is incoherent. Second, he bolsters his case by arguing against a strawman. Third, he makes the bizarre assumption that being better at counter-insurgency (COIN) is the same as being good enough at it to win. I will deal with all three in turn...

Much more at ASP Flashpoint.

The issues on the magnitude TRADOC Leadership is grappling with right now can seem daunting. Many of which were conveyed via PowerPoint (and to General Dempsey's credit he tactfully utilized his authority and leadership qualities to generate discussion vs. the slide reading ritual). We've discussed this many times here at SWJ and SWC - justice to the "message" and to the "real intent" is often lost - completely and brutally via such venues.

I'll keep this short and it is addressed to the naysayers -- walk one mile in their shoes with an open-minded perspective. We have conveyed many SLC discussion points today - the military power of our nation will be measured by our ability to adapt -- and -- the right soldier, at the right place, at the right time - are but two examples. They come across as "sound bites" -- bumper sticker slogans - until you look the conveyer of such messages directly in the eye and gauge if they actually mean it or it is just another dog and pony show.

I'm coming away from this week with a sense that there is meat behind the PowerPoint bones.

I don't have a dog in this fight -- excepting that we get this right -- this time -- right now. As Editor in Chief of Small Wars Journal, as a retired Marine who keeps track of how the Corps' is handling many of the same issues, and most importantly as a chronic cynic, I'm encouraged by what I've heard so far.

My gut-feeling concerning this conference -- I looked them in the eye -- literally -- is that they are very serious and very concerned about what the Army has to do. For my Army brothers in arms -- if you happenchance upon General Dempsey and his "Lee's Lieutenants" -- engage. You may walk away with a few feathers ruffled -- but you will gain from that engagement - as a better leader, student and practitioner of what our nation requires during these "interesting times".

--Dave Dilegge

If your recommendation is an article, essay, or study and is available online a link would be most appreciated. If you'd like your recommendation, when published, to be tied to your real name you can either provide it on the SWC thread or send it along via SWC PM or e-mail to me - SWJED - Dave Dilegge. Otherwise we will go with your Council ID.

We've already had one suggestion today, by Council member Anlaochfhile, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, by Dr. Adrian Lewis, as a resource that addresses the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight.

Thanks much.

--Dave Dilegge