First off, ARFORGEN is a radical change from previous forms of force generation. In many ways, from what I can see of it, it is moving towards, although certainly not reaching, an Information Age style of force generation (e.g. the right person in the right place at the right time), at least in principle. The model, however, appears to have been presented more in the genre and forms of an Industrial Age style of force generation (office based, standardized training). This form and genre is not surprising given the hierarchical organizational form of the US Army. In fact, it is organizationally imperative that that form and genre be used in order to tie it in with the political and economic resources (i.e. sell it in DC).

The second observation is a touch more subtle. Within the management literature dealing with corporate culture change, there are several truisms. First, you need a "champion" - a senior level executive who will act as the focus for the change. Second, you need to explain the change to everyone in the organization so that you get general buy-in rather than opposition (either intentional or unintentional). ARFORGEN has their champion, but has the communications strategy worked in order to achieve a general buy-in? From the tenor of the questions and comments, I would have to say it has not, at least to date.

ARFORGEN establishes a basis to schedule deployments on an Army-wide scale. ARFORGEN also provides the following critical objectives: Reduce uncertainty for Soldiers, Families, and the communities that support installations Improve availability of trained and prepared forces for Combatant Commanders. Generate a continuous level of BCTs, augmented by all required supporting organizations (given appropriate Reserve Component mobilization authority) (source: Addenda E| Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Process)

While the process as currently constituted might reduce some uncertainty, it is certainly apparent, to me at least, that it is also serving to increase institutional uncertainty.

Uncertainty, in and of itself, can be a "good thing". Indeed, too much certainty led the US Army to produce a vision of "reality" that was closer to a self-delusion that a true prediction (see here). But institutional uncertainty can increase strain, and force people to focus on immediate day-to-day survival objectives rather than allowing them to see the bigger picture.

As I understand it, one of the central strategic goals of ARFORGEN is to increase the adaptive potential of the US Army. But "adaptation" is an emergent process that operates in response to selection pressures that operate in particular points in time and space. If you wish to increase an organizations adaptive potential, you need to have a coherent "map" of the "terrain" that is constructing these selection pressures. But having such a map isn't enough, you also have to teach people how to "read" that map and feel that they have an investment in it, and this is where it circles back to the process of communications.

As you might have gathered, Robert and I rode in different buses even while we both took part in the same staff ride. Or did we? After the ride was over, we got the chance to talk to each other about how each of our rides operated and, as it turns out, there were some differences.

The biggest difference between our two rides lay in the tactics of how people were encouraged to interact, both with each other and with the past. In place of people having been tasked with short presentations, we were encouraged to ask questions, make comments and, in general, bring out free associations between the past, the present and the future.

I cannot say whether this difference came about as a result of differing pedagogical styles or just emerged from the group interaction. What I can say, however, is that I had an opportunity to both witness and take part in an event that I can only describe as a "ritual". Over the course of the day, I could see people bringing the past into the present until, by the end of the ride, past and present seemed to co-mingle. It was fitting that the end of the ride was signalled by thunder, lightning and a line squall.

I describe the event as a "ritual" in a very technical sense. Fifty years ago, Mircea Eliade talked about the power of origin myths -- how by re-enacting the origin myth, the participants in these rituals would touch both a "sacred time" and a source of power that could re-invigorate them. I saw some of that process operating today.

At the start of his post, Robert asked

Why would the Army waste the time of the senior leaders of its training and doctrine command with a guided tour of a 19th century battlefield? What does Gettysburg have to do with Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other conflicts the Army is likely to face?

Certainly for the ride I was on, the answer is still "Quite a lot", but it went beyond historical analogies and lessons into something much more subtle and intangible. It set the stage for these senior leaders to reconnect with one of the key events that defines the modern United States. It was truly a case of "In that time...".

And before someone comments that I am being overly poetic, let me note that we were primed for this by a quote that served to introduce the ride and, for our bus at least, served to close it.

In great deeds something abides. On great fields something stays. Forms change and pass; bodies disappear; but spirits linger, to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls. And reverent men and women from afar, and generations that know us not and that we know not of, heart-drawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them, shall come to this deathless field, to ponder and dream; and lo! the shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them in its bosom, and the power of the vision pass into their souls.

Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, October 3rd, 1889

Today I went on a "staff ride" of the Gettysburg battlefield with a group of about 20 generals, sergeants major, and Senior Executive Service employees of TRADOC. Leading the staff ride was an Army historian who is also a retired Army officer.

Why would the Army waste the time of the senior leaders of its training and doctrine command with a guided tour of a 19th century battlefield? What does Gettysburg have to do with Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other conflicts the Army is likely to face?

The answer is "quite a bit," if you prepare the staff ride properly. And this the TRADOC staff and the Army historians did.

First, the historian used the events of the 1863 battle to illustrate military problems common to all campaigns regardless of era or variety. These included discussions of such matters as national grand strategy; an assessment of ends, ways, and means; adaptation to unforeseen circumstances; decision-making under conditions of uncertainty; assessing the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates; command styles; collegiality among commanders and staff; and many other such universal factors.

Second, the TRADOC leaders were not passive students -- they were tasked to make presentations during the day, discussing their functional expertise as it related to the Gettysburg battle and what lessons from that experience were relevant to today's problems. While standing in the woods on the 20th Maine's position on Little Round Top, a question about the Army's transition from a small force geared to irregular warfare on the frontier in 1861 to a very large force focused on major combat operations sparked an energized discussion among the generals about how TRADOC can improve the matching of its resources to its priorities.

At the end of the day, while looking over the ground of Pickett's Charge, a lieutenant general led his commanders and staff in an after-action review that again focused on lessons for the Army's future.

History is not dead, when you can get it to work for you.

While Woodstock Rocked, GIs Died - Richard K. Kolb, Veterans of Foreign Wars magazine - an excerpt follows:

With the 40th anniversary of the '60s cherished rock concert, the so-called "Sixties Generation" remembers fondly those four days in August 1969. Instead, VFW magazine commemorates the 109 Americans killed in Vietnam then.

Newsweek described them as "a youthful, long-haired army, almost as large as the U.S. force in Vietnam." One of the promoters saw what happened near Bethel (nearly 40 miles from Woodstock), N.Y., as an opportunity to "showcase" the drug culture as a "beautiful phenomenon."

The newsmagazine wrote of "wounded hippies" sent to impromptu hospital tents. Some 400,000 of the "nation's affluent white young" attended the "electric pot dream." One sympathetic chronicler recently described them as "a veritable army of hippies and freaks."

Time gushed with admiration for the tribal gathering, declaring: "It may well rank as one of the significant political and sociological events of the age." It deplored the three deaths there—"one from an overdose of drugs [heroin], and hundreds of youths freaked out on bad trips caused by low-grade LSD." Yet attendees exhibited a "mystical feeling for themselves as a special group," according to the magazine's glowing essay.

That same tribute mentioned the "meaningless war in the jungles of Southeast Asia" and quoted a commentator who said the young need "more opportunities for authentic service."

Meanwhile, 8,429 miles around the other side of the world, 514,000 mostly young Americans were authentically serving the country that had raised them to place society over self. The casualties they sustained over those four days were genuine, yet none of the elite media outlets were praising their selflessness.

So 40 years later, let's finally look at those 109 Americans who sacrificed their lives in Vietnam on Aug. 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1969...

... So when you hear talk of the glories of Woodstock—the so-called "defining event of a generation"—keep in mind those 109 GIs who served nobly yet are never lauded by the illustrious spokesmen for the "Sixties Generation."

Apathy Among the Educated - Hassina Sherjan

A "fair and transparent election," even if one were possible, would not be enough to set Afghanistan on a path toward stability. Only when democracy is combined with a legitimate process of truth and justice will we achieve peace.

Phantoms at the Polls - Atif B.

Demoralization and despair have reached such a level in my city, Kandahar, this summer that most people tell me they will not participate in Thursday's presidential election. They doubt the transparency of the vote, disbelieving that President Hamid Karzai's corrupt administration will allow another candidate to win.

Waking Up to Terror - Mirwais Ahmaddzai

The "night letters" have been coming for a while now. I saw my first one last week, posted on a door in Kunar Province, on the Pakistani border. But its message was no different than the ones that, according to press reports, have been popping up overnight in most of the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, whether posted on mosques or government buildings, or at busy road intersections, or simply scattered onto streets: do not vote on Thursday, or we will punish you. Signed, the Taliban.

Hopeful in Panjshir - Ahmad Wali Arian

Last Friday I was in the Panjshir Valley, about 50 miles north of Kabul, talking with a dozen of my relatives about their perceptions and expectations of the presidential election. Our discussion was all about the candidates' platforms, promises, teams and abilities. This was a huge change from the last vote, in 2004, when nobody was talking about ideas. That election consisted mostly of ethnic groups and political parties trying to show their strength.

As Afghanistan Votes, Will the Taliban Win? - New York Times

President Obama on Monday defended his administration's new approach to the fierce fighting that rages in Afghanistan, calling it "not only a war worth fighting" but also one that "is fundamental to the defense of our people."

Speaking to the annual gathering of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Obama praised the American troops in Afghanistan who are helping to secure the country ahead of elections there this week.

"As I said when I announced this strategy, there will be more difficult days ahead," Obama said. "The insurgency in Afghanistan didn't just happen overnight. And we won't defeat it overnight. This will not be quick. This will not be easy."

The president said that he would continue to increase the size of the military to confront problems around the globe, but he added that he rejects wasteful spending on technology that commanders insist they no longer need...

More at The Washington Post. Bolded emphasis ours.

When I started the rather grandly titled Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue a week ago, I decided that after listening to and reading the thoughts and opinions of the readership, I would then weigh in with a few thoughts of my own to close out the exercise. Some of the readership was a bit impatient for me to offer my own thoughts, but if you get one thing out of this exercise, remember this: the war in Afghanistan is complex, as are the consequences of any policy choice, and anyone who wades into this discussion full of confidence in his or her own assumptions is not to be trusted. I wanted to hear the thoughts of my readership before I offered my own. The people who have contributed to this debate thus far have advanced propositions for discussion -- and that is how it should be. I would hope that you would all take what follows to be in the same vein...

Much more at Abu Muqawama - to include seven days of the Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue.

Spillover crime from Tijuana's gang wars is relatively small, given the scale and brutality of the violence there. Nevertheless, the gang's migration to the San Diego area reinforces concern that border vigilance is no match for Mexican organized crime.

After Arellano-Felix cartel members in 2002 killed Lopez's brother in a gangland dispute, he moved his cell across the border to stage retaliatory attacks against anyone suspected of cartel links, according to authorities.

[...]

Police started getting chilling reports of criminals using tactics typically seen only on the streets of Tijuana: Men dressed in police uniforms and bullet-proof vests snatching victims in daylight and throwing them into cars before speeding off into traffic. Bodies bearing signs of torture were dumped.

The crimes haunted residents in such suburbs as Chula Vista and Bonita, where many prominent Tijuana families had moved to escape violence only to find that criminals had followed and blended into the cookie-cutter anonymity of American suburbia.

The veteran gang prosecutor leading the case, Deputy Dist. Atty. Mark Amador, said the gang was the most vicious he's ever prosecuted. "I've never seen a more ruthless, cold-blooded, sociopathic group," he said.

These Mexican gang members sought sanctuary in the U.S. due to the pressure they were under in Mexico. As competition from other cartels and pressure from the Mexican army increases, it is natural that cartel members will seek refuge inside the U.S. Once in the U.S., they will need to generate funding to maintain their organizations and pay their expenses. That means cartel-style criminal commerce with cartel-style violence.

According to George Grayson, a professor at William and Mary, an associate scholar at FPRI, and an expert on Mexico's cartels, the Arellano-Felix cartel is a small player compared to the presence other Mexican cartels have already established in the U.S. Or what is yet to come.

Grayson's latest essay at FPRI concerns La Familia, the exceptionally violent organization that rules Michoacán state, west of Mexico City (you can find Grayson's body of work on Mexico at FPRI at this link). On July 13th, La Familia made headlines across the world when it captured and executed 12 Mexican federal police officers. Shocking as that act was, it gives little indication of the scale of La Familia's organization, which specializes in the production and distribution of methamphetamines. According to Grayson, La Familia is now the parallel government in Michoacán, using money, a religious message, camaraderie, and a social services network to recruit and maintain a base of support from Michoacán's economically desperate population. Needless to say, La Familia is also suspected of owning most of Michoacán's mayors and other top public officials.

What does this mean for the U.S.? According to Grayson:

While it used to be satisfied with doing business in Mexico, La Familia is moving aggressively into the U.S. market. Reportedly, it has struck deals to pass through the Northwestern region dominated by "El Chapo's" Sinaloa Cartel and the divided, much weaker Arellano Felix Organization. Their trailers, replete with hidden compartments tucked under fruits and vegetables, enter the U.S. through Mexicali, Tijuana, or Tamaulipas and head for Atlanta, Dallas, or Los Angeles. The presence of 3.5 million Michoacán natives north of the Rio Grande enhances the traffickers' ability to sell their product in these cities, as well as use these metropolitan areas as hubs from which to supply smaller communities. DEA officials indicate they are beginning to receive inquiries from law-enforcement agencies on both coasts about "La Familia," a cartel with which the local police have little or no experience.

Mexico's drug war is another example of an irregular war showing no regard for a formal nation-state boundary. At first, the U.S.-Mexican border suited the purposes of several interests. It sheltered much of the U.S. population from Mexico's problems. And some of Mexico's cartel members used U.S. territory for a sanctuary.

But such protection could not last long. Where cartel members move, criminal commerce and violent competition have followed. And that has brought Mexico's drug wars into America's suburbs. The good news is that San Diego's prosecutors seem to have won a round. But it is only the beginning of a very long bout.