... US strategy - protecting the population - is increasingly troop-intensive while Americans are increasingly impatient about "deteriorating" (says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) conditions. The war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined US involvements in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible.

The US strategy is "clear, hold and build." Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that US forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state.

Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only about a third of the country - "control" is an elastic concept - and " 'our' Afghans may prove no more viable than were 'our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime." ...

Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting? - Washington Post opinions.

On Monday the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan called for a new strategy to fight the Taliban. The Post asked experts whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. Below are contributions from John Nagl, Andrew J. Bacevich, Erin M. Simpson, Thomas H. Johnson and Danielle Pletka.

Afghanistan Commander's Report Submitted, But Secret - Al Pessin, Voice of America. The US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has delivered his eagerly-awaited assessment to his bosses in Washington and Brussels, but the document is being kept secret. Pentagon officials say it will be followed by international consultations and possibly requests for more US and international forces. According to a NATO release, General McChrystal writes that "the situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable." The general is quoted as saying success will require "a revised implementation strategy," as well as commitment, resolve, and increased unity of effort. But that is all that has been made public. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he has not yet seen the assessment, but told reporters what he expects it to contain. "I think that his assessment, without having read it, I suspect is going to point to the challenges that remain before us in Afghanistan. I think it will also point to areas where we can do better and can make improvements in our strategy and tactics," he said. Some civilian advisers invited to Afghanistan to help General McChrystal prepare his assessment have said he needs more troops to put down a resurgent Taliban and establish security at least in Afghan population centers. Some analyses of the current situation have been fairly dire, including one by the top US military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, who has said security in Afghanistan is "serious and deteriorating." But Secretary Gates says he expects a balanced assessment from General McChrystal.

Gen. McChrystal Calls for New Strategy in Afghan War - Yochi J. Dreazen and Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal. The US and its allies need to change course in Afghanistan to salvage the faltering war effort and prevent the Taliban from extending their recent gains, the top American commander in Afghanistan warned in a highly anticipated strategic assessment. Gen. Stanley McChrystal said that conditions on the ground were "serious," but expressed confidence that the war could still be won if the US and NATO better coordinated their efforts and focused more heavily on protecting the Afghan populace from Taliban attack. The report, which wasn't released publicly, concluded that the Taliban had survived a series of recent US military strikes and were pushing deeper into once-stable parts of northern and western Afghanistan, according to three officials familiar with its contents. The report argued that the US and its allies needed to devote more troops to vulnerable Afghan population centers in southern Afghanistan's Kandahar Province and eastern Afghanistan's Khost Province, the officials said. It also emphasized the importance of limiting corruption in Kabul and building stronger local and provincial governments across the country, the officials said. The report didn't call for any additional US forces. Gen. McChrystal will instead detail any request for more troops in a second document next month, according to US officials familiar with the matter. The commander is considering asking for up to eight additional brigades, or roughly 40,000 troops, but the officials said no decisions had yet been made.

US General Calls for New Strategy Against Taliban - William Branigin, Washington Post. The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan called Monday for a revised strategy and increased unity in efforts to defeat radical Islamist insurgents in the country, saying that the situation is "serious" but that success can still be achieved. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal delivered the assessment as he sent a long-awaited strategic review to the Pentagon by way of the US Central Command. The review was also being sent to NATO headquarters. McChrystal stopped short of requesting more troops for Afghanistan in the review, but news agencies quoted NATO officials as saying he was expected to do so in a separate recommendation. The strategic review comes as Afghanistan's radical Taliban movement inflicts increasing casualties on US and NATO forces in an insurgency against the government of President Hamid Karzai, who is locked in a slow-moving reelection battle against former Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

Groundwork Is Laid for New Troops in Afghanistan - Dexter Filkens, New York Times. The top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said Monday that conditions on the ground were "serious" but that the war here is still winnable, part of a long-awaited assessment of the American-led war. Officials in Washington say that while the general's classified report did not request additional American troops, it effectively lays the groundwork for such a request in coming weeks. The change in strategy envisioned by General McChrystal would invest the United States more extensively in Afghanistan than it has been since toppling the Taliban government in 2001, Washington officials said. For President Obama, who already ordered another 21,000 troops to Afghanistan this year, the prospect of an even more extensive commitment of American troops would test his political commitment to the war at a time when he is already trying to tamp down discontent in his liberal base. In recent weeks, senior American officers here have said that they do not have enough troops to succeed. The American commanders and officials in Kabul were ordered to neither reveal the details of the assessment nor talk about them.

Gen. McChrystal Calls for Overhaul of Afghanistan War Strategy - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times. The top commander in Afghanistan has submitted his initial assessment of the war in Afghanistan, calling today for a full overhaul of the military's war strategy, NATO officials said today. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the newly appointed head of US and NATO forces, wants to intensify development of Afghan security forces, improve the country's government and refocus economic development initiatives, according to a description of the assessment released by NATO officials. The assessment is meant to be a more "philosophical" look at the current situation and does not contain any explicit requests for more troops or other resources. "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort," McChrystal said in the assessment, according to NATO officials. The assessment reflects McChrystal's belief that the military needs to follow an overhauled counter-insurgency strategy that focuses on making Afghan citizens feel safer, military officials said. The report was forwarded today to NATO and to Gen. David H. Petraeus, head of US Central Command, which controls forces in the Mideast.

US Commander General Stanley McChrystal: Afghanistan Strategy is Failing - Matt Spence and Deborah Haynes, The Times. The campaign in Afghanistan is failing and the strategies in place must be revised, the commander of US and NATO forces said today. General Stanley McChrystal described the situation in the country as "serious", but said success could be achieved there with a new approach. Gen McChrystal today delivered the results of his 60-day strategic assessment to US and NATO commanders in a long-awaited review of strategy ordered by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. He said: "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort." Gen McChrystal has been working on the review since President Obama put him in charge of the war on June 15. His review, sent to the US military's Central Command (CentCom), responsible for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to NATO headquarters in Brussels, is not expected to make firm recommendations about future troop levels. That recommendation is due out in another report later in the year. However, military officials say it will form the basis for a decision about force size which could be taken within weeks.

Obama Aides See Need for More Troops in Afghanistan - Adam Entous and Arshad Mohammed, Reuters. Many of President Barack Obama's top advisers on Afghanistan agree with military commanders that more troops are needed to reverse Taliban gains in the country's east and south, US officials said on Monday. But there is wariness within the White House to another large-scale increase at a time when public support for the eight-year-old war against a resurgent Taliban is eroding, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Military commanders and administration and congressional leaders have held preliminary discussions about future troop options, including sending a second 5,000-member Marine Regimental Combat Team to southern Afghanistan, a Taliban stronghold, participants said. This would boost the number of Marines in the country to 15,000-18,000 from just over 10,000. The debate is expected to intensify after Monday's long-awaited assessment of the war by US Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal called for the United States and its allies to change strategy, laying the ground for a likely request for more troops later, officials said. McChrystal has about 103,000 troops under his command, including 63,000 Americans, half of whom arrived this year as part of an escalation strategy started by former President George W. Bush and ramped up under Obama. The force is set to rise to 110,000, including 68,000 Americans, by year's end, stretching the US military to its limits, military officials said.

Marine Commander Sees Progress in Afghanistan - Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times. The general in charge of US Marines in Afghanistan said Monday that progress is being made in wresting a key southern province from Taliban control but cautioned that process will be slow and difficult to measure. Marine Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland also said the Marine Corps was ready to send more troops to Afghanistan if asked by top US officials. "Everything we're doing is preparing to put more forces in theater," Helland said. The Marines' goal is to train the Afghan security forces to carry the fight to the Taliban. The training is going slowly, Helland said. "They don't understand leadership, they don't understand noncommissioned officers," he said. "To use a Marine term, they're a herd. But once trained, they're warriors." Helland is set to retire Friday after 41 years of military service, beginning as an Army enlisted man with the Special Forces in Vietnam. For the last two years he has been the commanding general of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Force Central Command, with authority over Marines in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Marines have 12,000 troops in southern Afghanistan's Helmand province, where Taliban fighters are entrenched and opium poppy fields provide an illegal cash crop that funds the insurgency against the US-backed central government in Kabul, the capital.

New Strategy, Not Troops, Needed for Afghanistan - Joshua Foust, Registan. General Stanley McChrystal has finally come out and said what the rest of us have known for years: there needs to be some fundamentally new thinking in Afghanistan. While the various news stories talk about McChrystal's desire for a new strategy, all they seem to focus on is the (informed) assumption that he will request new troops in a separate, perhaps followup assessment. It seems, then, that Gen. McChrystal is taking his cues from Anthony Cordesman, who is out in the Washington Post saying that what we really need is more troops. Like many commentators on McChrystal's review team, Cordesman comes from a deep background in military studies but knows comparatively little about the vital civil side of the equation - therefore, all the problems he sees are problems of security and not necessarily other things. What is needed, however, is not necessarily more troops. As I wrote back in January, adding more troops to the mix would only make sense if they were going to serve a new strategy, one fundamentally different from the current, failing, strategy in the country. The biggest sin Gen. McChrystal has committed so far, at least in my view, is that there is actually very little "new" about his command so far, fawning media coverage notwithstanding. So if the reports of General McChrystal's report are right, then he is making the right decision to craft a new strategy for the country. The trouble is, to really know how to move forward, simply having an intimate understanding of the Army and military operations will only get you so far. You also have to have an intimate understanding of Afghanistan as well, and that kind of understanding simply wasn't on the McChrystal review team (nor is it on the many think tank panels that purport to discuss Afghanistan but just rehash vague generalities)

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months - any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war. I did not see any simple paths to victory while serving on the assessment group that advised the new US commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on strategy, but I did see all too clearly why the war is being lost.

The most critical reason has been resources. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States never provided the forces, money or leadership necessary to win, effectively wasting more than half a decade. Our country left a power vacuum in most of Afghanistan that the Taliban and other jihadist insurgents could exploit and occupy, and Washington did not respond when the US Embassy team in Kabul requested more resources...

More at The Washington Post.

Also see The Afghan War: A Survey of "Metrics" by Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas B. Greenough at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Afghan-Pakistan conflict is a complex conflict that covers two countries and has ideological, political, governance, economic, military, and security dimensions that are extremely difficult to measure and portray in summary form. NATO/ISAF, the United Nations, the US Department of Defense, and various polls and nongovernmental organizations have, however, gradually developed summary metrics and maps of the conflict. Whilke these data have serious gaps, and often attempt to "spin" the war in political directions, they stil provide a useful overview of developments in the conflict and are beginning to go beyond the military dimension to the political and economic dimensions and to show how Afghans and Pakistanis perceive the conflict...

Full Reports and Subreports at CSIS.

Watch C-SPAN's coverage of a discussion on the Presidential election in Afghanistan. With just ten-percent of the votes counted, President Hamid Karzai has a small lead over his nearest rival Abdullah Abdullah. The final results won't be announced until mid-September. The Heritage Foundation in Washington hosted this event. (1 hr. 30 min. broadcast)

Former Lt. Rusty Calley has finally spoken about the My Lai Massacre in terms of his remorse for the deaths of between 300 and 400 unarmed Vietnamese villagers who were slaughtered on one terrible day in March, 1968, 41 years ago, and his remorse for the ruined lives of American soldiers he and others ordered to do the killing...

After decades of refusing all requests for interviews, Calley this month accepted an invitation to speak to a Kiwanis Club in Columbus, Ohio, and there confessed to daily feeling "remorse" over his actions and their consequences...

In this case I am afraid that a "sorry" near the end of a comfortable life just doesn't cut it, Lt. Calley. I doubt it will buy much leeway on Judgment Day either.

Meanwhile, Michael Sullivan of National Public Radio reports that in Vietnam, Calley's My Lai apology barely registers.

Ten days ago, the only man convicted for the My Lai massacre publicly expressed remorse for what happened there in March 1968. The publicity-shy William Calley told a Kiwanis club lunch there was "not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened. I am very sorry." After his apology, Voice of America expressed interest in having Calley apologize on the air in Vietnam, but few seem interested in hearing it.

The White House has assembled a list of about 50 measurements to gauge progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan as it tries to calm rising public and congressional anxiety about its war strategy.

Administration officials are conducting what one called a "test run" of the metrics, comparing current numbers in a range of categories -- including newly trained Afghan army recruits, Pakistani counterinsurgency missions and on-time delivery of promised U.S. resources -- with baselines set earlier in the year. The results will be used to fine-tune the list before it is presented to Congress by Sept. 24...

More at The Washington Post.

US Fears Clock Ticking on Afghanistan - Paul Richter and Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

The Obama administration is racing to demonstrate visible headway in the faltering war in Afghanistan, convinced it has only until next summer to slow a hemorrhage in US support and win more time for the military and diplomatic strategy it hopes can rescue the 8-year-old effort.

But the challenge in Afghanistan is becoming more difficult in the face of gains by the Taliban, rising US casualties, a weak Afghan government widely viewed as corrupt, and a sense among US commanders that they must start the military effort largely from scratch nearly eight years after it began.

A turnaround is crucial because military strategists believe they will not be able to get the additional troops they feel they need in coming months if they fail to show that their new approach is working, US officials and advisors say...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

By Captain Joe Knable

19th Airlift Wing Public Affairs

If you stumbled upon a man wearing a Muslim headdress, an Iraqi security police colonel and military officers from three coalition countries, you might think you're somewhere in the Middle East.

However, this scene was part of Irregular Warfare training at Little Rock Air Force Base this week as part of the Green Flag Little Rock exercise.

Green Flag Little Rock is held in conjunction with the Joint Readiness Training Center exercise based at Fort Polk, La., which is training 5,000 Soldiers "deployed" to an austere environment at Fort Polk. The Air Force is providing airlift and airdrop capabilities, aeromedical evacuation and bare-base set up and operations for the JRTC exercise.

The goal of Green Flag Little Rock is for aircrews to fly their first five simulated combat missions in a safe environment, said Maj. Earl Burress, the trainer/mentor in charge of irregular warfare training at Green Flag Little Rock. The irregular warfare exercises are part of the rigorous training the Air Force members receive to prepare them for theater operations.

Irregular warfare is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will," according to the U.S. Air Force Irregular Warfare Operating Concept, Dec. 1, 2008.

In this Green Flag Little Rock exercise, aircrews from the U.S., Canada and Belgium are participating in a series of IW scenarios. While the players know there will be IW training at some point during the exercise, they do not know when it will be, what it will be or who will be participating. Just like in real-world deployments, they must be ready at all times, said Major Burress.

This week at Green Flag Little Rock, Department of Defense security and intelligence agents dressed up as Iraqi nationals and engaged coalition players in a variety of IW scenarios.

On the first day, agents posed as a local sheikh, his security police colonel and a U.S. escort. The agents met with members of all four coalition teams, including the Air Force aeromedical evacuation team, to discuss a variety of topics ranging from military assistance, humanitarian aid, political sentiments and religious affiliation. Players were challenged to maintain their military bearing with many personal and controversial questions and statements including a marriage proposal directed at the female Canadian mission commander. The players focused on remaining professional, warm and diplomatic in their responses while gathering intelligence that might be useful to the coalition.

After the 45-minute meeting, Air Force intelligence trainer/mentors discussed what the players did well and what they might want to do differently "in country." The meeting was purposely long with uncomfortable pauses because the culture in Iraq is so different. Such a meeting could last six hours, one trainer/mentor explained.

This first meeting was intended to illustrate "wasta," a key concept in Iraq that translates roughly to the concepts of strength, honor and trust. "Building relationships is the bull's-eye" for meetings with Iraqi nationals, said Major Burress. Once they build wasta, the Iraqi nationals will provide invaluable help.

In the second encounter, the son of the sheikh was very angry because of what he described as an "immoral use of technology," Major Burress said. Players had to overcome a simulated language barrier to discover the true issue. The son was told the pilots were using night vision goggles to see through local women's clothing. Once players understood this, they brought a pair of night vision goggles in for the sheikh's son to look through and he discovered for himself that the allegation was not true since night vision goggles have no such capability.

The third IW exercise was the shortest of all. The U.S. agent rapped frantically on the door until players answered. He said the sheikh had something urgent to show the players and they needed to send their mission commander right away. The team assembled quickly and uncovered a significant cache of weapons the Iraqis had discovered. The most important thing discovered were man-portable air-defense systems which could destroy the coalition airplanes and foil their mission. The mission commander thanked the sheikh with a cash gratuity and asked that he please let them know when he finds anything else.

This training is very unique for U.S. Airmen.

"Green Flag Little Rock is the first and only exercise in the USAF that provides Irregular Warfare training that is tailored specifically to prepare American and Coalition Mobility Air Forces personnel (at the squadron level) for deployments to austere locations," said Major Burress.

He explained that successful training would result in "participants who understand that their actions influence the local population and therefore the war on the strategic level, they have increased skills in relating to Muslim and Middle Eastern cultures and they are actively influencing the battlespace in a positive way."

Under an experimental program in Afghanistan, teams of anthropologists and social scientists are working alongside soldiers to help win the war by winning over the Afghan people. It may seem like a brilliant idea. But in this battle, nothing is as it seems...

The deployment of US soldiers to Maywand was an experiment. So, too, was the Human Terrain project and the road map to progress envisioned by the bespectacled social scientist joining the patrol that day. The war had not gone well. This was not a time for old approaches but for bold new ones that might seem crazy or that just might work.

Karl Slaikeu had asked for this assignment. A 64-year-old psychologist and conflict-resolution specialist from Texas, Karl had been nursing an idea that he thought could change the course of the war. He was looking for a village that, with concerted attention, could be turned into a model of development and security. Pir Zadeh, where the patrol was bound, was a place where locals had formed a neighborhood watch and where the village elder seemed to like Americans...

More at the Washington Post.

Cited in the article above:

Winning the War in Afghanistan

An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for Coalition Forces

by Dr. Karl A. Slaikeu, Small Wars Journal

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

While granting that Afghanistan is centuries behind Iraq in terms of infrastructure, the central question remains: can we build on the successes and lessons learned in Iraq and a half century of other counterinsurgency (COIN) wars to emerge victorious over the Taliban and al Qaeda? Or, will we go the way of Great Britain and Russia, who left Afghanistan in defeat? This paper offers a plan for victory that builds on classic COIN--the oil spot or ink spot strategy--customized to address the unique challenges of the Afghan area of operations (AO).

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Are Saudi Arabia and Iran at war in Yemen?

Has a proxy war broken out in Yemen? The Los Angeles Times has reported that 100 Shiite rebels are dead and 100,000 refugees are on the move in the Saada region of northwestern Yemen after the Sunni-dominated government attacked rebel positions with tanks, artillery and air strikes. According to The Economist, the rebels retaliated with volleys of Katyusha rockets. The current round of fighting, now into its second week, is the sixth uprising in this area since 2004.

What raises the profile of this development are accusations of foreign intervention in the conflict. The Yemeni government has accused Iran of providing funding and weapons to the Shiite rebels. Iran's news media has in turn reported that Saudi Arabia's military forces have joined in the fighting. The Saudi government acknowledges consultations with Yemen but denies any direct participation by its forces.

Evidence of foreign intervention in the conflict is sparse. But Yemen's foreign minister was at least concerned enough to summon Iran's ambassador his office. Meanwhile the Saudi and Yemeni defense ministries have stepped up consultations. According to The Economist, Iran's Arabic language news service has been reporting the latest round of fighting including Saudi Arabia's support of the Yemeni government.

Even if the actual foreign material support in Yemen's civil strife is minimal, the conflict is probably the newest front in a broadening proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is one front. Iranian attempts to gain influence over Shiite populations in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf is another. Some factions in Iran may feel obligated to support what they believe are oppressed Shiite minorities around the mostly Sunni Middle East. In the case of the rebellion in Yemen, some nervous officials in Riyadh may see an Iranian plan to achieve control over the Red Sea shipping lane.

Now there is another dimension to Saudi-Iranian competition. Despite having the largest crude oil reserves on the planet, the Saudi government recently announced plans to build a nuclear power plant. Even though it will take many years for Saudi Arabia to build up the necessary proficiency in nuclear engineering, Saudi policymakers must view the establishment of nuclear expertise as an essential strategic hedge.

A nuclear arms race and proxy wars were two prominent features of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. We should not be surprised to see that pattern of behavior repeat itself with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Compared to Saudi Arabia, Iran has a large head start. The Saudis will have to rely on their friends for protection while they try to catch up.

The autumn of Afghan discontent

August has been as cruel to President Barack Obama's policy for Afghanistan as it has for his health care reform plans. As autumn arrives, it is likely that an increasing number of Americans, most crucially members of Obama's Democratic base, will conclude that the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan is unrealistic and not worthy of increased support. This bad news for the administration will negate what could be one bit of hopeful news, the possibility that Afghanistan's presidential election will actually be accepted as legitimate.

The best outcome to the first round of Afghanistan's presidential vote is no outcome at all and a second-round run-off. Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, it appears today that Hamid Karzai will not receive more than 50 percent of the votes. If this turns out to be the case, Afghan election officials will get "a mulligan," another chance in the run-off election to demonstrate that the election process is reasonably clean. Should Karzai win the first round in a landslide, his government would have about as much legitimacy as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's has in neighboring Iran. And should Karzai barely crawl over 50 percent, the accusations of fraud by opposition candidate Abdullah Abdullah and others would sting. Thus, for the sake of legitimacy, a run-off vote is the best possible outcome.

And while Afghanistan's presidential election drags into October, this autumn will bring heightened debate about the wisdom of the U.S. military strategy. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan, which Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen has already described as "serious and deteriorating," is due in September. Although Defense Secretary Robert Gates has already banned any mention of additional troops from McChrystal's report, such a requirement will be the obvious conclusion.

When Gates ordered McChrystal to prepare a detailed study of the Afghan situation, Gates was thinking like the former intelligence analyst he is. Perhaps he should have been thinking more like a litigator, whose first rule is "never ask a question you don't already know the answer to." Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Advisor James Jones, and Gates himself have opposed additional U.S. troop increases in Afghanistan. Resistance to Obama's Afghan policy among Democrats is increasing. The arrival of McChrystal's report will amplify Obama's political problems and force Gates and his colleagues to either defend or recant their positions.

Domestic political pressure has created an additional problem for the Afghan campaign. In order to gain short-term support for the current strategy, Gates and Mullen have agreed to a 12 to18 month deadline to show results (in May, I discussed Gates's impatience for results). The Taliban, knowing this self-imposed deadline, can now conserve their forces and regulate the pace of their operations in order to deny the coalition the appearance of progress as the deadline approaches. Coalition and Afghan forces have been unable to seize the initiative over the Taliban because the Taliban have been able to avoid contact with coalition forces when they choose. In theory, a prolonged population-centered counterinsurgency campaign would erode this Taliban advantage. But U.S. officials have indicated that they lack the patience to execute this strategy.

After McChrystal's report arrives, Obama will have to either reject the judgment of his field commander (and assume full responsibility for the consequences) or go for another troop increase (which may not yield any military benefit) and risk further alienating his supporters.

There is another choice -- to change the goals of the mission in Afghanistan. Might Obama opt to climb down from his commitment to Afghanistan just months after unveiling his policy? Such a choice is hardly appealing, but may soon become the least worst option.

When Gen. Sir David Richards takes over as head of the British army on Friday he inherits two battlefields: the war in Afghanistan, and a battle for resources between the UK's military and government. On both counts Gen. Richards, a respected soldier who earned his stripes in the jungles of Sierra Leone, faces tough challenges. As the second-biggest contributor of North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Afghanistan, the UK has suffered high casualties, sapping public support for the war at home.

One reason for that, according to some critics in the UK, is that the army is hampered by a lack of resources after decades of cutbacks by Downing Street. Gen. Richards may soon hit the same quandary his predecessors struggled with: trying to play the role of a superpower with a military that hasn't been funded to play that part since World War II.

The UK has found it difficult to adapt its military hardware, within a budget, for conflicts that have morphed from the Cold War to peacekeeping operations to insurgency over the past 20 years. That problem will get harder as the UK faces budget cuts to battle its record debt, a situation that is heightening tensions between military and political leaders...

More at the Wall Street Journal.