Think cultural awareness is important? Most of us here do, that's fairly

non-controversial. The operative issue is how at hand is how do you get more of

what we (almost) all agree is needed?

Calling all testers for the Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer. Info on

the VCAT

here. Opportunity to weigh in on it here:

review the thread (anyone can do that) and, if interested,

send a

Private Messagee to SWC member Nichols (must be

registered and

logged in to SWC to do that) to get a crack at influencing this effort while it

is still at the ground floor. The effort will be conducted outside of SWJ,

we're just a conduit for connecting up folks with something to say about the

subject.

Reviewers should have ~4 hours to dive in to the web-based trainer sometime

in the next ~10 days..

This is an opportunity to get off the sidelines.

Officials Identify Gulf War Pilot's Remains

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2, 2009 -- Remains found last month in Iraq's Anbar province are those of Navy Capt. Michael Scott Speicher, who was shot down flying a combat mission in an F/A-18 Hornet on Jan. 17, 1991, and whose fate until now had been uncertain, Defense Department officials reported today.

Acting on information provided by Iraqi civilians, Marines stationed in Anbar province went to a desert location believed to be the crash site of Speicher's jet, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology positively identified remains recovered there Speicher's.

"Our thoughts and prayers are with Captain Speicher's family for the ultimate sacrifice he made for his country," Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said. "I am also extremely grateful to all those who have worked so tirelessly over the last 18 years to bring Captain Speicher home."

The Navy's top uniformed officer also praised the effort to determine Speicher's fate and expressed gratitude for the fallen aviator's sacrifice. "Our Navy will never give up looking for a shipmate, regardless of how long or how difficult that search may be," said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations. "We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Captain Speicher and his family for the sacrifice they have made for our nation and the example of strength they have set for all of us."

In early July, an Iraqi civilian told Marines he knew two people who recalled an American jet crashing and the remains of the pilot being buried. One of those people said he was present when Bedouins found Speicher dead and buried his remains. The Iraqis led Marines to the site, and the Marines searched the area. Remains were recovered over several days during the past week and were flown to Dover Air Force Base, Del., for scientific identification by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology's Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner.

The recovered remains include bones and skeletal fragments. Positive identification was made by comparing Speicher's dental records with the jawbone recovered at the site. The teeth are a match, both visually and radiographically, officials said.

While dental records have confirmed the remains to be Speicher's, officials said, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology DNA Lab in Rockville, Md., is running DNA tests on the remains and comparing them to DNA reference samples previously provided by his family. Results are expected tomorrow.

Links:

Michael Scott Speicher - Wikipedia

US Pilot's Remains Found in Iraq After 18 Years - Voice of America

After 18 Years, Remains of Pilot Shot Down in Iraq Found - Washington Post

US Pilot's Remains Found in Iraq After 18 Years - New York Times

US Identifies Remains of Pilot Missing in Persian Gulf War - Los Angeles Times

Speicher Remains Found in Iraq, Identified - Washington Times

Sands Hid Fate of Gulf War Pilot Lost Since '91 - Associated Press

Remains of First US Gulf War Casualty Found - Reuters

Remains of First US Gulf War Casualty Solve 18 Year Mystery - Christian Science Monitor

Comptroller Robert Hale, in a formal request to the four congressional defense committees earlier this month, asked permission to shift about $68 million in the Pentagon's budget to this program to ensure the first four bombs could be mounted on stealthy B-2 bombers by July 2010.

Hale, in his July 8 request, said there was "an urgent operational need for the capability to strike hard and deeply buried targets in high-threat environments," and top commanders of U.S. forces in Asia and the Middle East "recently identified the need to expedite" the bomb program.

The bomb would be the U.S. military's largest and six times bigger than the 5,000-pound bunker buster that the Air Force now uses to attack deeply buried nuclear, biological or chemical sites.

The U.S. Air Force and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) have already tested the MOP from B-52 aircraft. The urgent reprogramming of funding is apparently required to complete work on adapting B-2 aircraft to carry the MOP. MOP is said to be capable of penetrating 200 feet to buried targets. We can presume that USAF and DTRA targeting analysts have concluded that existing 5,000 and 2,000 pound bunker-busters were insufficient for either the Natanz or Kumchang-ni target sets. If true, this would also imply that the Israeli Air Force might not have the proper ordnance or aircraft to succeed in an air campaign against the Iranian nuclear complex.

According to the Bloomberg story, the accelerated work on B-2 MOP delivery will cut three years from the original deployment plan. As this DTRA fact-sheet on the MOP explains, the Air Force and DTRA have been working on the bomb since 2004. Why the sudden request, apparently from CENTCOM and PACOM, to get this capability by next summer? Who prompted an update of the war plans? And why?

... With respect to your comment concerning participation in the blogosphere and the upcoming milbloggers conference, let me speak pretty plainly - most of the blogs I've dropped in on and read on a regular basis leave me pretty cold. Too many seem to be interested in scoring cheap, and anonymous, hits vice engaging in meaningful and professional exchanges. There is also a general lack of reverence for facts and an excess of emotion that, for me, really reduces the value of the blog. Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype may be entertaining for some, but just doesn't work for me.

My best example of a truly worthwhile blog, worthy of our time and intellectual engagement, is the Small Wars Journal. The tone is always professional, the subject matter is compelling and the benefit from participating is significant.

All that said, here I am - I recognize the reality of the blogosphere and the potential that exists for worthwhile exchanges that enhance our professional knowledge and overall awareness. My intent is to continue to participate when I can and where I see I can make a contribution to a professional exchange, but my view today is that the bloggers generally see their activity as far more meaningful than I do right now. I do, however, remain hopeful...

Since then, and still finding time to drop in here for a comment or two, Admiral Harvey has been blogging at USNI and most recently, and most importantly, put up his own stake at the US Fleet Forces Command Blog.

First, thank you for your encouragement and your patience as I continue to learn the best way to run this Blog so that we can have an honest and robust dialogue...

Welcome aboard Admiral - fair winds and following seas...

Okay, it's Friday night, so relax. Apparently, someone has favorable commentary concerning Kimberly Kagan's The Surge: A Military History. That someone is GrEaT sAtAn'S gIrLfRiEnD who opines:

"The Surge" is essential reading for anyone who wants to know how Iraq was saved from the brink of disaster. Perhaps out of modesty, Ms. Kagan does not stress her own role, as pres and creator of Institute for the Study of War, in pushing for the surge or the role of her husband, Frederick Kagan, in designing (with Gen. John Keane) many of its components.

"The Surge" challenges existing accounts in two ways.

First, although Ms. Kagan is rightly respectful of Gen. David Petraeus, who led American forces during the surge, she avoids celebrating his genius at the expense of other important figures.

She draws attention to the pivotal role played by Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, who commanded the day-to-day operations of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq. She shows him helping to ensure that co-operating tribal forces submit fingerprints, weapons serial numbers and family details that would make it difficult for them to take up arms again.

Honestly, how many times can we beat this dead horse? That said, she has some salient points here. More honestly - the post caught my eye more for the visual, rather than the written word - so sue me. That said, back to the SWJ command bunker, conveniently located along the I-95 parking lot in Northern Virginia.

Iraq's army thinks about life after the insurgency

This week the relationship between the United States and Iraq underwent a significant but little noticed change. Until now, military cooperation between the two countries has focused exclusively on defending Iraq from internal threats. This week, the problem of Iraq's external defense came to the fore. With the counterinsurgency phase of the U.S.-Iraq relationship winding down over the next two years, the country's conventional warfare needs are taking on greater prominence.

It was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who initiated this change in the relationship. At a July 23rd speech in Washington, Maliki opened the door to a U.S. military presence in Iraq after 2011, when, under current agreements, all U.S. forces are to be out of the country. "If Iraqi forces need more training and support, we will reexamine the agreement at that time, based on our own national needs," Maliki said.

Implied in this remark is continuing U.S. assistance for Iraq's army and police in their ongoing struggle against various insurgent groups. But Maliki has other more conventional military capabilities in mind as well. According to the New York Times, Iraq is seeking to acquire F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft in order to rebuild its jet fighter inventory which currently stands at zero. The F-16 is a multi-role airplane, designed to attack both other aircraft and targets on the ground. Iraq currently has no indigenous capability of defending itself from air attack. According to General Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Iraq has little chance of acquiring that capability by the end of 2011. The U.S. Air Force is sending an assessment team to help Iraq solve its air defense problem.

The future of the U.S.-Iraq security relationship has been a subject of recent focus by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. After speaking with Maliki on the subject at a meeting in Washington on July 23rd, Gates appeared in Baghdad five days later for another discussion with the prime minister. Gates made it clear that any request to modify the existing 2011 withdrawal agreement would have to come from the Iraqis first. Maliki's speech in Washington and his request for F-16s seem to meet Gates's requirement.

Does Iraq even face a conventional military threat? At the moment Iran seems plagued with deep internal political problems; the leadership there would seem hard pressed to organize offensive military action. Saudi Arabia's relationship with Iraq is chilly but non-threatening. With Saddam Hussein and Iraq's missile and WMD programs gone, Israel does not seem like a factor. And the United States has gone from being an arch-enemy to Iraq's best ally.

Yet this report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (see pages 13 -- 20 and 25 -- 31) shows that Iraq has major military weaknesses compared to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iraqi statesmen looking outward will recall bloody wars fought against foreign invaders who entered Iraq from every direction. No statesman in the region can have any confidence about which country will be up or down, friend or foe a few years from now.

Maliki and his successors will not want to depend on the United States for Iraq's defense. Nor will U.S. policymakers wish to volunteer for such a commitment. Iraqi statesmen will seek to refocus the military's attention from battling insurgents to defending Iraq's borders. That will involve a complicated procurement and military training program extending far beyond F-16 fighters. It will also involve a relationship with the U.S. military extending far beyond 2011.

Does Afghanistan need the Phoenix Program?

The Office of the Secretary of Defense hired the RAND Corporation to study the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program and recommend whether some of the program's controversial techniques might be useful in Afghanistan. RAND's researchers endorsed a Phoenix-like effort for Afghanistan and in the process, attempted to dispel some of the program's myths.

What was the Phoenix program? RAND's relatively brief report summarizes its history: In 1967 the U.S. military command and the CIA created a program -- later called Phoenix -- that began as an effort to improve intelligence-sharing among a long list of U.S. and South Vietnamese agencies.

Separately but at about the same time, the CIA acted to reassert its control over some South Vietnamese counterterrorism teams it had recruited. The CIA renamed these teams Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), which later became part of the Phoenix intelligence-sharing program. Former South Vietnamese soldiers, many seeking revenge against the communist Viet Cong, made up much of the PRU membership. The CIA paid and directed these teams back to their home provinces with the mission of infiltrating the Viet Cong's support infrastructure.

The authors believe it was the PRU portion of Phoenix that became the subject of enduring myths both good and bad. Opponents of Phoenix condemned the program as little more than an illegal assassination rampage which killed many innocent of any involvement with the Viet Cong. Proponents credited Phoenix with virtually eliminating the Viet Cong insurgency, leaving it up to the North Vietnamese army to conquer the south. The new study discounts both of these perspectives.

RAND does however record Phoenix as a success, both for its ability to gain detailed knowledge about the Viet Cong and its ability to disrupt that organization. The authors believe the U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have suffered because the U.S. has apparently failed to aggressively recruit motivated indigenous agents to infiltrate and break up insurgent organizations.

Why wouldn't the U.S. want to resurrect Phoenix? Infiltrating insurgent organizations would seem to be a basic counterinsurgency tactic. However, the report reminds us of one more thing: fairly or unfairly, Phoenix was very costly to the U.S. government's reputation. The ruthlessness displayed by some unit members resulted in propaganda opportunities for opponents of the U.S. effort in Vietnam. The Vietnam War was ultimately decided on the information battlefield. That will also be the case in Afghanistan.

Papers should be 3,000 to 5,000 words in length. Papers will be blind reviewed and judged primarily for clarity of presentation, relevant insights to the question asked, and overall significance of the key points made to the practice of small wars. No extra points awarded for length, name dropping, or how epic the incidents discussed were as distinct from the weight of the insights. Papers need not be OIF- / OEF-centric. Papers must resonate beyond a single silo, i.e. they must touch on at least some aspect of joint, coalition, interagency, multi-disciplinary, or cross-cultural significance.

Papers are to be submitted by midnight on November 10, 2009, with winners to be announced in January, 2010. One entry per author per question. Standard writing competition mumbo jumbo will apply, we will publish a final announcement shortly with those gruesome details, including detailed submission instructions.

We will not answer questions about this competition submitted in individual emails. Submit any good questions publicly in the comments below, but let's not split hairs. The topics are what they are.

We greatly respect the works and insights of the usual suspects from the many DoD-centric writing competitions and anticipate some great and hard-to-beat entries from them. We would really like to see some stiff competition from fresh new voices and experience sets not often heard. Please spread the good word about this competition to the far reaches of the empire of important participants in the vastly broad and complex field of small wars. This is a level playing field, and let's get all the players on it.

The topics are:

1. Security vs. [Jobs & Services & etc.] -- horse and cart, or chicken and egg?

The "security is the military's job" camp at an extreme expects more order than can be obtained by kinetic measures without a scorched earth approach. Alternately, it demands that the armed forces exceed their organizational mandate in early phases and then obediently (and wastefully?) hop back into their military box until things go awry again. Other camps may err by expecting too much from non-military actors in non-permissive environments, understating the risks they already do or should accept, or tinkering with building massive non-lethal expeditionary capabilities that may be unsustainable.

What does security really mean in a small war, how much is needed when, and how do you make meaningful security gains through the pragmatic application of affordable capabilities? How does security relate as an intermediate objective or an end state? Include examples of real successes and failures.

2. Postcards From The Edge -- the practical application of the Whole of Government approach.

Organizational issues are being discussed from Goldwater-Nichols II to unity of effort and simple handshake-con. Whatever the structure on high, people from different walks of life and different functional expertise need to work together on the ground at the pointy end of the spear to deliver effects that matter. Discuss real experiences (personal, known firsthand, or researched and documented) of real people facing real challenges that offer relevant insights into the conduct of a small war.

Consider any, all, or none of the following:

- Discuss what worked and/or what didn't, and why.

- How did participants from different agencies, branches, nations, etc. look at problems differently, and how were those views eventually reconciled (or not)?

- Discuss personal challenges.

- Discuss the moral and ethical challenges of small wars.

- Approach as a turnover guide to a successor.

- Inform operational approaches and "grand" tactics, techniques, and procedures.

- Inform human resourcing / manpower / training & education.

- Relevance for national resource strategy.

- Relevance for go-to-war decisions and conflict strategy.

The top US commander in Afghanistan is preparing a new strategy that calls for major changes in the way US and other NATO troops there operate, a vast increase in the size of Afghan security forces and an intensified military effort to root out corruption among local government officials, according to several people familiar with the contents of an assessment report that outlines his approach to the war.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took charge of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan last month, appears inclined to request an increase in American troops to implement the new strategy, which aims to use more unconventional methods to combat the growing Taliban insurgency, according to members of an advisory group he convened to work on the assessment. Such a request could receive a chilly reception at the White House, where some members of President Obama's national security team have expressed reluctance about authorizing any more deployments.

Senior military officials said McChrystal is waiting for a recommendation from a team of military planners in Kabul before reaching a final decision on a troop request. Several members of the advisory group, who spoke about the issue of force levels on the condition of anonymity, said that they think more US troops are needed but that it was not clear how large an increase McChrystal would seek....

More at The Washington Post.