Steve Coll at The New Yorker asks what if we fail in Afghanistan? "Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?" A follow on post can be found here.

Tom Barnett on the bottom-line on nation building - BLUF: "It costs the United States $1 million a year to keep a soldier inside a theater of operations such as Afghanistan. The math is easy enough: For every thousand troops, the price comes out to $1 billion a year."

Via e-mail from the Council on Foreign Relations - "in advance of President Obama's announcement on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, CFR offers expert analysis and background resources from a broad range of views."

Over at Commentary's Contentions Max Boot says one word from Obama can rejuvenate troop morale and that word would be victory. "That is a word that has been missing so far from Obama's vocabulary. I hope it is not MIA on Tuesday night."

Foreign Policy releases its first top 100 global thinkers list. Yes another list - but you guys seem to love dissecting them - and yes - General P and Dr. K are on that list.

Andrew Exum (not quite back from the dead) has a new reading list - this one on irregular warfare courtesy of the U.S. Army War College. There's also a link to AM's counterinsurgency reading list.

Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) censured Iran for its "breach of its obligations" to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and for its refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions directed at Iran's nuclear program.

Iran responded by announcing a plan to greatly expand its uranium enrichment capacity, with plans to add 10 additional enrichments sites. Even though Russia and China joined Europe, the United States, and a majority of other countries in the IAEA vote against Iran, the Iranian government did not hesitate to escalate its breach with the IAEA and the Security Council.

The Iran government is likely only a few small steps away from quitting the NPT and ejecting IAEA monitoring from its country. Should, as seems likely, Iran leave the NPT and disappear from IAEA monitoring, it will then be the Security Council's responsibility to formulate a response. But the international legal system designed to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation -- a system comprising the NPT, the IAEA, and the Security Council -- has yet to demonstrate that it can stop countries that are determined to build a nuclear weapons capability.

The Security Council will likely impose much stiffer economic and financial sanctions against Iran. Based on its decisions to escalate the dispute, the Iranian government doesn't seem concerned by this prospect. It must be concluding that side deals, smuggling, and oil market leverage will suffice to allow the regime to meet its goals.

The likely failure of sanctions to change Iran's behavior would then bring the contentious issue of preventive war back into focus. No doubt the Security Council is many months, probably years away from taking up this debate. It remains to be seen whether it will fare any better than did the League of Nations in the 1930s. In the meantime, the international community will have to contemplate how it will cope with a nuclear nonproliferation system which is useless against determined regimes.

President Obama has offered Pakistan an expanded strategic partnership, including additional military and economic cooperation, while warning with unusual bluntness that its use of insurgent groups to pursue policy goals "cannot continue." The offer, including an effort to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, was contained in a two-page letter delivered to President Asif Ali Zardari this month by Obama national security adviser James L. Jones. It was accompanied by assurances from Jones that the United States will increase its military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and that it plans no early withdrawal.

Obama's speech Tuesday night at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, will address primarily the Afghanistan aspects of the strategy. But despite the public and political attention focused on the number of new troops, Pakistan has been the hot core of the months-long strategy review. The long-term consequences of failure there, the review concluded, far outweigh those in Afghanistan. "We can't succeed without Pakistan," a senior administration official involved in the White House review said. "You have to differentiate between public statements and reality. There is nobody who is under any illusions about this." ...

More at The Washington Post.

You've Had Eight Years, Now Get Us bin Laden, Brown Urges Pakistan - Philip Webster, The Times.

Gordon Brown told Pakistan to "take out" Osama bin Laden yesterday as Western frustration at its failure to capture the al-Qaeda leader burst into the public glare. With America and Britain seeking support for their decisions in the next two days to send tens of thousands more troops to Afghanistan, Mr Brown told the Pakistani leadership that it had not done enough to catch the men - believed to be hiding in the north of the country - responsible for the September 11 attacks.

His criticism was aimed at the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence service, which the West has long believed to be too close to extremist groups harbouring bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Mr Brown told President Asif Ali Zardari in a telephone call on Saturday that he intended to press home the message on Thursday when Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, visits London. About 30,000 Pakistani troops are in the lawless South Waziristan region to force out the Taleban. In interviews as he returned from the Commonwealth summit, Mr Brown made clear that he wanted them also to target the leadership of al-Qaeda, which has evaded international forces since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001...

More at The Times.

Britain Presses Pakistan and Afghanistan on Militants - John F. Burns, New York Times.

Highlighting themes likely to be taken up by President Obama in his military policy speech on Tuesday, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain has demanded that Afghanistan and Pakistan match plans for increased allied troop levels in Afghanistan by taking tough actions of their own, including, in Pakistan, a stepped-up effort to capture Osama bin Laden. In two hard-edged statements over the weekend, Mr. Brown signaled a renewed sense of impatience in the approach that Britain and the United States plan to take toward the governments in Kabul and Islamabad as the allies step up their commitment to the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

In recent days, American officials have been briefing allied leaders in Europe, including Mr. Brown, on what President Obama plans to say at West Point on Tuesday. Mr. Brown has said he will move this week to announce fresh British deployments, confirming a tentative announcement last month of Britain's readiness to increase its force by 500 troops, beyond the 9,000 already deployed. On the fate of Mr. bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, Mr. Brown, speaking Sunday, offered a sharp jolt to Pakistan. Western intelligence officials concluded long ago that the Qaeda leaders had taken sanctuary in the largely lawless tribal areas of Pakistan abutting Afghanistan, most likely in North or South Waziristan, barely 200 miles from Islamabad...

More at The New York Times.

Who knows everything there is to know and more about counterinsurgency and its current role in U.S. military strategy? These guys.

Pushed and prodded by a wonky group of Ph.D.s, the U.S. military has in the last year decisively embraced a Big Idea: counterinsurgency. Not everyone in uniform is a fan, but David Petraeus and the other generals in charge of America's wars are solidly behind it. Here are the brains behind counterinsurgency's rise from forgotten doctrine to the centerpiece of the world's most powerful military..

More at Foreign Policy.

Days after President Obama outlines his new war strategy in a speech Tuesday, as many as 9,000 Marines will begin final preparations to deploy to southern Afghanistan and renew an assault on a Taliban stronghold that slowed this year amid a troop shortage and political pressure from the Afghan government, senior US officials said. The extra Marines will be the first to move into the country as part of Obama's escalation of the eight-year-old war. They will double the size of the US force in the southern province of Helmand and will provide a critical test for Afghan President Hamid Karzai's struggling government and Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy.

"The first troops out of the door are going to be Marines," Gen. James T. Conway, the Corps' top officer, told fellow Marines in Afghanistan on Saturday. "We've been leaning forward in anticipation of a decision. And we've got some pretty stiff fighting coming." The Marines will be quickly followed by about 1,000 US Army trainers. They will deploy as early as February to speed the growth of the Afghan army and police force, military officials said...

More at The Washington Post.

- T.E. Lawrence, Twenty Seven Articles, Article 15

T.E. Lawrence's quote has become quite possibly the most over-used quotation by the U.S. Army in recent memory. Nearly every military presentation regarding our recent conflicts has some form of it embedded in the text. Nearly all U.S. military officers can parrot it with rote precision. However, application of Lawrence's wisdom in the field remains spotty. One doesn't have to look far to find accounts of U.S. soldiers and advisors emulating Larry the Cable Guy's "Git r' Dun" philosophy to prevent failure in Iraqi (or Afghan) forces. Sometimes this is required, but too often our own hubris and self-perception as the all-knowing American military overcomes the wisdom of listening to the host nation.

I learned this lesson the hard way in Tal Afar, Iraq. From March-May 2006, my company engaged in a difficult struggle for control of the Hai al Sa'ad neighborhood in the northwest part of the city. We established a platoon base in mid-March to take back neighborhood from the insurgents. Over the following month, my soldiers engaged with the enemy daily in the form of IED's, suicide bombs, and mortar attacks. The perpetrators of the attacks were elusive, escaping into the urban landscape as quickly as the IED detonated. Frustration built among the troops I had sent to secure the neighborhood, as they could garner no useful information from the local citizens they were trying to protect. The insurgents seemed to move freely in the neighborhood, crossing along a winding and deep wadi connecting to an adjacent insurgent dominated neighborhood. We knew they moved back and forth to conduct attacks in Sa'ad, but my scout/sniper teams and reconnaissance assets were unable to find them. I considered erecting a barrier along the length of the wadi, but I did not have enough troops to watch any barrier emplaced. It had been beat into my head since I was a lieutenant that "any obstacle that cannot be watched is not an obstacle to the enemy." So I decided against emplacing the wire.

In early April the mayor of Tal Afar offered the assistance of 50 newly trained Iraqi Police (IP) to assist in pacifying the neighborhood. He placed them under the command of his IP motor pool chief, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Ali. LTC Ali was a fit and personable individual, and spoke English well. A former officer in Saddam's army, he was the nephew of a prominent local sheik. His police were brand new, and I didn't have a clear read on LTC Ali's competence. At our first meeting, he suggested erecting a barrier along the wadi that was giving us trouble, saying it would curtail the attacks. I demurred, citing my military education. Since we didn't have forces to constantly secure it, I saw it as a waste of time and resources. LTC Ali smiled and demurred to my obvious superior wisdom.

Over the following two weeks our patrols continued to be attacked. We incurred more casualties, including the loss of one of my soldiers to an IED while on foot patrol. Frustrated, I met with LTC Ali, now a trusted confidant, and sought his advice on the seemingly intractable problem. Predictably, he advised me to emplace the barrier along the wadi. Exasperated, I agreed and resourced the concertina wire and pickets from battalion. Two days later a combined force of Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and U.S. Army combat engineers erected 400 meters of triple strand concertina wire along the winding wadi through its scrub vegetation. We cautioned the local populace that tampering with the wire meant arrest or possible engagement by our forces.

Emplacing Sa'ad Wire

Following emplacement of the wire, attacks dropped to zero. Insurgent activity disappeared in Sa'ad. Combined with growing security patrols, the neighborhood became a model of success. LTC Ali's IPs expanded and provided the backbone of the expanding security. Dumbfounded, I swallowed my pride and asked LTC Ali why the barrier worked when everything in my military education said it shouldn't. "Simple," he replied, "in Saddam's era you would never tamper with a barrier. To do so meant death. Even today, Saddam's legacy carries with us and influences the people's behavior." I then realized that in counterinsurgency, the locals often know the best and most relevant solution, which may not match the book solutions or conventional wisdom. In my arrogance, I failed to take into account the powerful social and cultural forces at play in the area. The meaning of the second half and often-omitted part of Lawrence's 15th Article hit me like a baseball bat - "Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."

The US-led coalition and the Afghan government are launching an initiative to persuade Taliban insurgents to lay down their weapons, offering jobs and protection to the militants who choose to abandon their fight. While President Hamid Karzai's government has been trying to woo these insurgents for years, the new program marks the first time that the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces are systematically reaching out to Taliban fighters. The tactic comes as the US prepares to announce Tuesday how many additional troops it will send to Afghanistan as part of a new strategy aimed at bringing the eight-year war to a successful end. US officials also hope America's European allies will raise their troop contributions as part of the new push.

The Afghan government has had a reconciliation program in place since 2004, and claims to have turned more than 8,000 insurgents. That program, however, is widely derided as corrupt and ineffective. Insurgents were enticed with offers of jobs but rarely received the promised assistance, leading many to rejoin the fight. Western officials behind the new reconciliation program say they believe the majority of insurgents are fighting for money - the Taliban often pay their members - or personal grievances. Luring such men from the battlefield is a central component of America's new counterinsurgency strategy crafted by US Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top allied commander here...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

While the Obama administration endlessly dithers about the US committment to Afghanistan, it would do well to look at the surprising results of a major public debate on the issue. On 10 and 11 October, New York University and Newsweek Magazine hosted a formal debate on the participation of the US forces in the conflict in Afghanistan. At New York University on 9 October the propostion "America cannot and will not succeeed in Afghanistan/Pakistan" was debated before a large audience. The next day, Newsweek Magazine's national radio programme also hosted a dialogue with experts presenting their views on reinforcing the US forces in Afghanistan or withdrawing.

There was a strong speakers' card at the New York University debate, with Steven Clemons, a prominent defence analyst, and Ralph Peters, a retired US Army officer and newspaper columnist, speaking for the motion. The speakers against the motion included James Shinn, the former assistant secretary of Defence for Asia and my old friend, Lt Col John Nagl (rtd), who now writes on defence issues. I took part in Newsweek's radio debate as a supporter of reinforcing the Western effort in Afghanistan. My credentials to speak on the subject: I have taught courses on counterinsurgency to US and British officers since 1991, I have written three books on counterinsurgency, I served as a US officer in Iraq in 2004, and I am one of the main authors of the US Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine (Counterinsurgency FM 3-24) brought out under General Petreaus in late 2006...

More at The Daily Telegraph.

A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army by Gian P. Gentile

In a sense, population-centric counterinsurgency has perverted a better way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation and practicality.

Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency by Heather S. Gregg

The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a counterinsurgency.

Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age by Michael S. Gerson

Deterrence is once again a topic of discussion and debate among US defense and policy communities. Although the concept has received comparatively little attention since the end of the Cold War, it seems poised to take center stage in America's national security policy during the coming decades.

Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes by Lincoln B. Krause

Insurgent leaders commit strategic mistakes that can significantly retard their efforts, and if properly leveraged by counterinsurgent forces, may lead to the insurgents' defeat.

Filling Irregular Warfare's Interagency Gaps by Lew Irwin

The US government has consistently failed to apply the full weight of its instruments of power during irregular warfare conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, largely due to an inability or unwillingness of various agencies to agree upon the ends, ways, and means needed to prosecute those wars.

The Defense Identity Crisis: It's a Hybrid World by Nathan Freier

The defense enterprise is abuzz with lively debates on "hybrid threats" and "hybrid war." Yet, newly emergent defense trends do not automatically merit exquisite definitions, new doctrine, or new operating concepts. As Frank Hoffman implies, such a caveat might be true of "hybrid warfare."

To Stay a Soldier by Chuck Callahan

A significant number of the medical hold soldiers were men and women caught in the mire of the Army's archaic physical disability evaluation system. This system's disability rating and arduous compensation processes were more than half a century out of date.

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