The Surge: the Untold Story is a 34 minute documentary produced by the Institute for the Study of War. This video documents the Iraq Surge as part of a population-centric counterinsurgency approach and features many of the top commanders and others responsible for its implementation - including GEN Jack Keane (Ret.), GEN David Petraeus, Amb. Ryan Crocker, GEN Raymond Odierno, GEN Nasier Abadi (Iraq), COL Peter Mansoor (Ret.), COL J.B. Burton, COL Ricky Gibbs, COL Bryan Roberts, COL Sean MacFarland, COL James Hickey, COL David Sutherland, COL Steven Townsend, LTC James Crider, and LT James Danly (Ret.).

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has been roundly criticized in the international community for presiding over a corrupt government. A new report reinforces the perception of widespread corruption in Afghanistan, naming it the second most corrupt country of all those surveyed. That worries American policy makers as they deliberate on the future US strategy in Afghanistan. In Transparency International's just-released 2009 survey of world corruption, Afghanistan was only one step above the bottom rung, ranking 179th out of 180 countries surveyed. According to the group's report, only another war-ravaged state, Somalia, is perceived as being more corrupt.

President Barack Obama is considering whether to send more troops to Afghanistan to battle the Taliban. Dispatching more troops would further commit the US to a strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The central premise of counterinsurgency is to win hearts and minds and weaken popular support for the insurgents. Georgetown University Security Studies Professor Christine Fair points out corruption concerns policy makers because it undercuts Afghans' support for their government and support among Western nations for the enterprise in Afghanistan...

More at Voice of America.

Afghan Minister Accused of Taking Bribe - Joshua Partlow, Washington Post.

The Afghan minister of mines accepted a roughly $30 million bribe to award the country's largest development project to a Chinese mining firm, according to a US official who is familiar with military intelligence reports. The allegation, if proved true, would mark one of the most brazen examples of corruption yet disclosed in a country where the problem has become so pervasive that it is now at the heart of Obama administration doubts over Afghan President Hamid Karzai's reliability as a partner. The question of whether Karzai can address his government's graft and cronyism looms large as he prepares for his inauguration Thursday for a new term, and as President Obama completes a months-long strategy review that will define the future of US involvement in Afghanistan after eight years of war.

Karzai is coming under intense international pressure to clear his cabinet of ministers who have reaped huge profits through bribery and kickback schemes. Although he announced a new anti-corruption unit this week, the president has been reluctant to fire scandal-tainted ministers in the past, and it is unclear whether he is ready to do so now. Meanwhile, Afghans' perceptions that they are ruled by a thieving class have weakened support for the government and bolstered sympathy for the Taliban insurgency...

More at The Washington Post.

Ridding Afghanistan of Corruption Will Be No Easy Task - Alexandra Zavis, Los Angeles Times.

Afghans have a name for the huge, gaudy mansions that have sprung up in Kabul's wealthy Sherpur neighborhood since 2001. They call them "poppy palaces." The cost of building one of these homes, which are adorned with sweeping terraces and ornate columns, can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Many are owned by government officials whose formal salaries are a few hundred dollars a month. To the capital's jaded residents, there are few more potent symbols of the corruption that permeates every level of Afghan society, from the traffic policemen who shake down motorists to top government officials and their relatives who are implicated in the opium trade.

Cronyism, graft and the flourishing drug trade have destroyed public confidence in the government of President Hamid Karzai and contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban by driving disaffected Afghans to side with insurgents and protecting an important source of their funding. With casualties mounting and a decision on military strategy looming, President Obama and other Western leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to justify sending troops to fight for a government rife with corruption...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

British forces should buy off potential Taleban recruits with "bags of gold", according to a new army field manual published yesterday. Army commanders should also talk to insurgent leaders with "blood on their hands" in order to hasten the end of the conflict in Afghanistan. The edicts, which are contained in rewritten counter-insurgency guidelines, will be taught to all new army officers.

They mark a strategic rethink after three years in which British and NATO forces have failed to defeat the Taleban. The manual is also a recognition that the Army's previous doctrine for success against insurgents, which was based on the experience in Northern Ireland, is now out of date. The new instructions came on the day that Gordon Brown went farther than before in setting out Britain's exit strategy from Afghanistan. The Prime Minister stated explicitly last night that he wanted troops to begin handing over districts to Afghan authorities during next year - a general election year in Britain...

More at The Times.

As President Obama wrestles with whether to send more troops to Afghanistan despite widespread corruption in the government of Hamid Karzai, little attention is being paid to a promising dimension of our efforts to foster reform - a much better approach to building the Afghan police force. This anticorruption agenda does not reduce the need to battle kleptocratic trends in Kabul, but it is a big reason for hopefulness. Although the Afghan police force has shown pockets of promise, and many officers risk their lives daily in defense of their nation, the force has long been a major disappointment. Corruption and drug abuse are rampant. Many citizens prefer to encounter roadblocks and checkpoints run by the Taliban rather than the police because of the latter's penchant for extortion. (On a recent visit to Kandahar and Helmand provinces, I heard about an informal survey of truck drivers in the south that suggested they must pay an average of five or six bribes to the police per journey. More encouragingly, the same poll reported few, if any, extortion demands at army-maintained checkpoints.) Training has been shoddy: In years past, only 20 to 25 percent of police officers received any training before starting the job. Those who join the force frequently quit, sometimes to join the resistance, which often pays better.

But much of this is changing. While there is still a long way to go, new efforts at police reform point to a more encouraging paradigm for improving the competence and integrity of key Afghan institutions. A bill before parliament is likely to soon increase police pay and benefits for the survivors of officers killed in the line of duty. This is expected to help reduce the tendency of police to demand bribes from fellow citizens...

More at The Washington Post.

The more President Obama examines our options in Afghanistan, the less he likes the choices he sees. But, as the old saying goes, to govern is to choose - and he has stretched the internal debate to the breaking point. It is evident from the length of this deliberative process and from the flood of leaks that have emerged from Kabul and Washington that the perfect course of action does not exist. Given that reality, the urgent necessity is to make a decision - whether or not it is right.

The cost of indecision is growing every day. Americans, our allies who have contributed their own troops to the struggle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the Afghans and their government are waiting impatiently, while the challenge is getting worse. When Obama became commander in chief, his course of action seemed clear. He was bent on early withdrawal from Iraq and an increase in resources and emphasis on winning in Afghanistan - the struggle he repeatedly called "a war of necessity." ...

More at The Washington Post.

... It was my third visit since April to rifle companies in northern and southern Afghanistan. In all, those visits included 40 to 50 shuras (meetings with village elders) and patrols. Some of those patrols stayed on the move for several days, and there were numerous small-arms engagements. In the field, I talked with about 500 American, British, and Afghan troops of all ranks.

Kightlinger's squad was typical. They were manning one of two dozen outposts nestled among 75,000 residents in a remote district called Nawa. In June, many observers had doubted the wisdom of inserting a Marine brigade into Helmand, which is the center of the world's heroin supply. All summer, the district market had stood empty; by October thousands of farmers were gathering to trade produce.

But five months has not erased years of distrust and turbulence. After the district governor met with the elders in a key village, the Taliban called their own meeting, which was attended by several of the same elders. The population, though thankful for the security, was hedging its bets. They know the Marines will not stay forever. Billions of dollars already have been spent in development projects to make Americans feel good about our generosity, but nation-building is an endless task. The tribes expect everything but give nothing in return.

It is not obvious that winning the hearts and minds of village elders, or linking villages to Kabul, wins the war. Our soldiers note that the Afghans are happy to accept what we give them but do not reciprocate by turning against the Taliban. The elders don't raise militias or secure recruits for the army, and they don't fight; there has been no replay of that scene from The Magnificent Seven in which the terrorized villagers finally rise up against their oppressors. Instead, fearful locals plead with migratory Taliban gangs to move on. A rural population, no matter how content with its government, cannot stand up to such a tough enemy...

Much more at Westwrite.

President Barack Obama has yet to decide where we're going and what we're doing in Afghanistan, but if the flood of leaks this week is any indicator, he at least has decided what he isn't going to do. He isn't going to be rushed into making such an important decision.

He seemingly is un—to buy a pig in a poke from any of the players - not from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top US military commander in Afghanistan, who wants another 40,000 to 80,000 American troops; not from his own national security wizards who've proffered four different pigs in four different pokes; not from Vice President Joe Biden, who wants to leave the fight to Special Forces and unmanned Predators. The word is that none of the options contains what the president wants to see - an estimate of how many more years beyond the eight already invested would be needed and an exit strategy...

More at McClatchy Newspapers.