The PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, transcript of the interview with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, 2 December 2009:
JIM LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, welcome.
SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: Thank you.
MR. LEHRER: How confident are you that the president's plan for Afghanistan is actually going to work?
SEC. GATES: I think that if the members of his team and he did not believe that it would work, that we would not have recommended it to him and he would not have made the decisions. Clearly, this is a very difficult, very complex challenge. But we believe this is the best way forward.
MR. LEHRER: There are many steps involved in this. One of them, of course, is to stop the momentum of the Taliban. You think that can be done with 30,000 troops and along the lines the president has outlined?
SEC. GATES: Yes, and in no small part because those 30,000 are joining another 68,000 American troops that are already there, another 40,000 non-U.S. troops, and we expect to get several thousand more. So this is a quite considerable force and Gen. McChrystal, I think, has a lot of confidence that we can reverse the momentum with this.
MR. LEHRER: And when will the total force be on the ground in Afghanistan? In other words, the NATO forces plus the American forces -- when will it all be together and working?
SEC. GATES: Well, I can only speak for the American forces at this point. The first U.S. units will probably begin to flow within a couple of weeks. I signed the deployment orders last night on Air Force One coming back from West Point. And the overwhelming majority of the U.S. forces will be in by the end of July; the full force probably the end of August, early September.
MR. LEHRER: And end of August, then, total troops on the ground -- NATO and U.S.?
SEC. GATES: Pretty close to 150,000. Well, excuse me, except that, again, I don't know exactly when the NATO forces or non-U.S. forces will be flowing. We do have some private commitments. I think there'll be some announcements over the next few days. There will be some additional announcements, I expect, of the consequence after the London conference in January on Afghanistan.
MR. LEHRER: Can you lay out some kind of division of labor for these troops? In other words, what percentage of these troops are going to be involved in training the Afghan military what percentage are going to be used in going after the Taliban -- in other words, in combat?
SEC. GATES: Well, in terms of the -- let me describe two divisions of labor. First of all, we are asking our allies with their added forces and the ones they already have in the country to essentially assume responsibility for the northern and western parts of Afghanistan so we can concentrate our forces in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. There will probably be a brigade or two that are involved in --
MR. LEHRER: How many troops to a brigade?
SEC. GATES: A normal brigade is about 3500 to 4,000 troops. But the real training that goes on with the Afghans is not the basic training where they teach them to march and so on. It is in partnering with us in combat and getting the combat experience and gaining confidence from that. That's what we saw, in Iraq, really made the difference was the actual partnering with us in combat operations.
MR. LEHRER: So there'll be American troops side-by-side with Afghan troops. There won't be an Afghan military unit and an American unit operating separately, is that right?
SEC. GATES: Our intent is that, at least for the next year or two, that most of the Afghan units will be partnered with international forces. As they gain confidence and can increasingly operate on their own, they will do that. And those are the circumstances under which we will then begin to transfer responsibility for security in specific districts or provinces -- as they gain confidence and capability.
MR. LEHRER: Now, the date the president gave for when to start withdrawing American troops when this process is more or less complete, or at least far along, is about 18 months from now -- July 2011. Why that date? Who selected that date and why?
SEC. GATES: It's 2 years from when the Marines arrived in Helmand in July of this year. So it wasn't just an arbitrary date; we picked a 2-year timeframe from when the Marines arrived. We're already starting to see results in Southern Helmand province as a result of the arrival of the Marines.
But I think it's important to make clear that what the president talked about in July of 2011 is not a deadline for the completion of something. It's the beginning of something. It is the beginning of a process of transition from international forces to Afghan security forces on a district-by-district, province-by-province basis -- essentially what we did in Iraq.
MR. LEHRER: Now, what is it that you know -- you know more, probably, than anybody about the state of affairs within the Afghan military as we sit here today; what has given you the confidence to think that they're going to be able to start taking over in 2011?
SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, it's going to depend on the conditions on the ground in the various provinces and districts. And the reality is, there are some considerable number of districts in Afghanistan that are not particularly contested by the Taliban. And so one ought to be able to turn over responsibility to them in July of 2011; potentially even earlier. The more heavily contested districts -- provinces like Helmand and Kandahar and so on -- will probably take longer.
So we'll have a situation similar to that in Iraq where you'll have some provinces that are under indigenous security control; at the same time, international forces will still be deeply engaged in combat in other provinces. This is a process that's going to be underway that we anticipate beginning in July of 2011.
MR. LEHRER: So, but that should not be seen as a firm date, is what you're saying, I mean, right? No matter what happens, the withdrawal is going to begin in 2011 -- you're not saying that?
SEC. GATES: What we're saying is that it is the president's decision that we should begin transferring responsibility for security district by district, province by province in Afghanistan as the conditions on the ground permit. We expect that transition to begin in July of 2011. It will take some period of time. It will be a gradual process, and the drawdown of our forces, as it has been in Iraq, will be a gradual one.
MR. LEHRER: As you know, Mr. Secretary, the president is getting a lot of heat today because of this date among members of Congress and others who say, hey, wait a minute, that's not the way you fight a war. You don't say hey, we're going to start the war, we're going to send 30,000 more troops, we're going to do all this and by the way, we're going to withdraw -- start withdrawing 18 months later. Are you comfortable with that?
SEC. GATES: I am. And the reason I'm comfortable is -- well, there's several reasons. First of all, you know, after it was clear that he surge had worked or was working in Iraq, the Iraqis were eager to get us out of the country as quickly as possible. Afghanistan is in a very tough neighborhood and it's not entirely clear to me that there aren't a lot of Afghans that would like the American Army and the Marine Corps to stick around and provide them with protection in their neighborhood for an indefinite period of time.
So what we've tried to balance here -- and a lot of this is a balance -- is to demonstrate resolve by saying we are going to send in 30,000 more troops to join the 68,000 we already have their; we are going to take the fight to the Taliban; we are going to reverse their momentum; we are going to deny them control of territory in Afghanistan.
But at the same time, we want to make clear a sense of urgency to the Afghans that they are going to need to step up to the plate and get busy in recruiting and training additional security forces, because they are going to be responsible, increasingly, for the security of their own country, partnering with us, working with us and our allies in the International Security Assistance Force and so on. So it's a matter of demonstrating resolve but at the same time, signaling to the Afghans that they need to build a fire and accelerate their efforts to begin to play a bigger role in this.
MR. LEHRER: What's to prevent the Taliban from just kind of laying low and say, okay, well the U.S. is going to start withdrawing in 18 months, the U.S. starts withdrawing and, wham, the Taliban comes back strong?
SEC. GATES: I'd love the Taliban to lay low for 18 months. That would give us open-field running, right? Are they going to lay low in Pakistan? So no attacks in Afghanistan; let us build the Afghan forces; let us develop economically. Are they going to lay low in Afghanistan and not kill people at night, not retaliate, not try and attack our coalition forces?
Or are they going to do what they're doing right now, which is being as aggressive as they possibly can be and we are sending in enough force to engage them, to put them down, degrade their capabilities so that a growing Afghan national security force can handle a degraded Taliban capability?
MR. LEHRER: Should the American public expect American casualties to grow as the U.S. and the allies take the battle to the Taliban?
SEC. GATES: We should have that expectation. It will vary. You know, every life is precious. We lost 44 heroes in October; we lost 15 in November. So as we go into the winter, there may be fewer casualties, but certainly, there will be more casualties. And as spring comes and we are more engaged around the country, the casualties are almost certain to rise again.
MR. LEHRER: Are you concerned about how this is going to impact American public opinion, which is already -- some support is already beginning to wane toward the Afghanistan project of the United States -- are you worried about that?
SEC. GATES: You know, contrary to the impression of a lot of people around the world, the American people have never been that enthusiastic about war, beginning with the Revolution. And I think it's a matter -- and I recall specifically before the first Gulf War 15 percent of the American people supported President H.W. Bush's decision to liberate Kuwait.
I think the president's firm decision, the clarity that he made a decision based on what he believed was important for the national security of the United States, rather than for any political or partisan purpose, the fact that they knew he was taking political risks by making this decision -- I think the American people appreciate and follow strong leadership.
MR. LEHRER: You mentioned the Bush administration. You've served at the highest levels in two administrations -- two Bush administrations. You've now watched President Obama -- been involved in President Obama's making this decision. What do you think about the way he went about it -- President Obama?
SEC. GATES: I think that the process that we went through was really an important one. A lot of questions were asked and a lot of people were asking questions. It wasn't just the president asking questions. I think we all learned something in the process. I think the generals learned something.
And I think we came up with a set of recommendations to the president and decisions on his part that have, really, unanimous support on both the civilian and military side. And I think we wouldn't have had that, had we tried to rush this process and had we not had the intense dialogue that we have.
MR. LEHRER: How would you describe your involvement in the decision-making process?
SEC. GATES: Well, I was involved.
MR. LEHRER: Is there -- did you get what you wanted?
SEC. GATES: I'm very satisfied with the outcome. I think that this is -- you know, there are no great choices in this situation. There rarely are, when you're in war. But I think, of the alternatives available to us, the options available to us, I think this is the best way forward and the way forward that offers the greatest possibility of success.
MR. LEHRER: Did you get the impression that President Obama was listening to every one of these voices, including your own, and taking it all in?
SEC. GATES: Absolutely.
MR. LEHRER: And this plan that he announced last night -- is it correct to say that it could be considered a Gates plan -- in other words, this is a consensus plan -- not just one or two people made the decision?
SEC. GATES: I would say this is the president's plan. He heard a lot of voices and there are elements of a lot of different people's views in the package of decisions that he made.
MR. LEHRER: So after this comes out, there won't be any leaks about the fights over this and that or whatever; everybody came together and made this decision?
SEC. GATES: Well, as one of the things, unfortunately, we've seen in this process, is that everything leaks in Washington. And there was a lot of debate. There were a lot of different points of view. What's important is that everybody came together at the end in agreeing that this was the right way to go forward.
MR. LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.
SEC. GATES: My pleasure.
Over the past three months President Obama and his team have analyzed the Afghanistan problem from first principles. Yet in spite of this effort, their solution is not likely to make the problem go away. Regrettably, the next few years are likely to reveal that America still lacks a winning strategy for modern irregular conflict.
The two speeches
President Obama wishes he could have given two speeches on Afghanistan.
The first would have been heard only by the Taliban, Pakistan's governing elite, and by Afghanistan's population wondering which side of the fence to jump to. Obama's message to this group would have been, "I am escalating this war in order to suppress the Taliban, wipe out al Qaeda, and create space for Afghanistan to take over the war."
The second speech would have been heard only by the American electorate, and especially those who most passionately supported his campaign in 2008. His message to this group would have been, "I will get America out of the Afghan war, starting in July 2011."
Alas, Obama could give only one speech to be heard by all. Tonight's speech attempted to transmit the two messages. Unfortunately, it is very likely that Obama's signals got crossed - the Taliban, Pakistan's governing elite, and Afghanistan's population heard the second message, that America is getting out, while the President's supporters angrily heard the first. The result is a muddled strategy that will reinforce bad behavior in the region, will be unconvincing at home, and will not help the morale of soldiers in the field.
Bad behavior rewarded
In order to succeed in Afghanistan, the United States needs actors in the region to change their behavior. Under Obama's plan they have no reason to do so. Now that they know the start date of America's withdrawal, the Taliban can continue to ambush U.S. soldiers and Marines, avoid major contact, and conserve their forces for a post-NATO Afghanistan. The U.S. needs Afghanistan's elites to be a real government and not feudal lords preparing their own fiefdoms. Instead, President Hamid Karzai and his allies will divert what assets they can and look for a new major-power patron. Fearing that India might be that patron, Pakistan's intelligence service will continue to support the Afghan Taliban as its proxy army. Obama's attempt to send two messages ensures that Afghanistan will get messier in the years ahead.
Meanwhile, Democrats old enough to remember the 1960s will remember that the rebellion against the Vietnam War began as a civil war within the Democratic Party. That episode seems likely to repeat.
The roots of Lyndon Johnson's failure in Vietnam extended back to mistakes made in the Eisenhower administration. Similarly, Obama's escalation in Afghanistan ratifies a murky decision made sometime in the middle of the Bush administration to construct a strong and competent central government for Afghanistan, something alien to its culture and history. The nation-state model is the reflexive Western response to modern conflict. When applied to Afghanistan, the nation-state model supplied the West with a weak partner, and the Taliban with a powerful recruiting tool and a security guarantee for its sanctuaries in Pakistan.
America's war in Afghanistan
Regrettably, this is not likely to be Obama's last speech or even his last policy for Afghanistan. Obama is hoping to leave the Afghanistan problem behind him as he prepares for a second term. But the problem will still be there, perhaps worse than ever. And the American electorate will be left wondering what the purpose was for escalating the war in 2010.
Afghanistan is not "Obama's War," it is America's war, and always has been. What America still needs is a winning strategy for this war and for future irregular conflicts. We all have a responsibility for solving that problem.
Hearts and minds? Overrated. If you want to run a successful counterinsurgency, it all starts with the person at the top.
On Thursday, December 3rd, Mark Moyar will appear at the Pritzker Military Library to discuss his new book, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. This event is free and open to the public. The presentation will begin at 6 p.m., preceded by a reception for Library members at 5 p.m. It will be webcast live on pritzkermilitarylibrary.org and recorded for later broadcast on WYCC-TV/Channel 20.
Moyar takes issue with much of the current U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which guided the "surge" in Iraq. Though its creation was overseen by Gen. David Petraeus, whose leadership he considers a near-perfect model for counterinsurgency, Moyar finds the general's most important qualities de-valued in the manual, which suffers from what he calls a "population-centric" emphasis toward defeating an insurgency by depriving it of public support. Using case studies from the Philippines, Vietnam, and other conflicts over the last 150 years, Moyar argues instead that counterinsurgencies succeed or fail based on the leaders involved: their ability to inspire subordinates, adapt to complex situations, unify civilian and military efforts, and identify capable sub-commanders, both from their own ranks and the target population.
Though A Question of Command describes historical insurgencies around the world, Moyar posits that the American South, after the Civil War, may have been the best model for the situation in Iraq. Whereas Grant and Sherman had led major victories on the battlefield, it was lesser-known leaders like Brig. Gen. Robert F. Catterson and Maj. Lewis Merrill who had the most success against insurgent forces such as the Ku Klux Klan. A Question of Command attempts to capture the qualities and decisions that set those leaders apart, making their successors easier to find.
Mark Moyar is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Marine Corps University. He is also the author of Triumph Forsaken: the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 and Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam. Moyar's writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and other publications. He received a B.A. summa cum laude from Harvard and a Ph.D. from Cambridge.
Seating for this event is limited, so reservations are recommended. Call 312.587.0234 or email events@pritzkermilitarylibrary.net.
Education professionals in Illinois may earn 1.5 Continuing Professional Development Units (CPDUs) for attending this event.
About the Pritzker Military Library
The Pritzker Military Library is a non-partisan, non-profit research institution located at 610 North Fairbanks Court in the Streeterville neighborhood of Chicago, near the Magnificent Mile. Admission is free and open to the public, Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and also for scheduled evening events.
Since opening in October 2003, the Pritzker Military Library has produced over 250 programs including events with award-winning authors, interviews with Medal of Honor recipients, and Emmy-nominated panel discussions on military issues. All programs are presented free of charge in front of a live audience, webcast live on the Internet, and recorded for later broadcast on WYCC-TV/Channel 20, a PBS affiliate. Programs are also available for download as audio podcasts.
The mission of the Pritzker Military Library is to acquire and maintain an accessible collection of materials and develop appropriate programs focusing on the Citizen Soldier in the preservation of democracy. The 5,000 sq. ft. facility features a collection of books and films on subjects covering the full spectrum of American military history, along with vintage posters, photographs, medals, uniforms, and other artifacts from private donors and the collection of the Library's founder, COL (IL) James N. Pritzker, ARNG (Ret.).
To learn more, visit pritzkermilitarylibrary.org.
Phil's comments:
The attachment is four pages that I scanned in from the OSD report "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967" pulled from the stacks at the Gray Research Center back in 2002.
I find it a fascinating read because it represents a DoD critique of the Marine III MAF Pacification approach in the I Corps zone, conducted with the knowledge available at the time. While I'm not in total agreement with what it states, I think it raises the argument above the usual uncritical "Marines had it right" and "CAP was great" conversations that occur within the Corps.
Key points highlighted:
- The Marines took to pacification, a very different strategy, with different strategic resource and time implications, through a chain of command that completely avoided the joint force commander responsible for the campaign (MACV).
- The Marines identified the need to have operational control of South Vietnamese forces in order to conduct this strategy--something the GVN did not want.
- The Marines were drawn into local politics to a larger degree than they expected due to the lack of RVN capability (which really begs the question of success of the whole US venture).
- The Marines failed to get GVN political support because the GVN political apparatus was not consulted in the planning.
Once again, all of these are assertions, but they point to questions on the USMC approach in Vietnam, and COIN campaign design in general.
Although the White House thoroughly examined the Afghan government before choosing the strategy that it will unveil tonight, the composition of that government - and hence its character - remains highly uncertain. We know the reelection of Hamid Karzai has left Afghanistan with five more years of a president who lacks leadership attributes essential for the job. Inclined toward conciliation and leniency, Karzai would make a fine president of a Kiwanis Club, but he presides over a country replete with recalcitrant tribal elders and crooked warlords that demands a leader with the toughness to strong-arm troublemakers and keep subordinates under control.
But Washington can compensate for Karzai's failings by persuading him to make personnel changes and delegate greater authority to subordinates, especially Cabinet ministers. During the run-up to this year's election, Karzai bought the support of a host of warlords and other power players by promising them Cabinet positions. How he distributes those posts could be more important than the election itself...
More at The Los Angeles Times.
President Obama will outline Tuesday his intention to send an additional 34,000 US troops to Afghanistan, according to US officials and diplomatic sources briefed Monday as Obama began informing allies of his plan. The new deployments, along with 22,000 troops he authorized early this year, would bring the total US force in Afghanistan to more than 100,000, more than half of which will have been sent to the war zone by Obama. The president also plans to ask NATO and other partners in an international coalition to contribute 5,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, officials said.
The combined US and NATO deployments would nearly reach the 40,000 requested last summer by US Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the coalition commander in Afghanistan, as part of an intensified counterinsurgency strategy. The new troops are to be sent in stages beginning in January, with options to delay or cancel deployments, depending on the performance of the Afghan government and other factors. Defense officials said that, beyond Marine units deploying next month, no final decisions have been made about specific units or the order in which they would be sent...
More at The Washington Post.
US Opts for Limited Surge - Jonathan Weisman and Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal.
President Barack Obama has ordered a revamped war plan for Afghanistan that appears to endorse the military strategy of his top generals but will set limits on US involvement in terms of duration, manpower and money, White House officials said Monday. After a three-month review, the president delivers a televised prime-time address at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY, Tuesday to publicly define his plan for the war. He is widely expected to announce he's committing around 30,000 new troops to fighting the Taliban. Eight US allies also have committed to sending additional troops, which could total some 5,000, according to European and US officials.
That level of additional manpower comes close to the preferred option of top US commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, which called for an additional 40,000 troops. Aides familiar with the new policy insist that Mr. Obama hasn't ended up where he started his review, planning for an an open-ended escalation. He will lay out benchmarks for the US and Afghan governments to meet on the recruitment and training of Afghan security forces, as well as on rooting out corruption that has bedeviled the country...
More at The Wall Street Journal.
... The administration seems to have spent the past few months trying to pare back the COIN strategy and adjust it to real world constraints. As it has done so, there has been less talk in the informed policy community about paving the way for a new, transformed Afghanistan. There has been more talk of finding cheap ways to arrange the current pieces of Afghanistan into a contraption that will stay together and allow us to go home. What's emerging appears to be something less than a comprehensive COIN strategy but more than a mere counter-terrorism strategy - shooting at terrorists with drones. It is a hybrid approach, and as we watch the president's speech Tuesday night, we'll all get to judge whether he has cut and pasted the different options into a coherent whole. It's not the troop levels that matter. What matters is how this war will be fought.
Some very smart people say that the administration's direction is already fatally flawed. There is no such thing as effective COIN-lite, they argue. All the pieces of a comprehensive strategy have to be done patiently and together because success depends on the way they magnify one another. These experts may be right. But none of us get to have our first choice on this matter. President Obama faces such a devilishly complex set of constraints that the policy he announces will be partially unsatisfying to every American and to every member of his administration. The fights inside have been so brutal that there have been accusations that the Defense and State Departments have withheld documents from the president to bias his thinking...
More at The New York Times.
