Marines Lead Offensive to Secure Southern Afghan Town - Richard A. Oppel Jr., New York Times. In the first major military operation since President Obama's call this week for a troop escalation, about 1,000 United States Marines and Afghan and British forces swept into a rugged valley in southern Afghanistan in an effort to finally secure what was once a bustling village but what years of fighting have turned into a ghost town. Yet the offensive in the village of Now Zad in Helmand Province could prove a harbinger of a wider and more significant effort in Helmand, a Taliban stronghold whose huge opium crop provides a large portion of the insurgency's financing. After a 10,000-strong Marine brigade began operations throughout Helmand this summer, commanders found that they had enough American and Afghan troops to take control of only limited areas. In many places Taliban fighters simply pulled back to safe havens, undermining the largest Marine operation since the 2004 invasion of Falluja, Iraq. Now, commanders are preparing to assault Taliban sanctuaries in Helmand, relying on an American force in the province that is expected to nearly double next year as part of Mr. Obama's decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.

Marines Launch Offensive in Taliban Stronghold - Alfred de Montesquiou, Associated Press. US Marines swooped down behind Taliban lines in helicopters and Osprey aircraft Friday in the first offensive since President Obama announced an American troop surge. About 1,000 Marines and 150 Afghan troops were taking part in "Operation Cobra's Anger" in a bid to disrupt Taliban supply and communications lines in the Now Zad Valley of Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, the scene of heavy fighting last summer, according to Marine spokesman Maj. William Pelletier. Hundreds of troops from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines and the Marine reconnaissance unit Task Force Raider dropped by helicopters and MV-22 Osprey aircraft in the northern end of the valley while a second, larger Marine force pushed northward from the main Marine base in the town of Now Zad, Maj. Pelletier said. A US military official in Washington said it was the first use of Ospreys, aircraft that combine features of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, in an offensive involving units larger than platoons. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to detail the operation, said that Ospreys have previously been used for intelligence and patrol operations.

Marines, Afghan Soldiers Attack Taliban Stronghold - Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times. Hundreds of US Marines and Afghan soldiers descended on a nearly empty city in southern Afghanistan on Friday to cut off supply routes for Taliban fighters who have taken refuge in the area. The troops want to starve out the insurgents holed up around Now Zad, which was once a vibrant city of 30,000 but now is a virtual ghost town because years of fighting. The assault in Helmand province, named Cobra's Anger, may prove to be a warmup for a larger, more complex and more dangerous assault on Marja, a town to which many Taliban fighters and narcotics middlemen fled after Marines descended on nearby villages this summer. In Now Zad, Marines had to contend with roadside bombs that Taliban militants buried in anticipation of the Americans' arrival. Even more such bombs are expected to await troops in Marja. "Marja is that last major sanctuary in Helmand province, the last place where the enemy has freedom of movement," said Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. "We're going to take that away from him." Nicholson compared the prospective battle in Marja to the fight in late 2004 to clear barricaded insurgents from the Iraqi city of Fallouja.

NATO, Afghan Troops Launch Major Offensive - Voice of America. The US military says more than 1,000 NATO troops, mostly from the United States, have launched a new offensive against a key Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan. Military officials say Afghan forces also are participating in the operation (known as "Cobra's Anger") in the Now Zad valley of Helmand province, which is aimed at clearing insurgents, and locating roadside bombs and other explosives. The provincial governor's spokesman (Daud Ahmadi) told reporters four Taliban militants were killed in fighting, and hundreds of landmines and explosives were seized Friday. Now Zad was once the second biggest town in Helmand, but is now nearly empty, after residents fled ongoing violence. Taliban forces now use the area to transport drugs, weapons and fighters. In an interview with the Associated Press, US Central Command Chief General David Petraeus said Friday the offensive lays the groundwork for the arrival of some 30,000 additional US troops, many of whom will be deployed in the south. General Petraeus says the military has been working for months to extend security around key towns in southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban influence is strong.

US Marines Advance in Southern Afghanistan - Golnar Motevalli, Reuters. US Marines pressed into a remote Taliban stronghold on Saturday with their first major assault in Afghanistan since President Barack Obama earmarked 30,000 more troops to try to turn the tide on the Taliban insurgency. Operation "Cobra's Anger," which involves 900 US Marines and sailors, British troops and 150 Afghan soldiers and police, pushed into the Now Zad district of southern Helmand province, an insurgent stronghold depopulated after years of heavy fighting. The advancing Marines killed several militants and seized bombs and weapons in the first day of the operation, which begin with an airborne assault on Friday, said Major Bill Pelletier, spokesman for the Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand. "Among other things found yesterday evening ... two or three weapons caches and IED-making materials, mortars, small arms machine guns and light weapons were seized," he said. "The operation is continuing today in an area that had an enemy presence. We are going to disrupt that presence."

Marines Fire Opening Salvo to Retake Helmand - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal. US Marines backed by Afghan forces have launched the opening salvo in an operation designed to dislodge the Taliban from central and northern Helmand province. More than 900 US Marines, sailors and British troops, backed by 150 Afghan soldiers and police, have launched operation Cobra's Anger in the northern district of Now Zad, according to the US military. Tribal militias are also playing a role, a US military intelligence official told The Long War Journal. US Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 7, and the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion air assaulted behind Taliban lines into the northern Now Zad Valley. Another force pushed northward from the city of Now Zad. The district of Now Zad is considered to be under the control of the Taliban. The city of Now Zad is largely deserted and has a company of Marines and Afghan forces facing off against a dug in Taliban force. Four Taliban fighters have been killed in Cobra's Anger, while US and Afghan troops have discovered more than 300 roadside bombs, The Associated Press reported. Marines put off the operation until they could confirm additional forces would be deployed to the province to capitalize on any potential gains. President Barack Obama settled on a surge of more than 30,000 US forces, of which 9,000 Marines are heading to Helmand. NATO is expected to send more than 7,000 additional troops.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Obama hasn't told us how this ends

2) Will the QDR be DOA?

Obama hasn't told us how this ends

During his Dec. 1 speech on Afghanistan, President Barack Obama promised to begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces from the country in July 2011. What condition does he expect Afghanistan to be in at that time? Or in 2012 when he will presumably be campaigning for a second term? U.S. officials seem to anticipate a chaotic backdrop to the pullout of U.S. forces. Indeed, parts of Obama's plan promote improvised -- and likely messy -- governance solutions in Afghanistan. In 2012, Obama may find it difficult to explain why Afghan chaos should be considered a policy success.

Obama's speech, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's testimony the next day to the Senate Armed Services Committee, offered only a vague description of the future they expect. Obama discussed "handing over responsibility to Afghan forces" and providing support for "Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people." Gates made clear that, "This approach is not open-ended 'nation building.' It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state -- the likes of which has never been seen in that country." Gates also recommended "achieving a better balance between national and local forces" and "engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory."

Based on Obama's and Gates's remarks it appears that the U.S. government is giving up on the goal of building a strong central government in Kabul. Obama seems to be encouraging U.S. officials to bypass President Hamid Karzai and his circle, along with those ministries in Kabul that U.S. officials deem to be corrupt or ineffective, when they find other leaders in Afghanistan who can do a better job delivering for the Afghan people and for U.S. interests. Under this vision, U.S. officials will empower an opportunistic mix of tribal, local, provincial, and some central government actors to provide for Afghan governance and security.

It is not hard to see why the United States wants to shift to this approach. U.S. officials are barely on speaking terms with Karzai and much of his government. Top Afghan officials have used their positions to divert international assistance to their bank accounts and to their friends. Worst of all for U.S. troops in the field, Afghan government officials, senior military leaders, and local officials appointed by the Karzai government have in many cases achieved their positions due to their connections and not based on merit, competence, or integrity. In many cases this has left U.S. soldiers with poor partners to work with.

The resulting political mosaic however will be messy and contentious. Karzai, ostensibly Afghanistan's head of government, will not take kindly to the Americans bypassing and undermining his authority. He will respond by being even more assertive in protecting his interests and diverging even farther from U.S. objectives. In addition, U.S. officials should expect the local leaders they support to squabble with each other and with Kabul.

The result by 2012 will be an even messier portrait of Afghanistan's development and governance. Against this backdrop, Obama will have to explain why his policy, with its dramatic up-and-down shifts in U.S. troop levels, is helping the situation in the region. Obama will not be able to cancel the troop withdrawals scheduled for July 2011; that date is still early enough in the U.S. campaign calendar for an anti-war candidate to enter the race if he were to renege. Much of the U.S. electorate will feel some relief that the U.S. is getting out of still-chaotic Afghanistan. But for many that relief will be offset by fear of what is to come and by questions about Obama's national-security judgment.

Come 2012, does he foresee any problems reassuring the American electorate that all is going well in Afghanistan? With his new policy, Obama is attempting mighty political feats both in Afghanistan and at home.

Will the QDR be DOA?

In his speech this week, Obama made it clear that the U.S. would complete its long-planned pull-out from Iraq. And as discussed above, Obama laid out a plan for withdrawing from Afghanistan. Obama, and many Americans for that matter, seem eager to put these wars behind them.

Not so fast, says Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Iraq and Afghanistan will be "front and center" in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon's periodic appraisal of its long-term strategy. In a Dec. 2 speech, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn described the marching orders he received from Gates:

Unlike previous QDRs, the current review puts the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq front and center, Lynn said.

"Secretary Gates has made clear that the conflicts we're in should be at the very forefront of our agenda," and set the priorities, Lynn told the executives. "He wants to make sure we're not giving up capabilities needed now for those needed for some unknown future conflict. He wants to make sure the Pentagon is truly on war footing."

Will U.S. defense planners be guilty of "preparing for the last war"? With Obama intending America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to end during the period of the upcoming QDR, and with no visible appetite for another such campaign, should the U.S. military's experience with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan still be "front and center" in the Pentagon's long-range strategy document?

We will have to await the arrival of the QDR before passing judgment. According to the press report cited above, Lynn discussed how issues such as cyber threats, anti-satellite technologies, and high-end hybrid threats will also be a focus of the study. In addition, Lynn described how the Defense Department plans to integrate its efforts with civilian aspects of national power found in the State Department and elsewhere.

What role should the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan play in future defense planning? With over a 100,000 U.S. soldiers still in Iraq and a 100,000 slated for Afghanistan, these campaigns and their lessons should not be ignored. Yet there is also a long list of security challenges that are unrelated to al Qaeda's terrorism or modern insurgencies. Better to put a focus on these before they become big problems later.

A Plan in Need of Clarity - Jim Webb, Washington Post opinion.

I have great regard for the careful process the Obama administration employed in its efforts to define a new approach for the long-standing military commitment in Afghanistan and to put an operational framework in place for our responsible withdrawal. I intend, nevertheless, to continue to call on the administration to clarify to the American public and Congress how it defines success and how we reach an end point. Since early 2009, I have said repeatedly that the US strategy for Afghanistan must proceed based on four considerations: (1) the fragility of the Afghan government; (2) whether building a national army of considerable scale is achievable; (3) whether an increased US military presence will ultimately have a positive effect in the country, or whether we will be seen as an occupying force; and (4) the linkage of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the coming weeks I intend to examine the administration's plan to see how it addresses these criteria and how it will affect our troops.

Since the president's address Tuesday, there has been much discussion of the date that the United States will begin to draw down military forces and transfer security responsibility. Just as important is a focus on creating the conditions to enable this transfer of responsibility. The administration has not defined them with sufficient clarity. Our strategy is sound only if framed with clearly defined and attainable goals, an understandable end point and a regional perspective. We must also avoid the inherent risks of allowing our success in Afghanistan to be defined by events that are largely beyond our control...

More at The Washington Post.

Senator Jim Webb, a Democrat from Virginia, was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration. He serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he is chairman of the subcommittee on personnel. He served in Vietnam as a Marine infantry officer.

Our Low-risk, Low-return Afghan Surge - Rodger Shanahan, The Interpreter.

... Advisors who never get to interact with the locals outside the security of coalition bases are severely restricted in both the situational awareness that will inform good decision-making, and in their ability to manage projects. If advisors are not out among the population, it is fair to question the quality of advice they can provide to locals and to their superiors back home. The Government's announcement that our contribution to the US-led 'surge' would be additional police trainers is likely to replicate this risk-averse approach. So I don't share Mark O'Neill's view that the announcement was 'sound policy'.

Sound politics, for sure, but sound policy? Just as advisers who cannot go outside the wire are constrained in the quality of the advice they give and receive, police officers who train but cannot mentor will produce sub-optimal results. This is not to criticise the efforts that the police trainers will put in. Rather, the issue is that training without mentoring produces good objective data (numbers of police trained) but no subjective data (how do they perform once they leave the base?). There is little point in training police inside a base and then releasing them into their own cultural environment with the attendant familial, ethnic, financial and cultural pressures and expect them to become bastions of probity and respected members of the community. When the security environment is deemed too risky for the trainers to accompany the Afghan police officers on their task, it doesn't send a great message to the trainees...

More at The Interpreter.

Dr. Rodger Shanahan was the Chief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and is now a non-resident Fellow at the Institute. The Interpreter is the blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, an independent international policy think tank.

How Obama's Surge Is Like Bush's - Steven Metz, The New Republic.

President Obama's revised strategy for Afghanistan has already been pinned with the "surge" moniker, inevitably leading to comparisons with the 2007 "surge" in Iraq. Certainly there are similarities. Both were part of America's global conflict with al Qaeda. Both revisions were compelled by a deteriorating security situation. In neither case was there a reason to believe that if the United States continued on its chosen track, the insurgents linked to al Qaeda would break ranks to join the masses of peace-seeking individuals. And both strategic revisions had dual purposes.

One purpose was to revive flagging domestic support for involvement in the conflicts. America was and is tired of its costly, frustrating wars. To re-inspire the nation, both President Bush and President Obama painted a picture of a direct threat. Bush asserted that if the radicals took over Iraq, then they would attack us "here." Obama asserted that without an increased American effort, the Taliban will regain control of Afghanistan and again give al Qaeda sanctuary to plot attacks on the United States. From that common point, though, the two presidents diverged. President Bush propped up domestic support by trumpeting "victory," playing on the deep American love for winning. President Obama, by contrast, tried to mollify the public's concerns by identifying a clear point at which he intends to begin scaling down US involvement in Afghanistan - the summer of 2011. Pain is always more tolerable when there is an end in sight...

More at The New Republic.

Dr. Steven Metz is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.

Our New Afghanistan Deployment - Mark O'Neill, The Interpreter.

... An effective police force is an essential pre-requisite for stabilising a society affected by insurgency. The proper use of police by counterinsurgents offers security to the population, develops intelligence, and reinforces the appearance of normalcy that is crucial to emphasising the rule of law. Such an effect will be highly complementary to the Australian military effort in Oruzgan Province.

While working for the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence in Iraq during 2007-2008, members of my team in Ramadi saw the impact a viable police force can have in counterinsurgency. The US Army and Marines stabilised what had previously been an insurgent stronghold. The work of the Marines was noteworthy in mentoring and developing the Iraqi Police into an effective force - a significant factor in the success of their efforts was the embedding of troops throughout the city's police stations and the delivery of training at those sites.

Unlike our American allies, Australia need not rely on its military to train indigenous police forces. The investment made in the development of the Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group (IDG) over the last half decade has given Australia a unique capability among its principal allies with respect to deployable police...

More at The Interpreter.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill was the Lowy Institute's inaugural Chief of Army Fellow. Mark is the author of 'Confronting the Hydra: Big problems with small wars', a Lowy Institute paper on counterinsurgency strategy. The Interpreter is the blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, an independent international policy think tank.

Despite Some Questions, Obama's Afghan Policy is Sound - Max Boot, Los Angeles Times opinion.

... The questions that remain unanswered after the president's West Point address: Will the troops have the time and resources needed to win? "Win" is a word that Obama avoided. He cited his long-standing goal of "disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies," but he spoke merely of his desire to "break the Taliban's momentum" rather than defeat it altogether. He spoke of wanting to "end this war successfully" but said nothing of winning the war. Nor did he endorse nation-building, even though the only way that Afghanistan will ever be secure is if we build a state capable of policing its own territory. He did say we "must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government," which sounds a bit like nation-building, but then he also promised that he would not make an open-ended troop commitment, "because the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own."

The most problematic part of Obama's policy is his pledge to begin a withdrawal in July 2011. Getting 30,000 troops into Afghanistan is a difficult logistical challenge. It will be a major achievement if all of them are in place by July 2010. That will give them only one year to reverse many years of Taliban gains before their own numbers start to dwindle. That may or may not be sufficient. The "surge" in Iraq had a big impact within a year, but the US had made a much bigger commitment to Iraq pre-surge than it has in Afghanistan. The good part of the deadline is that it presumably means we will be spared another agonizing White House review for at least another year. That's no small thing, given that Obama first unveiled an Afghan strategy on March 27, and less than six months later launched another drawn-out and very public reappraisal...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Obama's Folly - Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times opinion.

Which is the greater folly: To fancy that war offers an easy solution to vexing problems, or, knowing otherwise, to opt for war anyway? In the wake of 9/11, American statecraft emphasized the first approach: President George W. Bush embarked on a "global war" to eliminate violent jihadism. President Obama now seems intent on pursuing the second approach: Through military escalation in Afghanistan, he seeks to "finish the job" that Bush began there, then all but abandoned.

Through war, Bush set out to transform the greater Middle East. Despite immense expenditures of blood and treasure, that effort failed. In choosing Obama rather than John McCain to succeed Bush, the American people acknowledged that failure as definitive. Obama's election was to mark a new beginning, an opportunity to "reset" America's approach to the world. The president's chosen course of action for Afghanistan suggests he may well squander that opportunity. Rather than renouncing Bush's legacy, Obama apparently aims to salvage something of value. In Afghanistan, he will expend yet more blood and more treasure hoping to attenuate or at least paper over the wreckage left over from the Bush era...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

A Wartime President - Eliot A. Cohen, Wall Street Journal opinion.

When it comes to President Barack Obama's long-awaited decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, there are three main points to consider: the decision itself, the manner in which he made it, and the way in which he sold it. He could not, in the end, have decided on a very different course of action. Having replaced the previous commander in Afghanistan with one of the outstanding soldiers of this generation, how could he deny Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request for some 40,000 troops? To do so would tell the world that Mr. Obama had no confidence in his new commander, a tried veteran of our post 9/11 wars.

However, the White House's decision to send only 30,000 troops, while calling upon our allies for thousands more - perhaps as many as 10,000 - makes little sense. The Europeans have repeatedly revealed their aversion to combat. Only accounting tricks will let the administration claim that they have met these targets, and then only by bringing in inferior forces mostly constrained from real fighting by anxious governments. Should the scheme fail altogether, add one more to a list of occasions upon which America's allies have stiffed this president with impunity. Moreover, the president's protracted deliberations about the war undermined his chosen course of action. On March 27, he proclaimed "a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan." But when Gen. McChrystal presented the manpower bill for the strategy, it seemed to all the world that the president and his advisers got a bad case of nerves...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

This Will Not End Well - George F. Will, Washington Post opinion.

A traveler asks a farmer how to get to a particular village. The farmer replies, "If I were you, I wouldn't start from here." Barack Obama, who asked to be president, nevertheless deserves sympathy for having to start where America is in Afghanistan. But after 11 months of graceless disparagements of the 43rd president, the 44th acts as though he is the first president whose predecessor bequeathed a problematic world. And Obama's second new Afghanistan policy in less than nine months strikingly resembles his predecessor's plan for Iraq, which was: As Iraq's security forces stand up, US forces will stand down.

Having vowed to "finish the job," Obama revealed Tuesday that he thinks the job in Afghanistan is to get out of Afghanistan. This is an unserious policy. Obama's surge will bring to 51,000 his Afghanistan escalation since March. Supposedly this will buy time for Afghan forces to become adequate. But it is not intended to buy much time: Although the war is in its 98th month, Obama's "Mission Accomplished" banner will be unfurled 19 months from now - when Afghanistan's security forces supposedly will be self-sufficient. He must know this will not happen...

More at The Washington Post.