Every PAO should have this in talking points -- if queried, repeat the SECDDEF's words.

Q: WikiLeaks. Post-WikiLeaks reaction. What's your sense on whether the information-sharing climate and environment created after 9/11 to encourage greater cooperation and transparency among the intelligence communities and the military led to these three massive data dumps? And how concerned are you now there may be an overreaction to clamp down on information dispersal because of the disclosures?

SEC. GATES: One of the common themes that I heard from the time I was a senior agency official in the early 1980s in every military engagement we were in was the complaint of the lack of adequate intelligence support. That began to change with the Gulf War in 1991, but it really has changed dramatically after 9/11.

And clearly the finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote, unquote, "connecting the dots" led to much wider sharing of information, and I would say especially wider sharing of information at the front, so that no one at the front was denied -- in one of the theaters, Afghanistan or Iraq -- was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them.

Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide. There's no reason for a young officer at a forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the START negotiations. And so we've taken a number of mitigating steps in the department. I directed a number of these things to be undertaken in August.

First, the -- an automated capability to monitor workstations for security purposes. We've got about 60 percent of this done, mostly in -- mostly stateside. And I've directed that we accelerate the completion of it.

Second, as I think you know, we've taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to direct that all CD and DVD write capability off the network be disabled. We have -- we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies -- wherever you can move information from a classified system to an unclassified system, to have a two-person policy there.

And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can -- and, first of all, in which we can identify anomalies, sort of like credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally, efforts to actually tailor access depending on roles. But let me say -- let me address the latter part of your question. This is obviously a massive dump of information.

First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it's Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.

But let me -- let me just offer some perspective as somebody who's been at this a long time. Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote from John Adams: "How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel."

When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-'70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress. Those fears all proved unfounded.

Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think -- I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.

Many governments -- some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.

The fact that there have been so few surprises in the latest Wikileaks data dump is the best evidence that State Department cable-drafters, consciously or not, knew that these cables would have a very large audience. And the wider the audience becomes, the greater the incentive to be careful with secrets in the drafting. With so few differences between the content of these cables (admittedly classified no higher than Secret) and the content in the news media, we should conclude that U.S. diplomacy is already remarkably open and transparent.

The Wikileaks scandal reinforces what should be an instinct to be circumspect with anything transmitted in digital form. No doubt a battalion or more of counterintelligence specialists warned Defense Department network administrators about the security risks presented by the post 9/11 data-sharing arrangements. To apparently no avail -- it seemed ridiculously simple for PFC Manning to extract (allegedly) hundreds of thousands of classified files. With the horse out of the barn and galloping into the next county, the Pentagon is only now tightening its computer security procedures. But there are still those million who have Secret access; the new security procedures are not likely to ward off a few trained and determined infiltrators.

The problems with the digital "cloud" do not stop there. In its recently released annual report, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission described a Chinese "hijacking" of global internet traffic. The report explains what happened better than I could:

For about 18 minutes on April 8, 2010, China Telecom advertised erroneous network traffic routes that instructed U.S. and other foreign Internet traffic to travel through Chinese servers. Other servers around the world quickly adopted these paths, routing all traffic to about 15 percent of the Internet's destinations through servers located in China. This incident affected traffic to and from U.S. government (''.gov'') and military (''.mil'') sites, including those for the Senate, the army, the navy, the marine corps, the air force, the office of secretary of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and many others. Certain commercial websites were also affected, such as those for Dell, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and IBM.

Although the Commission has no way to determine what, if anything, Chinese telecommunications firms did to the hijacked data, incidents of this nature could have a number of serious implications. This level of access could enable surveillance of specific users or sites. It could disrupt a data transaction and prevent a user from establishing a connection with a site. It could even allow a diversion of data to somewhere that the user did not intend (for example, to a ''spoofed'' site). Arbor Networks Chief Security Officer Danny McPherson has explained that the volume of affected data here could have been intended to conceal one targeted attack. Perhaps most disconcertingly, as a result of the diffusion of Internet security certification authorities, control over diverted data could possibly allow a telecommunications firm to compromise the integrity of supposedly secure encrypted sessions.

The designers of the internet assumed trust into its architecture. These early designers did not anticipate what the internet would become. Today, trust is obviously a very poor assumption. How will users who require security and reliability adjust?

We should expect "Balkanization" of digital communications, with those needing high security dropping out of the existing system and setting up their own. The Defense Department's SIPRNet has been an inadequate attempt at this answer, as the Wikileaks affair has revealed. DARPA (ironically the original inventor of the internet) now recommends that the Defense Department establish its own network hardware and software, a system that would emphasize security and would presumably be incompatible with the existing internet.

Users who need high security but who can't afford their own custom network would be wise to revert to the pre-Internet age of the courier, the telephone, and for the most sensitive of thoughts, the face-to-face meeting. This should not be much of an adjustment for those possessing either suspicious minds or experience.

This book provides a glimpse into what relatively small military units—teams, platoons, companies, and highly dispersed battalions—have done to roll back the insurgency in some of the more remote areas of Afghanistan. The focus is on counterinsurgency at the tactical and local levels. The book includes 15 vignettes about different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special Forces, the British Army and Marines, the Dutch Army and Marines, and the Canadian Army. The case studies cover ten provinces in Afghanistan's south and east. They describe the diverse conditions these units faced, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved. The research is based almost entirely on interviews with those involved in these operations.

Download the full report here.

The Center for Complex Operations in cooperation with NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan invites you to a discussion of progress and developments in Afghanistan's National Security Forces (ANSF). Join members of the NTM-A staff in discussing the past and future of the ANSF.

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

George C. Marshall Hall, Room 155

National Defense University (NDU)

10:30 a.m. until 12:00 p.m.

Click here to RSVP and download a copy of the NTM-A report.

The latest leak of diplomatic cables is less likely to cause likely to cause physical harm, but it has done great damage to American diplomacy; Assange is as much an enemy to the United States as any Al Qaeda operative. Assange is an enemy of our country.

The role of non-state actors as combatants in war has been debated since the early 1990s when Martin Van Creveld raised the Subject in his book, The Transformation of War, and thinkers such as William Lind and former Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak suggested that in "Fourth Generational Warfare", non state actors might be considered legitimate combatants in the future. This was a paradigm shift. From the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War to the end of the Cold War, only nation-states and their legally designated representatives were legally empowered to employ violence. Al Qaeda's attack on the United States in 2001 showed that non-state actors are capable of inflicting damage capable which rival Pearl Harbor or Tarawa in magnitude; and now they can do it on line. The human toll of the Wikileaks actions will not approach the level of a major war, but there almost certainly have been friendly casualties.

Mr. Assange obviously believes that there will be no kinetic consequences as a result of his actions. As a resident of the United Kingdom; he feels that he is protected by its laws. In contrast to the people who have tried to blow up airliners in flight and the American borne cleric in Yemen who is now on the "kill or capture" list, Mr. Assange does not envision any reprisal more dangerous than a civil legal action; and that is something that he may be relishing for the sake of the publicity that it will bring his web site.

This brings us to a very serious question. What is the moral difference between a would-be terrorist, who becomes a legitimate target when it becomes obvious that he is attempting to cause civilian or military casualties, and Mr. Assange, who has taken actions that will almost certainly cause friendly deaths if they have not already?

The American soldier who allegedly leaked the documents to Mr. Assange's organization is in a clear legal status. He is in custody and accused of clear violations of the military's Uniform Code of Military Justice and he can arguably be charged with treason. Meanwhile, Mr. Assange basked in the glow of the media spotlight. There is something clearly wrong with this picture.

Where does a person cross the line between wearing "Ho Chi Minh is Going to Win" T-shirt expressing distaste for a nation's foreign policy and actively becoming a combatant in supporting that country's enemies in an information war that causes actual human casualties? In a kinder and gentler pre-intranet age, Mr. Assange would have offered his leaks to a British or American newspaper. The editors would have made informed decisions regarding what to publish and what not to publish. No reputable news organization in the western world would have published information that would have put an informant at risk. For better or worse, and in this case for worse, those days are gone.

Admiral Mullin, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was uncharacteristically blunt in describing the potential consequences of the Wikileaks; however, he has no current course of action to prevent copycats in the future. Secretary Clinton was equally blunt in assessing the latest damage; she also has no leverage to punish the Assange actions.

I am not advocating putting a Hellfire missile into Mr. Assange's home or sending a special operations team to terminate him with all due prejudice, but I am suggesting that there be sanctions for the kind of actions that he has taken. We should use whatever resources that we need to have him apprehended as an enemy combatant and send him to Guantanamo Bay where our government can decide to do with him. We will want to take our time to determine how to dispose of his case and any avoid any legal mistakes; five or six years should do the trick.

Hoping to Avoid Bombs and Win Afghan Minds - New York Times

Six U.S. Troops Killed by Suspected Afghan Policeman - Voice of America

6 American Trainers Killed by an Afghan Police Officer - New York Times

Afghan Policeman Kills 6 American Troops - Los Angeles Times

Six Slain Servicemembers in Afghanistan all Americans - Stars and Stripes

6 From NATO Killed in Afghanistan - Associated Press

Officials Investigate Afghanistan Shooting Incident - AFPS

9 Afghan Guards Kidnapped in Kabul Province - Associated Press

Pakistan

Anticorruption Group Claims Harassment in Pakistan - New York Times

Pakistan Suicide Blast Kills Six - BBC News

Korean Peninsula

U.S. and South Korea Balk at Talks With North - New York Times

South Korea Announces, Then Postpones, Live-Fire Drill - Voice of America

Yeonpyeong Attack Uniting South Korean Public - Washington Post

Now North Korea Boasts Advances In Nuclear Programme - Reuters

Consequences on the Korean Peninsula - Washington Times opinion

Hitting the North - Los Angeles Times opinion

Iraq

High Cost of Security for Americans Who Stay - Washington Post

Iraq Court Gives Tariq Aziz New 10 Year Sentence - Associated Press

Iran

Bombings Hit Atomic Experts in Iran Streets - New York Times

Iran Blames Israel, U.S. in Death of Nuclear Scientist - Voice of America

Iran Says Two Bombs Target Professors - Associated Press

Public Holiday In Iran's Capital Due to Pollution - Reuters

WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks, Round Three - Small Wars Journal (post-release)

SWJ Wikileaks Roundup - Small Wars Journal (pre-release)

United Nations

U.N. Agency Pushes New Rules on Air-cargo Security - Associated Press

NATO

Flournoy: NATO Action Must Follow Lisbon Vision - AFPS

Russia: Partners for Peace? Just Possibly - New York Times

U.S. Department of Defense

Pentagon Study: Gays Could Serve with No Harm - Associated Press

United States

Guard Leaders Hope Efficiencies Will Extend Border Role - AFPS

Somali-Born Teen Pleads Not Guilty In U.S. Bomb Case - Reuters

Ore. Fire Raises Muslims' Fears of Attack Backlash - Associated Press

Democrats Press Republicans on START Ratification - Reuters

Obama Proposes Freeze In Federal Worker Pay - Reuters

United Kingdom

British Police Issue Warning Before Protests - Reuters

World

Climate Change Conference Begins in Mexico - Voice of America

Global Climate Change Talks Begin in Cancíºn - New York Times

Frustrations Show as Climate Talks Resume - Associated Press

Africa

Ivory Coast to Release Initial Election Results - Associated Press

Sierra Leone: Blisters Outbreak Case Study in Spread of Panic - New York Times

U.N. Says Congo Armed Groups Forming Criminal Gangs - Associated Press

Congo Army Denies Rebel Comeback - BBC News

Building Congo's Future - Washington Post opinion

Americas and Caribbean

Four Years On, Drug War Bleeds Mexican Heartland - Reuters

18 Bodies Found in Northern Mexico Mass Grave - Associated Press

Mexican Troops Find 18 Bodies Near U.S. Border - Reuters

Brazil: Rio Slum Dwellers Caught in Battle to Pacify City - Associated Press

Observers Declare Haiti's Elections Valid - Voice of America

U.N. Urges Calm Following Election - Washington Times

Monitors Say Haiti Vote Fraud Not Massive - Washington Post

Severity of Problems in Haiti Vote Is Disputed - New York Times

In Haiti, Tentative Calm Follows Chaotic Elections - Los Angeles Times

Observers: Irregularities Don't Invalidate Haiti Poll - Reuters

Asia Pacific

Taiwan Elections Put Pro-China Party in Lead for Presidency - VOA

U.S. Presses China Again Over Jailed Geologist - Reuters

Central Asia

Kyrgyz Parliament Agrees on Three-Party Coalition - Reuters

Gunbattle Breaks Out in Kyrgyz South - Associated Press

Blast Wounds Two Outside Court In Kyrgyz Capital - Reuters

Europe

Medvedev Takes Aim At Russia's "Demographic Crisis" - Reuters

Beaten Reporter: Russian Media Freedom Shrinking - Associated Press

Pro-European Alliance Ahead in Moldova Elections - Associated Press

Middle East

Al-Qaeda in Yemen Spreading Reach for Recruits, Targets - Washington Post

Lebanon: Hezbollah Indictments Loom - Washington Times

Aid Groups Say Plight of Gaza Civilians Still Dire - Associated Press

East Jerusalem Housing Gets Preliminary OK - Associated Press

Egyptians See Fraud in Voting, Respond with Riots - Washington Times

U.S. "Dismayed" By Egyptian Election Process - Reuters

Egyptians Riot, Burn Cars, Claiming Vote Fraud - Associated Press

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 'Faces Heavy Poll Losses' - BBC News

South Asia

India Aims to Break Parliament Deadlock Over Graft Scam - Reuters

The Importance of Understanding How Arab-Muslims

Ideologically Counter al-Qaida:

The Work of Moroccan Writer Muntasser Hamada

Review Essay by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Foreword by Mr. Gary Greco, Chief, Office of Intelligence Operations, Joint

Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT)

Those immersed in the business of countering terrorism and threats

to the United States must read copious amount of materials each day.  However,

it is easy to neglect the treasure trove of information and insights afforded by

Arabic authors who comment and analyze terrorist groups like al-Qaida.  Moroccan

journalist Muntasser Hamada represents a new trend among Arab authors who

deconstruct al-Qaida ideologically, philosophically, and theologically.  Arabic

language works attacking al-Qaida offers America's leaders a better way to

define the threat from Violent Islamist Groups who attack Muslims and

non-Muslims alike.  It offers the language by which to disaggregate al-Qaida

from Islamist Groups and those two from Islam.  Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein

has labored for several years bringing to life Arabic works of interest to

America's counter-terrorism analysts and military personnel.  His work is then

used to train better counter-terrorism analysts and prepare deploying units

utilizing fresh Arabic language materials that dissect al-Qaida and its

franchises.  I look forward to the debate and discussion this expose of Hamada's

work will generate among the readers of Small Wars Journal.

Introduction

Muntassir Hamada is a Moroccan journalist and author of three Arabic

books, who thinks deeply about the impact al-Qaida has had on the Arab Muslim

imagination.  The subject of this review essay is Hamada's 2008 work Nahnu wa

Tanzeem al-Qaida (Al-Qaida and Us), which offers valuable insight into Arab

discourse on al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden.  The book was published by Al-Awael

Printers in Damascus, Syria who maintains the website:

www.darawael.com. 

America's leaders must take the time to understand and pay attention to Arabic

language books that discredit al-Qaida, its leaders, and its ideology.  Such

books provide a way in which Muslims and non-Muslims can better articulate the

threat and disaggregate the fragmented pseudo-intellectualism of al-Qaida's

Islamic narratives from the diverse and rich beliefs of 1.5 billion Muslims. 

The purpose of this essay is to introduce Hamada's work and to expose American

readers interested in counter-ideology to the level of Arab-Muslim discourse

that attacks al-Qaida philosophically, theologically, and ideologically.  

Saudi Critique of al-Qaida Ideology

Mashary Zeydi, who emphasizes the concept of al-Harb al-Fiqhiyah (Battle

of Islamic Jurisprudence) as the pivotal and most important front in countering

Militant Islamist ideology.  He classifies this battle of Islamic

jurisprudence and interpretation as no less than a struggle for the modern

Muslim mind.  One can disagree with Zeydi, but it is important to amplify Arab Muslim voices who

are attempting to grapple intellectually with countering the ideology and

historical narratives of violent Islamist groups.  In particular violent

Islamist group's reductionism of Islamic jurisprudence.  Among the chapters of

the book are the ways Saudi Arabia's leadership rationalized their war against

al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) by comparing it to King Abdul-Aziz ibn

Saud's suppression of the Ikhwan Revolt in March of 1929, in the Plains of

Sabilla.  Did the ideas of the Saudi Ikhwan (Brotherhood) die in the Plains of

Sabilla, or were they resurrected through Juhayman al-Utaibi (hereafter Juhayman)

in the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and by Usama Bin Laden now?

Zeydi claims that Saudi rebel Juhayman was a major influence on Bin

Laden, and that Juhayman was inspired by the thesis of an Indian student of

Islamic studies who graduated from Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. The thesis

was entitled, "Al Ahadeeth al-Warida fee al-Mahdy fee Mizan al-Jarh

wal-Tadeel," [The Collection of Sayings on the Mahdi in Reforming and

Correcting (Islam)].  While the lead conspirator of the Mecca Siege (Juhayman)

spent much time at Islamic colleges and it is plausible that he may have read

this thesis, this cannot be definitively proven. What is fact is that the lead

conspirator of the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca was obsessed with the

return of the Mahdi (the expected one), due to events both inside and

outside of the Kingdom that made him feel that end times were near, as a new

Islamic century (1400 Anno Hijrae) dawned.

Zeydi, writes that the religious condemnations, in the form of

fatwas, are not catching up to the likes of condemnations from government and

security officials during the 1979 Siege of Mecca.    Hamada's book highlights

the fact that the fatwa attacking Juhayman was released to the public on January

7, 1980, a full month and a half after the end of the siege, illustrating that

the fatwa condemning Juhayman came only after his movement was crushed.  The

fatwa itself used adjectives such as kharijeen (those who acted outside)

the Islamic religion, munharifoon (wayward), mukharijun (fringe),

but did not use the outright label of kufr (apostate).  Perhaps the most

damning charge within the Saudi fatwa against Juhayman was his group's

presumption that they were following the Mahdi and ushering in his

arrival.

The militant Islamists today who utilize Juhayman's epistles ignore

the troubling aspect of the movement, which is the presumption that they were

the Mahdi. They instead focus on their calls for the removal of the Saudi royal

family and cutting Arabia off from the social ills of the west.  Juhayman's

central argument that the al-Sauds should not rule because they are not from the

Quryash (Prophet Muhammad's family) flies in the face of traditional Sunni views

that do not make this a requirement for leadership of Muslims, and is more in

line with Shiite views.  The other aspect of Juhayman's grievance that the Saudi

monarchy does not uphold Islam and denigrates the faith, is a charge repeated by

al-Qaida today, despite the condemnation of Juhayman's violent methods. 

Juhayman's Islamic Views: Fragmented and Theological Reductionism

Hamada does a marvelous job arguing that Juhayman's writings,

epistles, and theological views can be reduced to selections from a few books

that Juhayman uses to usurp the entire discourse and scholarly opinions of

Islam.  The books are:

(1)  Tafseer Ibn Kathir

(2)  Mukhtasser Sahih Muslim (Summaries of a multi-volume work)

(3)  Sahih al-Jamaa al-Saghir wal Daifa

(4)  Mishkah Masabeh

(5)  Select fatwas of Sheikh Ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925-2001)

Four of these works are by one cleric Sheikh Nasser al-Albani (1914-1999),

ignoring fourteen centuries of debate, fatwas, opinions, and commentaries.  The

use of Al-Albani exclusively by Juhayman highlights how militant Islamist

ideology is narrow, and designed not to educate in the the faith, but to justify

direct violent action, whether it be the attackers of the grand mosque in Mecca

or al-Qaida today. 

Central Questions in 21^st Century Islam

Hamada discusses central questions in 21^st century Islam,

such as: what type of Islam do Muslims want?  Among Islamists (those who want to

usher in an Islamic government), what form of Islamist movement do they want? He

also asks rhetorical questions, including: what is al-Qaida's socio-economic

program? And, interestingly, what should the position of Shariah be towards

al-Qaida?  Is there a moral relativism to al-Qaida attacks and attacks conducted

by Palestinian resistance fighters? Are there differences between amaliyat

intahiriyah (suicide operations) and amaliyat istishadiyah (martyrdom

operations)?  The mere posing of these questions in an Arabic book written by a

Saudi demonstrates a refreshing direction in Islamic discourse in the 21^st

century. The author provides no straight answers to these complex questions, but

acknowledges that these questions cannot be answered without first answering the

question of what kind of Islam Muslims want?  Who speaks in the name of Islam?

Are they Islamic leaders sanctioned by the state, or leaders of Islamist

movements?  Is it the Islam of Usama Bin Laden? The Islam of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi? 

If it is state sanctioned Islam, then which regime?  Is it the Islam of the

family, or of the tribe?  Among Islamists is it the jurisprudence of Islamist

movements or Sahwa (reawaking scholars)?

A chapter in Hamada's book is entitled "Al-Qaida and the Crisis of Methods of

Tafsir" (Exegesis or Interpretation).  He begins by asking which Islamic

models can challenge al-Qaida's Islamic narratives.  Is it Islam? If Islam,

which constructive Islamic narratives  can be distilled to marginalize

destructive narratives?  Or can Islamists, and if so, can the Muslim

Brotherhood?  If the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood can, which phases of its

history and, if today, which faction: the pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood

parliamentarians who reach out to pan-Arabists, Nasserists, and leftists to form

a coalition against Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party?

Islam a ma'zaq hadari, or civilizational crisis.  This crisis is more

than Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilization thesis, and a crisis that impairs

Islam's proselytizing mission inherent in the Abrahamic traditions of faith,

most notably Christianity.  In other words, Islam and Christianity both have a

proselytizing component, and Bin Laden is severely impairing Islam's ability to

proselytize and convert.  This is an interesting argument, and can be better

packaged to say that Bin Laden and Zawahiri, who have caused the death of

thousands, are the last people able to represent Islam and call people to the

faith. Other Arab critiques of Usama Bin Laden are that his al-Qaida group

failed to impact the world's political institutions or even that of Arab nations

specifically.  Instead, he has only succeeded in touching the most sacred

aspects of Islam, causing increased challenges for Muslims to freely practice

their faith. Nasser Ahmed al-Bahri, Bin Laden's bodyguard, reduced Bin Laden's

strategy as an attempt to disengage the United States from Islamic nations. 

This has been his strategy since Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.  I believe

there are strategic communication opportunities embedded in Arabic language

critiques of Bin Laden and al-Qaida. 

Hamada Attacks Bin Laden's Claim to Leadership

Hamada highlights the Kuwaiti al-Qaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, who is

believed to be among those detained in Iran.  There are a dozen points Abu

Ghaith uses to justify Bin Laden as leader of the Muslims, all these points

reveal al-Qaida's insecurities. The following are examples highlighted by

Hamada:

• The

  crisis of the Umma (the Muslim community), is a crisis of capability

  and role models. Bin Laden provides the right path in addressing these

  crises.  This desire to represent the Muslim community is presumptuous, and

  not in keeping with Quranic injunctions to accept diverse Muslim beliefs

  that are inherent in the human condition. 

• "We

  follow Bin Laden not from emotion but based on a rational application of

  Islamic law."  This statement by Abu Ghaith shows an attempt to project

  al-Qaida's own views of  capitalizing on emotion and irrationality upon

  those who attempt to Islamically criticize Bin Laden.  His need to assert

  that Bin Laden's leadership is derived on an application of Islamic law

  shows al-Qaida's insecurity, and that Bin Laden's understanding of

  leadership is derived not from Islamic law but from the political expression

  of violence and terrorism.  Such points are important in deconstructing Bin

  Laden's false humility by identifying his real desire to lead even if that

  legitimacy is derived through violence. 

• Bin

  Laden is the awaited figurehead.  Although stopping short of calling him the

  Mahdi, Abu Ghaith's appeals on this point have the tinge of Mahdism. 

  Al-Qaida understands that outright claims to be the Mahdi would likely

  undermine the group's image, as it harkens back to the 1979 Mosque Takeover

  in Mecca, in which one of the leaders was declared the Mahdi. 

Other Bin Laden Blasphemies

Hamada cites even wilder blasphemies relating to Bin Laden that are

on the internet.  For instance, the internet inciter, under the cover name Louis Awad, refers to the al-Qaida leader by a blessing reserved to Prophet Muhammad

alone, Salaa Allah Alayhi wa Salam (Peace and Blessings of God Be Upon

Him).  Observant Muslims typically utter this small prayer after the Prophet

Muhammad's name as a sign of reverence. Yet Louis Awad refers to Bin Laden and

invokes this prayer reserved to the Prophet alone.  This confirms Imam

al-Sherief's (Zawahiri's former mentor) accusation that al-Qaida is nothing but

the cult of Zawahiri and Bin Laden.  Al-Qaida leaders remain silent on Louis

Awad's indiscretion, which should be offensive to most Muslims, as well as the

charge that the organization is merely a cult designed to serve the al-Qaida

leader and his deputy, not God.  Hamada also distills other anti al-Qaida

clerical arguments, such as:

• Killing Muslims in the World Trade Center; the twin towers contained a

  mosque that catered to Muslims working in the financial district.

• Bin

  Laden deceived fellow Muslims into committing suicide; while pilots knew of

  the mission, those charged with subduing the passengers did not.

• The

  group caused Islamic treaties and agreements to be jeopardized with the

  west.

Hamada's Criticism of European Islamophobia: How this Plays into al-Qaida's

Plans?

Hamada underlines a problem with European legislation of Islamic

behavior, such as the French ban on women's Islamic dress, the hijab. 

Aside from the recruiting opportunity this provides militant Islamists by

galvanizing the Muslim population, the adversary has seized upon the narrative

of democratic hypocrisy.  Hamada emphasizes how the third column (articles

18--21) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned with spiritual,

public and political freedoms such as freedom of religion and freedom of

association. However, the banning of Islamic dress seems to contravene this

seminal document of western democracy. We cannot allow al-Qaida to extract a

narrative in which democratic ideals work for all, except Muslims. This is

exactly their aim and why they have seized upon the narrative of democratic

hypocrisy.

Sound bites to Counter Militant Islamist Slogans 

Hamada's book also delves into a few themes that counter militant

Islamist sound bites, such as:

• Their

  unwillingness or purposeful suppression of delineating between verses and

  meanings by using exegesis.

• The

  blurring of the concept of jihad and irhab (terrorism) in their

  slogans.

• Reaching an immediate and negative judgment on the intent of the Ulema

  (Islamic scholars) and thereby attacking not their arguments, but their

  person and reputation.

• Excessiveness in matters of faith, known in the Quran as ghilu.

Nahnu wa Tanzeem al-Qaida urges the amplification of a series

of anti al-Qaida fatwas issued by the Saudi Higher Ulema Council, as a means of

adding a cacophony of competing Islamic voices to al-Qaida and militant

Islamists.  Hamada also advocates the amplification of the Egyptian Islamic

Group's revisionist volumes that ideologically attack al-Qaida and other

militant Islamist ideologies.  He mentions eight volumes that utilize Islamist

argumentation to undermine militant Islamist ideology.  In addition, many of

these volumes' authors ideologically lapsed from militant Islamist to Islamist,

the difference being a renunciation of attaining an Islamic state through

violent means. However, from a counter-narrative perspective there is value in

these volumes.  In addition, after 9-11 there are many so called Sahwa (Islamist

Reawakening) clerics, some of whom Bin Laden holds dear, such as Salman

al-Awdah, who have since written open letters criticizing Bin Laden

Islamically.  This criticism led to a trend of Saudi revisionism that, when

added to Egyptian Revisionism, offers a corpus of anti al-Qaida ideological

arguments.  Saudi revisionism centers on how takfir (declaring fellow

Muslims apostate) has caused division among Muslims, and how Bin Laden has

damaged the reputation of Islam and retarded proselytizing. It also focuses on

the declaration of jihad through the permission of the waly al-amr

(recognized authority) and questions Bin Laden's authority.

Conclusion

Hamada's work offers insight in which the United States can begin to

understand the complexities within Islamic clerical discussions pertaining to

Islamist politics and the narratives of Militant Islamist groups.  The author

highlights schisms between Jihadi Ulema (those clergy who advocate

violent action), Sahwa Ulema (those clergy who are revisionist and may

share the same vision as violent Islamists), and finally Regime Ulema

(government sponsored clerics who challenge militant Islamist clerics).  For

instance, Hamada highlights the cleric Abdul-Aziz Bin Saleh al-Jarbuah, and his

book, "The Religious Rulings on What Happened in America," issued after 9-11. 

The cleric ruled that the 9-11 operation was suicide and by implication not

martyrdom.  "Killing infidels in this manner is excessive in Islamic law," he

writes, and "the condition of Muslim states and the United States is that of

a'hd (truce)"   Jarbuah says that the Taliban should surrender those wanted

for justice, and cites the example of Prophet Muhammad, who turned over a

criminal (Abu Basir) to his Meccan adversary for justice, in accordance with the

treaty arranged with the Meccans.  The book charges that the Taliban has caused

irreparable harm to the body of Muslims worldwide, to the reputation of Islam in

particular, and has ruined opportunities to spread the faith. Of course, a

cleric's rulings are only as good as Muslims who choose to follow him, and we

should be attuned to Islamic counter-argumentation that seeks to undercut

al-Qaida theologically and ideologically as the basis for an effective and

long-term campaign to make militant Islamist ideology unpopular among Muslims. 

The goal of this essay is to highlight the nature of the Arab-Muslim

debate on al-Qaida for America's counter-terrorism experts.  It is not to agree

or disagree with Hamada or other clergy's work, but to offer a means for the

United States to see an opportunity to de-popularize and marginalize al-Qaida

rhetoric. Some of these clergy are by no means friends of the United States, as

many disagree with American foreign policy, but they have been vocal in Islamically

attacking al-Qaida.  This aspect of their discourse needs to be amplified

to marginalize militant and violent Islamists who represent an immediate threat

to the national security of the United States, and attempts to disaggregate

America from the region.

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology:

Understanding the Global Threat," published in the summer of 2010 by Naval

Institute Press.  He is Adjunct Chair of Islamic Studies at the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, where he teaches an elective on Islam, Islamist

Political Theory, and Militant Islamist Ideology.  Commander Aboul-Enein wishes

to thank the National Defense University and Yale University Libraries for

providing Hamada's work for study and analysis.  In addition, Ms. Dorothy

Corley, an intern at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and student at

Boston University, provided valuable edits, inputs, and discussion that enhanced

this work.

Yemeni Intellectual Saeed al-Jamhi Ideologically Attacks al-Qaida:

Exploring Recent Arabic Volumes Deconstructing Militant Islamist

Narratives

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN & Ms. Dorothy

Corley

Saeed Ali Obaid Al-Jamhi represents the type of research being conducted by Arab

social commentators on al-Qaida.  His 556 page book entitled, "Al-Qaeda:

Establishment, Ideological Background, and Continuity," offers an interesting

deconstruction and critique of al-Qaida's reductionist and pseudo-intellectual interpretation

of fragments of Islam.  The book was published in 2008 by Madbooli Press in

Cairo, Egypt, and it is part of a series by Cairo's Madbooli Press on al-Harakat

al-Islamiya al-Muassira (Modern Islamist Movements).  Al-Jamhi is a Yemeni

expert on terrorism whose commentaries have appeared in the Arab press.  He

represents fresh Arab writers on al-Qaida. Al-Jamhi writes that Imam al-Sherief's

books are a cornerstone in al-Qaida (hereafter AQ) ideology, which is confirmed

by a Bin Laden audio tape entitled, "Jihad is the Path."  The challenge

is that Imam al-Sherief (aka Dr. Fadl) is not only a major inspiration to AQ, but

also a mentor to AQ Deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Today, Imam al-Sherief has ideologically

turned against AQ, calling the organization the cult of Bin Laden and Zawahiri. 

Al-Qaida Takes Muslim Brotherhood Reductionism and Further Simplifies It

Al-Jamhi highlights insecurities inherent in AQ ideology within the pantheon

of Islamist groups, from political advocates, to radical, militant and violent individuals. 

His book discusses the problem of AQ, other militant Islamists, and Islamist groups,

which is of AQ's placement of jihad as the supreme and perhaps only obligation in

Islam save for the belief of the oneness of God, Tawhid.  This reduction

of Islam is becoming more and more acceptable to Islamists and the wider Muslims

around the globe.  In the militant Islamist obsession of jihad as only

fighting, they deny other forms of jihad, such as that of education, individual

morals, conduct, politics, art, or a jihad that is constructive and includes dialog. 

Al-Jamhi traces the origins of this obsession with jihad to Hassan al-Banna (d.

1949), the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Jihad reduced to fighting

was a cornerstone of his recruitment effort and was finally put into practice when

the Muslim Brotherhood sent thousands of fedayeen (irregular guerilla fighters)

with the Egyptian army in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  Al-Jamhi highlights Hassan

al-Banna's reductionism using the Muslim Brotherhood founder's book "Muzakiraat

al-Dawa wal Daeeah," or Memoirs of Proselytizing and the Proselytizer.  

He blends the act of peaceful proselytizing inherent in all three Abrahamic faiths

with a call to violence, and reduces centuries of Islamic traditions into these

bipolar slogans:

• Ebaada wa Qiyada (Obedience and Command)
• Deen wa Dawla (Religion and State)
• Rawhaniya wa Amaal (Spirituality and Action)
• Salaat wa Jihad (Prayer and Fighting)
• Taah wa Hukm (Submission and Governance)
• Mushaf wa Saif (Quran and Sword)

One cannot separate one from another in this list, according to al-Banna. 

These Islamic slogans were stripped of context and history, and applied to a modernist

interpretation to incite anti-colonial direct violent action. This was done in an

effort to evict the British from Egypt, as the British had been in control of Egyptian

affairs since 1882.  Al-Banna takes these sound bites and gives them a gradualist

plan of action writing:

• Al-Deen taqoom bil Jihad (Religion can only be established by Jihad)
• Al-Jihad taqoom illa bil Dawaa (Jihad can only be established by

  proselytizing)

• Jamma la takun illa bil Dawaa (A group cannot form except through

  proselytizing)

We cannot substitute the concerns of God with that of man, al-Banna continues,

concluding by writing that a military coup is only one means of armed resistance. 

His language is important to both Arabic and English readers, as it immerses one

in the language of militant Islamist ideology and its sound bites.  From a

counter-terrorism perspective these are the clues that will allow for the tactical

detection of militant cells, as how they describe their Islam in reductionist terms

is the first indication of radicalization.  Another example in al-Jamhi's book

is the notion of tarbiah (personal moral salvation). Is it the intent of

spiritual purity, or the more earthly attainment of power through direct violent

action?  Does the Muslim strive to be individually just or is this striving

reduced to a perpetual overturning of an unjust system?  AQ takes the concept

of tarbiah (personal moral salvation) called for by the Muslim Brotherhood

to attain piety and conviction before fighting, and dispenses with tarbiah

(the slow process of cultivating proper Islamic belief and practices) to feed adherents

into killing machines.  AQ has no patience for the Muslim Brotherhood's proselytizing

of the grassroots, the cultivation of leaders to the Islamist philosophy, the setup

of the Islamic state (in the Muslim Brotherhood image), or the restoration of the

caliphate.  

Countering Militant Islamist Narratives:  Why Al-Qaida Represents Bankrupt

Ideas

 According to al-Jamhi, AQ does not possess any political program that is

coherent.  This lack of a political program makes AQ different from other Sunni

Salafi Islamist groups.  However, al-Jamhi deduces an AQ strategy from its

writings, statements, and general principles.  The foundational principle of

AQ revolves around the fealty given to the Emir (Usama Bin Laden) and those he designates

as his representative through audio and video tapes.  Those who are among AQ's

senior leadership know their rights and obligations and are committed to raising

their banner in opposition to various flags they consider to be infidel.  The

key is that it is AQ who decides and judges whom amidst Muslims and non-Muslims

they consider to be apostate (Muslims deemed by AQ as unworthy) or infidel (non-Muslims). 

AQ portrays itself as a global Islamic (not Islamist) group of which any Muslim

can join or contribute to. The key here is their attempt to cloak themselves within

Islam and not designate themselves as Islamist. However, their narrow and pseudo-intellectual

interpretation of what amounts to violent politicized Islam is what characterizes

them not as Islamist but violent Islamist.  They plan to reach wherever Muslims

are, and presume to be defenders of the faith whether desired or not by Muslims

or non-Muslims.  Embedded in the pages of anti-AQ Arabic works are the seeds

for an effective campaign to develop schisms that isolate and portray AQ as a fringe

violent cult within Islamist groups.  They claim to be the victorious party,

unique among Islamist groups; a group that cannot and will not coexist with other

faiths, or even differences inherent in 1.57 billion Muslims.  By AQ's own

statements they say, according to al-Jamhi's book, "Jihad is our goal, the path

to salvation and happiness."  Dying has become the end and has supplanted the

means in the AQ of the 21^st century, and Islamic reasoning is only good

to lead people to AQ's version of jihad.  AQ describes itself as a global organization

in which nations must take into account when deciding the fate of Muslims. 

Al-Jamhi describes AQ funding as coming from unique, committed, and special sources,

and not from any party or government.  While other Islamist groups have been

co-opted by government funds, AQ has not.

AQ considers the killing of apostates and infidels an issue that requires no

proof due to their animosity toward the Muslim people.  AQ sees no difference

between Muslim apostasy and Western infidelity, comparing people to alcohol (forbidden

in Islam) that is manufactured domestically, and that alcohol that is imported from

foreign nations.  It is fascinating that AQ compares ideas to alcoholic beverages

in an attempt to counter critical Islamic thought.  Unlike other Islamist radical

groups, AQ considers knowledge andnd tarbiah as no longer needed to delay

to jihad.  AQ criticizes the ulema (the Islamic clergy) as being immersed

in their texts and divorced from the people.  They add that the ulema have

been bought by the state as a means of usurping religious leadership from the clergy. 

AQ talks of Muslims as victims who have been intellectually conquered by the West,

presuming superiority over most Muslims.  AQ considers enjoining the good and

forbidding the evil as the most important principle.  While there is confusion

as to whether jihad (as fighting) or enjoining the good and forbidding the evil

is the most important principle, it is natural for AQ to zero in on this Quranic

injunction.  By stripping away intent, AQ uses this injunction as a means to

exert societal control and to abuse perceived offenders in order to intimidate the

rest of the populace, not as a means to individual moral salvation.

An Attempt to Address the Problems of Salafism: An Arab-Muslim Perspective

Al-Jamhi also discusses the problem of 21^st century Salafism (the

return to the pious founder movements that emerged in different times in different

locations).  His focus is on the evolution of Salafism in current times. 

He writes that Salafism has evolved from a corrective movement dedicated to correcting

orthodoxy, to breaking into factions and being reduced to a simple radical opposition

movement, which even opposes other Salafists who may have a slightly different Islamic

view.  Salafis have expropriated Islam as a means of acting in conceited pride

and superiority and have neglected to submit themselves humbly before God. 

This is the arrogance of possessing what they believe to be the only true form of

Islamic expression.  Al-Jamhi's book outlines that modern Salafism of the late

20^th century onward fell into philosophical trap by rejecting political

parties, democracy and elections.  Salafis shut themselves off from constructive

expressions, means of protest, and the opportunities to peacefully proselytize their

message in society by engaging in social isolation, which then leads to radicalism

and militancy.  Al-Jamhi's ideas are not fully formed, but this is the first

attempt to explain why Sunni militant Islamists who resort to violence tend to be

Salafi. 

Al-Jamhi discusses three types of dawa (proselytizing) among Salafis today. 

(1)  Dawa Salafiyah, which is straight proselytizing to God's book and

the path of Prophet Muhammad; (2) Dawa Ikhwaniyah is more politicized and

a is a call to follow a personality within the Islamist movement; (3) Dawa Tablighiyah

is also a call to follow a personality and is politicized but compromises in attempting

to attain political power through the abuse of constitutional means.  The last

two Dawa Salafiyah and Dawa Tablighiyah are fragments of Salafism, Hasafiyah Sufism,

and Sunni Islam.  A Muslim is loyal to God and Prophet Muhammad, while a member

of the Muslim Brotherhood is loyal to an organization or person.  These nuances

show the schisms within the more radical forms of Salafism that AQ derives followers,

as it reduces obedience from God to an individual, represented by the cult of Bin

Laden and Zawahiri.  It is crucial for counter-terrorism experts to immerse

themselves in these schisms and in the language of radicals, and to disaggregate

Militant (Violent) Islamists, from Islamists, and these two from Islam.  A

more nuanced approach is needed, and this cannot be achieved by considering Islam,

Shariah (Islamic law) or Muslims as monolithic and not subject to the human

condition of disagreement over orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and the big questions over

what Islam will be in the 21^st century.

Conclusion

Reading and discussing Arabic works of significance should be required in America's

war colleges and counter-terrorism training programs.  Al-Jamhi is a Yemeni

scholar with many observations and ideas that could be of use in finding strategic

advantages for the United States and its Muslim friends who wish to undermine AQ

ideologically.  Studying Arabic works on al-Qaida represents the new frontier

in training our men and women attending such institutions as the National Defense

University and who wish to better protect America's national security. 

Commander Aboul-Enein is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer and Middle East

Foreign Area Officer.  He has been involved in Middle East policy and counter-terrorism

since 9-11.  Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant

Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published in 2010 by Naval

Institute Press.  He teaches one elective on Islam, Islamist Political Theory,

and Militant Islamist Ideology as Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces.  Ms. Dorothy Corley is an undergraduate student

of international affairs at Boston University and intern at the Industrial College

of the Armed Forces.  Ms. Corley is the Teaching Assistant to Commander Aboul-Enein's

course.  Finally, the authors' wish to thank the Yale and National Defense

University Libraries for making Al-Jamhi's work available for study and analysis.

What will the South Korean government do after the next North Korean attack? In a speech to the nation, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak announced that his government will abandon the previous policy of not retaliating against North Korean military provocations. In spite of this public promise, the South Korean government still lacks retaliatory credibility. The only South Korean firing that has hit a target was the firing of its defense minister, done to buy time domestically until the government could sort through the political viability of its options. Seoul still has no willingness to risk a larger war and therefore dreads the embarrassment of sitting on its hands once again should another volley of artillery shells arrive from the north.

How likely is another North Korean attack? The North Korean regime wants the six-party talks to resume in order to extract another installment of blackmail payments. This procedure has succeeded in the past and the North expects it to work again. North Korea enjoys escalation dominance over the first segment of the escalation ladder; the North's leadership knows that South Korea, having achieved a very high standard of living, is extremely averse to risking military damage to its wealth. The North, by contrast, could hardly care about military damage suffered at the lower rungs of escalation. Of course, war at the top of the escalation ladder would almost certainly be an extinction event for the North Korean regime. But the North is counting on the South never mounting the painful bottom rungs of the ladder. Assuming South Korea and the United States continue to resist making another blackmail payment, the North will likely calculate that another attack is a gamble worth taking.

Over the weekend China called for "emergency" six-party talks, essentially supporting North Korea's policy objective. Like the two Koreas, China also strongly supports the status quo. China has supported the Kim Family Regime for decades but for reasons that have shifted over time. In the beginning, there was communist ideology. Then North Korea provided a territorial buffer, separating China's territory from the U.S. army in the south. Today, China props up the Kim Family in order to forestall a refugee, environmental, and loose-WMD crisis that China might otherwise have to contain and clean up.

No rational leader knowingly starts a messy war; such wars begin through miscalculation. North Korea has calculated, based on past patterns of behavior, that South Korea and the United States will opt to make a payment through the six-party process rather than risk the consequences of even the most minor act of military retaliation. Miscalculation would occur when that assumption is no longer operative, perhaps due to a sudden hardening in the attitudes of South Korea's electorate. Such a change in the political calculus in the South may now be occurring. Northern miscalculation would occur if it did not perceive this change or did not believe that an announced change in the South's policy was credible.

What will the United States government do after the next North Korean provocation? Its standard response is to alert its forces and pledge support to its allies. Beyond that, the United States is thought to be a status quo power and thus -- just like the two Koreas and China -- should be in favor of maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula.

All true. But a regime collapse in the North could bring a large strategic benefit to the United States, especially if China ended up with the burden of cleaning up the North afterward. Should North Korea's government and military power collapse, U.S. military forces in the region would be liberated from the Korean War scenario. China, by contrast, would not be able to resist getting sucked into a large and messy stabilization commitment in North Korea. In the abstract, South Korea wants reunification and has planned for it. But it also understands its crippling cost. With Korean reunification inevitable in the long run, South Korea would no doubt maneuver to get China to pay as much of the clean-up tab as possible. South Korea could simply watch a post-collapse North from its side of the DMZ minefield and thus force China to stabilize the North. In addition to the financial cost of such a stabilization mission, China's competence and reputation would come under scrutiny the longer such a mission went on. A North Korean collapse would thus subtract a liability from the U.S. security balance sheet and add one to China's.

In spite of this potential opportunity for strategic benefit, we should not expect the U.S. government to use the current situation to apply strong pressure on the North. On the other hand, with all of the other actors in mortal fear of a change in the status quo, the United States has more leverage than the other players. China is increasingly held responsible for North Korea's behavior and will eventually have to make the largest payment to clean up the mess the Kim Family ultimately leaves behind. While it waits for this day, the United States government should use its leverage to make sure that China pays something every time North Korea acts up.