| Small Wars Journal

Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries by Chris Kraul, Los Angeles Times. BLUF: "We have a lot to learn from Colombia. We're now going through what they have experienced for the last 20 years," the 27-year-old Garcia said later of the drug-fueled violence plaguing Mexico. "What Colombian pilots know about night missions, flying over difficult terrain, and participating in joint task forces is invaluable to us."

Ground Truth: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Ground Truth: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Center for Naval Analyses Briefing

When: Monday, 7 March 2011, 10:30 am -- 12:00 pm

Where: Capitol Hill, Cannon House Office Building, Room 122

This briefing will feature the key findings of a recent CNA study, Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions (by Dr. Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis). The study includes 15 vignettes (from 10 provinces) about different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special Forces; the British Army and Marines; the Dutch Army and Marines; and the Canadian Army.

In these cases, it was up to small units on the ground to adapt counterinsurgency principles to the unique conditions they faced in different areas of Afghanistan. The briefing will feature two officers, a U.S. Army colonel and a U.S. Marine captain, who were involved in two of these cases. They will describe the diverse conditions their units faced, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved.

In addition, the authors will discuss recurring themes from the 15 vignettes, lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels, and what they mean for future conflicts.

Some of the book's key themes include:

Dealing with a localized insurgency

Navigating the political terrain

Searching for political solutions

Engaging the population and building popular support

Employing restraint in the use of force

Operating with little strategic guidance

The agenda can be found here. For more information regarding CNA's work on issues related to stability and development, please refer to this website.

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PRC 2023: The Now or Never Moment on Taiwan

PRC 2023: The Now or Never Moment on Taiwan by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon, BLUF: "... in the 2023-2032 time frame, the PRC leadership may conclude a now or never moment faces the country on a key priority -- reunification with Taiwan..."

5 March SWJ Roundup

Middle East / North Africa Unrest

Wave of Arab Unrest Continues - Washington Post

U.S. Wavers on Arab 'Regime Change' - Wall Street Journal

Qaddafi Brutalizes Foes, Armed or Defenseless - New York Times

Gaddafi Loyalists Unleash Fiercest Attack Yet - Washington Post

Fighting, Airstrikes and Protests Rock Libya - Voice of America

Libyan Rebels Locked in Battles - BBC News

Gadhafi Forces Battle Rebels as 37 Killed in Libya - Associated Press

Libyan Forces Attack Western Town, Rebel Push in East - Reuters

Libyan Rebels Accused of Targeting Blacks - Los Angeles Times

A Dissident Takes on Kadafi - Los Angeles Times

Foreigners May Be Prevented From Leaving Libya - Reuters

U.S. Says Gadhafi Has 'Forfeited' Right to Lead Libya - VOA

U.S. Warships Arrive at Crete in Libya Buildup - Associated Press

New Egyptian PM-Designate Addresses Protesters - Voice of America

Egypt: Crowd Cheers Newly Appointed Prime Minister - Washington Post

New Premier Speaks in Cairo Square - New York Times

New Egypt PM Shows Popular Touch in Tahrir Square - Reuters

Egypt: Protesters Storm Alexandria State Security HQ - BBC News

Hundreds March on State Security Building in Egypt - Associated Press

U.S. Offers Aid for Egyptian Democracy - Washington Post

Venezuela Says Libya OKs Chavez Mediation Plan - Associated Press

Previous Tunisia Regime Called 'a Gang of Saboteurs' - Voice of America

Fleeing Migrants Ease at Tunisian Border Crossing - New York Times

New Sectarian Violence Erupts in Bahrain Protests - Voice of America

Bahrainis Fear the U.S. Isn't Behind Fight for Democracy - New York Times

At Least 3 Dead in Yemen Clash - Washington Post

Shooting in Yemen May Widen Tensions - New York Times

Yemen Rallies Grow, Saleh Rejects Plan to Step Down - Reuters

Jordanian Protesters Ratchet Up Demands - Washington Post

More Shi'ite Protests in Saudi Oil Region - Reuters

Palestinian Protests More Muted - Washington Post

A Low-key Mideast Gamble - Washington Post opinion

Iraq

Maliki's Broadened Powers Seen as a Threat in Iraq - New York Times

Iraqis Protest in 'Day of Regret' - Washington Post

New Iraq Protests Smaller, Less Violent - Los Angeles Times

Iraqis Defy Checkpoints, Vehicle Bans to Protest - Associated Press

Iran

U.S. and Sweden to Push U.N. Rights Body to Act on Iran - Reuters

Afghanistan

Marines Await Taliban Move in Deadly Afghan Valley - Associated Press

U.S. Seeks Friends in Afghan Detainees - Wall Street Journal

Amputations and Genital Injuries Increase Sharply - Washington Post

Forces Kill Haqqani Terrorist in Afghanistan - AFPS

'AfPak Hands' Strive for Cultural Awareness - AFPS

Pentagon Hit for Lax Oversight of $4.2b Supply Contract - Bloomberg

Pakistan

Grief-Stricken Pakistanis Bury Slain Minister - Voice of America

Slain Cabinet Minister Is Buried in Pakistan - New York Times

Pakistan Christians Bury Murdered Leader - BBC News

Pakistanis Bury Slain Christian, Warn of Extremism - Associated Press

Pakistan: Nowshera Mosque Bombing 'Kills Nine' - BBC News

Terrorism

Even YouTube Can't Silence Radical Cleric - New York Times

Frankfurt Airport Shooting

Gunman in Germany Wanted 'Revenge' for Afghanistan - New York Times

Frankfurt Airport Shooting: Jammed Gun 'Saved Lives' - BBC News

Suspect Chatted With Soldiers Before Shooting - Wall Street Journal

U.S. Department of Defense

Gates Ratchets Up His Campaign of Candor - New York Times

U.S. Must Prepare for Varied Threats, Gates Says - AFPS

Commanders Cite Unpredictable Future Threats - AFPS

Gates Urges New Air Force Leaders to Think Creatively - AFPS

Gates: Air Force Must Find Balance for Future Wars - Associated Press

Lynn Praises Work, Successes of IED-Defeat Agency - AFPS

Senate Confirms Hertling as USAREUR Commander - Stars and Stripes

Fort Hood Suspect Step Closer to Court-Martial - Associated Press

MAJ Nidal Hasan Faces Death Penalty - Stars and Stripes

Sailor Charged with Espionage - Stars and Stripes

United States

Federal Grand Jury in Tucson Indicts Loughner - Washington Post

Rep. Peter King (R-NY): IRA Supporter - Washington Post

United Nations

U.N. Members Eyeing Arms Trade Treaty - Associated Press

Africa

Somalia Fighting Forces Thousands of Refugees Into Kenya - VOA

Somalia: At Least 50 A.U. Peacekeepers Dead - Washington Post

Danish Child Hostages Moved to Ship Off Somalia - BBC News

Ivorian City 'Resembles War Zone' - BBC News

Video Shows Women Gunned Down in Ivory Coast - Associated Press

Ivory Coast Pays Government Workers as A.U. Mediators Stall - Reuters

Sanctions Hurt Ivory Coast Economy - Voice of America

The View From Sudan - Washington Post opinion

Americas

Mexico: Concerns Raised Over Young Police Chief - New York Times

Rights Activist: Young Mexico Police Chief in U.S. - Associated Press

Family of Slain Mexican Activist Seeks U.S. Asylum - Associated Press

A Free Man Still Looks Over His Shoulder in Mexico - New York Times

13 Mexican Troops Charged With Transporting Drugs - Associated Press

U.S. Orders Mexico Border Gun Probe - BBC News

Mexico's Frustration with U.S. Drug Policy - Washington Post editorial

Arrest of Top Bolivian Drug Cop Riles President - Associated Press

Trial Against U.S. Contractor Starts in Cuba - Associated Press

Cuba Frees Dissident, Other Prisoners - Associated Press

Asia Pacific

Beijing Resumes Rapid Increase in Military Spending - New York Times

China to Boost Military Spending - Voice of America

China Muzzles Media to Prevent Mideast-Style Protests - Voice of America

China's Premier Wen Jiabao Targets 'Social Stability' - BBC News

Virus Infects 40 Web Sites In South Korea - New York Times

Dozens of South Korean Websites Attacked - Associated Press

N. Korea Heir Formally Invited to China-S. Korea Spy Agency - Reuters

Burma Democracy Group Slams Military Fund - Associated Press

Europe

German Minister Reopens Row Over Muslim Integration - The Guardian

Austria Holds ex-Bosnia General Divjak on Serb Warrant - BBC News

South Asia

Villages Set to Expand India's Consumer Market - Washington Post

Nepal's Ex-Rebels Finally Join New Government - Associated Press

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Friday Night Fight Club: War is War?

Over the last month, as the situation is questioned in Afghanistan and small wars perculate throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, the discussion has returned towards asking what is the nature of war in modern conflict and what is the utility of our Counterinsurgency Doctrine.

In February, I interviewed Bing West to ask his opinion prior to the release of his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. Bing contended,

The new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare. The new COIN, however, remains an unproven theory, with a distinct downside.

Over at Foreign Policy, Dr. Stephen Walt asks Hearts, minds, and gunships: What are we really doing in Afghanistan? He comments that

It goes without saying that the accidental killing of nine Afghan boys by an American helicopter gunship was yet another public relations setback for the U.S. war effort. But more than that, I think it may also tell us a lot about how we are really waging that war, which is somewhat at odds with the rhetorical emphasis that it tends to get back home. The incident also underscores the inherent contradictions in U.S. strategy and does not augur well for our long-term prospects.

Walt links to BCSIA fellow Jacqueline L. Hazelton's Compellence in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Uses of Force in Dhofar, Oman, and El Salvador

This paper analyzes the uses of force in two successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns to delineate under what conditions the use of military force serves the state's strategic ends, and under what conditions it hinders them. The conventional wisdom prescribes the strictly limited use of force in COIN. Historically, however, successful states have used considerable force, including massive force and including the targeting of civilians. I argue that successful counterinsurgency requires using force selectively: to punish and deter, for denial, and to show resolve. Further, I sketch the conditions under which each type of force is likely to achieve state political ends, and under what conditions it is not. The cases are the British-led campaign in Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976, and the U.S.-backed campaign in El Salvador, 1979-1992.

In my opinion, enemy versus population counterinsurgency disputes are as useless to the study of war and warfare as east verse west coast disputes were to rap and music. While both provide great publicity, they lack rigor and end in senseless tragedy.

In the end, regardless of scope, breadth, or duration, war is still war. Please continue to weigh in on the discussion and send us your experience for possible publication.

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This Week at War: The Jawbreaker Option

Forget no-fly zones; if Obama really wants to be rid of Qaddafi, it means changing the balance of power on the ground.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) For Libya, think 'Jawbreaker,' not 'Southern Watch'

2) Is asking the Army for a quick ending asking too much?

For Libya, think 'Jawbreaker,' not 'Southern Watch'

The current struggle in Washington and European capitals over what to do about Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi sounds very much like a case of déjí vu. A ruler of an oil-exporting Arab country -- a veteran of military confrontations with the West -- faces an armed uprising from citizens in rebellious provinces. He responds by counterattacking with regime loyalists who are supported by air power. Western military forces stationed near the fighting watch as the bombardment and street fighting proceeds. The U.N. Security Council issues a condemnation and the ruler's overseas bank accounts are seized. Western leaders discuss imposing a no-fly zone while a few openly hope that a palace coup will remove the ruler from power.

Two decades ago, this was the situation with Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein, just after the remnants of his destroyed army limped back from Kuwait. President George H.W. Bush and his advisors felt certain at the time that Saddam would not last more than a week or two against Kurdish and Shiite revolts that sprang up after his defeat in Kuwait. Little did they know how much irritation he would cause two succeeding U.S. presidents. Although U.S. policy toward Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War resulted in open-ended frustration and then another war, some policymakers apparently seem —to follow the same path today with Libya.

Just as with Saddam in March 1991, last week Qaddafi seemed certain to go down. One week later, it seems very possible that he could hold on. Although numerous, widespread, and enthusiastic, Libya's opposition is essentially leaderless, disorganized, and untrained for military operations. It now seems a reasonable bet that Qaddafi's trained and ruthless defenders -- supported by loyalist air power -- could scatter the resistance.

The question for President Barack Obama and his officials is whether they are —to tolerate the damage to U.S. prestige that would occur should Qaddafi crush the revolt and restore his authority over Libya. Qaddafi would join Iran as a U.S. adversary that would have successfully used repression to hang on to power while the Obama administration looked on. Meanwhile, U.S. friends in Egypt, Yemen, and perhaps elsewhere have not fared nearly as well. Fairly or not, the president may decide he is —to run some risks to avoid this characterization of his administration's foreign policy.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates made plain his concerns about imposing a no-fly zone over Libya. A no-fly zone -- similar to Operation Southern Watch, imposed over southern Iraq from 1992 to 2003 -- would have to begin with a large-scale attack on Libya's air defense system, which includes surface-to-air missile batteries, radars, military airfields, and command-and-control units. Such spectacular bombardment might be politically acceptable if it resulted in a rapid and decisive outcome against Qaddafi. But it wouldn't. Previous U.S.-imposed no-fly zones over the Balkans and Iraq merely resulted in indecisive sieges with no material change to the military balance on the ground.

If Obama decides that a Qaddafi victory would be intolerable, he should consider dusting off the plan (code named Jawbreaker) that routed the Taliban from Afghanistan in late 2001. After the 9/11 attacks, CIA paramilitary and U.S. special operations teams made contact with the Afghan Northern Alliance that opposed the Taliban. The U.S. teams, which at their peak amounted to only a few hundred men, helped the Northern Alliance organize its ground forces for an offensive, provided critical battlefield intelligence to rebel commanders, and directed U.S. air power against Taliban targets in support of a ground offensive. The Taliban's ground forces were shattered and the result was a quick decision rather than a protracted siege.

In Libya, U.S. assistance would aim to provide the resistance with decisive battlefield support it could not otherwise generate on its own. This could include the identification of loyalist military positions and capabilities, surface-to-air missile defense of resistance positions, communications support for resistance field units, electronic jamming of loyalist communications, a shutdown of Qaddafi's propaganda media, training of resistance militia, and staff and logistics support for resistance field units. The vast majority of this support would be non-kinetic and hidden from view, and could be enough by itself to be decisive against Qaddafi.

Naturally, there is a risk that such support would not be decisive. In that case, Obama would face the choice of escalation, employing U.S. air power and perhaps ground forces to break a battlefield stalemate. Another risk is that after successfully deposing Qaddafi, U.S. goals would shift in a way that resulted in another prolonged U.S. military deployment in an Arab country; after toppling the Taliban, U.S. policymakers then decided that indefinite suppression of al Qaeda in the region was necessary, which explains why the U.S. military is in Afghanistan nearly 10 years later.

Against these risks, Obama must weigh the consequences of a Qaddafi victory should the United States opt to provide no material support to the Libyan resistance. A no-fly zone, on the other hand, seems like no choice at all -- committing the U.S. to an expensive and open-ended siege without any effect on the ground, where Qaddafi's fate will ultimately be decided.

Is asking the Army for a quick ending asking too much?

In last week's column, I asserted that U.S. Army and Marine Corps leaders, who are already planning for reductions in their forces after their engagement in Afghanistan concludes, may face even further reductions if they cannot explain how U.S. ground forces will be relevant to security problems in the post-Afghanistan era. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated to some U.S. policymakers that general-purpose ground forces may not be a very good tool for solving many of today's irregular security challenges.

Nathan Freier, a retired U.S. Army officer and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is among a rare group of analysts openly discussing what the future holds for the Army after Afghanistan. In a recent essay for the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Freier offered up his recommendation for what the Army should prepare for. If soldiers thought Iraq and Afghanistan were unpleasant, Freier thinks the next challenges could be even tougher.

Freier asserts that Pentagon planners would be wise to begin with some stern assumptions. Resources, especially for the Army, will be in decline. Allies will be of little help. Adversaries will continue to use irregular warfare techniques to avoid U.S. military strengths. And Washington will expect U.S. forces to solve a greater variety of "small war" security challenges, but will demand that military planners avoid risks, casualties, and long campaigns as they do so.

Freier's worst-case scenario is a "large-scale limited opposed stabilization campaign." In this scenario, the United States would face a political collapse and a security breakdown inside a politically fragile country, resulting in either large and uncontrolled refugee flows or the loss of control over nuclear or other mass-destruction weapons. Freier further posits that the population of this country is hostile to U.S. intervention and that there is no functioning central authority as a useful partner. Even if U.S. officials would prefer to remain detached from the chaos, the security and humanitarian consequences of benign neglect would be too painful to endure.

In such a scenario, Freier foresees the need for 90,000 to 230,000 soldiers deploying to the immediate theater of operations to conduct stabilization operations. At the high end, such a force would be more than twice the force currently in Afghanistan and nearly 50 percent larger than the maximum "surge" force in Iraq in 2008. Freier suggests that U.S. planners should count on a two-year commitment at this level followed by a much smaller but lingering presence, a forecast that would imply an extensive mobilization of reserves and at least one rotation of fresh brigades to the war zone.

It is on this point that Freier's properly gloomy planning assumptions become improbably bright and sunny. The United States has no record of such a prompt exit from such a large military campaign. The only way such a prompt exit could occur is if U.S. forces were able to rapidly train indigenous security forces to replace U.S. forces. Such "security force assistance" must become an essential tool of U.S. government policy. Although a critical tool, there is no record of the United States executing a security force assistance mission both rapidly and on a large scale. More likely, and contrary to what Freier expects, would be many more rotations of U.S. general-purpose forces -- in other words, another Iraq or Afghanistan.

Faced with that less sunny assumption, U.S. policymakers will demand a major rewrite of the plan. They will ask for options that get to the finish line faster. Freier has alerted policymakers to the difficulties ahead and has challenged military planners to prepare options that are both militarily and politically realistic. Unfortunately, no planner knows how to write such an operations order.

U.S. and Mexico Should Embrace Regional Cooperation

CNAS Report: U.S. and Mexico Should Embrace Regional Cooperation to Combat Drug Cartels

As Presidents Obama and Calderón continue to discuss the United States and Mexico's efforts to combat growing drug-related violence, the leaders should look to embrace regional cooperation to combat the cartels, according to a recent report authored by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Non-Resident Senior Fellow Bob Killebrew.

In Crime Wars: Gangs, Drugs, and U.S. National Security, Killebrew surveys organized crime throughout the Western Hemisphere and analyzes the challenges it poses to individual countries and regional security. He argues that Mexico will remain a key state in the struggle against violent organized crime in the region, and that the United States should continue to support Mexico's efforts while examining its own role in the ongoing conflict. In addition, the report notes, the United States and Mexico should:

* Increase U.S.-Mexico law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

* Increase bilateral training and assistance.

* Embrace regional cooperation to attack cartels.

* Attack the cartels' financial networks and money-laundering capabilities.

"Whether Calderón and his successors can or will sustain a long-term, bloody fight to root out corruption in the Mexican state and reassert the rule of law is a matter of grave concern for the United States," said Killebrew.

Download Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security.

This report is also available for download in Spanish: Guerras del Crimen: Pandillas, Cárteles y la Seguridad Nacional Estadounidense.

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Battle for the Heart and Soul of USNI

Several of us at Small Wars Journal are card carrying members of the U.S. Naval Institute. For those of you who might ask why the current bru-ha-ha concerning the proposed changes in USNI's mission statement I'll quote the following e-mail that just arrived in my in-box:

I am not sure how aware you are of the USNI battle over its fundamental mission, its soul if you will, but it may not seem like something of much concern to the SWJ audience. Nothing could be further from the truth. The numbers of insurgency and COIN related article published in both Proceedings and Naval History Magazine are rather phenomenal and the entire public forum is diminished when we lose another independent public entity, especially one as well regarded at the USNI. One might even forecast that the means used to conduct the coup d'etat from within by these folks at USNI could conceivably be similar to actions that might be taken to undermine the independence of any other public service publication or electronic journal - including yours. "It could never happen here" was probably on the lips of many at USNI and among the membership just short years ago, I am sure.

Here is the current USNI mission statement:

"The Mission of the Institute is to provide an independent forum for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical to national defense."

Here is the proposed change:

"THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE IS AN INDEPENDENT FORUM ADVOCATING THE NECESSITY OF GLOBAL SEA POWER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY."

Even this simple minded Marine understands the difference between independence and advocacy. Once you become an advocate for a particular service don't knock at my door expecting sympathy. USNI is heads and tails above similar institutions associated with the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. Why? USNI does not mouth the party line -- and for that reason alone - the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard have benefited greatly over the years by USNI's INDEPENDENCE.

On the 2011 annual ballot the Board of Directors has recommended "an historic change to the Mission of the Naval Institute to 'advocating the necessity of global seapower.'" I am voting no to the proposed change and I encourage other USNI members to do the same. I'll not regurgitate what those much smarter than me have said about this issue - here are several links - and from there - you'll find more.

Information Dissemination -- Almost real-time coverage of the debate and issues by Raymond Pritchard and crew.

The Crazy Plan to Change the Longtime Mission of the U.S. Naval Institute - CAPT John Byron (USN, Ret.) at Foreign Policy's Best Defense.

Open Letter to the Board of the United States Naval Institute by John Byron - At Information Dissemination.

CDR Salamander - More near-real-time coverage of the issue.

The United States Naval Institute and the Junior Officer - By SWJ friend and author LCDR Benjamin "BJ" Armstrong at CDR Salamander.

Add additional links in the comment section below - thanks much - Dave D.