Is the U.S. coming to terms with the Taliban?
Is the U.S. coming to terms with the Taliban?
What do possible peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban mean for Afghanistan's future?
The Stream on Al Jazeera English
Cross-posted with full permissions
The announcement that the Taliban will open a political office in Qatar marks the first public step towards negotiations with the United States. Critics argue that talks will diminish the role of the Afghan government and strengthen the Taliban.
Many believe there is no clear role for Afghan President Hamid Karzai and this could undermine his power in future negotiations. Advocates for civil society groups similarly believe that too much of Afghan society is being ignored by the proposed peace talks.
In this episode of The Stream, we talk to Fariba Nawa (@FaribaNawa), author of Opium Nation and Ahmad Shuja (@AhmadShuja), who writes the Afghanistan Analysis blog.
What do you think? Will talks with the Taliban promote national reconciliation or lead to greater divisions and conflict in Afghanistan? Send us your thoughts and comments on Facebook or Twitter using hashtag #AJStream.
Adelphi 425-6: Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond
Adelphi 425-6: Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond
edited by Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman
IISS
As the international security forces prepare to depart from Afghanistan, this Adelphi turns attention to the ability of a ravaged country to tackle its myriad security problems, overcome crippling poverty and corruption and somehow revive its devastated economy. The government faces daunting challenges, ranging from the threat of insurgency and cross-border terrorism to the difficulty of reintegrating and reconciling former Taliban figures and combatants into a political settlement. It must do so against the background of continuing and potentially increasing regional instability, with the country’s neighbours tempted to step up their interference in Afghan affairs.
Stability depends upon drawing the wider Pashtun community into the ruling coalition, while simultaneously maintaining security, increasing the capability of the state and balancing the interests of its neighbours and regional powers. This volume draws together expert analysis to provide a comprehensive study of the obstacles that Afghanistan must overcome, together with regional and international partners, as it charts a slow course back to functional statehood.
‘This penetrating analysis, succinctly written with a total grasp of the complexity of the problems, provides the most forward-looking analysis available anywhere. Addressing Afghanistan’s ties to Pakistan, India, Iran and Central Asia, it shows how the region will affect Afghanistan’s future and how Afghanistan will affect the region.’ Ahmed Rashid, author of Taliban and Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia
‘For those of us who care about the importance of Afghanistan and worry about its future and thus for our own safety, this book makes fascinating and essential reading. It illuminates the issues with great thoroughness and, against the prevailing gloom, dares to make the case for conditional optimism.’ Lord Robertson, former Secretary-General of NATO
‘An invaluable work of sober, informed analysis. Each chapter lays out the facts without bias, guiding the reader through the enormous complexity of Afghanistan past and present. Most importantly, the regional dynamic receives thorough treatment.’ Jason Burke, author of Al-Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam and The 9/11 Wars, and South Asia correspondent for the Guardian and the Observe
Was There a Recent Coup Attempt in China?
Was There a Recent Coup Attempt in China?
by Gordon G. Chang
World Affairs
According to a report, around New Year’s day officers in two Chinese air force units were arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup. At the same time, a nuclear submarine on patrol was ordered back to port because some on board were thought to have links with the plotters. This report, circulated on Sunday on a China-watching listserv, remains unconfirmed. This rumor could be linked in some fashion to the detention last month of Colonel Tan Linshu, of the Chinese navy, for subversion.
A coup at first glance seems inconceivable, but there has been an evident erosion in civilian control of the Chinese military in recent years. The most important manifestation of this breakdown is that colonels and flag officers have begun openly criticizing civilian leaders and are now speaking out on matters once considered the exclusive province of diplomats.
What’s happening? From all indications, senior officers have gained influence in top Communist Party circles as civilian leaders have, since the early part of last decade, looked to them to settle power struggles in Beijing. Today, that trend is continuing as generals and admirals are involving themselves in a major leadership transition set to formally begin at the end of this year at the 18th Party Congress.
China Communist Party bureaucrats like their cars high end
Old School
by Adam Elkus
Rethinking Security
It is without reservations that I state that The Sovereignty Solution was the most important book of 2011 that most of you never read.
Anna Simons and her co-authors at the Naval Postgraduate School have crafted the national security equivalent of a religious revival. Like the Great Awakening, it contains a heavy undertone of conservatism (although thankfully no fire-and-brimstone moments akin to “Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God”) but also a call for reinvention. It is both a trip back to as we once were and a journey to a place we never were—but might go.
The Sovereignty Solution begins by laying out a set of unfortunate realizations: Americans don’t like protracted wars, are easily politically divided over national security, and our enemies understand us in many ways better than we understand ourselves. To make matters worse, those enemies, through use of human shields, lawfare, and the assistance of”useful idiots” both home and abroad, force us to play by their rules and agonize over how to deal with their asymmetric tactics. Our campaigns have attempted to use state-building and democracy promotion to overcome these difficulties, but met with mixed results. So far, the book is hardly different from many post-9/11 critiques.
Book Review: A Lesson Ignored
Book Review: A Lesson Ignored
By Colonel William T. Anderson
The Moro War, How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913, by James R. Arnold, Bloomsbury Press, 2011, 306 pages.
As Operation Iraqi Freedom spiraled into a counterinsurgency in the summer of 2003, our military institutions struggled to get a sense of the cultural and religious conflict spiraling out of control. Book shelves long dusty through nonuse were perused for any examples of how to wage war in what appeared to be a new paradigm. In reality, of course, this situation was not new but a modern example of wars at the turn of the 20th Century. There were lessons to be learned in libraries. You just needed to know where to look. It would have been helpful if Mr. Arnold’s new book had been available. The author of several books on the history of counterinsurgency, he has done a great service in reminding us of the Moro War in the Philippines from 1902-1913 when an insurgency sprang from a clash of cultures.
As a result of the 1898 Treaty of Paris ending the war with Spain, the US obtained sovereignty over the vast Philippine Archipelago. Included in this collection of islands was Moroland, a province comprised of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan and a host of smaller islands in the Sulu Sea. Inhabited by primitive Muslim communities of pagan hill warriors, the dense jungles of Mindanao became known to American soldiers as the “boondocks,” based upon a Tagalog word bundok. Arriving in 1899, the Americans were, as Mr. Arnold describes, “{b}lithely unaware of the history that had shaped Moro society and supremely confident in the virtues of their own beliefs.” Sound familiar? One critical fact was that the Spanish had never really established any sovereignty in Moroland. The only thing that was accomplished by the Spanish was to unite the various tribes against the occupying Christian colonial administration in a holy war. It is not hard to imagine the reaction of the Moros when Christian Americans replaced the Spanish and announced that the US was in charge and were going to “improve” the local culture.
Between 1899-1902, there was a honeymoon of sorts in Moroland as each side avoided confrontation. Due to more pressing problems, the Americans concentrated their efforts during this period on Luzon to the north and other islands of the archipelago. Indeed, the difficult operations in Samar from 1901-1902 are an iconic episode of Marine Corps history. Subsequently, focus shifted to Moroland in 1903 where both sides eventually experienced “mutual disillusionment.” A conflict was inevitable as Moroland was essentially a feudal society based upon banditry and slavery. The first military governor, Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, attempted to bring order by exposing the locals to the benefits of “civilized” society. This exposure included punitive expeditions similar to those conducted against Native Americans. Subsequently, Wood’s successor, Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss, sought to incorporate economic and social reforms rather than use force. This was in response to considerable bad press about what some believed was Wood’s “reign of terror.” Success was ultimately achieved after Brig. Gen. John Pershing became governor in 1909. His approach was a combination of reforms and the use of decisive force when warranted. Regardless of who was in charge, what ensued was a decade of classic colonial misrule marred by bloodshed on both sides, with each having a share of villains and heroes.
The crux of the problem for the Americans in Moroland has a modern sound to it. With the arrival of well-meaning troops, the US began a campaign with the laudable goal of improving Moro society. However, these agents of progress failed to understand the culture of the Muslim inhabitants and, in effect, did everything within their power to challenge the Moro way of life. Indeed, the visitors viewed most aspects of Moro society with disgust: slavery, piracy and the degradation of women, to name three. Reluctantly, the American soldiers ventured into the wild interior; areas so remote and ungovernable that even the Spanish stayed out. Once the inhabitants began to resist attempts at civilization, a conflict ensued that pitted predominately Christian forces against a ragtag group of Islamic fighters in a classic insurgency. Thus, in what was mainly a company-grade officers’ war, lessons were learned by the US through the blood, sweat and tears of the American soldier. Mistakes were made and new approaches attempted when others failed.
The reputations of a number of leaders burned brighter after their service in Moroland. Some would rise to positions of greater leadership, both before and during the Great War. Regrettably, some reputations would suffer. The Moro War lasted until Gen. Pershing was relieved by the first civilian governor. Pershing would return to the US and command a brigade in San Francisco, a transfer seen by some as a demotion. However, during his service in Moroland beginning in 1902 as a captain, he had earned an enormous amount of respect from anyone who knew of the war. Ultimately, he would lead the American Expeditionary Force during our participation in the Great War.
Mr. Arnold has done a masterful job in telling this story. He recounts not only the routine problems operating in an austere area (i.e., fatigue, supply shortages and sickness) but he also discusses how the US authorities wrestled with the complex nature of a counterinsurgency. It is axiomatic now that a thorough understanding of the indigenous culture is critical to success. Failures in cultural appreciation led to many missteps. In addition, a short-deployment rotation of personnel can be counter-productive in a conflict that requires experience of the local conditions and the maintenance of goodwill with local leaders. Finally, Mr. Arnold relates the difficulties with strategic communications and the questions of national commitment for a war lasting over a decade. Even in an era without the blogosphere, their version of instantaneous communication through the telegraph caused many leaders to lose sleep. Not surprisingly, some journalists were not welcomed in some US camps in Moroland. This is a great story of a little-known war far from home with “ill-defined national objectives” coupled with operational errors. We should be distributing copies to the war colleges and forces preparing to go overseas.
Col. William T. Anderson USMCR (Ret.) is currently a senior analyst with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.
New Hampshire and Vietnam
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd Edition)
by Graham Allison
One of the most influental political science works written in the post World War II era, the original edition of Essence of Decision is a unique and fascinating examination of the pivotal event of the cold Cold War. Not simply revised, but completely re-written, the Second Edition of this classic text is a fresh reinterpretation of the theories and events surrounding the Cuban Missle Crisis, incorporating all new information from the Kennedy tapes and recently declassified Soviet files. Essence of Decision Second Edition, is a vivid look at decision-making under pressure and is the only single volume work that attempts to answer the enduring question: how should citizens understand the actions of their government?
by Carl Prine
Line of Departure
You see, gentle readers, presidents tell generals what to do. The GOs don’t tell presidents or Congress how to run wars, a problem we’ve had with a generation of late Baby Boom four-stars who never served in Vietnam, too, which is why Huntsman has to lecture us about Afghanistan.
Do you think Ronald Reagan took orders from generals? How about Teddy Roosevelt? George H.W. Bush?
Really? Heck, I think Dick Nixon would’ve cracked a Stroh’s bottle over a four-star’s skull and shivved him with the glass jags if he looked halfway crooked at Hank Kissinger in the White House cafeteria.
Here was Huntsman reminding Romney about what real presidents do:
Yes. I would have to tell Mitt that the president of the United States is the commander-in-chief. Of course you get input and — and advice from a lot of different corners of Washington, including the commanders on the ground.
But we also deferred to the commanders on the ground in about 1967, during the Vietnam War, and we didn’t get very good advice then.
Here’s what I think is around the corner in Afghanistan. I think civil war is around the corner in Afghanistan. And I don’t want to be the president who invests another penny in a civil war. And I don’t want to be the president who sends another man or woman into harm’s way that we don’t — we’re not able to bring back alive.
I say we’ve got something to show for our mission. Let’s recognize that and let’s move on.
Huntsman, you see, didn’t need to serve in Vietnam, get drafted into the Air Force or brag about what his state’s National Guardsmen did honorably and bravely overseas to learn a few lessons about America’s wars.
He might’ve been the only on at the debate who did. I wish he’d teach us some more.
11 January SWJ Roundup
US Naval Institute Daily - USNI
Real Clear World - RCP
Afghanistan
Suicide Attackers Storm Afghan Government Building - NYT
Militants Storm Government Building Killing Seven - LAT
Suicide Bomber Targets Afghan Police, 1 Hurt - AP
Training Kicks Off for NATO Mentors in Afghanistan - AFPS
Talking to the Taliban - WP opinion
Pakistan
3 Killed as Drone Strikes Resume in Pakistan - NYT
US Fires 1st Drone in Pakistan Since Fatal Strike - AP
Bomb Kills 35 in NW Pakistan - VOA
30 Killed in Northwest Pakistan - WP
US Aided Pakistan Group Which Supported Extremists - AP
Pakistan PM Sacks Defense Secretary - Reuters
Rockets to Flatten Osama Bin Laden Hideout - TS
Pakistani Judges Press Premier to Defy President - NYT
Pakistan Army Warns of 'Consequences' to PM Charge - AP
Pluralism on Trial in Pakistan - WP opinion
Iran
Public ire is One Goal of Iran Sanctions, US Official Says -WP
Bombing Kills Iranian Nuclear Scientist - VOA
Blaming US and Israel, Iran Reports Killing of Nuclear Scientist - NYT
'Nuclear Scientist Killed' in Iran Blast - BBC
Report: Bomb Kills Official at Iran Nuke Facility - AP
US Forces Rescue Second Iranian Vessel - AFPS
US Rescues Iranians at Sea, Again - WP
US Navy Reports Second Rescue of Iranian Mariners - NYT
US 'in Second Iran Sea Rescue' - BBC
Geithner Discusses Iran Sanctions During Beijing Talks - VOA
Geithner in Beijing Talks on Iran - BBC
China Defends Iran Oil Trade Despite US Push - Reuters
Iran Speaker in Turkey for Talks - BBC
Clinton Assails Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program - LAT
American’s Unusual Résumé May Have Attracted Suspicion - NYT
Iran’s New Threats - WP editorial
Syria
Defiant Assad Speech Draws Angry Reaction From Syrian Opponents - VOA
Assad Vows ‘Iron Fist’ Against Protests - WP
Outsiders Feed Unrest in Syria, Assad Says - NYT
Assad Pledges Iron Fist Against Opponents - LAT
US Condemns Hardline Assad Speech - BBC
Syria's Assad Makes Rare Appearance at Rally - AP
UN: 400 Killed in Syria Since Dec. 27 - WP
Syria Observer Mission 'a Farce' - BBC
Israel Prepared to Take in Syrian Refugees, Chief of Staff Says - LAT
Israel, Expecting Syrian Collapse, Braces for Refugees - NYT
Middle East / North Africa
Report Says Israeli Settlement Construction up by 20 Percent - VOA
Palestinian Leaders Outraged over West Bank Construction Data - LAT
Gunmen Kill 1, Injure 5 Yemeni Intelligence Officers - Reuters
HRW: Yemen Should Reject Saleh Immunity Law - Reuters
Egypt: Israeli Pilgrimage 'Impossible' This Year - AP
Libya Gets Reprieve on Extradition of Gadhafi Son to ICC - WT
ICC Extends Gaddafi Son Deadline - BBC
Political Islam Without Oil - NYT opinion
US Department of Defense
CNO: Don't Expect More Troops, Ships in Pacific - S&S
People Form Defense Strategy’s Centerpiece, Official Says - AFPS
Marine: Haditha Killings Justified after House Labeled Hostile - S&S
What’s Ahead for Guantanamo Camps in New Decade? - S&S
Army Sought 'Universal' Radio, but Created a Boondoggle - S&S
Back From War, Fear and Danger Fill Driver’s Seat - NYT
United States
Medical Schools to Increase Focus on PTSD, TBI - S&S
Give Guantánamo Back to Cuba - NYT opinion
Africa
Sectarian Strife Roils Nigeria Amid Strike - LAT
Deadly Gun Attack on Nigerian Bar - BBC
Outrage Grows Among Nigerians Striking Over Fuel Prices - VOA
Government: Ongoing Nigeria Strike Invites Anarchy - AP
UK Man 'Sold Illegal Arms to Nigeria' - BBC
Kenyan Youths Urged to Join Al-Shabab Jihadist Campaign - VOA
Uganda Shops Shut in Bank Protest - BBC
Rwanda: Kagame 'Did Not Shoot Down Plane' - BBC
Americas
Businesses in Mexico Help City Shaken by Violence - NYT
Colombia Rejects Rebel Talks Bid - BBC
Ortega Begins New Nicaragua Term - BBC
Peru Replaces Drug Tsar Soberon - BBC
Brazil Moves to Stem Haiti Influx - BBC
Asia Pacific
China’s Premier to Visit Persian Gulf - WP
China Warns US Not to Meddle in Its Affairs - AP
N. Korea: US Offered Food Aid in Exchange for Nuclear Concessions - VOA
North Korea Opens Door to Possible Food Aid From US - NYT
North Korea Keeps Door Open for Food-Nuke Deal - AP
Gates, US Corporate Captains to Visit Burma - Reuters
Europe
Fear that Austerity is Killing Greece’s Economy - WP
Italy Austerity: PM Monti Warns of Angry Response - BBC
German Economy 'Probably Shrank' - BBC
Russia: Anti-Putin Opposition Robust After Holidays - VOA
A Warning to Russian Protesters? - WP
Russian Official Suggests Weapon Caused Spacecraft’s Failure - NYT
Russia's Space Chief Says Failures May be Sabotage - AP
Afghan Man Faces German Terrorism Charges - AP
France Expels Record Number of Illegal Immigrants - AP
Scots Leader: Scotland Must Run Independence Vote - AP
South Asia
Indian PM: Malnutrition a Matter of 'National Shame' - VOA
Malnutrition Widespread in Indian Children, Report Finds - NYT
Change Would Allow Some Foreign-Owned Stores to Open in India - NYT
Afghan Noir: review of Michael Hastings’ “The Operators” in The Daily
Afghan Noir: review of Michael Hastings’ “The Operators” in The Daily
by Ann Marlowe
Selfishly, I wish “The Operators” were a better book. Though we come from different places in the political spectrum, Michael Hastings shares many of my views on Afghanistan and has the notoriety to bring them to a wide audience.
Was the surge a mistake, increasing levels of violence? Yes. Has the American effort to train the Afghan army and police been an unbelievably expensive boondoggle? Check. Did the American military’s toleration of thugs like Ahmed Wali Karzai and Border Police Gen. Raziq help fuel the insurgency? Yes. Was former commanding Gen. David Petraeus more concerned with managing perceptions than reality? Check. Was his predecessor Stanley McChrystal an amoral mediocrity in way over his head? We agree there too.
Furthermore, Hastings has the guts to let the chips fall where they may — as he did in the June 2010 Rolling Stone profile of then-commanding general McChrystal that quickly led to his firing.
But “The Operators” is a mess.
SWJ QUOTE OF 2012
SWJ quote of 2012 (H/T French Defence Analysis Stéphane Taillat)
Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)
by Robert D. Kaplan
The Atlantic
If you tell people the world is complicated, you’re not doing your job as a social scientist. They already know it’s complicated. Your job is to distill it, simplify it, and give them a sense of what is the single [cause], or what are the couple of powerful causes that explain this powerful phenomenon. (Samuel Huntington à son protégé Fareed Zakaria)