Small Wars Journal

U.S. Navy rescues Iranian vessel from pirates

Fri, 01/06/2012 - 1:21pm

The rescue was completed today by the Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) team of guided missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG 100). USS Kidd is assigned to the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group, which recently transited from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to the Arabian Sea.

As described in the Navy press release, the VBSS team recovered the fishing dhow Al Molai from the 15 suspected pirates without resistance.

“After securing the ship and ensuring the safety of all persons on board, we began distributing food and water to both the crew and the suspected criminals as is our standard practice in Counter-Piracy operations,” said [NCIS agent Josh] Schminky. The pirates were detained on the Al Molai by the Kidd boarding party until the next morning when they could be transferred to the USS John C. Stennis where the matter will be reviewed for prosecution. The pirates currently remain on the Stennis.

“The Captain of the Al Molai expressed his sincere gratitude that we came to assist them. He was afraid that without our help, they could have been there for months,” said Schminky.

Needed: A national economic security lens

Fri, 01/06/2012 - 9:33am

Needed: A national economic security lens

By Juan C. Zarate
CBS

Last October, a U.S. intelligence report to Congress revealed that foreign economic espionage worth billions of dollars is being driven by China and Russia and represents a "significant and growing" threat to the nation's prosperity and security.

The Internet has accelerated and amplified economic vulnerabilities given the ease of digital access to mass amounts of data, low barriers of entry to cyber intrusion, and the useful cloak of online anonymity. But this threat to our national economic security isn't confined to cyberspace.

In the interconnected global environment, economic power, access to resources, and cutting edge technologies are defining both power and vulnerabilities. China and Russia have already demonstrated their willingness to engage in a new geo-economic game. It's one the United States needs to learn to play quickly.

During a diplomatic spat last year with Japan, China suspended its export of rare-earth minerals - necessary for key high-tech manufactured items like hybrid engines and solar panels. China has also used its undervalued currency, subsidies, and the weight of its market - both current and future - to demand local content and partnership concessions from foreign companies.

The resulting transfer of technology and marginalization of multinational companies has allowed Chinese companies to take larger chunks of the global solar, wind turbine, and high-speed rail markets. At the same time, Chinese infrastructure and extraction projects in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America are facilitating Chinese access to both raw materials and political influence.

Russia hasn't hesitated to play the game either, using its oil and natural gas resources to exert political pressure while padding the Kremlin's coffers. In 2006 and again in 2009, Russia shut off natural gas supplies to Europe through Ukrainian pipelines to extract concessions from the Ukraine and put political pressure on a rival. Russia - through Gazprom - has also followed an acquisition pattern of "plugging the holes" of alternate channels of energy supply to Europe in the Balkans, Poland, and perhaps now in Greece.

The United States is unprepared to play this new geo-economic game. Our current approach to economic security abroad reflects a reticence to meld political and economic interests, something Secretary of State Clinton has begun to highlight. This underscores a long-standing structural divide between national security policies and the role of the U.S. private sector in the international commercial and financial system.

Why Panetta's Pentagon Cuts Are Easier Than You Think

Fri, 01/06/2012 - 8:18am

Why Panetta's Pentagon Cuts Are Easier Than You Think

by Lawrence J. Kolb

Foreign Affairs

 

This week, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is expected to announce a strategy for cutting hundreds of billions of dollars from the defense budget. Civilian and military leaders have reacted with apocalyptic warnings, decrying the disastrous impact such cuts will have. They claim that without proper resources the United States will not be able to protect its interests around the globe.

But the Pentagon does not have a resource problem. As even the Pentagon's strongest supporters agree, it has a management problem. Norbert Ryan, the president of the Military Officers Association, summed it up well in a recent Washington Times op-ed: "Almost weekly we see reports of gross mismanagement and cost overruns in expensive programs, few of which have any relevance to the wars our troops are fighting today," he wrote. "The level of mismanagement is so severe that the Pentagon's books have been deemed 'unauditable,' and Pentagon leaders have said they won't be able to pass the test before 2017." 

Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), a career naval officer and war hero, went further. In a December 15, 2011 speech on the Senate floor, he unleashed a blistering attack on virtually every weapon system under development. He called the F-35 program a mess, lamented significant problems with the Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, criticized the Army's Future Combat Systems as worse than a "spectacular, shameful failure," and said that the F-22 may well be the most "expensive corroding hangar queen" ever. 

The Pentagon was not always so poorly run. It has had fewer management problems whenever the administration has brought in a strong deputy secretary as the chief operations officer (the secretary usually being too busy to manage the department). For example, President Dwight Eisenhower had Charles Wilson from General Motors, Richard Nixon had David Packard from Hewlett-Packard, Jimmy Carter had Charles Duncan from Coca-Cola, and George H.W. Bush had Donald Atwood, also from General Motors.

6 January SWJ Roundup

Fri, 01/06/2012 - 7:00am

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

US Department of Defense

Obama Unveils Strategy for Smaller, Agile Future US Military - VOA

Smaller Military, Narrower Capabilities Highlight Strategy Review - S&S

Obama Describes Refocused Strategy for Leaner Military - NYT

Obama Plans a Leaner, Cheaper Military - WP

President Obama Calls for Leaner Military - LAT

New Defense Strategy Sets Obama's Gaze on Asia - AP

Obama: Future Force Will be Smaller, Agile, Ready - AFPS

Sept. 11 Case a Litmus Test for Military Commissions - NPR

Court-martial to Begin for Marine in Iraqi Killings - LAT

Rules Restrict Political Activity by DOD Personnel - AFPS

A Leaner Pentagon - NYT editorial

America's New Lean Fighting Machine - LAT editorial

One War at a Times - WP opinion

Cuts Threaten the Military - WP opinion

 

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Closes Firm Providing Security - NYT

Karzai Demands Afghan Control Over Biggest Military Prison - WP

Karzai Calls for Coalition to Cede Control of Afghan Prisoners - NYT

NATO: 5 Troops Killed in South Afghanistan - AP

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

 

Pakistan

Senators: Stop Harassing Former Pakistan Envoy - WP

 

Iran

Iran’s Sense of Gloom Contrasts with US Hope - WP

Iran Responds With Anger to Proposals by Europe - NYT

Screws Tighten on Iran as Big Buyers Shun Its Oil - Reuters

EU Governments Consider Delay on Any Iran Oil Ban - Reuters

EU Officials Try to Agree on Iran Oil Embargo - AP

Iran to Hold New Naval Exercises - AP

UK Signals Ready to Use Force to Keep Strait Open - Reuters

Analysis: Iran Could Close Hormuz, but Not for Long - Reuters

Iran Under Pressure - WP opinion

 

Syria

Hundreds Tortured in Syria, Human Rights Group Says - NYT

Qatar Asks UN to Help Monitors in Syria - LAT

Qatar Says Arab Monitors in Syria Made Mistakes - AP

Syrian Media Awaken Despite Risks - Reuters

Deadly Explosion in Damascus, Says Syria State TV - BBC

Explosion Targets Police Bus in Damascus - AP

Suicide Bomber Kills Several in Damascus - Reuters

 

Iraq

Political Role for Militants Worsens Fault Lines in Iraq - NYT

Scores Dead as Bombings Shake Iraq During Political Crisis - VOA

Explosions Across Iraq Kill Dozens Amid Political Crisis - NYT

Bombs Targeting Iraqi Shiites Kill 72 - WP

Iraq Bombings Targeting Shiites Kill 71 - LAT

Iraq Bombings Leave Scores Dead - BBC

Bombs Target Iraqi Shi'ites, Kill at Least 73 - Reuters

Iraq Militia Says Kidnapped Briton Killed in Escape - Reuters

 

Egypt

US Pro-Democracy Policy Faces First Major Test with Islamists - WP

Prosecution Demands Death Penalty for Egypt's Mubarak - VOA

Prosecutors in Egypt Call for Mubarak to Be Hanged - NYT

Death Penalty Sought for Mubarak - WP

 

Middle East / North Africa

Israel, Palestinians to Meet on Monday, U.S. Says - Reuters

Former Israeli Premier Is Indicted on Bribery Charge - NYT

Israel Plans New Rules on Exchange of Prisoners - NYT

12 Israeli Settlers Banned from West Bank - WP

Eighteen Militants, 4 Troops Killed in Yemen Clashes - Reuters

UN Criticizes Sharp Rise in Saudi Executions - AP

Libyan Soldiers Demand Salaries - Reuters

 

United States

Recent Fights in Congress Could Be Just Warm-Ups - NYT

Rule Would Let Undocumented Stay in US During Application - LAT

Easier Route to Green Card to Be Proposed for Some - NYT

Foreign Money Swaying US Voters? - NYT opinion

 

United Kingdom

Britain and US to Scale Down Military Capability Due to Debt Crisis - TG

Bomb Defused Under Soldier's Car in Northern Ireland - Reuters

UK PM David Cameron Criticizes 'The Iron Lady' - AP

 

Africa

Accounts Emerge in South Sudan of 3,000 Deaths in Ethnic Violence - NYT

Deadly Shooting at Nigeria Church - BBC

Gunmen Kill 6 in Nigeria Church Attack - Reuters

Q&A: Zimbabwe's 'Cold War, Which Is a Racial War' - VOA

In New Control Over Diamonds, Smugglers Pay in Mozambique - NYT

Somalia: Ethiopian Troops 'to Hand Over to AU Force' - BBC

Kenya Seizes Explosive Equipment Near Somali Border - Reuters

 

Americas

Migrants’ New Paths Reshaping Latin America - NYT

Mexico Turns Up the Heat on Drug Lord Guzman - Reuters

Police Detain 20 in Deadly Mexico Prison Riot - AP

Guatemalan Judge Suspends Trial Against Ex-Leader - AP

 

Asia Pacific

China Must Assert Itself Despite New US Strategy - Reuters

US Asks China to Press N. Korea To Avoid Military Provocations - NYT

US and S. Korea Discuss Leadership Change in N. Korea - AP

Sometimes, It's a Crime to Praise Pyongyang - NYT

Tax Case Against China's Ai Weiwei to Get Review - AP

Kidnappings Point to Security Breakdown in Southern Philippines - NYT

Britain's Hague Says Burma Needs More Reforms  - AP

Burma's Suu Kyi, UK's Hague in Tune on Sanctions - Reuters

 

Europe

Ex-Chief of Turkish Army Arrested in Widening Case Alleging Coup Plot - NYT

Turkey's Ex-army Chief Arrested - BBC

Turkish Ex-Army Chief Held in Jail - Reuters

Turkey: Ex-Military Chief Arrested Over Plot - AP

German President Retreats on Openness - NYT

Ex-Minister Urges Russian Parliamentary Vote Rerun - AP

 

South Asia

Indians' Ordeal Rattles New Delhi-Beijing Ties - LAT

Indian Kashmir Shuts to Protest Killing of Student - AP

The End of Twentieth-Century Warfare

Fri, 01/06/2012 - 4:03am

The End of Twentieth-Century Warfare

by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Atlantic Council

9/11 was the defining event of the new millennium, but not for the reasons we thought for most of the ensuing decade. For most of that period we would have pointed to 9/11 as the beginning of twenty-first century warfare: perpetual vigilance and probing pre-emptive strikes against an ill-defined, global, networked and largely non-state enemy. From the vantage point of 2011, however, it is far more likely that historians will see 9/11 as the catalyst for the end of twentieth-century warfare: large-scale, multi-year deployments requiring the conquest, control and long-term stabilisation and reconstruction of foreign territory. The nuclear weapons that ended the Second World War ended great power war. The fall of the Soviet Union ended great power proxy war among current great powers, although Pakistan certainly thinks it is fighting India in the valleys and cities of Afghanistan. The second Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan are ending boots-on-the ground wars of counter-insurgency and regime change.

The great power wars of the twenty-first century will be fought by special forces: specialised in combat against pirates, terrorists and global criminal networks; in focused search and rescue and search and destroy missions; and in civilian protection units capable of disabling but not destroying an enemy. They will be fought by cyber-warriors, skilled in manipulating unmanned weapons and in deterring and responding to system-wide cyber-attacks. And they will be fought in multilateral coalitions aimed at stopping the wars that criminal governments wage against their own people and bringing individual leaders and their coterie of high-level supporters to justice.

Many readers will shake their heads and think how short is historical memory. 'Never again' has as little impact on the decisions to mobilise armies as it does on the decisions to stop genocide. Reasons always exist to send in the troops; it is just that war-weary, broke, frustrated Americans confronted with their crumbling domestic human and physical infrastructure have temporarily forgotten or forsworn them. Perhaps. But as two American military officers argue compellingly in a twenty-first­ century sequel to George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' (the X article), the world's greatest military power, near the height of its military dominance, is confronting a world in which control is giving way to credible influence (Mr Y, 'A National Strategic Narrative', 2011). No country, however mighty, can direct or determine global outcomes (it never could, but the illusion was good enough for government work). The best it can hope reflections on the 9/11 decade for is to influence others - governments and societies alike - in shaping events and adapting to a continuous stream of changing challenges. In this world we will not 'win wars'. We will have an assortment of civilian and military tools to increase our chances of turning looming bad outcomes into good - or at least better - outcomes.

The horrific attacks on that brilliant blue September morning brought down not only buildings and planes, but also Americans' towering certainty that they could go about their daily lives without fear of enemy attack. A decade later, we are learning to face and even embrace an age of perpetual uncertainty. But it was the US responses to 9/11 - actual (Afghanistan) and purported (Iraq) - that brought the lesson home. Twentieth-century means are no match for twenty-­first-century problems.

Asia Security Watch: Sovereignty and National Defense

Thu, 01/05/2012 - 5:10pm

Asia Security Watch: Sovereignty and National Defense

by Adam Elkus

Japan Security Watch New Pacific Institute

As the year comes to a close, discussion of America national security policy has focused on the “pivot” to Asia. Yet, while America is interested primarily in the region as a national security concern, policymakers are less interested necessarily in the divide between America and many Asian states over national security policy. As William Overholt noted in his book on the United States and the new Asian geopolitics, regional tolerance of political pluralism is one of the larger divides between the United States and Asian states. The United States tends to believe that states with a different regime type naturally pose more of a danger than others, a view not generally shared by many in Asia.

Some in the US also believe that a new globalized order demands a stronger role abroad in producing security through political and military intervention to protect vulnerable populations and build capacity in troubled regions. Lastly, a strain of American political thought since Wilson has held that exporting democracy is beneficial to American national security.

As the United States shifts its security focus back to Asia, it may benefit from a serious consideration of the national security philosophies of the other states in the region. Ten years of third-party state-building and democracy promotion later, the United States has little success other than the defeat of al-Qaeda. Genuine revolutionary change in the Middle East, in turn, occured due to endogenous rather than external dynamics. Amid the proliferation of new proposed national security doctrines, some American thinkers have turned to a admittedly old-school solution.

In their new book The Sovereignty Solution, Naval Postgraduate Institute (NPS) scholar Anna Simons and her co-authors develop an approach to global security rooted around an odd idea: every state should have the right to order itself internally under its own preferences and in turn bares responsibility for all acts of aggression that transgress the sovereignty of others. This implies tolerance for a range of governmental types, an end to expeditionary state-building (direct and indirect), and an approach to warfare built on breaking states that misbehave with conventional capabilities rather than a “whole of government” approach. While a national defense policy built around such ideas may or may not be sensible, it certainly is at variance with many cherished ideas in American and Western national security policy. To name a few, the strong and weak versions of the Responsibility to Protect and the commonly held philosophy that all foreign events are interconnected and thus of American concern.

Iran’s growing state of desperation

Thu, 01/05/2012 - 10:20am

Iran’s growing state of desperation

by Fareed Zakaria

The Washington Post

In fact, the real story is that Iran is weak and getting weaker. Sanctions have pushed its economy into a nose-dive. The political system is fractured and fragmenting. Abroad, its closest ally and the regime of which it is almost the sole supporter — Syria — is itself crumbling. The Persian Gulf monarchies have banded together against Iran and shored up their relations with Washington. Last week, Saudi Arabia closed its largest-ever purchase of U.S. weaponry. Meanwhile, Europe is close to approving even more intense sanctions against Tehran.

The simplest measure of Iran’s strength is its currency. When Barack Obama became president, you could buy 9,700 rials with one dollar. Since then, the dollar has appreciated 60 percent against the rial, meaning you can buy 15,600 rials. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told parliament recently that the latest sanctions were “the most extensive . . . sanctions ever” and that “this is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history . . . every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked.” The price of food staples has soared 40 percent the past few months, Reuters reported this week.

Looking for the “Good Guys” Leadership and Technology Don't Always Mix

Thu, 01/05/2012 - 5:16am

"The Role of the leader is central to all Army operations and trust is a key attribute in the human dimension of combat leadership. Once trust is violated, a leader becomes ineffective." FM 3-0

In many respects, leadership in the 21st Century is more complex than ever before. The military leaders of today face an unpredictable world that operates 24 hours a day with the ability to access unlimited information and still require timely decisions. The pace of change and the ability to acquire and exchange mass quantities of information suggests that military leaders today may not have all the facts available to them before an important decision is required. In most cases, leaders will have too much data to assimilate in order to make a decision and must possess the skills to weed through the mass of information in order to find the pertinent facts needed to make an informed decision.[i] Leaders in all branches of service share the same requirement to make informed decisions or enforce policies that ultimately impact people, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and military dependents. The human dimension of leadership must not be overwhelmed and/or supplanted by the electronic means of communication prevalent today. Subordinates must be motivated, evaluated and led by those who are trusted, lead by example and not those who lead and communicate primarily via electronic media.

To build the "trust factor," a leader must exhibit many key traits, including competence, character, courage, loyalty, confidence, selflessness, sacrifice, and empathy.[ii] These traits are no different than those required of leaders throughout history. In the 21st Century, the pace is much quicker and leaders must keep up. Today’s leaders must think associatively and analytically. They must see the links between information and people, culture and expected cultural responses, decisions and projected outcomes as well as leadership and resultant subordinate expectations. Through it all, the personal, interactive and hands-on aspect of leadership must take precedent.

Technology is a wonderful thing, but there is no substitute for leadership by example and interactive personal communication skills. All soldiers are "boss watchers." They will always take their cues from the action or inaction of their leader.[iii] Motivating subordinates and communicating guidance can become very difficult for a leader who is not attuned to the capabilities of his subordinates, peers and superiors alike. Leaders must be able to personally relate to soldiers, unit mission and goals, and the capabilities of the organization they are leading. Trust from both higher to lower and lower to higher are absolutely critical to command relationships. A leader must trust his subordinates to execute the mission to the best of their ability, forgive forgivable setbacks and if lacking in some area, provide the training opportunities to correct any shortfalls. Equally, subordinates must feel that their leader trusts them to do their best in any situation. Trust in subordinates encourages initiative. Trust allows subordinates to make decisions based on initiative as well as learn to command without fear of micromanagement or retribution. Micromanagement erodes the self-confidence of subordinate leaders and drives subordinate leaders to accept this toxic style of leadership as the norm and the acceptable way of succeeding in the military.[iv]  This works for a few, but for most it offends and drives them out of the unit and potentially out of military service.   

Technology is a tool to facilitate communication and exchange of information.[v]  Technology is not a substitute for personal communication skills required to lead soldiers. In fact, the extensive use of technology within an organization, at the expense of personal interactive leadership, is detrimental to the unit’s morale and command climate. This is a challenge with which many leaders in the Army are dealing.

Soldiers in any organization will quickly determine whether their leader is a “Good Guy” or not. “Good Guy” refers to a leader who is first and foremost, competent in his duties, dedicated to his men and focused on their health and welfare, sometimes at the expense of his own reputation with his superiors. A Good Guy is one who listens to his soldiers, is approachable, and who can mentally and physically handle the same challenges as his soldiers. He accepts obligations of service before self, assigned tasks, missions and  his subordinates.[vi]  He inspires soldiers to do their best, not because they have to, but because they want to. A leader's greatest impact on an organization is to its morale and command climate. Soldier morale and unit command climate are directly linked to unit effectiveness and job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is directly linked to retention of professional soldiers in the Army.

There are many ways to use information tools such as email and video conferencing. The leader can use these information tools to identify areas requiring additional attention or indicators of positive trends. He can use email as a secondary means of communication to reinforce decisions and policies. He can use these tools to archive unit information and quickly transmit data and reports. He should never use these tools as the primary means of communication or evaluation of his subordinates.       

Unfortunately, Information tools are incorrectly being used as rating criteria for subordinate officers, non-commissioned officers and overall unit evaluations. Officers and soldiers are receiving performance evaluations based solely on the results of information such as maintenance readiness reports, medical statistics, training statistics, awards and discipline statistics, training briefings, unit status reports, and other automated statistical spreadsheets. It is tempting to believe that the use of information technology eliminates certain types of uncertainty. This belief is unrealistic.[vii] The Army evaluation system dictates that a commander significantly influences the careers of subordinates he senior rates or those two levels in command under him. It is incumbent on senior leaders to lead, influence and most importantly, personally know the subordinates he senior rates. He cannot and should not predominantly rely on automated information tools for his evaluation. This requires making a personal effort on his part to get to know his subordinates, their accomplishments, their strengths, their career aspirations....down to the names of wives and family members.[viii]  How can he mentor someone as well as identify the future leaders of the Army without knowing all he can about the person?  The leader needs to visit training, observe his subordinates leading missions, have informal social gatherings, make needed hospital visits, do informal counseling and provide a structured professional development program. These are all examples of the personal and emotional side of leadership.

Many leaders today have become tethered to their computers and spend their day sending and receiving electronic mail.[ix]  Field commanders often spend considerable time in their tactical operations centers and view electronic screens streaming in video from satellites, planes and vehicles. This is management and communication by electronic means and does not qualify as leadership. From platoons to senior level staffs, officers spend hours preparing briefings for their bosses who demand perfection in presentations that include electronic gee whiz slides with imbedded videos and photos. These are hours spent away from the leading and learning to lead soldiers, which is arguably the primary reason they joined the Army. Whether subordinates can put formulas into an excel spreadsheet, import streaming video and pictures into a briefing or develop a statistical tracking program should not be a skill set required for promotion to higher levels of command.

Electronic mail allows for directives and orders to be transmitted at any time of the day or night with the expectation that the recipients are sitting at their computer eagerly waiting for guidance and will react immediately after the “send” button is pushed. Further, email also allows a leader to confront unpleasant personal and emotional situations through the use of a sterile unemotional keyboard. Brigade commanders senior rate company commanders and battalion commanders senior rate platoon leaders. It is easy to rely on statistics to neatly rank order subordinates on a sterile excel spreadsheet. The one with the highest total points wins and gets the highest evaluation and there is no personal or emotional investment required by the senior rater. What was that guy's first name?

The solution to the information intoxication problem and depersonalization of the leader is easier to state than to implement. How does the Army develop a system that rewards inspired warfighting leaders?  The Army needs to find those officers that are innovative, the respected leaders of men, the officers that can motivate soldiers, the commanders that inspire soldiers and units, and the officers that younger officers and soldiers want to emulate. These are the officers that deserve to lead. Often heard is the phrase, "I would trust my son or daughter to that leader in combat". How do we find and keep those leaders?  

One recommendation would be to integrate a command climate assessment of each company to corps level commander as part of the officer evaluation system. The independently acquired and assessed command climate information would be provided to the rater and senior rater of each evaluated commander prior to the submission of the evaluation report. It would be necessary to ask the peers and subordinates of Army leaders at every level whether they would trust their lives to this commander in the most desperate of situations. Ask these soldiers whether they would follow this leader in peacetime as well as combat. Ask these soldiers whether their leader is respected—can be considered a mentor and inspires them to be better soldiers.

The greatest impact of a leader is his effect on the morale and command climate of the unit he commands. One of the greatest imperatives when leading an organization is to be present in person. Those who impose risk must be seen to share it.[x] The prevalence of electronic communication tools such as email and teleconferencing erodes the leader's ability to personally influence his subordinates in a most fundamental way—leadership by example. An important lesson that is evident throughout history is that brave men in desperate situations will follow the leader that is trusted, sincere, competent, and has proven himself in front of his soldiers. This leader can and has inspired soldiers to perform individual and collective actions above and beyond the limits of their physical and mental endurance. One needs only to read the citations of those that have earned recognition in combat to understand the impact of inspired leadership. [xi]  Inspired leadership leads to inspired units and inspired units are filled with inspired soldiers – a simple formula but true. There is a fundamental need for the Army to find, nurture, and promote the leaders referred to as the "Good Guys" – those who have been endorsed not only by their senior raters, but by their peers and subordinates alike. The military profession is not a corporation or a business. Military service is a calling. Officers and soldiers do not stay in the military for the money. They stay for the prestige of wearing the uniform and serving in a most honorable profession that requires dying as the ultimate sacrifice for service. Soldiers deserve inspired leadership.



[i] Kevin J. Bergner, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom:  Leader Development Implications for the Army after Next, in Douglas V. Johnson II, ed, Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods, (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute Publishing, 2000), 8.

[ii] Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell, (New York: McGraw-Hill 2002), 213.

[iii] Harari, 254.

[iv] Colonel George E. Reed, "Toxic Leadership," Military Review (July-August 2004): 68

[v] Harari 195.

[vi] TRADOC Pam 525-8-2:  The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 41.

[vii] Gary Klein, Sources of Power, How People Make Decisions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 279.

[viii] Paul B. Malone III, Love'em and Lead'em, (Annandale: Synergy Press, 1986) 112.

[ix] Lawrence G. Shattuck, A proposal for Designing Cognitive Aids for Commanders in the 21 Century, in Douglas V. Johnson II, ed,  Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute Publishing, 2000), 101.

[x] John Keegan, The Mask of Command, (Harrisonburg, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1987), 329.

[xi] Major Chuck Larson, ed., Heroes Among Us, (New York: Penguin Group Inc), 2008

 

Bibliography

1. U.S. Army Field Manual 3.0: Operations (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-18, 4-8.

2. Kevin J. Bergner, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom:  Leader Development Implications for the Army after Next, in Douglas V. Johnson II, ed, Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods, (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute Publishing, 2000), 8.

3. Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell, (New York: McGraw-Hill 2002), 213, 195, 254.

4. Colonel George E. Reed, "Toxic Leadership," Military Review (July-August 2004): 68.

5. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2:  The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 41.

6. Gary Klein, Sources of Power, How People Make Decisions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 279.

7. Paul B. Malone III, Love'em and Lead'em, (Annandale: Synergy Press, 1986) 112.

8. Lawrence G. Shattuck, A proposal for Designing Cognitive Aids for Commanders in the 21 Century, in Douglas V. Johnson II, ed,  Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute Publishing, 2000), 101.

9. John Keegan, The Mask of Command, (Harrisonburg, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1987), 329.

10. Major Chuck Larson, ed., Heroes Among Us, (New York: Penguin Group Inc), 2008

 

5 January SWJ Roundup

Thu, 01/05/2012 - 5:09am

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Karzai Supports Direct US-Taliban Talks - WP

Karzai Gives a Lukewarm Welcome to Taliban Talks - NYT

Iran Intensifies Efforts to Influence Policy in Afghanistan - WP

Afghan Official Gunned Down on Way to Mosque - AP

Some Find Hope in Afghan Outcry Over Bride's Abuse - AP

‘AfPak Hands’ Program Pays Dividends in Afghanistan, Pakistan - AFPS

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Talking With the Taliban - NYT editorial

 

Pakistan

Pakistani Taliban Kills 15 Abducted Security Officers - VOA

Insurgents Say They Executed 15 Pakistani Soldiers - NYT

Pakistani Militants Kill 15 Security Officers - AP

Pakistani Taliban Say Kill 15 Soldiers, Vow Further 'Revenge' - Reuters

 

Iran

Iranian Bill Would Bar Warships from Gulf - WP

Work as Usual for US Warship After Warning by Iran - NYT

Europe Takes Bold Step Toward a Ban on Iranian Oil - NYT

EU Agrees to Ban Iranian Oil Imports - VOA

EU Agrees to Embargo on Iranian Crude - Reuters

Iranian President Expected to Visit Latin America - LAT

Iran Under Pressure - WP opinion

 

Syria

Syrian Activists: Damascus Misleading Arab League Observers - VOA

Syrian Activists Say Troop Withdrawal Is a Sham - Reuters

Doubts Over Syria Rebel Army After Escalation Threat - Reuters

Syria Releases 552 Detainees - BBC

 

Iraq

Explosions Across Baghdad Kill Dozens - NYT

Baghdad Hit by Deadly Bomb Blasts - BBC

Explosions in Shiite Areas of Baghdad Kill 23 - AP

Four Blasts Kill 25 in Iraq's Capital - Reuters

 

Egypt

Egypt’s Islamists to Vie for Power - WP

Egypt Leader’s Credibility Stumbles on His Words - NYT

One Year on, No Answers to Egypt Church Bombing - AP

Rulers Are Threatening the Gains of Tahrir Square - NYT opinion

 

Middle East / North Africa

Analysis: Jordan Talks May Help Palestinian Leader - AP

Israel's Religion Minister Fears Jewish Divides - Reuters

Ex-Israeli Leader Olmert Accused of Bribe-Taking - AP

Turkey to Broach Kurdistan Issue in Tehran - VOA

In a Shift, the President of Yemen Will Stay Put - NYT

Yemen President Capitalizes on His Political Wits - LAT

Libyan Leader Says Militia Clashes Could Create Civil War - NYT

Libyan Leader Warns of Civil War - WP

UN Diplomat Wants Libya NATO Investigation - AP

 

US Department of Defense

Obama to Unveil Details of a Strategic Review for the US Military - WP

Pentagon Review 'Will Axe Troops' - BBC

It’s a Brave New World of Weaponry - WP

Navy Testing Long-range Drone that Tracks Suspicious Vessels - S&S

Air Force Continuing to Trim Workforce with 2nd Round of Buyouts - S&S

New Law Eases Airport Screening for Troops, Families - AFPS

Navy Pilot Killed Self in San Diego Murder-Suicide - AP

Retired Colonel Accused of Taking $2M from Guard Families Fund - S&S

 

United States

Military's Gold Star Families Often Feel Disconnected - S&S

 

United Kingdom

UK MPs Urge Foreign Aid Conditions - BBC

British Lawmakers Urge Ruling on Lethal Force Against Pirates - VOA

UK MPs: Clarify Piracy Defense Laws - BBC

 

Africa

Africa’s Many Elections Reap Few Rewards - VOA

Kenyans Still Living in Camps From '07 Elections - VOA

Nigerian Unions Call for Fuel Price Strike, Protests - VOA

Police Break Up Fuel Protest in North Nigeria - AP

Rwandan Rebels 'Kill 26 in Congo' - BBC

AU Prepares Big Anti-Shabab Military Push in Somalia - VOA

 

Americas

Iranian President Expected to Visit Latin America - LAT

Mexico Cartel Boss Pleads Guilty - BBC

31 Inmates Killed in Northern Mexico Prison Fight - AP

Cuba Blames Twitter for Castro Death Rumor - WP

Colombia's Wrong-way Reform - LAT editorial

 

Asia Pacific

China Pushes for N. Korean Stability - WP

Pitching US Liberal Arts in China - WP

Ties to China Linger as Issue as Taiwanese Prepare to Vote - NYT

Senior US Diplomat to Meet Top South Korean Nuclear Envoy - VOA

US and S. Korea Discuss Leadership Change in N. Korea - AP

South Korea Says Ready for Talk With Hostile North - Reuters

Finland Grants Transit Permit for Impounded Patriot Missiles to S. Korea - AP

Japanese Troops Heading to California to Train with Marines - S&S

Burma Celebrates Independence Amid Criticism - VOA

Britain’s Hague Urges Reforms During Burma Visit - VOA

UK's Hague Arrives in Burma to Urge Reforms - AP

Philippines Doubles Bounty on Fugitive Ex-General - AP

Aussie Kidnapped in Philippines Seeks $2M Ransom - AP

Cambodia Anti-Drug Chief Sentenced for Corruption - AP

 

Europe

Charges Against Journalists Dim the Democratic Glow in Turkey - NYT

German President Rejects Calls to Quit in Scandal - NYT

Experts Dispute Report Norway Mass Killer is Insane - AP

Sovereignty – The Ultimate States’ Rights Argument

Wed, 01/04/2012 - 3:33am

Sovereignty – The Ultimate States’ Rights Argument

by Anna Simons

FPRI

July 2011

Much as it would be comforting to think that jihadism will wither with Osama bin Laden’s demise, the opposite could well occur. Or, what about NATO’s discombobulated effort to topple Moammar Gadhafi? This, too, could augur plenty more anti-American terrorism. If Gadhafi survives, watch out. If he doesn’t, but his family members do, watch out. All of which should lead Americans to wonder: do we have any more coherent a policy today for dealing with anti-American violence than we did ten years ago?

The answer, sadly, is “no.”

For ten years and counting, U.S. policy has rested on the misguided notion that it is somehow possible to separate “moderates” from “radicals,’’ or reconcilables from irreconcilables. Washington’s policy has been that if those espousing and participating in unjustifiable violence can be isolated, moderates should be wooable, and once they’ve been won over the irreconcilables can be eliminated. To accomplish this, we just need to persuade moderates to stop lending extremists support.

One problem with such a presumption, however, is it treats radicals and moderates as if they represent two neatly distinguishable groups of people. But, they clearly don’t, not when parents and siblings can express genuine surprise when they learn it was their son, daughter, brother, sister, or husband who just martyred him or herself in a suicide attack. If family members in close quarters and tightly knit households can’t tell or don’t know exactly where each other is on the scale of radicalization, how can we make such a determination? More to the point, why would we ever want to base our security on the presumption that we can?

Sometimes individuals make it obvious that they hold extremist views; some wear their politics on their sleeves. Others do not. Most famously, the 9/11 hijackers didn’t. But also, just because someone is a moderate today does not mean that he or she can’t be radicalized tomorrow. It is impossible to predict which sorts of events will trigger what types of reactions or in whom. It could be the 16th rather than the 15th time that a young man is made to stand for hours at a checkpoint that flips the switch. This is why even the best intentioned de-radicalization efforts through education are likely to prove insufficient.

Inadvertence compounds the radicalization problem. For instance, consider the release of the prisoner abuse photos from Abu Ghraib. They depict abuses that should not have occurred. But the fact that incidents that shouldn’t have occurred were recorded—which also shouldn’t have occurred—means those images will be available to incite people for years to come.

Once incidents are logged into social memory, that’s where they stay. But also, as the Abu Ghraib debacle illustrates, there is no foolproof way to ensure abuses won’t occur. Worse, if unforeseen events can push buttons in people who themselves aren’t aware they have them till after they are pushed, keeping “moderates” separate from potential “radicals” becomes either an impossible or a never-ending task.

Logic suggests two ways to deal with radical adversaries who are uninterested in a secular peace: inflict so much loss and pain that none dares cross you again. Or, force those with the ambition to rule to have to rule. Let al Qaeda, for instance, wrest Saudi Arabia from the Saud royal family if it can.

Several summers ago a group of military officers and I put together an argument that is not quite as untempered as the two approaches just described might suggest, but it does borrow from both. [1] In the Sovereignty Rules world we envision, the United States would not engage in the same sorts of behavior that radicalize so many people today. We Americans would not imprison people in other countries. Nor would we imprison them in their own countries. We wouldn’t occupy. We wouldn’t invade to nation-build. Instead, the United States would do everything in its power to reinvigorate sovereignty. We would make countries self-police.

Think about it. There is no more effective mechanism for eliminating “bad guys” than to impel countries to self-police. This is true even given the caveat that not every country in existence should be a country. Some should be two or three. Others should not exist at all. But until humans stumble or agree upon a new way to arrange political space around the globe, states are the socio-geographic containers we’ve got. Nothing else at the moment has states’ potential to box in terrorists and other non-state anti-state actors. Nothing else grants diverse peoples a freer rein to govern themselves as they see fit.

The Telegram is a publication of the Hertog Program in Grand Strategy, jointly sponsored by Temple University’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy and the Foreign Policy Research Institute and made possible by a grant from the Hertog Foundation.

Anna Simons is a Professor of Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), joining the faculty in 1998. Prior to teaching at NPS, she was an assistant and then associate professor of anthropology at the University of California at Los Angeles. At NPS, she teaches courses in the anthropology of conflict, military advising, low intensity conflict in Africa, and political anthropology. This essay draws from a talk presented to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in August 2010, which in turn draws from The Sovereignty Solution: A Common Sense Approach to Global Security (forthcoming from the Naval Institute Press), co-written with U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenants Colonel Joe McGraw and Duane Lauchengco. The views expressed here do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, or any office of the U.S. government.