AirSea Battle As Presently Conceived

by R. Jordan Prescott

originally posted at House of Marathon reposted with full permissions

In mid-December, a senior U.S. Navy official delivered a (not for attribution) presentation on the AirSea Battle concept at a Washington D.C. institute.  While AirSea Battle was first introduced in early 2010^[1], official Department of Defense explanations of the concept have been minimal.  In the absence of a comprehensive DOD summary, the void has been filled by service publications, defense media, and online journals.  To date, the principal reference point has been two monographs published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "Why AirSea Battle?" (02/19/2010) and "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept" (05/18/2010).  Aviation Week produced a comprehensive overview in April 2011.  By contrast, DOD acknowledged the Aug. 12 establishment of an “AirSea Battle Office” composed of 12 to 15 officers -- after the fact on November 9th.  Defense media coverage ranged from objective to underwhelmed.  The week prior to the presentation, Inside the Pentagon obtained a unsigned copy of a new Joint Staff publication entitled “Joint Operational Access Concept”.  In all, the dearth of information is surprising given previous Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s depiction of AirSea Battle as a concept with “potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what AirLand Battle did near the end of the 20th.”  As such, the December briefing provided a welcome introduction to AirSea Battle -- the presentation focused principally on its historical antecedents but it also succinctly summarized how the concept is expected to address current operational challenges associated with power projection.  AirSea Battle, as currently conceived, represents a substantive (embryonic) attempt to address anti-access and area denial, but, as with many attempts by civilian and military department leaders, it be may be hindered by the paucity of guidance from elected decision-makers as to America’s national security objectives going forward.

The Core of AirSea Battle

At its heart, AirSea Battle is anticipated to be the basis for “winning a guided munitions salvo competition.”  The key aim is “to disrupt and destroy enemy A2-AD networks and their defensive and offensive guided weapons systems in order  to enable U.S. freedom of action to conduct concurrent and follow-on operations.”  Winning is accomplished by employing both kinetic and non-kinetic means and by scouting the enemy’s network, attacking effectively first, and coordinating operations and fires across dispersed forces.

The presenting official came to this summation by demonstrating how warfare has evolved from engagements between forces wielding massive unguided munitions.  Whether thrown, shot, fired, or dropped, effective unguided munitions had to be delivered in mass to compensate for the low probability of striking the designated target.

Warfare began to transition away purely unguided munitions engagements during World War II when forces began fielding “battle networks” to sense enemy attacks earlier and coordinate defensive measures more quickly.  Guided munitions made their appearance in the form of Imperial Japanese kamikaze attacks in the Pacific theater.  The tactic fared well as a strategem to overcome American networked defenses (and contrasted positively with massive American naval fires) demonstrating guided munitions could achieve comparable effects more efficiently, especially if delivered first.

The breakthrough, however, was underappreciated as the coinciding development and use of the atomic bomb demonstrated how a single munition’s explosive capacity could dwarf an entire arsenal’s firepower and eliminate the problem of missing the target.  Instead of comprehensively exploring the potential of guided munitions, the American military established nuclear weapons as the basis for its offensive arsenal; the development of guided munitions occurred primarily only as part of integrated and computerized network defense systems.

The next catalyst to prompt the U.S. military to begin developing offensive guided munitions was the Vietnam War.  American reliance on unguided munitions had two shortcomings.  One, North Vietnamese air defenses employed guided missiles increasing the risk to American pilots loitering at length in order to discharge unguided bombs.  Two, indiscriminate bombing campaigns resulted in massive civilian deaths, diminishing support for the American war effort domestically and abroad.  The operational performance of guided munitions led the Department of Defense to launch in 1975 after the war’s end the Long Range Research and Development Planning Program.  The priority was to provide American decision-makers with an alternative to choosing “massive nuclear destruction” as a course of action; as the path not yet taken, the Department would develop guided munition capabilities.

Initial progress was uneven as the main munitions-dependent services, the Navy and the Air Force, focused on service-specific tactical objectives, namely countering air and maritime platforms.  Moreover, technology had not yet overcome limitations connected with the nature of delivery systems (carrier magazines, carrier-based air forces) or weather (laser-impeding clouds).

In the end, the decisive factor was the continuing competition with the USSR.  Soviet military theorists, led by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, readily recognized command and control systems networked via computer systems and armed with guided munitions could usher in a “military technical revolution” in warfare.  Faced with a potential Soviet “reconnaissance-strike complex,” the American military responded by beginning to examine full how campaign planning and execution could capitalize on capitalize on guided munitions (as well as digital networks).  Meanwhile, technology finally advanced whereby new munitions would be less costly and more precise.  Doctrinal application occurred with the formulation of AirLand Battle.

Operational validation occurred in the victory over Iraq in 1991.  After Operation Desert Storm, “the defining battle” in the words of the presentation, relying principally on unguided munitions would have been inconceivable for any of the services.  As successive charts demonstrated, the American reliance on guided munitions increased in volume, proportion, and precision over the time period leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  

For American adversaries, the only conventional countermeasures available at the time entailed denying American battle networks the information needed to execute strikes (deception, jamming) or mitigating the effect of executed strikes (moving assets below the surface or hiding among the civilian population).  Adversaries could seek nuclear weapons but not without a substantial commitment of resources and inevitable attention from the United States.

While American military dominance was assured during this period, the advantage would ultimately be fleeting.  Invariably, the underlying technology spread and adversaries -- state and non-state -- have developed or acquired commensurate capabilities and are prepared to deny the American military the freedom of action to which it has been accustomed.  Referring to slide 26, the presenting official noted how the cumulative effect of layered SAM, fighter, ship, and missile assets would curtail the maneuver space for American forces.

It is in this context the presenting official returned to the opening premise of AirSea Battle as a means for assuring American power projection in an era of guided munitions.  

If Adversary X (and the presenting official repeatedly stressed the concept is not premised on a specific country) employs anti-access area denial measures, then AirSea Battle will have shaped operational planning and resulted in capabilities whereby American forces can neutralize the enemy’s network and attack first.  By first defeating an enemy’s targeting capabilities and delivery systems (as well as demonstrating the ability to mitigate or sustain a strike), the United States will retain the requisite operational freedom of action.  “Air Sea Battle will soon be a necessary precursor before deploying the remainder of the joint force.”  

American decision-makers concerned anti-access and area denial measures would thwart deployed forces or allies worried the United States would not contest such measures would be assuaged.

In this regard, winning the guided munition salvo competition is ultimately about deterring adversaries and re-assuring allies.

The presenting official acknowledged the concept principally remains a joint Navy-Air Force endeavor but speculated a successful AirSea Battle concept could prompt exploration of a successor ground force doctrine -- an “AirLand Battle II.”  The presenting official commented the Marine Corps would be the “bridge” for the eventual incorporation of the Army; whether this incorporation would be into ensuing conceptual development or (later) operational planning was not explained.

Critical to the success of AirSea Battle is “scouting” whereby American forces have successfully established the scope and scale of the enemy’s battle network.  The presenting official indicated intelligence would be integral to successful scouting and made a brief (but unintentionally) pointed reference to network operational capability.  Whether this signifies the use of indigenous service capabilities or the newly established Cyber Command is unknown.

In discussing new platforms and weapons, the presenting officials stated the Department must sustain its investment in directed energy and electronic warfare -- otherwise, the American military will be at a distinct disadvantage in the future.

In discussing present assets, the presenting official asserted the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program is proceeding satisfactorily^[2] and stated it will provide capabilities consistent with AirSea Battle as currently conceived.  Moreover, the presenting official contended the aircraft would be purchased by allies throughout the region, providing a complementarity that is rarely available.^[3]

AirSea Battle as a Joust?

If a future operational challenge will entail overcoming anti-access and area denial measures via the employment of guided munitions, then AirSea Battle’s focus on neutralizing the enemy’s battle network and striking first with long range guided munitions appears appropriate -- if it indeed can be accomplished.  Each side will still be holding the other at bay with an integrated battle network and guided munitions, just as the Soviets had contemplated earlier (see below left).  Revisiting the Soviet rendition, one is possibly reminded of the medieval joust (see below right).  Two opponents, each armed with “long-range” weapons and each trying to exploit very narrow margins for victory.

In this context, AirSea Battle presupposes a parity between the American military and an enemy’s military (even though little evidence suggests parity indeed exists).  Again, the Soviets realized the incorporation of precision weaponry would expand the battlespace and assumed the United States was moving in the same direction.  Developing an equivalent reconnaissance-strike complex would have been their attempt to deter an anticipated American advantage.  

Accordingly, a face-off between opponents with integrated battle network and guided munitions is an instance of mutual deterrence.  AirSea Battle seeks to resolve this standoff by placing a tremendous premium on defensive measures and sustaining superior maneuverability and speed.  If a future operational challenge will entail overcoming anti-access and area denial measures, then AirSea Battle’s focus on neutralizing the enemy’s battle network and striking first with long range guided munitions appears appropriate -- if it indeed can be accomplished.^[4] 

As depicted by the presentation, the Soviets conceived of the reconnaissance-strike complex as a maritime application.  The Americans, in contrast, developed its complex to support ground operations in Europe.  At that time, the technology supported only short range combined ground and air operations in a confined geographic space.  In the present, the Department of Defense will need to develop and procure long-range systems and, emphatic disclaimers aside, the expected battlespace will adversaries along the combined enormity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, more than 86 million square miles and approximately 126,000 miles of coastline.  

The corresponding number of targets and platform requirements may dwarf what can be attained in the near to medium future.  As Mr. Robert Haddick of Small Wars Journal has pointed out in recent articles, the current configuration of forces in the Western Pacific may simply preclude a quick resolution of any engagement.  Moreover, the military services will have to accept inevitable “large cultural changes” if its members are to accomplish the tall tasks laid out in AirSea Battle, whether it is operating new remotely-piloted long-range systems or synchronizing previously independent planning and programming.

Warning of inevitable cultural changes and expecting adaptation by the warfighter brings to mind (again) the admonition of Air Force COL John Boyd:  “Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.”  The warfighter should not have to adjust to accommodate organizational integration or anticipated platforms -- organization and platforms should.

The Imperative of Broader Structural Restructuring

AirSea Battle is a laudable attempt to address a nettlesome operational challenge, but amidst severe budgetary challenges and the continuing need for reform, the concept should be concomitant with a broader restructuring of American forces.

In a recent Joint Force Quarterly article, retired U.S. Army COL Doug MacGregor outlined force design options warranting additional attention.

In line with the premium placed on maneuver and speed arising from the above salvo competition, COL MacGregor calls for a force structured and equipped for dispersed mobile warfare inside an integrated maneuver-strike-intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)-sustainment complex that combines ground maneuver forces with strike, ISR, and sustainment capabilities from all of the services.  In COL MacGregor's estimation, military establishments that integrate functions and capabilities across service lines while simultaneously eliminating unneeded overhead not only are less expensive to operate and maintain, but are also likely to be far more lethal.

Again, the US military should be inspired by its former Soviet foe and similarly establish a unified military command structure that compels the integration of core service capabilities under a single operational commander, which permitted the maximization combat power (land, sea, and air) where it was needed and minimization where it was not needed.  Accordingly, a future force would combine strike and maneuver into a single joint operation inside a joint task force command under a lieutenant general or vice admiral.  Subordinate commanding major generals would separately be responsible for maneuver, strike, sustainment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).  Additionally, COL MacGregor recommends establishing a new self-contained mission-focused capability package -- a Combat Maneuver Group (CMG) of 5,000- to 6,000-man under the command of a brigadier general and capable of limited independent action that “eliminates unnecessary command levels and drives jointness to a much lower level.”  In the aggregate, the future force would feature reduced command overhead^[5] combining with existing single-service echelons transitioned into a flatter, multi-service integrative structure to maximize ready and deployable combat power.

Beyond Structural Reform -- Defining Red Lines

COL MacGregor’s recommendations center principally on ground forces and he contends sea control is no longer a mission demanding a large surface fleet.  To ensure access in the same battlespace AirSea Battle is being designed to address, the United States should instead rely on a nuclear submarine fleet employing long-range sensors, manned and unmanned aircraft, communications, and missiles.

The emphasis reflects a final matter AirSea Battle does not address and, admittedly, probably should not have to address.  AirSea Battle is a means for militarily contesting impeded access but whether it will be sufficiently decisive is (again) unknown; does its conception imply a readiness on the part of the elected national decision-makers to proceed up the escalatory ladder?  

Returning to the likely battlespace and, by extension, supposable adversaries in the form of China and Iran, have decision-makers clearly laid out the national interest and what constitute the basis for war?  

Is China’s pursuit of increased flexibility in the western Pacific Ocean a critical threat to American interests?  If the matter is the forcible re-unification of Taiwan, yes; if the matter is increasing naval capabilities to preclude reliance on a foreign power’s navy to safeguard its burgeoning maritime trade interests, then perhaps not.  (Moreover, the guided munition salvo competition is going to occur over the territory of critical American allies like Japan -- have decision-makers broached the matter?)

Is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons a critical threat to American interests?  Yes, but has the continued absence of diplomatic and trade relations and sole reliance on military posturing facilitated American objectives?  The past decade in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the limitations of applying principally military forces and resources to American foreign policy challenges.  Although reductions must occur in the Department of Defense budget, decision-makers will still have to retain a modicum of diplomatic and intelligence capacity to compensate for the retreat of “military forward” presence; hopefully not all budget reductions will be reserved for deficit reduction.

In closing, AirSea Battle is a laudable attempt to address the continuing challenge of the asymmetric approaches an adversary will undertake to undermine U.S. objectives.  Nonetheless, effective employment of this concept may deter would be adversaries and assure allies, but guidance at the presidential level must be forthcoming to answer how the nation proceeds should such circumstances prove short-lived.

A Chinese Policy for Central Asia?

by Joshua Foust

Registan.net

Still, the effects of Chinese policies in Central Asia are not the same as the policies themselves, and this is what Alexandros (and his common writing partner, Raffaello Pantucci) is arguing. But, despite the big talk about Chinese plans for doing… something influential in the region, there just isn’t data that there is a concerted, long-term plan for establishing decisive Chinese control. And that’s the big problem I have with this formulation: it is a deductive analysis of what China might be doing, but there just aren’t enough data to conclusively say that this is what China intends to do. And more important, there’s no sense of whether it’s a good thing, a bad thing, — and if the U.S. should respond, much less care about it.

The Sunni-Shia Wars

by Patrick Cockburn

Counterpunch

The Shia and Sunni split has other serious implications. The struggle between these two Islamic traditions, so similar to the battle between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, has been escalating since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and Shia-Sunni civil war in Iraq in 2006-7 deepened the hatred between the two sects. Of course it was always much in the interests of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Assad clan in Syria and the al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain to play the sectarian card and demand communal solidarity from their co-religionists. As far back as 1991 I remember Saddam Hussein bringing the mutilated bodies of Baathist officials back from Najaf, where they had been lynched by Shia insurgents, and the terror expressed by Sunni friends in Baghdad, previously opposed to the regime, that the same fate awaited them if Saddam was toppled.

The Sunni-Shia rivalry goes some way to explaining why the Arab Spring won successes in North Africa that it has not achieved east of Egypt. Each side has been led by religiously inspired states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have struggled for supremacy in the region for 30 years. Embattled regimes and their insurgent enemies automatically gain allies. The Assad government might be isolated, but not quite to degree that Muammar Gaddafi was before his fall. Iran will do almost anything to keep its most crucial ally in the Arab world in power. By the same token Iran’s many enemies, unable to overthrow the government in Tehran, are determined to weaken it by changing the regime in Damascus.

The Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) periodic report on China’s naval modernization is now circulating. Authored by Ronald O’Rourke and dated November 30, 2011, CRS’s latest update on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) includes current analysis of PLAN shipbuilding and weapons developments; Chinese maritime capabilities from and air and land-based systems; a discussion of the U.S. Air-Sea Battle Concept; and other U.S. responses to Chinese naval developments.

As usual, O’Rourke’s report presents various tables which display PLAN shipbuilding trends by ship class, and projections of China’s fleet in 2015 and 2020. According to the report, China plans little growth in ship numbers during this decade although that will mask the retirement of obsolete vessels and their replacement with modern designs. China’s attack submarine inventory will be a notable exception; this force should grow to 70+ boats by 2020. This compares to the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection of about 50 U.S. attack submarines in 2020, a number which the CBO forecasts will decline to 40 by 2030. Even if China’s submarine readiness rate is lower that the U.S. Navy’s, by 2020 available Chinese submarines are likely to substantially outnumber U.S. subs on station in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and on both sides of the Strait of Malacca.

The traditional naval net assessment is a comparison of ship types, numbers, displacement, readiness, crew training, etc. with ship inventories themselves the focus of attention. That made the most sense when naval munitions where shells and dumb bombs.

Today however, the real stars of the show are Chain's precision anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, most of the them with over-the horizon ranges, supersonic speeds, and delivered by platforms ranging from patrol craft, submarines, and surface ships to a variety of land-based aircraft. A report on China’s shipbuilding risks minimizing the most important aspect of Chinese naval modernization, namely the PLA’s focus on missiles, which it has fitted to every imaginable naval, land, and air platform. O’Rourke does include a discussion of China’s missiles in his report, including a detailed section on the DF-21D medium range anti-ship ballistic missile. But with missiles now the stars and the ships more like supporting actors, China’s missiles developments deserve a much fuller treatment, such as found in Vitaliy Pradun’s research published by the Naval War College Review.

Another area of China naval development that needs greater exposition is China’s naval target acquisition, battle command and control, weapons coordination and cuing. O’Rourke and other naval analysts would do well to explain Chinese operating concepts and systems related to acquiring and tracking U.S. and allied ships underway and how Chinese missile forces would then be coordinated. Such a description would undoubtedly reveal implications for U.S. space doctrine and U.S. capabilities (or lack thereof) for deep strikes against heavily defended continental targets.

O’Rourke’s latest report on the Chinese navy is a valuable description of its modernization. He covers, if briefly in some cases, a full range of issues that U.S. policymakers should consider. China’s ships and submarines, now just the middle of the “kill chain,” get most of the attention. It is the beginning and end of the kill chain, China’s ocean surveillance on one end and its high-performance missiles on the other, that need a fuller treatment.

Revolutions Are Violent

by Eric Cummings

On Violence

The Arab Spring, as our most thought provoking event of 2011, should remind would-be-American-revolutionaries what a revolution really is: the break down of society and order, a revolution in power, which (mostly) results in violence. In this pan-Arab/north African revolution we have seen a few civil wars (Yemen, Syria and Libya), a military invasion (Saudi Arabia into Qatar), authoritarian crackdowns with unlawful arrests (Qatar, Eqypt, Syria and Yemen) and protesters generally arrested or attacked throughout. It is safe to say, to those who advocated revolution, violence followed.

This completely fits into the larger narratives of the history of revolutions. The American Revolution (Historians debate over whether this qualifies, I believe it does; it threw out the entire power structure.) cost one in every hundred males his life. The American Revolution is the second deadliest conflict in American history, percentage wise, with only the Civil War beating it, itself its own kind of revolution.

Meanwhile, France’s revolution is symbolized by the guillotine, an industrial means of execution. The Russian Revolution lead to the deaths of literally millions of people. The revolutions that wracked Europe throughout the nineteenth century always included violence and death. When I studied Latin America history in high school, my notes read, “Colonialism. Revolution. Dictator. Revolution.” It applied to every country.

Violence always coincides with the outbreak of revolutions, for a few reasons:

First, instability. Inherently, revolutions are unstable, by definition an overthrow of the existing power structures. When this happens, chaos ensues. Food shortages, lack of security, a breakdown of the social order. The best explanation for this is our blog’s namesake, On Violence, by Hannah Arendt, that argued that violence and power are opposites. Thus, when the power structure disappears--as in France or Russia or Libya--violence fills the gaps.

Second, vengeance. Most revolutions have a very legitimate basis: people feel discriminated against, or suffer from severe economic inequality, or chafe under colonial rule. When the masses revolt, they take their vengeance against their previous oppressors. Look at what happened in the French revolution. Or what happened to Moammar Ghaddafi. Or Saddam Hussein.

Third, civil wars. They happen when revolutionaries disagree, or the over-thrown don’t want to leave so easily. Take the above groups advocating revolution, the Occupiers and the Tea Partiers. They don’t agree on anything. So if one side starts a revolution, they’ll basically have to go to war with the other side. Boom, you’ve got a civil war. This is what is happening in Syria.

Are there counter-examples? Sure. The Revolutions of 1989 were relatively peaceful. So was the later Orange Revolution. But the idea of “peaceful revolutions” is a relatively new one; clearly it isn’t at work in north Africa.

The point of this post, the “So what?” if you will, is that revolutions often end in severe, uncontrollable violence. And often then transition to authoritarianism. Extremists on both sides of the political spectrum in America casually throw around the Jefferson quotation (behaving properly) that “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants,” without really understanding what this means or implies.

Hell On Wheels

AMC

Hell on Wheels tells the epic story of post-Civil War America, focusing on a Confederate soldier (Mount) who sets out to exact revenge on the Union soldiers who have killed his wife. His journey takes him west to Hell on Wheels, a dangerous, raucous, lawless melting pot of a town that travels with and services the construction of the first transcontinental railroad, an engineering feat unprecedented for its time. The series documents the railroad's engineering and construction as well as institutionalized greed and corruption, the immigrant experience, and the plight of newly emancipated African-Americans during Reconstruction. Hell on Wheels chronicles this potent turning point in our nation's history and how uncivilized the business of civilization can be.

Rethinking Revolution:Paddy Ashdown: The Global Power Shift

Rethinking Revolution: Lawfare

Rethinking Revolution: Introduction

The temptation to quantify war is strong. Old systems of measuring progress in war fall out of favor just long enough to be given a new skin and praised for their more modern and refined approach. Metrics as a system of calculation only obscures our understanding of war, but taking a step back from that problem shows us much more than the numbers ever could.

The usual use of metrics in a war, body counts or materiel seized or destroyed, only means so much. Killing and destroying the resources of our enemies gives them less to work with, so they must be a in a worse position than when they started.  But how much worse? We cannot calculate the value to them of what was lost. A modern example of this disconnect between systems of valuation will make the point better. Massive sums of wealth are spent by the US in preserving human life both because of its intrinsic value and because of the human capital that has been built up in that person. Life does not enjoy such high regard amongst the insurgents of the Taliban. They practice suicide bombing and spray their bullets through local populations in an attempt to hit their enemies. Our different values lead to different tactics and also make a common unit of measure impossible.

Attempts have been made to account for this kind of enemy. The most commonly accepted solution is to measure the amount of local support we enjoy in a place. This has the advantage of being better suited to the kind of fight we find ourselves in but also has two added problems. There are no “units” of local support to be counted up like bodies or bullets, and no one can tell us how many units are needed to win. We can neither measure our progress nor know when to stop.

If metrics cannot provide the mathematical simplicity that people turn to it for then what good is it? The answer is that it points to the truly precious resource in this sort of war: Time. If we want to reach our enemy’s breaking point but cannot find it through measurements then there is one option left: shoulder the draining hardships of war, hardships we know our enemies share with us to some degree, in a contest of endurance. The winning strategy for both sides is to outlast their opponent by minimizing their own war burden.

There is one other scenario. When both sides restrict themselves to the same style of war then certain resources become more obviously important and measuring may be easier though still not precise. Time could be the resource, or each side could turn similar physical materials into similar machines and use similar tactics. If war were simplified into tank battles then counting up how many tanks were lost on each side could be very illuminating.

But we must be careful. War need not be, and often is not, so simple. It is adaptive and messy and does not give in to bean counting. The failure of such an approach shows us the subtlety and enormity of war. Trying to calculate our enemy’s breaking point is dangerous, yet we cannot force our enemies to fight like us and long wars are a terrible burden. A more creative option must be found, one that accounts for our own system of values. One that is tempered by humble goals that reflect that subtlety and enormity. One that is not fooled by the latest numbers.

The public debates regarding United States’ policy in Afghanistan have largely focused on the differences in defining our objectives and the best possible means to achieve these objectives. The objectives debate relates to the range of options between whether we should just focus on ensuring that Afghanistan does not have safe havens for terrorists and terrorism to the much more ambitious aim of ensuring a democratic and stable Afghanistan. The means debate has primarily focused on whether counterinsurgency or counterterrorism is the best approach to achieve our key objectives.

Unfortunately, these debates on objectives and means have not been informed by an adequate consideration of the the domestic balance of power in Afghanistan prior to, during and after the United States invasion. Interestingly, at the onset of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan considerable attention was given to identifying possible allies against the Afghan Taliban. This involved reaching out to and working with warlords and factions who had fought against the Taliban including the Northern Alliance. While our efforts to oust the Afghan Taliban were aided by whatever support we received from their (Taliban’s) rivals, this support was not without consequence. Most significantly, by working with certain factions who were active during Afghanistan’s civil war, in addition to achieving our objective of ousting the Taliban, we too became entangled in the Afghan civil war.

The Bonn Conference held immediately after the overthrow of Taliban resulted in the Northern Alliance demanding and receiving “the most important ministries.”^[1] This essentially meant that while we succeeded in accomplishing our mission to get rid of the Taliban, willingly or unwillingly, we helped bring their rivals into the Afghan government. The shift in the balance of power and the Afghan government thus formed were more a reflection of a particular outcome in a civil war, albeit aided by external support, rather than being a consequence of what we in the west typically understand and accept as legitimate political processes.

Interestingly, save for a few exceptions, the mainstream discourse post Bonn 2001 has been characterized by an insufficient acknowledgement of the civil war perspective, despite the widespread use of this concept to understand Afghanistan prior to the U.S. invasion.^[2] Introducing the civil war lens to understand Afghanistan since 2001 is necessary as it brings to fore certain considerations that must inform how we define our key objectives and the means to achieve them. Following are just some of these considerations:

• Understanding the emergence of post 2001 governments in Afghanistan as representing a particular outcome and shift in the balance of power within an ongoing civil war cautions against any ahistorical formulations that fail to associate the history and context of conflict in Afghanistan and its impact on the politics and conflict post Bonn 2001. It also requires us to remain wary of being used by one or more of the contending parties to the civil war to further their objectives, especially if they do not coincide with and/or contradict our objectives.

• A recent survey by an Afghan media company “linked almost every minister or serving member of parliament to one of the former warlords.”^[3] Viewing the last ten years through a civil war lens can not only help us assess and understand the nature of the present day conflict it can also provide us insights regarding the possibility and nature of conflict in a post U.S. Afghanistan and thus help us plan, prepare and devise our policy accordingly.

• The civil war lens can help us understand the motivations and aspirations of the various actors within Afghanistan from a perspective other than our own, which after all is an external perspective informed by our own objectives and logic of necessity. This in particular can help us avoid committing the fallacy of projecting our own aspirations and objectives and mistaking them for what the population of Afghanistan wants as well.

• Lastly, the idea that there is a civil war in Afghanistan is an important factor to be considered in our domestic public opinion arena and the debates regarding the future of our policies in Afghanistan.

Given the considerations the above approach brings to bear, it is also important to ask as to what accounts for the general absence of references to civil war in public discussions and debates on Afghanistan. The lives and resources we have committed to this effort are far too precious for us to ignore or insufficiently consider any of the dimensions of the war in Afghanistan. Thinking of the Afghan conflict in civil war terms may not provide us everything we need to know about this conflict, but it does highlight certain considerations without which any discussion and debate regarding our objectives and the most appropriate means to achieve these objectives is both incomplete and irresponsible.

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Afghan Peace Council to Qatar to Probe Taliban Office - VOA

Afghan Opposition Urges Caution in Taliban Talks - AP

Afghan Soldier Shoots Americans, Killing One - NYT

Insurgents Try to Storm Afghan Government Building - AP

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Pakistan

Ex-Pakistan Envoy to US Denies Memo Link - AP

Bomb Kills 25 in Northwest Pakistan - AP

Deadly Blast at Pakistan Bus Stop - BBC

Bombing Kills 23 in Pakistan's Khyber Region - Reuters

Iran

Sanctions Begin Taking a Bigger Toll on Iran - LAT

US Presses China, Japan, South Korea to Trim Iran Oil Imports - LAT

China Rejects Iran Oil Sanctions - WP

Inspectors Say Iran Is Enriching Uranium at Mountain Site - NYT

Iran 'Enriching Uranium' at Mountain Site - BBC

UN Agency Confirms Iran Nuke Work at Bunker - AP

US Warns Iran over Uranium Plant - BBC

Iran Imposes Death Sentence on Alleged US Spy - NYT

Alleged US Spy Sentenced to Death in Iran - WP

Iran Sentences American Accused of Spying to Death - LAT

Iran Sentences Ex-Marine to Death in CIA Case - AP

US Presses Iran to Release American Sentenced for Spying - VOA

Iran Condemnation after Sentencing US 'Spy' to Death - TT

US Condemns Iranian Death Sentence for American - AP

Iran's Leader Visits Venezuela Amid Tensions - AP

Iran Leader Defends Nuclear Program on LatAm Trip - AP

Iranian, Venezuelan Leaders Rebuff US, Joke About Bomb - Reuters

Iran Too Close for US Comfort - WT

Iran Calls Video Games Part of CIA. Plot - NYT

Iran’s Nuclear Agenda Comes to Our Backyard - WT opinion

Tough Talk on Iran from GOP Candidates - LAT opinion

Syria

Syria Criticizes Arab League Committee Chief's Comments - VOA

Arab League Presses on with Under-fire Syria Mission - TT

Syria Leader to Make Rare Speech - BBC

Embattled Assad to Make Speech on 'Internal Issue' - Reuters

Violence Continues in Syria - NYT editorial

Iraq

Paying the Cost of Security in Iraq - NYT

Analysis: Iraq's Plight Imperils US Goals - AP

Iraq: Baghdad Bombs Target Shi'ite Pilgrims, 16 Killed - VOA

Baghdad Hit by New Deadly Attacks - BBC

Blasts Hit Shi'ite Pilgrims in Iraq, 15 Dead, 52 Hurt - Reuters

Al-Qaeda Affiliate Claims Iraq Attacks - WP

Iraq's PM Maliki: Democrat or Autocrat? - Reuters

Egypt

Egypt: Brotherhood Party Backs Off Demands - WP

Boycott Threat Overshadows Last Stage of Egypt Vote - Reuters

Salafi Leader Offers Egypt Army a 'Safe Exit' - Reuters

Egypt’s Women Find Power Still Hinges on Men - NYT

Blasphemy Trial for Egypt Tycoon - BBC

Middle East / North Africa

Peace Talks Are Discussed in a Session in Jordan - NYT

Israel OKs Harsh Penalties for Illegal Migrants - AP

Libya: Court Seeks News of Gaddafi Son - BBC

Bahrain Jails Protest Policeman - BBC

Libya's Nasty New Friend - LAT editorial

US Department of Defense

Pentagon Tries to Counter Cheap, Potent Weapons - NYT

Official: Strategic Guidance Recognizes US NATO Commitments - AFPS

War Yields Lessons in Preventing, Treating Eye Injuries - AFPS

Trial of US Marine Charged in Iraqi Killings Begins - VOA

Prosecutor: Marine Lost Control of Himself in Major Iraq War Crime - WP

Prosecution: Fatal Assumptions by Marine Led to Killing of Iraqis - S&S

Navy to Let Ousted Ship Captain Get 'Honorable' Retirement - S&S

Virtual Training Expands as Military Evolves - S&S

United States

Daley Out, Lew in as White House Chief of Staff - WP

Has Obama Taken ‘Preemption’ Strategy to Another Level? - WP opinion

Government Employees' Free Speech on Trial - WT opinion

America Abroad - NYT opinion

Africa

3 Killed as Nigerians Strike Against End of Fuel Subsidy - VOA

Nigeria Fuel Protests Turn Violent, Two Killed - Reuters

Police: Sect Kills Nigeria Secret Police Officer - Reuters

Guinea Bissau President Dies in France - Reuters

Americas

US Agents Helped Launder Millions in Drug Proceeds - AP

Police Find 15 Bodies in Western Mexico - Reuters

Mexico Bodies May be Drug Gang Victims - BBC

Mexico Rights Body Suspects Cops in Protest Deaths - AP

Mexico Says 1,500-Barrel Oil Spill Controlled - AP

In Brazil, Officers of the Law, Outside the Law - NYT

Haiti Pres Says Much to Do, Concedes Mistakes - AP

Asia Pacific

China Top Military Paper Warns U.S. Aims to Contain Rise - Reuters

China Trade Growth Slows to 2-Year Lows in December - Reuters

China: More Monks Die by Fire In Protest Of Beijing - NYT

Chinese Rights Lawyer in Remote Jail Denied Visits - AP

US Authorities Probe US-China Commission Email Hack - Reuters

North Korea Diplomacy Picks Up in Beijing - Reuters

North Korea 'in Prisoner Amnesty' - BBC

N. Korea Pardons Convicts as Generals Back Kim - AP

Acquittal of Opposition Leader May Level Field in Malaysia - NYT

Top Dissident to Run for Parliament Seat in Burma - NYT

Burma's Suu Kyi to Run for Parliament - AP

Europe

Renewed Sparring Over Scottish Independence Movement - NYT

UK Police Smuggle Fake Bomb Onto Olympic Site - AP

Greece Told to Make Debt Deal - WP

Germany and France Warn Greece on Bailout Money - NYT

Guns, Not Butter

by David Betz

Kings of War

1. If Greece gets the next big (80 billion Euro) tranche of IMF-EU bailout moulah in March; then,

2. it will be able to conclude a whole bunch of new defence contracts including, inter alia, new Eurofighter jets, frigates from France, submarines from Germany, and Apache helicopters from the USA.

This is on top of a whole heap of kit purchased, largely from Germany, but not yet paid for–Leopard 2 tanks, Eurocopter helicopters, M109 howitzers, phased plasma rifles in the 40 watt range…

In case you’ve missed it, the Greek economy is tanking. In the Guardian today one reads:

…Greece’s economy is being smashed by the heavy spending cuts and tax rises imposed since the country accepted its first IMF rescue package. And as if Greece didn’t have enough problems – Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble has urged its leaders to hurry up and agree a debt-reduction deal with its creditors:

Schäuble told German radio that:

‘Greece…could go faster. We are pushing hard for that.

Greece has to implement what was agreed. All the rescue packages in the world can’t help if the causes are not tackled credibly.’

Now, it would be easy to get on the high horse here, and I must admit I find Schäuble’s words a little nauseating in context. The ‘rescue package’ for Greece has very little to do with rescuing Greece and everything to do with rescuing its creditors and those who have sold it guns on credit. But I’ve got to say if the money has to be spent I’d rather it was on guns than on paying people in ‘arduous’ professions (barbering, waitering)  to retire at 50-55. I think they may find the former more useful since I reckon things are going to hell in a handbasket…