Why Tire Repair Workshops Are the Target of a Wave of Violence in Guanajuato, Mexico

Why Tire Repair Workshops Are the Target of a Wave of Violence in Guanajuato, Mexico

Tomás Andres Michael Carvallo

Since 2018, the state of Guanajuato has been the most violent state in Mexico due to an intense conflict between criminal groups. This article analyzes an under-examined facet of the Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL), and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) conflict in Guanajuato: the use of tire repair shops as fronts for criminal activity. An exclusive data set reveals that over the last ten years, at least 138 tire repair shops have been violently attacked in the state, leaving over 200 dead. An analysis of crime data, news reports, and statements of local security experts suggests that these attacks are related to the fight between organized crime groups. These groups have infiltrated tire repair shops, installing networks for merchandizing stolen fuel and methamphetamine, two key criminal markets in the state. While violence and insecurity due to conflicts between criminal groups are widespread across the nation, Guanajuato is the only state where tire repair shops have been infiltrated and systematically targeted with stunning violence. Therefore, this article aims to explain a unique trend and elucidate a key aspect of the most violent conflict in Mexico.

Tire Shop Sign. Photo by Tomás Andres Michael Carvallo

Methodology 

This article uses a data set of attacks on tire repair shops in the state of Guanajuato since 2013, when the press first reported on these attacks. The events were found by searching on Google news, Twitter, and several Guanajuato news websites for keywords related to tire repair shops, such as “vulcanizadora Guanajuato” and “taller de autos Guanajuato” with a range of one month. After all the relevant events were catalogued according to date, municipality, number of deaths, and source, the search process was repeated for the next month. The same search method, with the search term “Guanajuato” filtered out, was used to find the number of attacks at tire repair shops in all other states of Mexico.

The final count as of the writing of this article is 138 attacks causing 213 deaths, with the first event recorded on July 23, 2013, and the most recent event occurring on November 17, 2022.[1][2]

There are a few important limitations to this article.

First, this article relies on analysis of reporting on tire repair shops in Guanajuato. It is possible that there are “media black holes,” areas where events occur but are not reported on. Also, the data set is dependent on events that were reported on, and then uploaded online. It is possible local paper press reported on attacks but did not publish their articles online.

The government has been entirely silent on the causes of these attacks. Therefore, this article is dependent on analysis of local news reporting supplemented by two interviews with Guanajuato journalists. 

Overview of the Security Situation in Mexico

Since the early 2000s, conflicts between criminal groups have contributed to accelerated and shocking levels of violence in Mexico. In 2021, the Mexican statistics agency National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) recorded 35,625 homicides, nearly 100 deaths a day.[3] While the final homicide count for 2022 is on track to drop by around 8%, the violence and its effect on the nation are staggering.[4] While government and expert estimates vary, it is agreed that somewhere between 70-80% of homicides in Mexico are related to organized crime conflict.[5] Apart from the tragic cost in human lives, the conflict has resulted in high perceptions of insecurity among citizens,[6] major costs to the Mexican economy,[7] and, whether true or not, has caused international partners to perceive that the Mexican government is losing control of large parts of the nation.[8]

The security landscape of Mexico today looks quite different than at the outset of the drug war in 2006. The United States and Mexico’s bilateral security initiative included the kingpin strategy, a focus on capturing and extraditing the heads of criminal organizations. This strategy yielded the takedowns of many top criminal leaders. However, as leaders of criminal groups fell, their subordinates fought for control of the organization, causing large alliances to fragment and breaking large criminal organizations into numerous smaller groups all competing for a smaller share of the market. [9] For example, in 2007, the government of President Felipe Calderón claimed that there were 20 criminal groups operating in the nation.[10] A 2020 study by the think tank Crisis Group found that after a decade of group fragmentation, there were just under 200 criminal groups operating in Mexico, revealing an unrecognizable and complex conflict landscape.[11]

Parallel to this proliferation of smaller actors is a marked increase in homicides, and a diversification of markets for criminal organizations. In the past, while a handful of Mexican criminal organizations grew their power by primarily focusing on drug cultivation and trafficking, today’s criminal groups are involved in numerous criminal markets in addition, such as synthetic drug production, domestic drug retail, extortion, and fuel theft. As security analyst Alejandro Hope explains it, the criminal groups of today are not like Pablo Escobar or Amado Carrillo Fuentes, they are like “Los Motonetos,” referencing a small criminal group from Chiapas, composed of young men, mostly involved in extortion and local drug sales.[12] These criminal groups are well armed, often with weaponry smuggled into Mexico from the United States, taking advantage of their northern neighbor’s relaxed gun ownership laws.[13]

As criminal groups have diversified away from drug trafficking to other economic pursuits, larger areas of Mexico have become available for the extraction of economic rents, introducing violent conflicts which translate into high homicide counts and insecurity. Violent turf wars still determine who controls key smuggling routes, international borders, ports, and other geography related to drug trafficking, but now, once peaceful states which hold little value for drug trafficking have become epicenters of conflict. In 2010, many of the most violent states were along the northern border, a result of fights for access to drug gateways into the United States.[14] Today, states in the center of Mexico have risen on the homicide count rankings.[15] 

The State of Guanajuato

The case of Guanajuato is central to these themes of escalating violence, economic diversification, and the proliferation of small groups. Long considered one of the most peaceful and safe states in Mexico, a brutal conflict between a local organized crime group, the Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL), and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) has made it the most violent state in Mexico by homicide count since 2018.[16] So far this year, Guanajuato has recorded 2,471 homicides, about 10% of the nation’s total, according to government data.[17] Much of the violence is fueled by the fight between these two groups and their allies for control of the state’s lucrative Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) pipelines and an expanding market of synthetic drug consumers.[18]

A Brief History of the CJNG-CSRL Conflict in Guanajuato

While it is commonly believed that the CJNG entered the state in 2017, they were infiltrating the state on a small scale before this, establishing criminal cells but avoiding conflict with existing criminal actors, according to an investigation by organized crime blog Borderland Beat.[19]

Security analyst David Saucedo told Borderland Beat that in 2015, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho,” the leader of CJNG, attempted to negotiate an alliance with local criminal group the Union de Leon, in eastern Guanajuato. They rejected his proposal, viewing the CJNG as an untrustworthy external force.[20] This sparked an armed conflict between the two groups, which spread from Leon in the east of the state, reaching Irapuato in the center by 2017.[21] From the period of 2015–2017, this violence was reflected in rising homicide counts, notably in the city of Leon, where the invasion began.[22]

In January 2017, El Mencho once again tried to negotiate with existing groups in the state, this time sending his nephew as an emissary to meet José Antonio Yépez Ortiz alias “El Marro,” the leader of the CSRL. His goal was not the state’s fuel theft market, but rather control of the trafficking routes and replacing another criminal group called Los Viagras as CSRL’s primary methamphetamine suppliers.[23] However, rather than negotiate, El Marro killed El Mencho’s nephew.[24] After this, in October of 2017 El Marro released a message directed at the CJNG, where he appeared standing in front of several dozen armed CSRL members, threatening and ordering the CJNG to leave the state.[25] That year, homicides almost doubled from the previous year, from 1,232 to 2,285.[26] Associated homicides are described in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Annual homicides in Guanajuato [27]

Conflict rapidly spread across the state over the next few years. In 2018, Guanajuato was propelled to the front of the list of Mexico’s most dangerous states by homicide count, where it remains now.[28] In March 2019, the federal and Guanajuato governments launched the ‘Golpe de Timón’ a security offensive which aimed to regain control of the state and capture high value criminal targets, particularly El Marro. CSRL cells were dismantled across the state and the government pursued El Marro, making five attempts to capture him.[29]

In June 2020, a distraught, crying, El Marro posted a video and threatened the government following the capture of 26 alleged CSRL members, among them his mother.[30] In the video, he railed against the government for what he alleged was unfair persecution and appealed to CJNG rivals, the Sinaloa Cartel, for support. One month later, on August 2nd, he was captured in a nighttime raid by the army in a ranch in Juventino Rosas.[31] According to Mexican Secretary of Defense Luis Cresencio Sandoval, El Marro was protected by just five men and lived on the run, never sleeping more than two nights in one place.[32]

This did not end the conflict, however. Violence intensified to staggering levels in 2020 as both groups grappled for control. Researcher Francisco Jiménez Reynoso told BBC Mundo: “There is a fierce conflict, neighborhood to neighborhood and sometimes street to street for the control of those markets.”[33] That year there were 5,370 homicides, almost 15 murders a day. This meant a homicide rate of 70 per 100,000, over two times the rate for all of Mexico.[34][35]

17 months after the launch of the Golpe de Timón, the state government presented results in a press conference marking the successful completion of the strategy.[36] The presentation revealed that because of the initiative, 2,662 alleged criminals were captured. Figure 2 breaks down the captures by group.[37]

Figure 2. Captures by group affiliation from Golpe de Timón (3/ 2019 – 8/ 2020). Graphed collectively as ‘Other groups’: Unión de León (13), Cárteles Unidos (9), Nueva Familia Michoacána (8), Cártel del Golfo (7), Cártel de Sinaloa (3). [38]

The weakening of the CSRL did pacify the state to a significant degree. The homicide count dropped from 5,370 in 2020 to 3,884 in 2021, a reduction of 27.6 percent.

Compared to the CSRL, who lost several top commanders and members of El Marro’s family, the CJNG has not been as impacted by the government. While the Golpe de Timón also captured significant numbers of their members and equipment, the CJNG’s top leadership in the state has remained relatively unscathed. In fact, after a government attempt to capture regional CJNG leader Ricardo Ruiz Velasco “El RR” or “The YouTuber” in August 2022, the CJNG flexed their strength by burning dozens of businesses and vehicles in a dozen cities across the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato, a reminder that their influence in the state has grown as the CSRL’s has waned.[39]

Today, while Guanajuato remains at the top of both the state homicide counts and national newspapers for atrocities, the violence, and attacks on tire repair shops are on a downward trend. The simplest explanation is that at this point the CJNG is winning the fight for the state. As of the writing of this article, due to the CSRL’s repeated loss of leaders, they appear to be losing ground. [40]

It is within this context that both criminal groups have been attacking tire repair shops (vulcanizadoras in regional Spanish) to strike at each other’s drug dealing and stolen gasoline rackets. A review of local press reports reveals that since 2013, there have been at least 138 brutal attacks on these tire shops in the state, causing 213 deaths. The victims are often the owners, employees, and customers of the businesses.[41]These tire shop attacks are linked to this turf war between criminal groups. According to an interview with David Saucedo, the attacks are the result of a targeted campaign by both criminal groups to destroy each other’s economic engines, as the tire shops are used as sites for the dealing of meth and stolen gasoline.[42]

The most recent attack occurred on 17 November 2022, in the city of Celaya. Around 2 p.m., police responded to reports of gunshots in a tire repair shop. When police arrived, they found a man dead inside. The attackers had already fled the scene.[43]

The Role of the Government

It is impossible to discuss the situation in Guanajuato without acknowledging the murky, complex, and obscure, but very real role of government forces in prolonging the conflict by colluding with both criminal groups. Members of different levels of government, from Pemex plant workers to small town mayors are involved in the conflict in many ways from allowing the theft of fuel to contracting out police departments in the service of organized crime. Further, the topic is difficult to analyze due to the obvious threats faced by journalists who choose to investigate links between organized crime and government forces. Indeed, a Small Wars Journal analysis of the journalists murdered in Mexico between 1992 and 2022 found that nearly as many were covering the government and politics as were covering organized crime and criminal groups when they were killed.[44]

In August 2022, newspaper Milenio reported on an investigation by undercover federal officers which led to the dismissal of around 150 Municipal police officers in the city of Celaya. According to police sources cited by Milenio, the corrupt officers provided intelligence, sabotaged law enforcement operations, and worked as hired security for both the CSRL and the CJNG.[45] This was hardly an isolated event: a year earlier, 29 officers in the city of Leon were similarly dismissed for having links to organized crime.[46]

As InSight Crime points out, the low salaries and violent threats which make Guanajuato the most dangerous state to be a police officer contribute to the endemic security force corruption in the state.[47] Indeed, since 2018, 321 police officers have been killed in the state, the most of any state in Mexico, according to the think tank Causa en Común.[48]

Mexico’s President López Obrador, stated that the CSRL’s growth was facilitated by the complicity of state authorities.[49] This is supported by the numerous political scandals which linked the CSRL with local political figures. For example, in March 2019, an audio recording was leaked of a call between Hugo Estefanía, the ex-mayor of the city of Cortazar and a high-ranking figure in the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and Noé Israel Lara Belman, alias “El Puma,” a CSRL officer.[50] The two discussed arrangements which would let the CSRL charge extortion in the city of Villagrán, where a relative of CSRL leader El Marro was currently mayor. Later that year in December, Estefanía was gunned down at his home by armed men.[51]

While the CSRL have enjoyed the “defenders’ advantage” of having developed layers of corruption in the state’s political, security, and energy spheres, the CJNG have made it their mission to uproot the CSRL and install their own connections, even posting the names and patrol numbers of police they accuse of being connected with the CSRL and threatening authorities with violence if they are not fired.[52] CJNG messaging in the state is often directed at state authorities, alleging corruption with the CSRL, especially for unfairly prosecuting CJNG’s members.

In July 2022, police received a tip call about a body inside a house in Irapuato. Paramedics and Municipal police arrived shortly after and discovered a severed head inside a cooler placed inside the empty home next to plastic trash bags. Shortly after an investigative police officer (Agencia de Investigación Criminal) entered the home, the bags exploded, apparently by a remote detonated IED inside.[53] The officer was hurt but was rushed to the hospital and survived. The following day, CJNG released a video of the attack, filmed from a hidden camera inside the home, with threatening text overlayed. In the text, the CJNG alleged that the local investigative police targeted CJNG members and their families, raiding their homes without warrants.[54]

In another instance the CJNG kidnapped and tortured members of an elite state police unit called the “Tactical Group,” seeking information about its members.[55] They used the addresses and names they learned to hunt the officers at their homes, killing at least seven. In a publicly posted narco banner, the CJNG explained that this was in response to the Tactical Group’s targeting of their members and vowed to retaliate with two murders of officers for every CJNG member that was arrested.

The Data

The frequency of attacks mirrors the homicide counts in the state, beginning in the early 2010s, and drastically increasing around 2016, after the CJNG invasion of the state. The tire shop attacks peaked in 2020, with 51 attacks in one year which resulted in 91 deaths. Since then, just as the pace of the CSRL–CJNG conflict has slowed as the CJNG gains the upper hand, the number of tire shop attacks has sharply decreased, but remains a constant in the local criminal environment. The data is described in Figures 1 through 7, and elaborated upon in the two appendices. Specifically, Figure 1 and 2 (above) describes homicides in Guanajuato and criminals captured by group during the Golpe de Timón, operation respectively. Figure 3 recaps annual tire shop attacks in Guanajuato; Figure 4 compares tire shop attacks by state; Figure 5 describes tire shop attacks in Guanajuato by city; Figure 6 details tire shop attacks by zones of conflict; and Figure 7 correlates the top ten municipalities in Guanajuato by homicide count and tire shop attacks (2017–2021).

Figure 3. Annual tire shop attacks in Guanajuato [56]

Figure 4. Tire repair shop attacks in Mexico by state (2013-2022). [57]

A count of attacks across all states of Mexico reveals that while tire repair shops are attacked elsewhere, Guanajuato is the epicenter of the attacks, representing 138 out of 184 attacks (75.5%) between 2013 and the beginning of 2022.[58]  

Figure 5. Tire repair shop attacks in Guanajuato by city (2013-2022).[59]

Categorizing attacks by city in Guanajuato reveals that almost all attacks occur in the middle and south of the state, exactly the parts of Guanajuato contested for the last couple years. The northern half of the state is relatively free of these attacks.

Indeed, Figure 5 looks strikingly like Figure 6, which shows key zones of conflict.

Figure 6. “Map of the cartel war in Guanajuato by David Saucedo.” June 2022.[60]

The cities most affected by the attacks are the same cities frequently in headlines for massacres and shootouts. The ten most violent cities by homicide count and the ten cities with the most tire shop attacks have a correlation of .8411, a strong positive correlation.

Figure 7: Top ten municipalities in Guanajuato by homicide count and tire shop attacks (2017–2021) [61]

Of the 138 attacks in Guanajuato, 123 (89.1%) have occurred since 2017, when the CJNG and CSRL fully went to war.

Methods of Attack

Most of the attacks fall into two methods: ‘shop invasions’ or ‘drive-by’ attacks. Both occur during the day, when the shop is open, often with customers inside. In some cases, the attackers will spread flame accelerants or throw hand grenades to light the business on fire. The objective is to quickly cause as many casualties and damage as possible before fleeing the scene. 

An analysis of the modus operandi of the events reveals that attackers use a variety of methods of attack, all with similar elements including:

1. Targeted hits against owners – while the attackers had no qualms about killing customers, in most cases their objective was to kill the owners and employees.
2. Speed and surprise are paramount – most attacks lasted only a few moments, from the drive up to getaway. As a result, hardly any attackers are arrested.
3. Time of attack – attacks almost always occur during the day when employees and customers are on site.
4. Attacks are often publicized after the attack – signed narco messages, taking of photos, and the timing of attacks suggests that the attacks are meant to be publicized. Criminal groups want the public to know they were behind the attack.

Most of the attacks resembled drive-by shootings, where a small group of hitmen, sometimes as few as one or two, will drive up to the shop on motorbikes or cars. They will stop on the street and fire off shots at whoever is in range. Sometimes, one shooter dismounts the bike to fire shots, before mounting again. As quickly as they arrive, they speed off. Due to the speed of these attacks, they are typically less fatal.

A typical example of a drive-by attack occurred on 24 April 2021, around 5 p.m. Two armed men on one motorcycle sped up to a tire shop on the side of a road in Celaya, stopped, fired shots inside, and sped off. One man was injured in the attack but survived.[62]

In another usual method, a group of heavily armed hitmen will rush at the shop in cars or on motor bikes, dismount, and enter the business and spray gunfire at whoever is inside. After killing their victims, the gunmen flee before neighbors can call the police. Again, the culprits are rarely caught. Based on videos of shop invasion attacks, they typically last around two to three minutes. In these attacks, the hitmen sometimes leave a narco message, sometimes even taking the time to photograph the crime scene for dissemination online.[63]

In one case that went viral across Mexico in February 2019, attackers affiliated with the CSRL used a portable GoPro camera to film themselves ambushing a tire shop in the city of Valle de Santiago. The video shows first-person footage of several attackers armed with AR-15 style rifles and bulletproof vests riding in the back of two speeding pickups, before screeching to a halt in front of the business. Instantly they open fire, killing five employees and customers, as they shout their allegiance to El Marro, the leader of their criminal enterprise. In just over a minute, they cleared the building and piled back into the trucks to make their getaway.[64]

In addition to attacks on tire shops by groups of hitmen, owners and employees have been killed at their own homes or have faced threatening messages with corpses left outside their businesses.[65][66]

The Sale of Stolen Pemex Fuel

The theft of Pemex fuel for sale on the black market is a major criminal racket in Mexico, causing over one billion USD in losses to the state oil company at its peak in 2016.[67] According to organized crime expert Dr. Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, this criminal market, called “huachicol” in Mexico, was first pioneered by the Zetas, a criminal group whose expansion in the 2000s was propelled by their violent military tactics and diversification.[68] The CSRL, who splintered off from the Zetas in the late 2000s were instrumental in turning Guanajuato into one of the states with the highest counts of illegal Pemex fuel taps in the late 2010s.

There are two main methods of fuel theft. The first is theft from the Antonio M. Amor refinery in the city Salamanca. This required the corruption of Pemex engineers within the plant, who would underreport the actual production and sell the difference between the actual and reported production. Due to inaccurate record keeping necessary for this method, it is difficult to quantify.

The second method is by tapping pipelines. Tapping pipelines does not require extensive corruption networks to exploit, as the pipelines run for hundreds of miles across the state and are difficult to patrol. Fuel thieves simply perforate the unguarded pipes and siphon the gasoline into containers. This method can be risky, and pipelines explosions and fires result frequently, often with fatal consequences. These taps are tracked by Pemex as “tomas clandestinas.” Data for these pipelines is available on Pemex’s transparency page and by information request from the Mexican Government.

The CSRL and the state’s other criminal groups looted Pemex, creating hundreds of taps into the pipelines which cross the state, as well as utilizing corrupt officials within Pemex to steal tanker trucks carrying fuel out of the state’s refineries.[69] It is important to note that widespread fuel theft is not driven solely by organized criminal groups. As a Crisis Group report on fuel theft in Mexico concluded, most pipeline taps involved the complicity or support of government or security forces in some way.[70]

However, in 2019, likely due to the expansion of CJNG, and a successful government offensive against illegal fuel theft, the number of fuel taps plummeted, from 1,915 in 2018 to 652 taps, a decrease of 66%, according to Pemex data. As of September 2022, the number of fuel taps has further reduced to 316.[71] According to Guanajuato journalist Miguel Ángel Mejía, in northeastern Guanajuato where the sale of fuel was once common: “you don’t see it anymore.” [72]

Figure 8. Illegal fuel taps in Guanajuato per year 2012-2022.[73][74]

Until the early 2020s, the marketing of stolen fuel was widespread in the state. It could be purchased at roadside stands along major highways, delivered to your home, and found at tire repair shops.

According to an interview with an illegal fuel salesperson with AM Noticias in 2019: “they have been selling it like it is nothing on Highway 57. Sometimes it is easier to find (stolen) gasoline or diesel than a tire repair shop or food.” [75]

Many are involved in the theft and sale of stolen gasoline. According to Pagina Negra, in a region where many earn between 60-120 pesos a day, selling stolen fuel can offer up to 800 pesos. However, workers are typically not paid cash, but with gasoline.[76] This gasoline can then be sold by the employees of the criminal enterprise to convert their earnings into cash.

Stolen fuel has been observed for sale at tire repair shops and other similar businesses across Mexico before.[77] When interviewed, Saucedo elaborated that this was the case in Guanajuato. The CSRL began the practice, noticing the opportunity that tire shops held. According to Saucedo: “When a motorist takes his vehicle to repair a flat tire, the seller of the tire repair shop also sells them two things: blue glass (meth) and stolen fuel at a good price obviously.”[78]

An Expanding Market of Drug Consumers?

When asked about drug use trends in the state, Guanajuato journalist Miguel Ángel Mejía H said: “The United States has had their fentanyl crisis for two years, where they are impacted by the number of deaths from overdoses. Here, surely, we have the same, but we don’t have the data.”[79] Indeed, government data showing an increasing number of drug dealing cases, statements from public officials, and analysis from drug rehabilitation centers point to a burgeoning segment of synthetic drug consumers who are supplied by criminal groups in the region.

Guanajuato is a major market for illicit drugs, especially methamphetamine. Earlier this year, the Secretary of Public Security, Alvar Cabeza de Vaca Appendini, claimed in an interview with news daily Noticieros en Líneathat the drug market in Guanajuato is worth about 60 million pesos ($2,904,247.US dollars) daily.[80] Multiplied for the year, this means that Guanajuato is worth just over 1 billion US dollars, a tremendous sum for the criminal groups who fight for dominance of the local drug dealing market.

Coinciding with figures are the vast numbers of drug dealing cases. According to Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad (SESNP) data, there have been 59,362 cases of drug dealing since the end of 2018 in the state.[81] This makes Guanajuato the state with by far the highest counts in Mexico, representing 21.7% of the nation’s total of 273,223 cases.

Although there is a lack of official data on the type of drugs used, experts believe that methamphetamine is the most popular, and is rapidly gaining users. In 2021, Nicolás Pérez Ponce, President of the United Rehab Centers of the Bajio announced that in 2020, 6 out of 10 addicts they encountered sought help for a meth problem, but in 2021, that number had increased to 8 out of 10.[82] According to Ponce, “the problem lies in that crystal is the drug with highest circulation in the state, and it’s also very cheap and very addictive, but also very harmful”.[83]

These statements align with drug seizures during the Golpe de Timon, which underscore the prevalence of methamphetamine in the state. During the 16-month operation, marijuana was the most common drug seized, with 2,081,620 doses, followed by methamphetamine, with 123,347 doses. The next common drug was cocaine, with 5,643 doses seized.[84]

Tire Shops as Drug Selling Spots

On 15 June 2020, in the municipality of Silao, armed gunmen attacked a tire repair shop on the outskirts of town, killing three—two owners and an employee. Newspaper La Silla Rota spoke to an anonymous neighbor who identified themself as a ‘frequent customer’ of the establishment. According to them, the business was known in the area for selling both stolen gasoline and meth.[85]

The CSRL and CJNG are the two main forces behind the sale of meth in the state, and routinely kidnap and kill rival dealers for marketing the competition’s product. The CSRL are infamous for selling meth that has a blue color, while the CJNG sells a white variant. This branding makes it easy for both groups to discover which drug dealers are aligned with their rivals.[86] This rivalry is reflected in the narco messages each group leaves by the bodies of killed dealers, which frequently reference blue or white meth.

Figure 9. Blue and white meth in Guanajuato.

While often the attacks at tire shops are related to their use as drug selling spots, according to Saucedo, at times innocent tire shops are hit by accident. He writes further that sometimes criminal cells have quotas of attacks they need to meet and will attack uninvolved tire shops to inflate their count.[87]

Extortion as a Possible Reason for Attacks

When businesses are attacked in Mexico, extortion often comes up as a possible answer. Extortion is defined in Mexican penal code Article 390 as, “Anyone who without right forces another to give, do, stop doing or tolerate something, obtaining a profit for himself or for another or causing someone a property damage.”[88] Corporate extortion is an endemic problem in Mexico, with 44.8% of businesses polled by INEGI paying fees to criminal entities in 2021.[89] Law enforcement data of cases, government polls, and economic studies find that the issue is increasing, and poses a major threat to the Mexican economy.[90][91]

Typically, extortion is understood as charging businesses a fee in exchange for protection, or the ability to operate on territory controlled by a criminal group. However, the systematic violent assault on tire repair shops in Guanajuato does not fit with these methods of extortion, but rather indicates greater involvement by tire repair shops in the criminal enterprise.

There are several reasons why these attacks are likely not the result of extortion in exchange for protection, but imply a deeper connection with criminal groups:

1. Tire repair shops are the only industry that has been victimized by this level of brutality, focus, and for this long. While businesses are sometimes targeted collectively by extortionists, they are not attacked with such brutality.
2. On several occasions, those ambushed at the tire shop have returned fire, killing, or injuring their attackers. In one such event in 2016, police arrived at the scene of an attacked shop, and found two bodies. One was an employee, and one was an attacker with a bulletproof vest and ski mask.[92] This suggests the employees are sometimes armed and expecting an attack from rivals.
3. Local witnesses have claimed that the tire repair shops have been involved in the sale of drugs and gasoline.
4. Narco communications left at crime scenes indicate the employees or owner were involved in a rival criminal enterprise, not just paying extortion fees.

Another common extortion practice in Mexico is using force and threats to compel a business to sell or allow the sale of illicit products provided by that criminal group. This model has been observed across Mexico, perhaps most clearly in the case of the Cártel de Tabaco, a group affiliated with the CJNG.[93] In 2018, an investigation by Milenio uncovered this group, which used an elaborate scam where members posed as government officials and notified businesses that they were only permitted to sell tobacco products provided by their criminal enterprise. Businesses who resisted faced threats and violence, sometimes with employees and owners being killed. Some businesses would also receive messages informing them they were under the protection of the CJNG. Using this “franchise” method, the Cártel de Tabaco was able to expand their product to 364 businesses across seven states in Mexico.[94]

This model offers a possible explanation for how tire repair shops have been systematically infiltrated by criminal groups who force the sale of their product, and as a result, place the businesses in the crosshairs of the rival criminal enterprise.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The violent conflict between the CJNG and CSRL for control of Guanajuato has turned the state into Mexico’s most dangerous by several metrics such as homicide count and murders of police officers. Guanajuato is a unique state, with trends unique to Mexico, such as an outsized percent of cases of drug dealing and systematic attacks on tire repair shops. Further, Guanajuato’s spiral from one of the safest states to one of the most dangerous within a few years because of the CSRL–CJNG conflict is of special importance, as it can offer a cautionary example, and provide lessons for how to identify when, why, and how violent turf wars are erupting. Therefore, Guanajuato is an important state to analyze and understand if we hope to understand the criminal landscape in Mexico at large.

The data suggests that tire repair shops play a complex and important role in this turf war in Guanajuato. Their role ties together two key criminal markets in Guanajuato, the theft and sale of government fuel and the local sale of synthetic drugs, as well as explains how these criminal markets propel violence in the state.

It is also necessary to make clear that the victims of these attacks are most often owners, employees, and customers of the business. The attacks occur during the day, when the businesses are operating, many times with customers inside. Therefore, with a few notable exceptions, the mortal victims are not hitmen of criminal groups engaged in combat, they are regular, unarmed civilians. While the tire repair shop employees and owners may be involved in criminal activity, they are likely strongarmed and extorted into cooperation under threat of violence. These attacks should not be interpreted as combat between armed members of two criminal groups then, but armed aggression by hitmen against victimized business owners, their employees, and their customers. Similar estimations have been used to minimize the effects of drug violence and downplay the security situation. One notable example was when former President Felipe Calderón told business investors in 2010 that 90% of homicides in the nation were the result of cartel-on-cartel violence, the implication being that the security situation was not as grim as it appeared, and their business investments would be safe.[95]

However, there is a lack of clarity on how exactly tire repair shops came to be so influenced and infiltrated by criminal groups in Guanajuato. While we can speculate based on methods of extortion observed elsewhere, it is so far unknown what arrangements were made to allow the sale of fuel and meth on site. It is important to research this as the extensive infiltration and takeover of a business sector for the commercialization of illicit substances by criminal groups is a model that could be applied anywhere. Indeed, on a smaller scale, entire industries have become the target of criminal pressure before, such as chicken and tortilla sellers in Guerrero in 2022.[96]

Further, tire repair shops should be placed under more intense scrutiny by authorities. A government offensive against fuel theft, a main policy objective of the López Obrador administration, is incomplete without removing tire repair shops from criminals’ portfolios. Tire repair shops have been suspected of being fronts for the commercialization of stolen fuel for years and the ease of locating stolen fuel at tire repair shops is well known to the public.

The government must also address Guanajuato’s emerging position as a main consumer of synthetic drugs. While representing under 5% of Mexico’s population, Guanajuato accounts for about 21% of the nation’s drug dealing cases since 2019 —a staggering over representation, which rises to 27% when changing the timeframe to just 2022.[97] Additionally, state authorities and those involved in the drug rehabilitation and research sectors are sounding the alarm about shifting trends which show increased consumption of methamphetamine. A drug use crisis is an entire issue of its own, but it is necessary to examine its role in violence in Guanajuato.

Finally, as is often the case in Mexico, it is impossible to fully understand the issue without exploring the role of government. First and foremost, why has there been silence from authorities on the attacks on tire repair shops? The attacks have been happening with high frequency for almost a decade, at some points at a rate of one attack per week. Some establishments have even been attacked multiple times. Local police and paramedics who respond to these attacks have undoubtedly noticed these trends. This raises questions as to why the government, who must have noticed these attacks, has not issued public messaging about their causes, methods, and culprits.

Endnotes

[1] “Están Inconscientes Dos Rafagueados.” Periódico AM. 23 July 2013, https://www.am.com.mx/news/2013/7/23/estan-inconscientes-dos-rafagueados-22678.html.

[2] Centeno, Lidia. “Matan a Balazos a “El Kalimba” En Una Vulcanizadora de Celaya, Guanajuato.” Noventa Grados. 17 November 2022, https://www.noventagrados.com.mx/seguridad/matan-a-balazos-a-el-kalimba-en-una-vulcanizadora-de-celaya-guanajuato.html.

[3] “Datos Preliminares Revelan Que En 2021 Se Registraron 35 625 Homicidios.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2022/DH/DH2021.pdf.

[4] “Homicidios En México Caen 8.1% En 2022, Presume SSCP.” La Crónica de Hoy, 20 October 2022, http://www.cronica.com.mx/nacional/homicidios-mexico-caen-8-1-2022-presume-sscp.html.

[5] “Datos Preliminares Revelan Que En 2021 Se Registraron 35 625 Homicidios.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2022/DH/DH2021.pdf.

[6] “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización Y Percepción Sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2022.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://bit.ly/3CYWUWc.

[7] “Violencia Costó a México 4.9 Billones de Pesos En 2021: ONG.” El Financiero. 17 May 2022, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2022/05/17/violencia-costo-a-mexico-49-billones-de-pesos-en-2021-ong/.

[8] ““Organized Crime Controls 35% of Mexico” Glen VanHerk, Head of the U.S. Northern Command.” The Yucatan Times. 22 March 2021, https://www.theyucatantimes.com/2021/03/organized-crime-controls-35-of-mexico/.

[9] Jane Esberg, “Why Mexico’s Kingpin Strategy Failed: Targeting Leaders Led to More Criminal Groups and More Violence.” Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy West Point. 9 June 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/why-mexicos-kingpin-strategy-failed-targeting-leaders-led-to-more-criminal-groups-and-more-violence/#:~:text=In%20part%2C%20this%20was%20the,organizations%20expand%20into%20new%20areas.

[10] Alejandro Hope participation in “¿Hacia 16 Años de Guerra?: Pasado Y Futuro de La Violencia Criminal En México,” webinar, sponsored by Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI), YouTube, 21 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJxvGvBK5WQ.

[11] Jane Esberg, “More than Cartels: Counting Mexico’s Crime Rings.” Crisis Group, 8 May 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/more-cartels-counting-mexicos-crime-rings.

[12] Alejandro Hope participation in “¿Hacia 16 Años de Guerra?: Pasado Y Futuro de La Violencia Criminal En México,” webinar, sponsored by Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI), YouTube, 21 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJxvGvBK5WQ.

[13] Ioan Grillo, Blood Gun Money: How America Arms Gangs and Cartels. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021.

[14] “Homicidios Durante 2010 Rompen Récord Desde La Revolución.” El Informador. 19 Oct. 2011, https://www.informador.mx/Mexico/Homicidios-durante-2010-rompen-record-desde-la-Revolucion-20110729-0141.html.

[15] “Datos Preliminares Revelan Que En 2021 Se Registraron 35 625 Homicidios.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2022/DH/DH2021.pdf .

[16] Felipe Sánchez Nájera and Daniela Osorio, “Violencia Sin Tregua: Las Cifras Del Inegi Sobre Homicidios Durante 2020.” Nexos. 24 January 2022, https://seguridad.nexos.com.mx/violencia-sin-tregua-las-cifras-del-inegi-sobre-homicidios-durante-2020/#:~:text=Al%20analizar%20la%20distribución%20de,concentrando%2046%20%25%20del%20total%20nacional.

[17] “Informe de seguridad, 20 de septiembre de 2022.” Gobierno de Mexico. 2022, https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/documentos/informe-de-seguridad-20-de-septiembre-de-2022.

[18] Óscar Reyes, “Aumentan Adictos al Cristal En Guanajuato.” El Sol de León.19 November 2021, https://www.elsoldeleon.com.mx/local/aumentan-adictos-al-cristal-en-guanajuato-7496417.html.

[19] Redlogarythm, “Criminal Dynasty. The Upsurge, Splendor and Demise of the Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (Part One).” Borderland Beat. 19 August 2021, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2021/08/criminal-dynasty-upsurge-splendor-and.html.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Josefina Salomon, “Mexico’s CJNG: Local Consolidation, Military Expansion and Vigilante Rhetoric.” InSight Crime. 8 February 2018, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-cjng-local-consolidation-military-expansion-vigilante-rhetoric/.

[22] Alma Paola Wong, “En 10 Años, Guanajuato Pasó al Lugar Seis En Homicidios.” Grupo Milenio. 3 August 2016, https://www.milenio.com/policia/en-10-anos-guanajuato-paso-al-lugar-seis-en-homicidios.

[23] Op.cit., Redlogarythm, “Criminal Dynasty” at Note 19. 

[24] Oscar Reyes Rodríguez, “Fueron 16 Hombres Los Que Protagonizaron Balacera En Cafetería.” El Sol de Irapuato. 18 January 2017, https://www.elsoldeirapuato.com.mx/local/fueron-16-hombres-los-que-protagonizaron-balacera-en-cafeteria-520330.html.

[25] “El Marro” Amenaza al Cártel de Jalisco.” Grupo Milenio, 18 October 2017, https://www.milenio.com/policia/video-el-marro-amenaza-al-cartel-de-jalisco.

‌[26] “Mortalidad, Conjunto de datos: Defunciones por homicidios.”, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] “La Cacería Contra “El Marro”: 5 Operativos Fallidos.” La Silla Rota. 21 June 2020, https://lasillarota.com/guanajuato/estado/2020/6/21/la-caceria-contra-el-marro-operativos-fallidos-234750.html. 

[30] “Narco Alias “El Marro” Llora Y Lanza Amenazas Por El Arresto de Sus Familiares.” YouTube, 22 June 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=blhNrviFrHY.

[31] Carlos Loret. “Así Detuvieron a ‘El Marro’ En Guanajuato.” Washington Post, 2 August 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-opinion/2020/08/02/asi-detuvieron-el-marro-en-guanajuato/.

[32] ““Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima Operó Con Licencia Del Gobierno Anterior”: Santiago Nieto.” Infobae. 6 August 2020, http://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/08/06/cartel-santa-rosa-de-lima-opero-con-licencia-del-gobierno-anterior-santiago-nieto/.

[33] Alberto Nájar, “Paraíso Perdido: Cómo El Estado Más Próspero de México Se Convirtió En El Más Violento En El Último Año.” BBC News Mundo, 21 January 2020, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-51200888.

[34] Parker Asmann, “InSight Crime’s 2020 Homicide Round-Up.” InSight Crime, 29 January 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20221113043720/insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2020-homicide-round-up/.

[35] “Mortalidad, Conjunto de datos: Defunciones por homicidios.”, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est.

[36] “Anuncia Gobernador Estrategia ‘Por Un Guanajuato Seguro.’” Gobierno de Guanajuato. 17 August 2020, https://boletines.guanajuato.gob.mx/2020/08/17/anuncia-gobernador-estrategia-por-un-guanajuato-seguro/.

[37] Wendoline Adame, “Operativo Golpe de Timón En Guanajuato Termina Con Más de 2 Mil 600 Detenidos.” Grupo Milenio, 17 August 2020, http://www.milenio.com/policia/guanajuato-termina-operativo-golpe-timon-resultados.

[38] Governor Diego Sinhue participation in “Estrategia por la Seguridad Guanajuato” sponsored by state government of Guanajuato. Periscope (PSCP), 17 August 2020, http://www.pscp.tv/w/1gqxvaqYbaqJB.

[39] “Narcobloqueos Se Extendieron a Guanajuato; Reportaron Incendios de Autos, Comercios Y Farmacias.” Infobae. 11 August 2022, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/08/10/narcobloqueos-se-extendieron-a-guanajuato-reportaron-incendios-de-autos-comercios-y-farmacias/.

[40] “Cayó El “Panther”, Líder Del Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima Que Se Operó Para Huir de La Justicia.” Infobae. 8 October 2021, http://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/10/08/cayo-el-panther-lider-del-cartel-de-santa-rosa-de-lima-que-se-opero-para-huir-de-la-justicia/.

[41] Data set of attacks on vulcanizadoras in Guanajuato between 2013–2022. Collected and organized by author.

[42] Interview with security expert David Saucedo, July 2021.

[43] Lidia Centeno, “Matan a Balazos a “El Kalimba” En Una Vulcanizadora de Celaya, Guanajuato.” Noventa Grados, 17 November 2022, https://www.noventagrados.com.mx/seguridad/matan-a-balazos-a-el-kalimba-en-una-vulcanizadora-de-celaya-guanajuato.html.

[44] Natalie D. Baker and Jonathan Landry, “Why Is Mexico so Dangerous for Journalists?” Small Wars Journal. 17 August 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-mexico-so-dangerous-journalists.

[45] Jannet López Ponce, “Con Policías Federales Infiltrados, Guanajuato “Caza” a Criminales Uniformados.” Grupo Milenio, 22 August 2022, https://www.milenio.com/estados/policias-infiltrados-guanajuato-caza-criminales-uniformados.

[46] “Comenzó “Limpia” En Guanajuato: Destituyeron a 29 Policías de León Por Nexos Con El Crimen Organizado.” Infobae. 27 October 2021, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/10/27/comenzo-limpia-en-guanajuato-destituyeron-a-29-policias-de-leon-por-nexos-con-el-crimen-organizado/.

[47] Scott Mistler-Ferguson, “Corrupt Police Play Both Sides in Guanajuato, Mexico.” InSight Crime. 29 August 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/corrupt-police-play-both-sides-guanajuato-mexico/.

[48] “Registro de Policías Asesinados.” Causa en Común. 2022, https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/.

[49] “Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima Creció Por Complicidad de Autoridades: AMLO.” El Sol de México. 2 August 2020, https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/mexico/justicia/cartel-santa-rosa-de-lima-crecio-por-complicidad-de-autoridades-amlo-el-marro-guanajuato-5573954.html.

[50] Laura Nancy, “Filtran En Redes Audio Que Vincula a Políticos de Guanajuato Con El Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima.” N+, Noticieros Televisa, 13 March 2019, https://noticieros.televisa.com/ultimas-noticias/filtran-audio-cartel-santa-rosa-de-lima-politicos-guanajuato/.

[51] “Asesinan a Tiros a Hugo Estefanía, Exalcalde de Cortazar, Guanajuato.” YouTube, 3 December 2019 , https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kmaERYFtIjk.

[52] “CJNG Está ‘Cazando’ Y Matando a Policías En Sus Casas En Guanajuato, Alertan.” La Opinión. 31 May 2021, https://laopinion.com/2021/05/31/cjng-esta-cazando-y-matando-a-policias-en-sus-casas-en-guanajuato-alertan/.

[53] “Video. Criminales Observaban a Ministeriales Por Cámaras Cuando Detonaron Explosivo En Irapuato.”El Universal. 30 July 2022, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/video-criminales-observaban-ministeriales-por-camaras-cuando-detonaron-explosivo-en-irapuato.

[54] Robert J. Bunker, “CJNG “Smart Home Weaponization” in Irapuato, Guanajuato: Indications & Warning (I&W) Concerns.” C/O Futures. 25 November 2022, https://www.cofutures.net/post/cjng-smart-home-weaponization-in-irapuato-guanajuato-indications-warning-i-w-concerns.

[55] Mark Stevenson, “In Mexico, Cartels Are Hunting down Police at Their Homes.” Associated Press. 30 May 2021, https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-mexico-police-f6ea7798ca3cc171ac13b3a5a6a6c266.

[56] Data set collected by author in open source of attacks on tire repair shops in Guanajuato between 2013–2022.

[57] Created by author with Tableau Public Version 2022.04.02 using data collected from open sources.

[58] Data set collected by author in open source of attacks on tire repair shops in Guanajuato between 2013–2022.

[59] Created by author with Tableau Public Version 2022.04.02 using data collected from open sources.

[60] Map created by Guanajuato security consultant David Saucedo. David Saucedo, “Cartografia de la Guerra.” (@David_Saucedo_ )Twitter, 27 June 2022, https://twitter.com/david_saucedo_/status/1541588948849500160?s=46&t=1SGes5S37TaXuXjqK8EmMQ. Image used with permission.  See “Image taken from ‘Cartel war map’ shows further incursion by Jalisco cartel into Guanajuato.” Mexico News Daily. 28 June 2022, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/cartel-war-map-jalisco-cartel-guanajuato/ for additional context.

[61] INEGI homicide data by municipality for 2022 is not yet available, so the author correlated 2017–2021 for both data sets. “Mortalidad, Conjunto de datos: Defunciones por homicidios.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). 2022, https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est; Data set collected by author in open source of attacks on tire repair shops in Guanajuato between 2013–2021.

[62] “Seguridad Celaya: Balacera a Vulcanizadora Deja Un Herido En La Cruz.” Periódico AM. 27 April 2021, http://www.am.com.mx/guanajuato/2021/4/27/seguridad-celaya-balacera-vulcanizadora-deja-un-herido-en-la-cruz-514750.html.

[63] “FUERTE VIDEO: Sujeto Entra a Vulcanizadora Para Matar a Un Hombre En Celaya, Guanajuato.” SinEmbargo MX. 10 June 2020, https://www.sinembargo.mx/10-06-2020/3802435.

[64] Robert J. Bunker, Alma Keshavarz and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #39: GoPro Video Social Media Posting of Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) Tactical Action against Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) in Guanajuato.” Small Wars Journal. 3 May 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-39-gopro-video-social-media-posting-cartel-santa-rosa-de-lima.

[65] “Acribillan a Dueño de Vulcanizadora.” Periódico AM. 14 February 2017, https://www.am.com.mx/news/2017/2/14/acribillan-dueno-de-vulcanizadora-278553.html.

[66] “Encuentran Restos Humanos En La Carretera Irapuato-Silao.” Periódico AM. 4 February 2019, https://www.am.com.mx/news/2019/2/4/encuentran-restos-humanos-en-la-carretera-irapuato-silao-375355.html.

[67] Tania Montalvo, “Pemex Pierde 100 Mil Mdp Por Robo de Combustible Y Fugas En El Sexenio de Peña.” Animal Político. 2 February 2017, https://www.animalpolitico.com/2017/02/robo-combustible-ductos-Pemex-gobierno-pena?utm_source=Hoy%20en%20Animal&utm_campaign=d4c605bfb3-ga&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ae638a5d34-d4c605bfb3-392975049.

[68] “La Historia Del Cártel Que Inició Con El Tráfico de Combustibles a Gran Escala En México.” Infobae. 8 January 2019, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2019/01/08/la-historia-del-cartel-que-inicio-con-el-trafico-de-combustibles-a-gran-escala-en-mexico/.

[69] Op. cit., Redlogarythm, “Criminal Dynasty” At Note 19.  

[70] “Keeping Oil from the Fire: Tackling Mexico’s Fuel Theft Racket.” Crisis Group. 22 March 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/keeping-oil-fire-tackling-mexicos-fuel-theft-racket.

[71] Alejandra Padilla, “Tomas Clandestinas 2019: Disminuyeron En 11% Según Pemex.” Serendipia. 25 February 2020, https://serendipia.digital/investigacion/tomas-clandestinas-disminuyeron-11-por-ciento-durante-2019/.

[72] Interview with Guanajuato-based journalist Miguel Ángel Mejía H, October 2022. mn 

[73] Oscar Reyes, “Imparable El Saqueo En Ductos de Pemex.” El Sol de Irapuato. 3 November 2021, https://www.elsoldeirapuato.com.mx/local/imparable-el-saqueo-en-ductos-de-pemex-7428180.html.

[74] “Robo de hidrocarburo en ductos – Tomas Clandestinas 2021.” Instituto para la Gestión, Administración y Vinculación Municipal (IGAVIM) & Observatorio Ciudadano. February 2022, http://www.igavim.org/Documentos%20Generados/Reportes/2021%20ReporteAnual.pdf.

[75] “Venden Huachicol a La Vista de Todos Y Hasta Lo Publican En Internet.” Periódico AM. 28 July 2019, https://www.am.com.mx/news/2019/7/28/venden-huachicol-la-vista-de-todos-hasta-lo-publican-en-internet-444900.html.

[76] “Nación Huachicol: La Cultura En Torno al Robo de Combustible En Puebla.” Periodico Central. 14 January 2022, http://www.periodicocentral.mx/2019/pagina-negra/huachicol/item/643-nacion-huachicol-la-cultura-en-torno-al-robo-de-combustible-en-puebla.

[77] Samuel León Sáez, “El “Otro Dato” Del Huachicol (Parte II).” Nexos. 16 October 2019, https://datos.nexos.com.mx/el-otro-dato-del-huachicol-parte-ii/.

[78] Interview with Guanajuato security analyst David Saucedo, June 2021.

[79] Interview with Guanajuato-based journalist Miguel Ángel Mejía H, October 2022.

[80] Fernando Velázquez, “Valúa Mercado de La Droga En Guanajuato En 60 Millones de Pesos Diarios.” Noticieros En Línea. 13 June 2022, https://noticierosenlinea.com/valua-mercado-de-la-droga-en-guanajuato-en-60-millones-de-pesos-diarios/

[81] Carlos Penna Charolet, “Guanajuato Estado Con Más Narcomenudeo Durante 2022.”, TResearch. 9 September 2022, https://www.tresearch.mx/post/guanajuato-estado-con-ms-narcomenudeo-durante-2022-1.

[82] “Aumentan Adictos al Cristal En Guanajuato.” Noticias Radio Irapuato. 19 November 2021, https://noticiasradioirapuato.com/2021/11/19/aumentan-adictos-al-cristal-en-guanajuato/.

[83] “Aumentan Adictos al Cristal En Guanajuato.” Noticias Radio Irapuato. 19 November 2021, https://noticiasradioirapuato.com/2021/11/19/aumentan-adictos-al-cristal-en-guanajuato/.

[84] “Anuncia Gobernador Estrategia “Por Un Guanajuato Seguro.”” Gobierno de Guanajuato. 17 August 2020, https://boletines.guanajuato.gob.mx/2020/08/17/anuncia-gobernador-estrategia-por-un-guanajuato-seguro/.

[85] “Eran Conocidos Por Vender Huachicol Y Ordeñar Camiones; Los Mataron.” La Silla Rota. 16 June 2020, https://lasillarota.com/guanajuato/estado/2020/6/16/eran-conocidos-por-vender-huachicol-ordenar-camiones-los-mataron-234117.html.

[86] Interview with Guanajuato security analyst David Saucedo, June 2021.

[87] David Saucedo, “Guanajuato En Llamas; Narcoterrorismo.” Notus Noticias. 21 June 2020, https://notus.com.mx/guanajuato-en-llamas-narcoterrorismo/.

[88] “Justia Mexico | Federal Criminal Code | Chapter IIIa | Title Twenty-second | Book Two | Mexico Law.” Justia.com, 2021, https://mexico.justia.com/federales/codigos/codigo-penal-federal/libro-segundo/titulo-vigesimosegundo/capitulo-iii-bis/#:~:text=Art%C3%ADculo%20390-,Art%C3%ADculo%20390,a%20ciento%20sesenta%20d%C3%ADas%20multa.

[89] Silvia Rodríguez, “Inegi: Cuatro de Cada 10 Empresas En México Se Vieron Obligadas a Pagar Extorsiones En 2021.” Grupo Milenio. 29 September 2022, https://www.milenio.com/negocios/inegi-10-empresas-mexico-pagaron-extorsion-2021.

[90] “SSPC: Extorsiones Aumentaron Un 22.6% En Comparación Con El 2021.” Infobae. 23 May 2022, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/05/23/sscp-extorsiones-aumentaron-un-226-en-comparacion-con-el-2021/.

[91] “Extorsión y Actividad de las Empresas en las Regiones de México.” Banxico. December 2019, https://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-prensa/reportes-sobre-las-economias-regionales/recuadros/%7BAA15A8BC-0EEE-4E00-9E0E-2B8912877BA3%7D.pdf.

[92] “Deja Balacera Dos Muertos En Zona Centro de SFR.” Periódico AM. 7 November 2016, https://www.am.com.mx/news/2016/11/7/deja-balacera-dos-muertos-en-zona-centro-de-sfr-261430.html.

[93] “Cómo El CJNG Y El Cártel Del Tabaco Han Redoblado La Producción de Cigarros Ilegales En México.” Infobae. 9 June 2022, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/06/09/como-el-cjng-y-el-cartel-del-tabaco-han-redoblado-la-produccion-de-cigarros-ilegales-en-mexico/.

[94] Carlos Puig and Galia García Palafox, “Cártel Del Tabaco: Amenaza de Muerte a Quien Venda Otras Marcas.” Grupo Milenio, 25 October 2018, https://www.milenio.com/policia/cartel-tabaco-amenaza-muerte-venda-marcas.

[95] “Calderón Lamenta 90% de Muertes Por Violencia.” El Informador. 20 October 2017, https://www.informador.mx/Mexico/Calderon-lamenta-90-de-muertes-por-violencia-20100417-0186.html.

[96] Pablo Ferri, “La guerra del pollo: la última amenaza del narco en México.” El País México. 16 June 2022, https://elpais.com/mexico/2022-06-16/la-guerra-del-pollo-la-ultima-amenaza-del-narco-en-mexico.html.

[97] Op. Cit., Carlos Penna Charolet, “Guanajuato Estado Con Más Narcomenudeo” at Note 81. 

Appendices

Appendix 1: Attacks within Guanajuato state

Appendix 2: Attacks outside Guanajuato state