by Alfred Paddock, Jr.
Download the full article: PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine
On Monday, June 21, 2010, Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander of the US Special Operations Command, announced a decision to change the term, "psychological operations" (PSYOP) to "Military Information Support" and "Military Information Support Operations" (MISO). He stated that henceforth the term, PSYOP, will be eliminated from usage in the military.
Admiral Olson commands all of the military services' special operations commands. He and General George Casey, Army chief of staff, agreed on the decision, which the Secretary of Defense approved. As Admiral Olson states, "This will be a complete change in organization, practice, and doctrine."
The bulk of our PSYOP forces is in the Army. Its only active duty organization, the 4th PSYOP Group, is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its commander, a colonel, reports to the commander of the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), a lieutenant general. In addition, there are two PSYOP groups in the Army Reserve.
Admiral Olson's memo announcing this decision states that the active duty PSYOP community is very receptive to this change. "Very" is the operative word. Based on my discussions with some active duty personnel over the past couple of years, I don't believe this to be the case. Of course, all of them knew that I was writing an article for publication, and asked for non-attribution.
Download the full article: PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine
Alfred Paddock, Jr., was on active duty in the U.S. Army, 1957--1988, and served three combat tours in Laos and Vietnam with Special Forces. He also was the Director for Psychological Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June 2009 he received the inaugural Gold Award of the MG Robert A. McClure Medal for Exemplary Service in Psychological Operations, recognizing his lifetime of achievements and outstanding service to the Psychological Operations Regiment.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Now is the time to sit down and think about a new Unit Name and Branch name that takes in consideration the activity's name change. PSYOP term as an activity has changed for a more palatable term, oh well this is not new. What would be the future of this?, who knows. Would the former "PSYOP Groups" change their unit names taking in consideration DOD Information Activities? Would a new structure emerge out of this? Would IO completely disappear now that "MISO" is sounds as a more encompassing activity? What about Public Affairs, would they adapt to the change?
Finally, in 2001 the School of Americas changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Clearly on a similar case as PSYOP vs. MISO. Has WHINSEC stopped providing security cooperation as it did between 1964 and 2001...? In some respect yes, it has changed, however the overarching method and the target audience is still the same regardless of the name change.
Marcus typed: "<i>I offer the elephant in the room that I'm quite sure no one has considered...<u>Recruiting</u>...It's been ridiculously difficult to recruit the right numbers the last few years and given that they are adding a selection process soon, changing the name to MISO is going to nearly ensure that recruiting will fall off the chart.</i>"
The irony is very interesting. Remind me again about the "influence" part...
As the guy that spent the last two years at Human Resources Command I offer the elephant in the room that I'm quite sure no one has considered.
Recruiting.
We like to think that the young Captains volunteering for this duty have a cogent concept of what exactly PSYOP does or doesn't do. This is generally not the case I assure you.
They apply because it sounds cool. It's been ridiculously difficult to recruit the right numbers the last few years and given that they are adding a selection process soon, changing the name to MISO is going to nearly ensure that recruiting will fall off the chart.
The only thing they can do to save things right now is to make the course as challenging as possible such that folks want to be a member of something elite.
But I'm here to tell you, recruiting is going to take it in the shorts.
Dave Maxwell is correct in what I am trying to convey here.
First going back to ARSOF Core tasks, PSYOP is indeed one of them (FM 3-05). Moreover it is also an activity.
As far as the "37E/MISO-Comms NCO" this Opearator should be first and foremost a MIS-Operator and is also a communicator i.e. he can put a tactical radio or TV station into operation or provide the expertise to host nation partners to put it into operation, thus making the target audience more accesible for following MISO programs and other operations. I am not simply talking about a 18E like communicator (i.e. HF/VHF/UHF/TacSat Voice and Data)but someone that knows that and takes it to another level in order to effectively influence the target audience.
Lastly, a BCT does not need a company of MISO or CA. Just as it does not have a SF company. Further, MISO is currently working within IO at the Operational and Strategic level per joint doctrine, and because IO is a coordinating function not a force providing I don't IO has much say on the MISO structure other than receiving some PSYOP training.
Dave Maxwell wrote: <i>Just like we have SF Soldiers who can perform the SF mission and make comms we need the PSYOP Soldiers who can perform the PSYOP/MISO mission and make comms to support that. Putting 112th guys on small 4 man teams is one overkill from a comms technical expertise perspective and 2) a waste of manpower and space if he cannot perform the PSYOP/MISO mission as well.</i>
Sir:
I see the point of looking at the 18E model. However, my thought was to look at needed skill sets based on requirements. Knowing the full comms requirement would be the logical first question to be answered. I do not know if that is fully comprehended.
If all that is required at the MISO Team level is single channel (i.e. HF/VHF/UHF/TacSat Voice and Data)comms, then the 18E model works. My assessment is that these MISO teams would require more than just some <i>push to talk/here's a picture or text file</i> comms systems.
Most ODAs don't require the data-heavy comms that (I suspect) a PSYOP/MISO team would likely need. When they do, SigDet personnel of some stripe are usually detailed to support them. Again, if that is how support to MISO will be done, then MISO Bn SigDets will be needed to supplement.
As talented as 18Es are, adding in multichannel comms systems goes into a higher skill realm and enters the "full-time job" category. Such would be the case with a "37E" if that Soldier's focus is as a PSYOP-trained warrior with additional comms training.
Taking it further, should this 37E have, like his 18E counterpart, stunted career growth as s/he gains in rank and the number of possible senior NCO positions dwindles?
To LongTabSigo:
I know you have your Long Tab and are a Signal Officer but I think you might want to recall your SF roots vice your current Signal perspective. I think what PSYCHO means is this about an 18E. First and foremost an 18E is a Special Forces NCO who can move, shoot, communicate, medicate, and train, adivse, and assist and when necessary lead indigenous forces in combat operations. Secondarily, he is a Sergeant who specializes in communications. What I think PSCYHO is advocating is a PSYOP Communications NCO who is first and foremost a PSYOPer (or MISOer) who can influence the behavior of foreign target audiences and secondarily is a Sergeant who can make comms. We are not going to be able to put someone on a Tactical PSYOP Team or a Military information Support Team (MIST)who can only make comms. Just like we have SF Soldiers who can perform the SF mission and make comms we need the PSYOP Soldiers who can perform the PSYOP/MISO mission and make comms to support that. Putting 112th guys on small 4 man teams is one overkill from a comms technical expertise perspective and 2) a waste of manpower and space if he cannot perform the PSYOP/MISO mission as well.
In essence, I think PSYOP is trying to apply the SF model to PSYOP/MISO but I could be putting words in his mouth!!
Psycho wrote:
<i>1) The former is what we should be striving for. Having the capability of a communications NCO trained in PSYOP that can operate-maintain/repair an existing radio and TV station. This guy/gal should be able to complement/support 18E in an effort to effectively gain target audience support, etc. What do you think?</i>
An 18E does not "gain target audience and support" and to think for even a second that that is the case is to fundamentally misunderstand to role of an SF Communicator. Think of comms as "fire support" more than "direct fire". Instead of looking at 18Es for a "role model", you should be looking at the Signal Soldiers in the SF Battalion and Group Signal Detachments, the 112th Sig Bn, and the TSOC Sig Dets, not to mention the more obvious C/3 Psyop Bn. Multi-functional comms folks who keep the Psyop Co's and Tm's connected via various voice and data means.
Psycho wrote:
<i>To caveat more, I think the PSYOP Community needs to address this issue from the holistic point of view looking to complement the other ARSOF Branches (SF and CA). Doing so, will provide the whole ARSOF community with a better interoperability and habitual relationships. </i>
I am of the school of opinion that holds that, while SOF should have a PSYOP capability, PSYOP/MISO is not a SOF Core Task. MISO needs to be interoperable to a greater extent with the Conventional Force.
I guess it would be heresy to suggest putting a Psyop Company (and a CA Company) in each BCT? Nonetheless, that's what I would suggest in both cases. The more operational/strategic level Psyop should be part of a larger IO (not SOF, per se) effort. It really should be the <b>I O </b> community that addresses this in a writ large fashion.
LongTabSigo
1) The former is what we should be striving for. Having the capability of a communications NCO trained in PSYOP that can operate-maintain/repair an existing radio and TV station. This guy/gal should be able to complement/support 18E in an effort to effectively gain target audience support, etc. What do you think?
2) What I meant by that was that every PSYOP/MISO Officer/NCO is capable to operate at every level (tactical, operational, strategic). We currently have a divided structure i.e. have operational and tactical units. We should aim for an operator who can be flexible enough to conduct both. Essentially is what you wrote "capable of supporting Full Spectrum Ops".
Did I answer your questions?
Psycho:
Take your points but two things vex me a bit:
(1) A "37E <b>Psyop Commo NCO</b>"? Do you want a Communicator/Signaleer who has Psyop Training? Or do you want a Psyop NCO who moonlights as a commo guy? If you want the latter, that would be an epic fail. If what you really want is the former, then that would be a 25-series Soldier in whom you'd make an investment in some Psyop training. To do the things you'll want done, comms is not something left to a "hobbyist".
(2) As reads: <i>In essence every PSYOP/MISO Officer and NCO should be capable of conducting Full Spectrum Operations...</i>
I think what you mean is Officers/NCOs capable of <b>supporting</b> Full Spectrum Ops. That is Psyop/MISO support to Offense, Defense, and Stability missions conducted by the supported unit/force. Do I understand your intent correctly?
I am reclassing in January to what I thought was PSYOP and let me be the 1st to tell you that not only am I thoroughly confused as to what this name change signals as far as the future of the branch itself but I will be doing everything in my power to get out of it until I can figure out what MISO is and how to tell my kids I don't make soup for a living.
LongTabSigo
1) The former is what we should be striving for. Having the capability of a communications NCO trained in PSYOP that can operate-maintain/repair an existing radio and TV station. This guy/gal should be able to complement/support 18E in an effort to effectively gain target audience support, etc. What do you think?
2) What I meant by that was that every PSYOP/MISO Officer/NCO is capable to operate at every level (tactical, operational, strategic). We currently have a divided structure i.e. have operational and tactical units. We should aim for an operator who can be flexible enough to conduct both. Essentially is what you wrote "capable of supporting Full Spectrum Ops".
To caveat more, I think the PSYOP Community needs to address this issue from the holistic point of view looking to complement the other ARSOF Branches (SF and CA). Doing so, will provide the whole ARSOF community with a better interoperability and habitual relationships.
Did I answer your questions?
A few questions remain to answer. Would this change provide the flexibility for a Branch overhaul? Making one branch structure will make applications a lot easier. We have different MOS's and now is the time to change the PSYOP/MISO structure to one solidified 37 Career Management Field (CMF). Making a 37 CMF structure focuses the force in achieving Special Operations Imperatives.
For example, having a 37F (Intel NCO) or a 37E (Commo NCO), or 37C ( Audio Visual NCO), will effectively enhance our capability as one self-sustained team. A structure like so would train the Soldier on PSYOP basic and advance skills as a baseline and would further specialize their skills into unique PSYOP specialties. Having a new structure will provide a better flexibility than the one we have today. In essence every PSYOP/MISO Officer and NCO should be capable of conducting Full Spectrum Operations, thus eliminating the current structure of Tactical and Regional units.
The branch needs to be re-structured, and as such our applications should be flexible in order to meet current and future challenges. Lastly, we also are in dire need of a string Association that fights and advocates our needs in the political arena and bring about unity among our force. Such organizations like the SF Association, the 82nd Airborne Association are a few examples of well respected organizations that make their case for the greater community. Perhaps this name change will catalyze these and other changes in the future...who knows. All I know that is up to us to embrace this upcoming change and make the best of it.
As COL Paddock eloquently said in his article in Small Wars Journal, "the decision has been made".
However, I think it important to note that the form of that decision did not follow normal military protocol for such a change - i.e. message traffic from those with the authority to make the decision. After all, it was HQDA General Order 30, signed by the Secretary of the Army and citing USC Title 10 as the authority, which officially created a Psychological Operations Branch within the Army. One would assume that this kind of total change would have similar documentation.
There is an email from the USSOCOM Commander, which "officially changes" the term Psychological Operations to "Military Information Support" and "Military Information Support Operations" (though it is unclear which term applies to what aspect of PSYOP), that everyone agrees, and that it will happen "quickly". The SOCOM commander does have the authority to change organization titles, so those in uniform will just have to accept that. However, Adm Olsons message states in a turn reminiscent of Syme from the Oceanian Ministry of Truth, that the term PSYOP "will be eliminated from the vernacular except in a historical context." Never mind the fact that the term is codified in Title 10 of the United States Code, section 167 where it gives the Department of Defense the authority to conduct psychological operations as part of special operations campaigns and that the primary regulation governing PSYOP is a 1984 DOD directive, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime." Joint and Service Publications define PSYOP at length and the term is a topic of a great deal of intellectual work that SOCOM does not exclusively own. It may be a trivial matter to update legislation so that DOD has the authority to conduct MISO but are we to throw much of the science and art of persuasive influence out because it contains the term PSYOP?
There are many good reasons for not making this change and few, if any, for doing so. COL Paddock has made such a case in the SWJ article, the PSYOP Regiment blog, and a JFQ article published before the "decision". As he rightly argues, leadership should make a defense of PSYOP, aggressively institutionalize, frame the argument in support of persuasive influence done by PSYOP, and ensure that the US Government form a unified policy on persuasive influence that has a reasonable chance of success. Instead, the name change, if that is all it is, pushes "restart" on the education and outreach the PSYOP community has done to date without dealing with any of the systemic and persistent challenges PSYOP forces are wrestling with.
Unfortunately, many outside the PSYOP community are simply labeling any rational critique as emotional rumblings from a passionate PSYOP community instead of accepting the counsel of wisdom, history, and common sense.
Why should PSYOP be ashamed, and why should any military leader or policy maker be troubled by the term? Congress has legislated on it and it is clearly defined, and regulated. As Daniel Silverberg and Joseph Heimann write in Parameters (DIME), "DOD exclusively relied upon PSYOP forces to conduct "influence" operations. It trained PSYOP practitioners to work within long-standing regulatory directives that limited the scope of their activities and required extensive oversight." Without new legislation for the term MISO the underlying authority could be lost.
In the memo released by the Special Warfare Center Commander, MG Csrnko heralds the name change as a historic event that promises to "allow a greater recognition and understanding of our inform and influence activities" and "give us greater flexibility". However, nothing could be further from the truth. The move from a very defined, codified, and procedurally designed PSYOP to a yet not officially defined MISO leaves us with a critical identity crisis. It also leaves the science of human influence, that we have remaining in PSYOP, at great risk at a time where we need to be standing on solid ground and pushing for more science, education, and mental capability in our force. The reality is that PSYOP brings an analytical process and methodologies necessary to engage todays global dynamic and fluid environments. That DOD has never adequately provided for PSYOP or institutionalized a clear understanding of its function is also a historical truism.
There has already appeared a difference between MISO as "Military Information Support Operations" (from the MG Csrnko memo) and "Military Information Support and Operations" (from the Adm Olson email) - I believe the difference between the two and from PSYOP is much more than semantic. Two key philosophical bents challenge us: 1) that PSYOP (now MISO) ONLY supports others to achieve SC objectives vs PSYOP conducting operations (on its own) and supporting others in achieving natl objs. 2) That information dissemination is our key role vs influencing behavior (a constant challenge for PSYOP at all levels). The MG Csrnko memo seems to emphasize information at the expense of Influence and implies structural change with absolutely no specificity.
Ridiculous hyperbole? How many PSYOPers currently have a deep understanding of Political Warfare, or have read some of the seminal books on persuasive influence such as Jacques Elluls Propaganda or have a firm grasp of the role of the psychological warfare in the OSS. These topics are largely kept in the history books and distant from current doctrine - though every well trained PSYOPer has studied them as part of their personal development. When the word PSYOP is banished to the history book will the scientific and conceptual underpinnings disappear from our understanding? Or will future MISO forces read about PSYOP only to become frustrated?
So why then was this decision made?
The Washington Post reported that "Pentagon officials including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, SOCOM's commander, Adm. Eric T. Olson, announced last week that the PSYOP name will be dropped because of bad connotations and changed to Military Information Support Operations (MISO)." if the key reason for making this move was to remove the obstacle that a "caustic" word created (without changing the essential nature of the operations conducted and methods used) then this action will merely be seen as an obfuscation and confirmation to the suspicious crowd that We are in fact "evil propagandists bent on lying to the American people". The example of the 15th (UK) PSYOP Group, raised by COL Paddock, is one piece of evidence, but a quick jaunt through Twitter and the comments of several blogs (like Mountain Runner) is a clear confirmation that the public is not buying it. In fact, the discussion is only highlighting negative misunderstandings of PSYOP and journalists with an ax to grind with the Defense Department are attributing all sorts of "misdeeds" to PSYOP.
How does this allow us to realize our potential without changing Title 10? Is there a plan to do that? If there is or not, this move complicates the "evolution". If MISO is to take a more active role in peacetime deterrence activities in the highly nuanced, rapidly evolving globalized media environment outlined in most strategic documents, "an Information Support Element in response to a domestic or overseas natural disaster...Army Commander's trusted advisor... in public and community relations... public information support to diplomacy" are not terms that give us "flexibility". Nor do they provide clarity or a defined mission set. On the contrary, this move will do more to restrain the persuasive influence arm of the military from acting at the strategic level, and potentially take us far away from the behavioral influence role that is proven and backed up by the science of human influence. It really defines a tactical dissemination support role for former PSYOP forces.
Certainly, the SOCOM commander does not need to give a reason for this change. However, Adm Olson offers that SOCOM has already changed PSYOP Support Elements to MISTs for OCONUS presentation of the force, that the Joint PSYOP Support Element changed its name to Joint Military Information Support Command (though to be truthful the JPSE was forced to change its name as a prerequisite to becoming a command), and "its the right thing to do". By that logic, Unconventional Warfare (an equally controversial but very necessary discipline) should be renamed Military Liaison Support Operations or some equally vague moniker. Yet such a move isnt even under contemplation and my very mention of it will likely set off all sorts of alarms in the Special Forces Community.
I think all of us "Propagandists" recognize propaganda and new-speak when we see it. The memo from MG Csrnko is particularly troubling. As professionals, we don't need the pep talk or shallow attempts to make us feel good about a ill considered policy (its purpose is evident to any real PSYOPer) - What we need is clarity; Crystal clear leadership and well defined missions, goals, and operational parameters for us to plan against, not simple attempts to brush off challenges by changing names. What exactly does the "the most senior military leadership" and more importantly Civilian leadership responsible for defending our way of life want us to be and specifically do? if nothing has changed but the name, have we not just gone from the frying pan into the fire?
Angelo Codevilla wrote in 1986, "We can operate radios, dispense money, and pull strings. But unless we do so in a manner reasonably calculated to significantly affect the outcome of a war or similar conflict that we are reasonably trying to win, we are not engaging in political warfare any more than someone engages in masonry who builds unconnected piles of bricks and mortar. Without policy, the tools of policy-but especially secret tools-are worse than useless. That is because incompetent policymakers can use them as substitutes for policy, as evidence to themselves and others that they are doing something, and thus as reasons to forestall confronting hard choices." It was true then, it is no less true today. The only measure PSYOP should be judged with is do we achieve the policy objective we were given. It has been my experience (and the experience of history) that when we have failed it was never because we needed a different name.
Brads, excellent points. And great article too. Now that we've spent enough time pointing out all the broken pieces of our defense IO constructs (can't speak to the rest of the national/interagency "kit bag"), this is truly a high time to be in the community. We're in a position now to take advantage of this opportunity and advise our leaders on how best to put these pieces together into something streamlined, efficient, and truly organized and equipped to execute "the influence and information fight." It should take some time and be deliberate; no need to rush into building something half baked. Send your constructive ideas and comments to your decision makers and be sure to hit up LTC Lwin at mike.lwin@soc.mil.
Brad Burris brings up a good point and one that I have also expressed on a few different blogs on this subject. This could be a great opportunity for our branch/function if handled correctly by our senior leadership. On 15 June, Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic wrote an interesting piece on Information Operations and Strategic Communications (http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/pentagon-informatio… ). The PSYOP/MISO debate could lead the way for a whole new evolution in influence warfare. I hope our senior leaders are willing and open to expand their horizons on this issue. If we want to truly (and I mean truly) tackle countering violent extremist organizations around the world as well as threats from hostile nation states, then we have to relook at how we organize, equip, and execute for the influence and information fight.
Special Operations officers and Soldiers portray themselves as flexible and highly adaptable and SHOULD possess the intellectual and operational acumen to gain an understanding of the intent behind the MISO name change and then develop and execute organizational concepts that meet the intent rather than engage in emotionally charged rhetoric.
Brad Burris
bradford.burris@us.army.mil
With this command-directed name change, we once again have the opportunity to refine our branch in such a way as to increase our efficacy across all three levels of war from phase 0 through phase 5. Arguments over the merits of a name change should be replaced with professional discussions of how MISO could be conducted in support of USG objectives in Afghanistan as well as how the MISO community could better conduct USG-synchronized operations that are supportive of the goals and directives outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy.
Tim, maybe I was a bit unclear. I believe changing the name changes nothing. So why tinker with MISO when PSYOP has a distinguished lineage? My mentor was GEN Richard G. Stilwell, sometimes mentioned as the father of PSYOP. Anyway, he was certainly a champion and so am I. Further, as a former PAO, I question the wisdom of piggybacking on information, lest it becomes a seductive ploy. Maybe you and I are in sync on this. clex@msn.com
A mentor of mine taught me to ask some fundamental questions when things like this happen and the good idea fairy is on the loose:
1. What problem is this name change trying to solve?
2. How will this name change contribute to better accomplishing the mission (assuming the PSYOP mission remains a valid contribution to US National Security by whatever it is eventually called).
3. How does this name change help the units that conduct the mission?
4. How does this name change help our soliders.
If the decision makers can answer those questions satisfactorily then the name should be changed. However, me so thinks there are not good answers to those questions.
This is by far the biggest slap in the face for all PSYOP personnel more specifically to those who have been seasoned within this MOS for a lengthy period of time. I can understand where this travesty began in 2006 and recall its initial separation from traditional SOCOM, bulking it in with civil affairs arguing the two together were one entity. The two are extremely different in many capacities from their team function to their underlying goals as such within the brigade they work in. Unfortunately most of whom remained within the PSYOP community in hopes that those above would recognize these differences and notice the distinction between the two. This "force multiplier" solidarity became as transparently ridiculous as the removal of berets from the SOCOM community-a right i feel,as well as the majority, was taken away for unjustified reasons. One can only imagine the doctrinal changes they plan to impose....maybe the removal of grey or black PSYOP or maybe the general support that aided in the unconventional thought processes needed for missions that called for free thinking. There are already rules established not to extend the free thought and execution to mission's success opposed against command and i myself wonder what if any positive impact this change may address. What's next?> are the powers that be going to deem the word"forces" on a green beret's tab to exhibit too much of an aggressive posture on the enemy? perhaps we should just change the tab to "special", keeping the delicate nature of everyones feelings in consideration. I for one am strongly against this change and considering the known facts against this being just a "military information support" mos will be a slap in the face for anyone that has any true knowledge of the capabilities within this MOS and will definitely appear devastatingly in its numbers to recruit or retain personnel. I for one, see a considerable drop in future recruits with ranger or SF experience to even consider joining this MOS. In time im sure that this "needed change" will not go quietly in the minds of those effected and will prove as a primary bone of contentment for those truly worth retaining to remain in its political nightmare.
This is nothing new, but it's sad that the PC proponents have finally won this long battle, and even sadder that it was imposed by senior special ops and Army officers rather than civilian political appointees. I was in the 4th POG from 1988-1991 and served as the operations officer for the 8th PSYOP Bn and the CENTCOM PSYOP Task Force during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Even then there was a big debate over changing the term "PSYOP" to "Military Information." When we arrived in Saudi Arabia during DESERT SHIELD, we were prohibited from wearing any distinctive insignia or T-shirts that would identify us as a PSYOP unit. Some of the things we proposed prior to the fight were prevented out of political sensitivity. However, the author is exactly right in saying that the credibility of the military will take a major blow when reporters realize the military is still doing "PSYOP" under the name of "information," although I supposed the widespread use of the term "information operations" to denote everything from public diplomacy and "strategic communications" to PSYOP and deception has blurred the distinction. So what will they call my former unit? The "4th Military Information Group?" I would think the public affairs folks would be up in arms about this. When I visited SOUTHCOM HQ's PA office while serving as a PSYOP officer in Panama right after JUST CAUSE and announced myself as being from the POG, it was as though I'd shown a cross to a vampire. The PA folks wanted it made clear that there was no intermingling of public affairs and psychological operations, even though our doctrine said we always presented truthful information in PSYOP campaigns.