Afghanistan and the Future of US Foreign Policy

Afghanistan and the Future of US Foreign Policy

By David S. Clukey

Introduction

September 11, 2021 marked 20 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 (911) and shortly before this solemn commemoration, on August 30, the United States (US) withdrew the last of its military forces from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA).[1]  Prior to the withdrawal, US forces had been on the ground in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001. In these two decades, the US spent over $2 trillion USD[2] and invested over 2,300[3] in human capital to offer Afghanistan a chance for prosperity. Unfortunately, the way the US withdrew from Afghanistan appeared as curious as it did haphazard. On a global stage, the US orchestrated a series of diplomatic, tactical, and strategic missteps that were all preventable. Although cringeworthy and tragic, these recent missteps offer opportunity for reflection and lessons to learn from; as did the way the US approached the war in Afghanistan.

“Once we have a war there is only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in war.” – Ernest Hemingway

The great irony is the US capitulated to the very terrorist group it drove from power 20 years earlier, and in doing so, created a pathway to enable the Taliban to recreate the conditions that precipitated 911 to begin with. In order to better understand the events that led to this and assist decision makers preclude a costly calamity like this in the future, this essay examines three US policy failures consisting of: (1) connection to the conflict; (2) mission creep; and (3) diplomacy, and how these lessons may shape future US foreign policy and armed conflicts.

Background

Before examining policy failures, this section illuminates three interconnected US national security challenges immediately resultant from the withdrawal: (1) terrorist safe-haven, (2) deterrence and access, and (3) legitimacy and credibility. Historic references are used to illuminate similarities to the contemporary environment, and the US Interim National Security Guidance serves a baseline to consider the rationale behind recent foreign policy decisions.

Safe-haven. In 1996 al Qaeda (still in Afghanistan) was granted nənawā́te (Pashto: ننواتې‎, “sanctuary”)[4] by the Taliban. This sanctuary offered al Qaeda the time and space necessary to plan, coordinate and train for the terrorist attacks of 911; observed, as the deadliest concurrent terrorist attacks in world history[5]. Notwithstanding economic implications, the attacks of 911 resulted in the immediate loss of 2,996 people (including 19 hijackers) and over 6,000 casualties.[6] This is also not accounting for long term latent health issues experienced by New York City residents and First Responders or the US servicemembers, contractors and civilians killed, wounded or affected through overseas deployments over the next 20-years in support of the Global War on Terrorism and subsequent Overseas Contingency Operations.

In August 2021, following the US departure, al Qaeda retained safe haven in Afghanistan, as did a resurgent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-K); again, under Taliban rule. Although al Qaeda (AQ) and ISIL-K are very different networks, both are designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US Department of State[7], and similar to the Taliban, each follows strict Sunni Islamic fundamentalist ideologies. Compellingly, the US persists in counter-terrorism (CT) operations against these and other known terrorist networks in Afghanistan. However, CT operations are surgical in nature and do not influence the broader humanitarian crisis nor assuage harsh Taliban fundamentalist rule over Afghan citizens.

Deterrence & Access. The White House published Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021. This guidance calls for the US to “promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the US and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions.”[8]  Afghanistan has found itself as a “dominating key region” in the great power competition throughout the ages. Its geographical position “sits at the heart of Central Asia, at the meeting point of ancient trade routes – known together as “The Silk Road” – that go out to all parts of Asia.”[9] Invaders unsuccessfully competed for this key region for its access; earning Afghanistan the nickname, “Graveyard of Empires.”

In the last 200 years, Western Powers have been drawn to Afghanistan as well, including the former British Empire (Anglo-Afghan Wars) throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries; the former Soviet Union (Soviet-Afghan War) from 1978 – 1989[10]; and most recently the US from 2001 – 2021. Regarding the US involvement, outside of preserving Afghan sovereignty and developing its military capabilities, the US military retained pressure on the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIL-K. Secure military installations in Afghanistan, replete with airfields, offered the US proximity to competitors: China, Russia and Iran. Ceding a nation state to known terrorists, whose sovereign borders are safe to characterize as a “dominating key region”, with “access to global commons” may prove problematic to US national security interests and regional goals.

The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance also calls for the US to “lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules”.[11] In the Aftermath of the events that preceded the withdrawal, its curious to consider how democratic alliances and partnerships were considered in these equations. Particularly, when the US left Afghanistan in the middle of the night without notifying its long-term Afghan-partners. More compelling, is how this “abandonment” will affect US foreign relations in the future. Long term consequences remain unknown; however, the immediate results have not presented US credibility in a positive light.

Legitimacy & Credibility. The US lost legitimacy and credibility on a global stage in Afghanistan in an eerily similar fashion to the fallout from Saigon, Vietnam in 1975. As Afghan citizens flooded the gates of HKIA, triaged by Taliban and US forces in complete chaos, images of Afghan’s falling to their death from a US C-17 flooded news and social media. These scenarios were preventable had the US executed a deliberate withdrawal it had 20-years to design; or pursued any other scalable alternative. Understanding it is impossible to consider every variable, it was no secret the rampant corruption and inefficiencies of the Afghan government and its national security forces. History offered insight to predict the mass exodus of refugees, humanitarian crisis, and disarray prior to the Taliban’s symbolic march into Kabul.

The US announcement of the withdrawal timeline emboldened the Taliban, and the rate at which the Afghan government and military forces collapsed was no surprise to anyone who had ever spent any time in the country. Over 20-years of intelligence reports, analytical assessments of Afghan government and military capabilities, systemic challenges and lists of current and former Afghan employees and key personnel were readily available for decision makers to consider. The timing of the withdrawal also raises questions. Afghanistan has a predictable fighting season with much less activity during winter months. The sequence of departure and abdication of Bagram Airfield placed the US Department of State remaining in Afghanistan in a precarious position. Many questions, few assurances; however, this is irrelevant to the countless Afghan families and American’s remaining under harsh Taliban rule, many imperiled to retribution.

Connection to the conflict

It’s important to note the US conducted a limited war, not an all-out war, in Afghanistan. Over its almost 20-year timeframe approximately 770,000 Americans deployed to Afghanistan, and “approx. 28,267 U.S. troops deployed there five or more times.”[12] The current US military strength in 2021 is 1.4 million[13] and the total US population is 333,449,281.[14] The current active-duty military consists of under 1% of the US population; in contrast, 11% of the US population served during World War 2[15] (total war). This metric illuminates a marked difference in the way the US sources its military and effects the way America conducts contemporary warfare under an all-volunteer force (AVF). This dynamic inadvertently creates a division between the civilian and military (CIV-MIL) population with an inherent implication of limited connection to the conflict/conflicts by the broader population. The US conducted a protracted limited war against the Taliban insurgency with strict rules of engagement and a proverbial “Rolodex” of commanders and priority focus. A small percentage (%) of troops were committed to fighting, a larger % to training, and the largest % to support operations.

The Vietnam experience compelled the US to professionalize its military, and in 1977 an AVF was created. A 30-year assessment conducted by Rand Corporation in 2006 proposed four reasons the AVF was successful: (1) “attention and leadership from top management, (2) the use of quantitative analysis to test, adjust, and evaluate AVF policies, (3) the need to develop programs for attracting the necessary type and number of recruits, and (4) adequate financial resources.”[16] The AVF succeeded in professionalizing the force, quantifiably realized through US military victories in Panama, Grenada, and the Gulf War. Quantitative analysis did not account for the effects of over 20-years of sustained conflict, significant cultural and educational changes in the US throughout the 2000s, and the inadvertent creation of a warrior class.

Across the US military, recruiters struggle to find candidates that meet the bare minimum requirements for military service. In contemporary America, only 3 out of 10 youth meet the moral, medical, and intellectual aptitude necessary to serve. This concerning metric combined with only 1% of US society currently serve and 7% have served, has created a widening CIV-MIL divide. “This disconnect is characterized by misperceptions, a lack of knowledge and an inability to identify with those who serve”[17] This widening gap combined with over 20-years of sustained conflict, post COVID-19 economic opportunities (reduced unemployment), and recruiting challenges, has realized a disconnection from American’s conflicts, by most American citizens. This lack of connection is extremely dire when it pertains to deciding whether or not US military intervention is required, as the implications of employing military capabilities are not fully understood. Currently, congress has the lowest number of Veterans since World War II.[18], The last US President to serve in the military was George W. Bush whose term closed in 2009.

Mission Creep

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, US Army Special Forces Teams, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaboration, aligned with Afghan warlords and leveraged US airpower in a joint-combined effort to defeat the Taliban. The mission was clear and the inherent tasks understood. Over time, the US deviated from this economy of force architecture and deployed larger formations of conventional military forces. In two notable instances the US lost the initiative, the first occurred in 2005, following the first Afghan Presidential election, with the demobilization of over 30,000 trained Afghan Militia Forces under the name of sovereignty.[19] The demobilization corresponded with the establishment of large conventional force headquarters or Regional Commands (RC). It was at this point, connection to the local populations and situational awareness decreased, and administrative bureaucracy, barriers, constraints and strict rules of engagement (ROE) emerged. The second instance occurred in 2014, when an unprecedented culturally aligned and hierarchically nested campaign plan, focused on security, governance and development, called Village Stability Operations (VSO), was cut short after realizing quantifiable achievements. The US directed downsizing of its military footprint killed the campaign and the initiative; it never recovered.

After Karzai took office in 2004, the US became nation builders and allocated more and more resources to training the developing the fledging Afghan nation state. US commanders in Afghanistan changed annually, as did the campaign’s priorities and focus. The Taliban in exile and those hiding in Afghanistan exploited this disorder to regroup and organize. The US settled into forward operating bases (FOB) and no longer maintained presence in local villages to retain pressure and weed out insurgents. The Taliban bide its time, assessed and adapted to the US strict ROE and reliance on technology. It began to harass and attack US bases, supply lines, and patrols in an all-out insurgency. Since the US was no longer in the villages, they became targets for recruitment, support and intelligence; Taliban strength and influence grew. Conditions in Iraq deteriorated, US losses mounted and more resources needed. US politicians grew weary and feared public outrage from losses in Afghanistan whose conditions also worsened with time.

Senior military commanders and politicians failed to realize conditions in Afghanistan degenerated not because of a lack of resources or intelligence assessments, but because the US was no longer fighting a war. After 2004, the US fought perceptions and self-imposed constraints, as senior military officers vied for opportunities to command in combat. Mission creep filled the void of an overt Taliban presence, and because of this lack of focus and consistent realignment of priorities, the US presence lingered. Instead of retaining pressure on the Taliban and deliberately committing the might of the US military, and ISAF[20]partners, in contested areas, commanders accepted risk in some areas and deemed them too difficult to access. Forces were misallocated and “hot spots” were never dealt with decisively.

The mission is Afghanistan was no longer clear. As service members, contractors and civilians gathered on FOBs, the Taliban continued to recruit and train in the periphery. Mission creep eroded moral and the overall mission, and only served to truly benefit the defense industry, contractors; notably, Halliburton through its subsidiary KBR,[21] and of course, the Taliban. Of note, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and select conventional units continued to fight, but these efforts did not involve the full capabilities of the joint-combined force, were limited in scope, and did not adequately leverage all instruments of national power.

Diplomacy

When the US military left Bagram Air Field (BAF) in the middle of the night on July 6, 2021 without notifying Afghan partners it had worked with for almost 20-years; diplomacy failed.

When the US withdrew under a timeline dictated by the Taliban leaving countless Americans stranded in Afghanistan; diplomacy failed.

When the US wittingly withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving the fledgling Afghan Government to fend for itself, after observing city after city fall to the Taliban; diplomacy failed.

The US did not fully understand what defined victory in Afghanistan prior to the invasion or what constituted an end to the conflict. This lack of clarity affected the US’s ability to advance its national interests in the region through a well-conceived diplomatic strategy with bordering nations Pakistan and Iran. Although US relations with Pakistan were/are much better than with Iran, the US relationship with Pakistan is complex. The US-Pakistan “partnership” struggled due to divergent strategic objectives.[22] Pakistan’s tensions with bordering India, desire for a Pakistan-friendly Afghan Government, and for the US to cease drone strikes within its sovereignty,[23] offered the US bargaining tools. The US sought to eliminate al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and desired full support from Pakistani Government.[24] Pakistan tacitly supported the Taliban in Afghanistan from its inception as well as Islamist militants operating in the Indian Kashmir. Pakistan was concerned full support to the US, through policy reversal, would have negative external repercussions and create internal instability.[25] This conundrum realized Pakistani support, never full support, as it worked to accommodate and protect its interests.

The US strained relations with Iran compromised any means to exploit the Iranian position regarding the Sunni-Shia divide. US interactions with Iran throughout its tenure in Afghanistan remained aggravated. The US and Iran went tit for tat through Iran proxy harassment, mostly in Iraq, culminating with a US retaliatory drone strike against Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. Retrospectively, the US understanding of the Sunni-Shia dynamic could have been extremely useful to encourage Iranian support against the Taliban. Iranian interest in Taliban territorial gains in Afghanistan is evident through a recent initiative. Following the US withdrawal; Iran, concerned about the Taliban’s expanded Sunni influence and in an effort to fill the security vacuum, formed “a new Shia militia Hashd Al-Shi’i (Shiite Mobilization) to execute a forward defense strategy.”[26] This approach was accomplished through revisiting a 1980s tactic and “rebranding the Fatemiyoun Unit,” [27] a proxy force composed of Afghanistan’s Hazara Shias.

US diplomatic efforts theoretically could have called for reduced sanctions in return for support against Taliban resourcing and safe haven. Considering Iran’s desire for regional hegemony,[28] a proposed entente with reduced sanctions would offer a manageable alternative to enable Iran the financial stability to pursue goals without accomplishing them. The US could have exercised a warmer relationship with Iran and established an informal alliance to influence their relationships with Russia (Chechnya), Uzbekistan and North African Republics for broader US goals. Specifically, to monitor and restrict foreign fighter involvement in Afghanistan (isolate the area). Iranian influence could also have hypothetically decreased the speed of improvised explosive device (IED) adaptations in Afghanistan, and better regulated movements of foreign arms and ammunition into the country. 

Conclusion

This essay examined three aspects of US foreign policy that if conducted differently may have positively influenced the outcomes of US efforts in Afghanistan. Firstly, a country’s connection and understanding of its military by its leadership and citizenry influences military commitments, outcomes, and the foreign policy that shapes it. Secondly, military forces are organized and trained to fight and win wars, clarity of mission and desired results (end state) are paramount to success. Mission creep detracts from this clarity and can compromise a campaign. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, explains wars are won by “employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic” to achieve national strategic objectives. Changing the-mission before the original mission is accomplished can undermine desired effects and create a misalignment of the instruments of national power.

Finally, successful diplomacy involves a thorough understanding of the culture, regional dynamics, and strategic goals of respective countries relevant to achieving national objectives. The US experience in Afghanistan reveals the importance of clearly defining what national objectives are before invading a country. Afghanistan further divulged how diplomacy is a critical component to any military campaign or international strategy. As the US campaign evolved in Afghanistan, regional diplomacy should have also adapted. However, this was extremely difficult to do as there was no clear definition of what quantified victory or end to the conflict. As the US and Central and South Asia adjust to a post-US occupied Afghanistan, the US must pay close attention to the new regional dynamics as they unfold. As ISIL-K and AQ remain uncontested under Taliban rule, US alliances, economic influence, and international relationships are more important now than ever.[29]