Small Wars Journal

Why Do We RAF?

Sun, 08/25/2013 - 9:58am

Why Do We RAF?

Mike Grater

States and power have long been the discussion pertaining to political science. To that end what is the motivation of states to achieve power and to whom does that power benefit? From the inception of diplomacy as a political tool; poignantly described by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue; states seek power in order to achieve their own political means. The 19th and 20th century are defined by political realism. After the fall of the Iron Curtain though, political realism could no longer accurately explain or predict geopolitical change with a single global hegemon.

The purpose of this paper is to explore Political Liberalism as applied to the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept in order to explain the “why” of the strategic implementation of this policy. An investigation of this sort requires one to explain the theory security cooperation and the benefits thereof, analyze how soldiers are instruments of foreign of policy, define the 3d security concept and finally, estimate the proximal and distal implications of the policy. This is by no means an authoritative narrative but drawn from the personal experience of the author through After Action Reviews and conversation topics proffered by RAF Soldiers and 162 IN BDE Cadre.

Foreign Aid has recently become a political “hot-button” issue. The current fiscal austerity measures proposed by congress have caused the nation as a whole to reexamine spending priorities. Coupled to this problem is the presidents’ public assurance of the cessation of combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014 and pivot of strategic focus from Central Command to Pacific Command. The Army needed a new strategy. Recently this new strategy has appeared in the form of the Regionally Aligned Forces concept.

As recent as March 2012 the Army announced plans to implement training of a Regionally Aligned Force with a Brigade designated as a proof of principle:

Regionally Aligned Forces are those forces that provide the Combatant Commander (CCDR) with up to Joint-capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment.  They are those Army units assigned to Combatant Commands (CCMD), allocated to a CCMD, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for CCMD regional missions.  Includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a CCMD area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility.  Regional missions are driven by CCMD requirements.  This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.[i]

Why then this shift? It is believed by some that conduct of security cooperation activities enables foreign states to maintain their own security so, in effect, US Soldiers don’t have to. For example: a US Soldier brings a discreet capability to exchange with a foreign partner. This discreet capability improves the security capacity of the foreign nation. The improved security capacity of the partner nation eventually enables that nation to secure its own borders. A nation that can guard against an external threat then can focus on any internal threats and relieve the general populace of the anxiety of insecurity. A secure nation facilitates trade within that nation as merchants and consumers can invest their effort in the economy and improve national wealth. With a secure nation both external and internal the government can then invest in the security apparatus i.e. the nation’s defense capability, which further improves the capacity of that organ of the state.  Ultimately with the example provided above a state can choose to project power beyond its borders in order to assist in regional security capacity building and stabilization.

To what benefit does this provide the United States? First and foremost security cooperation diminishes the necessity of the United States to expend blood and treasure abroad. Second, security cooperation provides access to partner nation strategic geographic location and at times resources. Finally, security cooperation contributes to the ability of the US Government to exert influence through foreign policy objectives abroad.

This begs the question of the school of thought for the implementation of such policy. In other words, to what end does security cooperation theory implemented as the Regionally Aligned Force serve the needs of the United States. Political Realism affirms that states pursue power in order to secure their own interest. Yet Political Liberalism proposes that states pursue power as a moral obligation; that is for the good of all. This theory is attractive especially given the evangelical perception of US foreign policy in the last decade[ii].

RAF implementation is the key indicator of United States foreign policy objectives. When asked during After Action Reviews of training conducted in preparation for deployment, Soldiers usually reply that the most visible form of US Foreign Policy is the embassy. American missions abroad are indisputably US soil; the national colors are flown as an indicator of this; yet foreign policy is not specifically reserved for this location alone. Many believe another, and important, visible form of US foreign policy is the presence of US troops. The contention is that the presence of troops evinces foreign policy priorities. A cursory glance of troops stationed overseas confirms this concept.  The lesson to RAF Soldiers is that they are instruments of foreign policy[iii]. They do not decide upon policy objectives but instead ensure the policy objectives are carried out.

Foreign policy is not reserved solely for the department of defense. Policy implementation is an interdepartmental, interagency effort. Building partner nation security capacity is focused on two federal departments and one agency. As ambassadors are the presidents’ personal representative to a partner nation the Department of State is the policy implementation lead. Foreign Policy is a set of ideas; ideas are not effective unless grounded in action. The US Agency for International Development; a subsidiary of the Department of State; is responsible for the development of host nation’s socio-economic capacity. It is clear that other agencies, e.g., education, agriculture, commerce, energy etc. assist in this process as well. The point is the holistic approach of diplomacy, development and defense applied to developing countries is thought to benefit the United States and the host nation. Hence the maxim attributed to Lao Tzu[iv] “rather to teach a man to fish than give a fish” applies to this concept.

Liberalism gives the broad advantages of RAF employment. On the proximal end; RAF justifies force strength, broadens experience and cultivates a skill set that is easily discarded after the cessation of major combat operations[v]. Maintaining this skill set is forward thinking and good for an army that relies on election cycles too frequent to plan generationally. On the distal end partner nations receive training equipment and improved security capacity that can have remarkable, measurable positive impact. In sum, why do we RAF? So we don’t have to.

End Notes

[i] RAF EXORD; 21 December 2012; para. 1.b.3.b.i ; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Washington DC

[ii] See: Walter Russell Mead; “Gods Country”; Foreign Affairs Magazine; SEP/OCT 2006; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61914/walter-russell-mead/gods-country; last accessed 7 June, 2013

[iii] Cue FM 3-24 COIN; para 1-157; pp.1-28 – The Strategic Corporal

[v] For example, from Vietnam,  Bing West in the Book “The Village” describes many of the tenants proposed in FM 3-24 COIN 24 years later

 

Comments

Dave Maxwell

Sun, 08/25/2013 - 2:40pm

In reply to by Robert C. Jones

Bob,

Your proposal has historical doctrinal precedence. The 1963 US Army doctrine for Counterinsurgency laid out the Special Action Action Force (SAF) that was built around the Special Forces Group and included Companies of medical personnel, engineers, intelligence, aviation and an Infantry battalion. The 8th SAF in Panama was established along with SAFASIA in Okinawa. I wrote about it in 2008 here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/security-force-assistance-operatio…

This concept later evolved to a new definition of SAF to the Security Assistance Force which was in the 1981 Low Intensity Conflict manual:

This doctrine outlined three tiers for employment of US Security Assistance Forces. The three tiers are:
• Tier I: US Army Special Forces—Security Assistance, FID, IDAD plus CA and PSYOP
• Tier II: US Army Separate Brigades- fight the heavy fight to allow host nation forces to develop.
• Tier III: US Army General Purpose Forces from CONUS become the main effort until the enemy is reduced in power and handover to the host nation is possible.

I wrote about this here in 2008: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/considerations-for-organizing-for-futu…

However, no one every really paid any attention to the above historical doctrine from 1963 and 1981 and thus post-9-11 we have to reinvent the wheel.

Robert C. Jones

Sun, 08/25/2013 - 12:19pm

The creation of regionally aligned Army brigades is a concept that we probably need to approach cautiously. Certainly if one is going to send foreign troops into the countries of others, it is better for them to be regionally aligned than not, so the question really isn't about "RAF," it is about the legend being built around the program of Security Force Assistance (SFA) and the concept of building partner capacity (BPC) as a way to reduce US defense costs.

From my perspective, I don't see much of a historical foundation to support the validity of this concept. My concern is that we are willing to overlook the holes in boat, as it is the only boat available to save Army force structure from looming cuts. So we get in the boat.

Based on the history and geostrategic strength of the United States, there is a solid foundation of history and logic to support assuming risk on the size of ground forces in peace. Sure, we lost a few "first battles," but it is only last battles that are decisive. I cannot, however, find any such foundation to support the concept that sending large formations out into the globe to train the militaries of others will result in net lower costs to the security of America.

The Army has accomplished this mission very well in the post WWII era through Special Forces, assisted by other Army SOF units, such as Civil Affairs and Psyop (now MISO) forces. Are these forces no longer adequate to the mission? Why take conventional combat formations away from the mission and training they require to be successful in war to dedicate so much time, expense and energy to a mission-set that is as likely to plant the seeds of future conflict as it is to prevent future conflict through the capacity produced?

Large foreign military presence is de facto illegitimate and serves to erode the perceived sovereignty and legitimacy of the host government - much as it has in Afghanistan for GIRoA. Small formations can also be damaging, but are far less likely to strike that chord among the populations who ultimately decide what is either sovereign or legitimate.

A single Brigade of RAF on each installation where we currently have a Special Forces Group could be a good and effective idea. The SFG would be the supported unit, and the RAF the supporting. But the Army would have to implement a regimental system and ensure that each RAF was tailored to the requirements of its region, and that troops spend 3/4 of their career working in the same RAF. Probably no more than 20-30% of such a RAF would be deployed at any one time, and then in small teams and units working for an ODA or ODB leading the mission in the discreet ways they are selected, trained, organized and equipped by the Army to do.

Selfless Service; Mission first, people always - concepts drummed into me, and bought into by me, throughout my Army career. But sustaining size for the sake of size in the Army? I don't see how that aligns with the core values of that very institution. I certainly don't see how it delivers on the promise of the rationale used to sell the concept.