Why Do We RAF?

Why Do We RAF?

Mike Grater

States and power have long been the discussion pertaining to political science. To that end what is the motivation of states to achieve power and to whom does that power benefit? From the inception of diplomacy as a political tool; poignantly described by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue; states seek power in order to achieve their own political means. The 19^th and 20^th century are defined by political realism. After the fall of the Iron Curtain though, political realism could no longer accurately explain or predict geopolitical change with a single global hegemon.

The purpose of this paper is to explore Political Liberalism as applied to the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept in order to explain the “why” of the strategic implementation of this policy. An investigation of this sort requires one to explain the theory security cooperation and the benefits thereof, analyze how soldiers are instruments of foreign of policy, define the 3d security concept and finally, estimate the proximal and distal implications of the policy. This is by no means an authoritative narrative but drawn from the personal experience of the author through After Action Reviews and conversation topics proffered by RAF Soldiers and 162 IN BDE Cadre.

Foreign Aid has recently become a political “hot-button” issue. The current fiscal austerity measures proposed by congress have caused the nation as a whole to reexamine spending priorities. Coupled to this problem is the presidents’ public assurance of the cessation of combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014 and pivot of strategic focus from Central Command to Pacific Command. The Army needed a new strategy. Recently this new strategy has appeared in the form of the Regionally Aligned Forces concept.

As recent as March 2012 the Army announced plans to implement training of a Regionally Aligned Force with a Brigade designated as a proof of principle:

“Regionally Aligned Forces are those forces that provide the Combatant Commander (CCDR) with up to Joint-capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment.  They are those Army units assigned to Combatant Commands (CCMD), allocated to a CCMD, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for CCMD regional missions.  Includes Army Total Force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a CCMD area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility.  Regional missions are driven by CCMD requirements.  This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.[i]”

Why then this shift? It is believed by some that conduct of security cooperation activities enables foreign states to maintain their own security so, in effect, US Soldiers don’t have to. For example: a US Soldier brings a discreet capability to exchange with a foreign partner. This discreet capability improves the security capacity of the foreign nation. The improved security capacity of the partner nation eventually enables that nation to secure its own borders. A nation that can guard against an external threat then can focus on any internal threats and relieve the general populace of the anxiety of insecurity. A secure nation facilitates trade within that nation as merchants and consumers can invest their effort in the economy and improve national wealth. With a secure nation both external and internal the government can then invest in the security apparatus i.e. the nation’s defense capability, which further improves the capacity of that organ of the state.  Ultimately with the example provided above a state can choose to project power beyond its borders in order to assist in regional security capacity building and stabilization.

To what benefit does this provide the United States? First and foremost security cooperation diminishes the necessity of the United States to expend blood and treasure abroad. Second, security cooperation provides access to partner nation strategic geographic location and at times resources. Finally, security cooperation contributes to the ability of the US Government to exert influence through foreign policy objectives abroad.

This begs the question of the school of thought for the implementation of such policy. In other words, to what end does security cooperation theory implemented as the Regionally Aligned Force serve the needs of the United States. Political Realism affirms that states pursue power in order to secure their own interest. Yet Political Liberalism proposes that states pursue power as a moral obligation; that is for the good of all. This theory is attractive especially given the evangelical perception of US foreign policy in the last decade[ii].

RAF implementation is the key indicator of United States foreign policy objectives. When asked during After Action Reviews of training conducted in preparation for deployment, Soldiers usually reply that the most visible form of US Foreign Policy is the embassy. American missions abroad are indisputably US soil; the national colors are flown as an indicator of this; yet foreign policy is not specifically reserved for this location alone. Many believe another, and important, visible form of US foreign policy is the presence of US troops. The contention is that the presence of troops evinces foreign policy priorities. A cursory glance of troops stationed overseas confirms this concept.  The lesson to RAF Soldiers is that they are instruments of foreign policy[iii]. They do not decide upon policy objectives but instead ensure the policy objectives are carried out.

Foreign policy is not reserved solely for the department of defense. Policy implementation is an interdepartmental, interagency effort. Building partner nation security capacity is focused on two federal departments and one agency. As ambassadors are the presidents’ personal representative to a partner nation the Department of State is the policy implementation lead. Foreign Policy is a set of ideas; ideas are not effective unless grounded in action. The US Agency for International Development; a subsidiary of the Department of State; is responsible for the development of host nation’s socio-economic capacity. It is clear that other agencies, e.g., education, agriculture, commerce, energy etc. assist in this process as well. The point is the holistic approach of diplomacy, development and defense applied to developing countries is thought to benefit the United States and the host nation. Hence the maxim attributed to Lao Tzu[iv] “rather to teach a man to fish than give a fish” applies to this concept.

Liberalism gives the broad advantages of RAF employment. On the proximal end; RAF justifies force strength, broadens experience and cultivates a skill set that is easily discarded after the cessation of major combat operations[v]. Maintaining this skill set is forward thinking and good for an army that relies on election cycles too frequent to plan generationally. On the distal end partner nations receive training equipment and improved security capacity that can have remarkable, measurable positive impact. In sum, why do we RAF? So we don’t have to.