Small Wars Journal

The Stability Operations Era

Wed, 11/18/2015 - 3:52pm

The Stability Operations Era by Mark Moyar, Foreign Policy Initiative

Douglas Blaufarb, a Kennedy-era intelligence officer, coined the term “The Counterinsurgency Era” to describe the period beginning in 1961 with John F. Kennedy’s inauguration…

The history of the counterinsurgency era holds important lessons for today. We are now fifteen years into one might describe as the “stability operations era,” in which American forces have fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reminiscent of the lengthy conflict in Vietnam. As in the mid-1970s, Americans have tired of a slow and confusing form of warfare that is not amenable to decisive victories. Disenchantment with stability operations has led to both to a serious underestimation of what American forces achieved on the battlefield, as well as wishful thinking about the possibility of avoiding such conflicts in the future…

But the skeptics get it wrong in several respects. First, they focus inordinately on the beginning and the end of the conflicts they describe as futile, which leaves out the crucial particularities of the middle. Even among the expert community, a relatively small number of analysts concern themselves with the details of day-to-day stability operations, which are essential to understanding the big picture. Oftentimes, stability operations have achieved their near-term objectives, only to be thwarted by external factors…

Read on.

Comments

A "heavy footprint" approach (relating to large-scale counterinsurgency and/or stability operations) may not make much sense today. In this regard, consider the following two scenarios:

a. A state and society, wherein, the majority of the population have (1) an overwhelming desire for the western way of life, the western way of governance and for western values, attitudes and beliefs, (2) appear to have an excellent chance of making such a transition and (3) are willing to fight and die to achieve same. And

b. A state and society, wherein, the majority of the population (1) have no overwhelming desire for a western way of life, a western way of governance and for western values, attitudes and beliefs, (2) show no ability, at this time, of being able to make such a transition and/or (3) are definitely not willing to fight and die to achieve same.

In scenario "a" above, the "heavy footprint" approach would not seem to be needed.

In scenario "b" above, the "heavy footprint" approach would seem to have little chance of success/create more enemies than friends.

This analysis suggesting that the "heavy footprint" approach would seem to have exceptionally small relevance and utility in our present world; one which finds the majority of outlying states and societies in either camp "a" or camp "b" above?

Now -- and re: scenarios "a" and "b" above -- let's consider the "light footprint" approach (associated with the use of special operations and air forces). Herein, might we say that the "light footprint" approach appears to make more sense?

In this regard to note that, re: scenario "a" above, the "light footprint" approach might be all that is needed.

And, re: scenario "b" above, that the "light footprint" approach would seem to be the only one that could be sustained politically; this, over the -- necessary and required in this case -- very long haul.

Thus, not the Counterinsurgency and/or Stability Operations Era but, rather, the Era of Special Operations and Air Forces?