The Tea Fallacy
The Tea Fallacy
by Michael Miklaucic
Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy
Shock and awe don’t leave much room for empathy. The doctrine, technically known as “rapid dominance” may have devastated the military capability of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in short order, but America’s failure to win the peace in either Iraq or Afghanistan with overwhelming military force has galvanized a profound re-thinking of the concept of war, the process of peace, and the challenges of failing states. This is evident in national strategies, doctrines, policies, manuals and the quadrennial defense review, as well as countless other official and unofficial statements, both military and civilian. Reflection on such a scale on so many levels and across such a broad range of disciplines and agencies is rare and impressive. The output has been dramatic, the implied self-criticism penetrating, and the insights promising, but there is a potentially a profound misunderstanding at the heart of much of this that could result in failure, defeat, and death.
The central epiphany of the new thinking is the recognition that the object of war, at least of the kind of wars that have been prevalent in recent decades, is the people. This message comes through clearly in such documents as the recent military field manuals on counterinsurgency, stabilization operations and unconventional warfare, not to mention General McChrystal’s recent strategic analysis of the Afghanistan war. The population dimension has also been re-discovered by diplomats who lament the loss of our previously robust public diplomacy capacity. For the development community the focus and main constituency for their efforts has traditionally been the population, though on occasion that focus has been lost in the halls and offices of ministries throughout the developing world capitals.
Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy
Michael Miklaucic is Director of Research and PRISIM Editor for National Defence University’s Center for Complex Operations.
