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What’s Your WAR? Moneyballing Professional Military Education

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11.18.2026 at 06:00am
What’s Your WAR? Moneyballing Professional Military Education Image

Stop Counting What Schools Produce. Start Measuring What Graduates Add.

For most of baseball history, the box score seemed to tell everyone what mattered. Batting average measured hitters. Runs batted in identified producers. Pitcher victories recognized winners. Scouts supplied another kind of evidence: the sound of the bat, the athlete’s build, whether a young player looked like a major leaguer. The measures were familiar, visible, and deeply embedded in the culture of the game.

Then the sabermetric revolution asked an impolite question: What if those familiar statistics captured activity and reputation better than contribution to winning? The lesson popularized by Moneyball was not that spreadsheets knew more than scouts. It was that an institution can become remarkably sophisticated at counting the wrong things. Baseball’s analytical movement sought evidence linking individual performance more closely to the outcome that mattered: winning games. Wins Above Replacement, or WAR, became one prominent attempt to estimate a player’s total contribution relative to a readily available replacement.

Professional military education (PME) has its own box score. Colleges count credit hours, courses, graduates, publications, electives, lectures, conferences, faculty credentials, and wargames. They record grades, survey student satisfaction, document accreditation, and certify completion of Joint Professional Military Education. Each measure tells us something. Taken together, though, they still do not answer the question that should govern the enterprise: How much more capable is an officer because the nation sent that officer to war college? PME has plenty of statistics. What it lacks is a convincing theory of value.

The Traditional Box Score

The problem is not a shortage of data. Professional military education produces mountains of it. Faculty grade papers and examinations. Departments assess course objectives. Programs report graduation rates. Institutions track research output, faculty workload, student-faculty ratios, curricular hours, and compliance with accreditation standards. Course critiques can generate precise averages for questions only loosely connected to professional growth.

These measures survive because institutions can see and report them. A credit hour can be counted. A publication can be listed. A course can be certified as delivered. A graduating student can be marked complete. The effect of education on an officer’s strategic judgment six months later is harder to observe, harder to isolate, and harder still to attribute. Institutions naturally organize around the evidence they can produce, even when that evidence is only a proxy for the effect they exist to create.

The gap is not theoretical. A 2020 Government Accountability Office review found that the military services’ PME programs met civilian accreditation requirements while the Office of the Secretary of Defense remained poorly positioned to assess their effectiveness. GAO recommended a department-wide mission statement, aligned performance measures, and standardized cost information. Its recommendation status updates continue to list the mission statement and performance measures recommendations as open. At the enterprise level, PME can show that recognized institutions delivered approved programs more easily than it can show what additional professional capability those programs produced.

The Naval War College’s published outcomes for its senior-level College of Naval Warfare include strategic thinking, joint warfighting, campaign planning, and strategic leadership. The problem is not a lack of aspiration. It is the distance between declaring an outcome, observing a student demonstrate it at graduation, and knowing that the capability survived long enough to shape professional performance.

Consider wargaming. The Naval War College conducts more than 50 gaming events each year. That is an impressive institutional statistic, but it does not tell us how many required resident students participated, how often each student made a consequential decision against an adaptive opponent, what feedback followed, or whether later performance improved. Games conducted is the PME equivalent of hits recorded. It may matter. It is not yet the same as runs created.

What Baseball Actually Learned

The shallow version of Moneyball is that quantitative analysts defeated old-fashioned scouts. The most useful lesson is that the Oakland Athletics tied evaluation to organizational purpose. They did not ask which players looked most like successful professionals. They asked which contributions helped produce wins, which of those contributions the market undervalued, and how a resource-constrained organization could act on that knowledge.

WAR captures both the ambition and the hazard of that approach. It tries to combine hitting, fielding, baserunning, position, playing time, and context into a common estimate of value. Even its advocates treat the result as an approximation. There is no single uncontested way to calculate WAR, and reasonable analysts disagree about its components. Serious baseball organizations use it alongside other statistics, scouting reports, medical information, and judgment.

Military education is far harder to evaluate. Baseball offers repeated contests, stable rules, observable actions, enormous datasets, and an unambiguous final score. Strategic leadership offers none of those comforts. Officers move among different organizations, missions, commanders, adversaries, and political conditions. Success may mean preventing a conflict, advising against an attractive but dangerous option, rebuilding a team, or recognizing a problem before everyone else sees it. Sometimes, the most important contribution is the decision that is never executed. PME should not reduce officers to statistics. It should stop treating familiar statistics as sufficient evidence.

PME should borrow the question behind WAR without pretending it can import the formula. What value did the education add beyond what would otherwise have occurred? Which experiences contributed to that value? Which activities consume substantial time or money while showing only a weak connection to it? Which undervalued practices repeatedly help graduates perform? Those questions move assessment beyond the registrar’s box score and toward the decisions a serious front office would make.

PME’s Replacement-Level Problem

Wins Above Replacement begins with a counterfactual: what would the team receive from a readily available substitute? PME has largely avoided the equivalent question because its students are not interchangeable players. War colleges admit accomplished officers who have already survived competitive selection, accumulated experience, and demonstrated potential. During the academic year, they continue to mature, build relationships, read independently, and learn from one another. A capable graduate, by itself, is not proof of an effective program.

The relevant comparison is not between a graduate and an uneducated officer. It is between what the graduate can do after the program and what a similar officer could probably have done without that particular educational experience. No school can measure that counterfactual perfectly. But refusing even to approximate it allows institutions to claim credit for the talent they admitted rather than the development they produced.

Call the missing construct Warfighting Ability Retained if the acronym is irresistible. It should not become a synthetic score attached to an individual officer. It should instead describe an institutional portfolio of evidence across several capabilities: framing unfamiliar problems, connecting military action to political purpose, integrating joint and allied capabilities, advising leaders under pressure, communicating risk, exercising ethical judgment, and adapting after failure. Retained is the important word. An outcome demonstrated once for a grade is not necessarily an ability an officer can retrieve later, under different conditions and real pressure.

Career progression is an especially poor shortcut. Promotion and command selection reflect service needs, occupational structures, prior records, timing, sponsorship, and opportunity as well as competence. If advancement becomes the proxy for educational value, PME will congratulate itself for selecting officers who were already likely to advance. Institutions should look instead for evidence of observable professional behavior, while remaining modest about how much causation they can claim.

OBME Is the Front Office

The Joint Staff has already created much of the architecture for a more analytical approach. The current Outcomes-Based Military Education manual, CJCSM 1810.01A, requires programs to align mission, learning outcomes, curriculum, assessment, and continuous improvement. Full certification depends on evidence that students achieve program outcomes across consecutive cohorts, not merely on proof that mandated topics appear in a syllabus.

In a 2024 Joint Force Quarterly article, Kristin Mulready-Stone explains why grading assignments is not the same as assessing outcomes. She describes a Naval War College research-paper assignment that required substantial student effort but did not align with the department’s declared course learning outcomes. Students could produce excellent work and deepen their knowledge without advancing the intended outcomes. Adjusting the research-topic guidance offered a way to preserve the assignment while strengthening its educational contribution.

That is a Moneyball problem in miniature. The inherited practice looked important, consumed real resources, and produced a respected academic product. The disconnect became visible only after someone asked what result the activity was supposed to demonstrate.

OBME will not transform PME merely because schools write measurable outcomes and upload assessment plans. Baseball analytics mattered because evidence changed player selection, lineups, tactics, and spending. Outcomes-based education becomes consequential only when evidence changes curriculum, assignments, schedules, faculty development, and resource allocation. If no cherished activity can ever be reduced, redesigned, or removed, OBME is not a front office. It is scorekeeping.

The Army War College’s Assessment-Based Tailorable Education initiative points in one possible direction. By assessing each student’s knowledge, skills, attributes, experience, and likely follow-on responsibilities early, the model is designed to combine a common core with more deliberate educational pathways. Its importance is not that every war college should copy the structure. It is that assessment arrives in time to shape the educational experience rather than after graduation, when it can only describe what already happened.

Five Statistics Worth Collecting

1. Educational Value Added

Every program should begin with a low-stakes diagnostic built around its most important outcomes. Before the curriculum teaches students how the institution prefers the work to be done, they should confront an unfamiliar case, frame a problem, make a recommendation, communicate risk, or participate in a decision exercise. A comparable culminating assessment can then show what changed. The purpose is not to rank students. It is to identify where the program produced growth and where it did not.

That evidence should be reported at the cohort and program level and interpreted against different starting points. A school that admits extraordinary students should not receive automatic credit for producing extraordinary graduates. Nor should a program serving less experienced students be penalized when it produces substantial development from a different baseline.

2. Repetitions with Consequences

PME should count student decisions, not merely educational events. How many times did each student frame a problem, choose among competing options, face an adaptive response, receive feedback, and try again? A capstone may demonstrate performance, but repeated practice develops it. The Army War College’s experiments with AI-supported educational wargaming are notable because they seek to increase repetition in campaign design while reducing the procedural overhead that can consume the learning process.

The measure should not reward theatrical complexity. A simple seminar game that forces six meaningful decisions and follows them with a disciplined after-action review may yield more educational value than a large event where most students just watch. The useful unit is the learner’s cycle of decision, consequence, reflection, and adaptation.

3. Transfer Across Boundaries

Courses naturally assess what they teach. Professional performance requires officers to integrate what institutions separate. Programs should therefore test whether students can carry ideas across departments, domains, and problem types. Can a student connect political purpose to campaign design, logistics to escalation risk, artificial intelligence to command responsibility, and alliance management to operational feasibility? An integrative assessment should require those connections without announcing in advance which disciplinary tool the student is supposed to retrieve.

This measure would also expose duplication and gaps. If every department claims to develop critical thinking but no common task requires students to demonstrate it across the program, the institution may possess several batting averages and still have no team record.

4. Performance After Graduation

The ultimate test occurs outside the schoolhouse. Six to eighteen months after graduation, programs should gather structured feedback from graduates and supervisors about specific behaviors: problem framing, collaboration, strategic communication, advice, adaptation, and ethical judgment. National Defense University’s public student-achievement framework shows how institutional outcomes can be made visible. The harder next step is connecting what students demonstrate inside the school to how graduates perform outside it.

External assessment should inform faculty judgment, not replace it. Gaining commands may overvalue immediate utility and undervalue historical perspective or conceptual education. That is a reason to interpret the evidence carefully, not a reason to avoid collecting it. A war college that never asks how its graduates perform is like a baseball organization that evaluates players only during spring training.

5. Cost per Essential Capability

Cost is not the same thing as price, and efficiency does not mean making PME cheaper. The relevant issue is opportunity cost. Faculty time, student time, classified space, travel, technology, and wargaming support committed to one activity cannot be spent on another. GAO’s call for standardized cost information matters because leaders cannot make responsible tradeoffs if they do not understand what different educational experiences actually require.

A costly exercise may be indispensable if it develops a capability that cheaper methods cannot. A long-standing requirement may warrant removal if it consumes weeks and yields little observable progress. Moneyball did not ask which players cost the least. It asked where the limited resources provided the most value toward winning.

Beware of Goodhart at Bat

The enthusiasm for better evidence carries its own warning. Economist Charles Goodhart argued that an observed statistical relationship can break down once authorities begin using it for control, an idea developed in his work on Goodhart’s Law. Social scientist Donald Campbell offered a parallel caution in Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change: the more a quantitative indicator is used for consequential decisions, the more pressure it attracts and the more likely it is to distort the process it was meant to monitor. The combined warning is often reduced to a useful maxim: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

Give schools a single PME effectiveness score, and they will eventually teach to it. Tie resources to graduate ratings and programs will narrow outcomes, select favorable evidence, avoid difficult experiments, and optimize what reviewers can see. When faculty are ranked by student scores, instructors may become reluctant to impose productive discomfort. Giving officers a synthetic WAR score and an educational measure will quickly become another personnel signal.

The answer is not to retreat to intuition. Use a portfolio rather than a single metric. Combine direct performance with qualitative judgment. Keep low-stakes improvement data separate from personnel decisions. Use multiple evaluators, report uncertainty, and invite independent challenge. Evidence should sharpen professional judgment, not impersonate it.

Baseball did not abolish scouts. It gave them better questions, additional evidence, and a way to test inherited assumptions. PME should do the same for faculty. Scholars and experienced practitioners remain essential because strategic judgment cannot be reduced to a formula. But expertise becomes stewardship when it remains answerable to evidence about what students actually learn and later use.

Changing the Lineup

A serious PME analytics system would change decisions, not merely reports. Experiences that consistently produce growth would become common rather than elective. Assignments that produce polished work but little evidence of program outcomes would be redesigned. Faculty who build integrative exercises, provide demanding feedback, and work across departmental boundaries would receive institutional recognition. Leaders would direct resources toward learning bottlenecks instead of preserving historical shares by default.

Someone would also have to own the team’s result. Departments can remain responsible for disciplinary excellence, just as position coaches remain responsible for specialized performance. But an authority above the course level must be accountable for the complete graduate, empowered to adjudicate tradeoffs, and expected to explain how evidence changed the program. A box score without a manager does not produce a winning club.

The most uncomfortable replacement-level question applies to the institution itself: If this war college disappeared tomorrow, what capability would the joint force lose that another school, a year in an operational assignment, or a collection of online courses could not replace? Tradition, prestige, and accreditation are not enough. The answer has to reside in distinctive development that the institution can describe, observe, and improve. The purpose of the PME assessment is not to prove that the institution is excellent. It is to discover how the institution makes officers better.

Professional military education does not need a leaderboard that assigns every officer a decimal. It needs a more honest scorecard, one that begins with the capabilities the profession requires, measures development through authentic performance, follows graduates into the force, accounts for resources, and stays modest about what the evidence can prove.

Moneyball did not turn baseball into numbers. It forced a resource-constrained organization to become less comfortable with ignorance about what actually produced value. Professional military education cannot afford that comfort either. The next time a school celebrates courses delivered, games conducted, papers published, or officers graduated, its leaders should ask the question behind the box score: What’s your WAR?

About The Author

  • Col. Patrick McCarthy

    Colonel Patrick McCarthy, USA, has been a Military Professor at the United States Naval War College since 2021. He has taught in the Strategy and Policy Department and within the College of Leadership and Ethics.

    View all posts

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