WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army today released How the Army Fights, new operational warfighting guidance that provides a common framework for translating tactical success into campaign-level advantage for the Joint Force.
Developed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, How the Army Fights builds on the Army’s multidomain operations doctrine by explaining how the force employs land power at the operational level of war. The guidance aligns how the Army organizes, trains, equips and sustains its formations for contested, high-intensity conflict.
“The challenge is on us as the leaders of the Army to make the decisions that are needed for the Army today,” said Acting Secretary of the Army Adam Telle. “This guidance provides a clear framework for focusing the Army’s efforts and ensuring the force is prepared to fight and win.”
The framework organizes Army land power through four interdependent operational elements:
Convergence creates and exploits positions of advantage by synchronizing effects across domains.
Strike degrades and destroys enemy systems through lethal and nonlethal fires at range.
Close Battle closes with and defeats enemy forces, seizes key terrain and consolidates gains.
Endurance postures, protects and projects combat power across time, distance and contested conditions.
Together, these elements enable operational maneuver and connect battlefield actions to campaign outcomes. Convergence and Endurance establish the conditions for success, while Strike and Close Battle deliver decisive effects.
How the Army Fights reinforces that the Army must maintain its technological edge while recognizing that war remains a human endeavor. The guidance addresses the integration of advanced capabilities, including uncrewed systems, artificial intelligence-enabled tools, resilient networks and precision fires, while underscoring the enduring importance of Soldier judgment, discipline and leadership.
“Technology will extend our reach and strengthen our combat power, but war remains a human contest of wills,” said Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Christopher C. LaNeve. “Our Soldiers remain our decisive advantage.”
The guidance directs the Army to prioritize operational readiness for the pacing threat, defend the homeland as a strategic base for power projection, and strengthen posture, interoperability and resilience with allies and partners. It also recognizes the need to sustain combat power across vast distances and under persistent adversary pressure.
How the Army Fights is unclassified and available for public download on Army.mil.
Per my biases: there is only a minor mention of Special Operations Forces alongside the Marine Corps as a component of landpower to shape the battlespace for conventional forces. There is no mention of irregular warfare (or unconventional warfare) in the entire document. There is one mention of counterinsurgency in reference to what we did in the GOWT and the generation of bad habits it created.
The guidance’s central contribution is its emphasis on connecting battlefield actions to campaign outcomes. Convergence and Endurance establish conditions for Strike and Close Battle, making sustainment, protection, and cross-domain coordination integral to operational maneuver. The decisive test is whether training and exercises demonstrate that these elements work together against an adaptive enemy. Its recognition that war remains a human endeavor should translate into education that develops Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil, with AI strengthening judgment rather than replacing it. For the US alliances, the emphasis on interoperability and resilience supports realistic combined training.
Winning engagements is insufficient. Commanders must explain how each action improves the campaign’s position and serves its purpose. Resilient networks cannot guarantee resilient judgment. Leaders must recognize deception, challenge assumptions, and act when information is incomplete. Consolidating gains requires attention to people, legitimacy, and governance. Seizing terrain alone cannot establish a durable political outcome.
What political end state gives these four operational elements direction, and how will commanders know tactical success is advancing it?
Will AI-enabled training preserve the productive struggle that develops leadership judgment, or encourage dependence on machine recommendations?
Can combined formations sustain combat power when communications, logistics, infrastructure, and allied political resolve come under simultaneous pressure?
Excerpt:
At the center of How the Army Fights is the American Soldier. Technology will extend our reach and strengthen our combat power, but war remains a human contest of wills. Judgment and discipline matter. So does the determination to endure when conditions are at their worst. Our Soldiers remain our decisive advantage.
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New lexicon for us to learn.
Per my biases: there is only a minor mention of Special Operations Forces alongside the Marine Corps as a component of landpower to shape the battlespace for conventional forces. There is no mention of irregular warfare (or unconventional warfare) in the entire document. There is one mention of counterinsurgency in reference to what we did in the GOWT and the generation of bad habits it created.
The guidance’s central contribution is its emphasis on connecting battlefield actions to campaign outcomes. Convergence and Endurance establish conditions for Strike and Close Battle, making sustainment, protection, and cross-domain coordination integral to operational maneuver. The decisive test is whether training and exercises demonstrate that these elements work together against an adaptive enemy. Its recognition that war remains a human endeavor should translate into education that develops Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil, with AI strengthening judgment rather than replacing it. For the US alliances, the emphasis on interoperability and resilience supports realistic combined training.
Winning engagements is insufficient. Commanders must explain how each action improves the campaign’s position and serves its purpose. Resilient networks cannot guarantee resilient judgment. Leaders must recognize deception, challenge assumptions, and act when information is incomplete. Consolidating gains requires attention to people, legitimacy, and governance. Seizing terrain alone cannot establish a durable political outcome.
What political end state gives these four operational elements direction, and how will commanders know tactical success is advancing it?
Will AI-enabled training preserve the productive struggle that develops leadership judgment, or encourage dependence on machine recommendations?
Can combined formations sustain combat power when communications, logistics, infrastructure, and allied political resolve come under simultaneous pressure?
Excerpt: