Technology vs Mission Command: An Evaluation of PLA Infantry Tactics
Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing a comprehensive military transformation, driven by Beijing’s ambition to build a “world-class” military. While the literature on the PLA Ground Force’s (PLAGF) strategic and operational capabilities is extensive, the discourse on tactical capabilities is somewhat limited. This article conducts a comprehensive review of PLAGF infantry tactics, examining company-level operations and below to inform commanders of key details to consider should they face the PLAGF in a future conflict. To understand the PLAGF’s tactics, one must understand the concepts which guided the PLA’s development since its founding in 1927. While the enabling technologies, scale, and destructive power of warfare have changed significantly, broad tactical principles remain unchanged; the force that can both disperse and concentrate mass and firepower at the right time and place will be victorious.
The PLA that succeeded in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War depended on battle-hardened soldiers exercising disciplined initiative and improvising according to the aforementioned tactical principles. These soldiers prevailed against adversaries that were better trained and equipped, and possessed extensive armor, indirect fire, and aerial assets. However, the modern PLAGF lacks combat experience and the ability to practice mission command, to include the use of modern technological command, control, date, sense, and strike systems, with corresponding implications for effective command and operational function. Having not conducted large-scale combat operations since the Sino-Vietnamese War, the PLAGF now turns towards technology in the form of widespread mechanization, unmanned systems, and AI tools to offset the lack of combat experience and the corresponding inability to quickly assess situations, create a plan according to the commander’s intent, and decisively execute it. The aim is to deny its adversaries the ability to safely mass combat power, giving the inflexible PLAGF more time to plan and execute operations.
Lin Biao’s Six Principles (六条战术原则)
The original guiding concepts for the PLA infantry are outlined in Marshal Lin Biao’s Six Tactical Principles: one point, two faces (一点两面), four fasts and one slow (四快一慢), three ferocities (三猛战术), four groups and one team (四组一队), three-three system (三三制), and three situations, three ways of fighting (三种情况三种打法). Manifesting throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War, these principles sought to compensate for the PLA’s shortcomings in training, equipment, indirect fires, and air support.
One point, two faces refers to massing of combat power on one point of attack, but along multiple axes of approach while disguising the main effort. This principle stems from a time when the PLA fought against militarily superior opponents, so Lin emphasized concentrating firepower and isolating the enemy to defeat it in detail. In a modern-day conflict, the PLA will likely have numerical superiority and parity in equipment and training. As a result, one point, two faces evolved, advocating attacks along multiple axes with a 4:1 attacker-to-defender ratio. Units tasked with being a face attack by fire to fix, suppress, disrupt and/or neutralize enemy forces. The faces (supporting efforts) draw enemy fire to enable the point (main effort) to gain lodgment and penetrate the enemy’s defenses, allowing follow-on exploitation.
The three-three system is still used by the PLAGF today and standardizes each squad to be composed of three fire teams, each with three soldiers. A unique aspect of the three-three system is its triangular formation that can be used in conjunction with traditional echelon and line formations. One fire team travels in an inverted triangle formation in front of the squad leader. The other fire teams form standard triangles on both sides of the squad leader behind the lead team, creating three triangles within a larger triangle. The fire team leaders are on the inside of their triangles for ease of coordination, which makes the formation very flexible and well-suited for infiltration. Additionally, a platoon can travel in the same formation with its three squads arranged similarly.
The other four principles are more straightforward, and while trends in modern warfare have reduced their applicability, their influence on the PLAGF remains pertinent. Considering the four fasts, one slow, the four fasts are: fast in approaching the enemy, setting conditions, exploiting breakthroughs, and pursuing a retreating enemy. The one slow describes the need for meticulous planning. The three ferocities are: ferocity in combat, assault, and pursuit. This principle emphasizes aggression constant contact with the enemy. The four groups, one team refers to the importance of modularity and cross-training, implying the importance of capabilities being organic to a unit rather than of relying on attachments from higher echelons. The three situations, three ways of fighting prescribes responses to enemy courses of action, noting the importance of careful preparation and deliberate timing.
The spirit of the Six Principles remains foundational to the PLAGF’s conception of tactics. The PLAGF’s infantry manual and assessments by the US Intelligence Community indicate that the PLAGF strongly emphasizes speed and deception, and prioritizes the maneuver principles of flexibility, aggression, integration, concentration, and depth. The PLAGF takes a target-centric approach to warfighting, considering the center of gravity to be the enemy force, and not territory. In training exercises against a blue force (BLUEFOR) modeled on the US, PLA commanders anchor plans around efforts to annihilate BLUEFOR occupying or attempting to occupy key terrain based on the belief that BLUEFOR is overly attached to it. Therefore, PLAGF units may deliberately yield territory if it enables decisive action against enemy forces. This focus leads PLA planners to think in terms of stratagems instead of courses of action, concentrating on how to create exploitable perceptions in the enemy’s mindset.
The PLAGF conceives of close combat three phases: closing the range, entanglement, and annihilation. In the first phase, the PLAGF conducts reconnaissance to find and destroy C2 nodes and rear areas with indirect fire and electromagnetic capabilities. While PLAGF units reposition themselves and constantly probe, BLUEFOR is blinded, deafened, and stuck in a delayed decision loop. In the second phase, PLAGF troops rapidly close with the enemy along multiple axes of advance, entering ranges that negate airpower and indirect fires. Finally, PLAGF units concentrate and target weak points, penetrating and enveloping to isolate BLUEFOR and induce a rout, whereupon the PLAGF troops aggressively pursue BLUEFOR.
Incorporating Modern Weapon Systems
Since the 2015 PLA reforms, the PLAGF has worked to build an army capable of winning on an increasingly technology-centric battlefield. To this end, the PLAGF adapted its guiding principles to integrate new technology into its units and incorporate the necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The details that follow in this section should be treated only as general guidelines. Each PLAGF light rifle squad consists of a Dongfang Mengshi CSK vehicle (equivalent of an up-armored HMMWV) and nine personnel: a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, a driver, a vehicle gunner, an automatic rifleman, an anti-tank gunner, an assistant anti-tank gunner, and two riflemen carrying assault or designated marksman rifles. In addition to the three-three system formation, PLAGF squads may divide and operate in two sections: one supporting the automatic rifleman and one supporting the anti-tank gunner. If the squad is moving dismounted, the driver and vehicle gunner will serve as riflemen. Three rifle squads make up a light rifle platoon, commanded by a lieutenant and assisted by a platoon NCO, just like a US infantry platoon.
PLAGF rifle companies come in light, medium, and heavy varieties. A light rifle company contains three light rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a command section. The weapons platoon is equipped with six 82mm mortars, and the company operates 12 CSKs and a supply truck. The rifle company is commanded by a captain, assisted by a deputy commander, a political officer, and a company NCO. A medium rifle company has the same doctrinal composition, except it substitutes CSKs for 14 Type 08 infantry fighting vehicles, each equipped with a 30mm autocannon and anti-tank guided missiles. A heavy rifle company substitutes 14 Type 04 IFVs for its vehicles, equipped with a 100mm main gun firing HE and ATGM rounds and a 30mm coaxial autocannon. By incorporating these platforms, the PLAGF greatly enhanced its combat power by providing its units with organic firepower that rival US mechanized infantry and surpasses US light infantry formations.
Incorporating Unmanned Systems
As a natural outcome of modernization, and a reaction to the Russo-Ukrainian War, the PLA plans to employ unmanned systems at every echelon. By the year 2035, the PLA intends to transition from practicing “People’s War in Conditions of Informatization” to “Intelligentized Warfare.” The former relies upon fast transmission of information, while the latter moves beyond, incorporating artificial intelligence and uncrewed systems to shorten the decision loop. In this way, PLA can enhance situational awareness, decision-making, and overall effectiveness across all domains.
The PLAGF aims to equip units down to the squad level with a diverse array organic UAS equipped with thermal sensors and laser designators. At the company level and below, PLAGF formations employ super-short-range recon unmanned aerial vehicles (超近程侦察无人机) with combat range of a few to tens of kilometers. These systems are particularly useful at providing ISR, targeting, and battle damage assessment data and PLA authors have identified key tasks for which UAS are distinctly well-suited: landing zone reconnaissance, perimeter security, route monitoring, signals intelligence collection, and maneuver unit forward recon. The last task involves extensive use of super-short-range UAVs at low altitudes to identify enemy positions, observe indirect fires, and free up airspace. Additionally, UAS ISR conducted at the company level is more effective than traditional land-based observation because of superior range, accuracy, speed of target acquisition, multiple perspectives, and usefulness in low-visibility conditions. Though a part of the PLA Air Force and not the PLAGF, PLA airborne units use UAS to conduct battlefield ammunition drops and casualty evacuation.
Aside from UAS, the PLAGF also makes use of unmanned ground systems. Known as “robot wolves” (机器狼), these unmanned systems come in reconnaissance, direct-action and support variants. In training, the PLAGF found that use of robot wolves complements the three-three system, equipping a squad with 3 robot wolves, one for each fire team. One training iteration with the PLAGF’s 76th Group Army saw a squad using a robot wolf carrying a thermal imager and a laser rangefinder, another carrying machine guns and grenade launchers, and the final wolf carrying anti-tank and anti-air equipment. The robot wolves are also intended to be used in conjunction with UAS to support maneuver units.
Implications for BLUEFOR
The effects of PLA modernization are clearly visible throughout the force. However, despite these changes, the PLA’s tactical thought process remains deeply rooted in historical experience. Though the core concepts are not dissimilar to western approaches, there are several critical details that US and allied ground commanders must consider. The PLA no longer suffers from a lack of armor, indirect fire, or air support, nor does it suffer from logistical difficulties and supply shortages. On the contrary, it will be US forces that are strained by the tyranny of distance, and faces an extremely aggressive enemy that outnumbers them, has a high tolerance for casualties, and has comparable equipment and technology. Commanders must acknowledge and mitigate the inherent risk of extended lines of communication and sustainment and vigorously fight to seize initiative early down to the squad level, lest US forces become isolated, overwhelmed, and destroyed. One possible remedy is expanding indirect fires authority within a unit according to predetermined triggers, enabling the rapid response needed to blunt a rapid PLAGF attack and shift the tempo of battle.
Despite modernization, the PLAGF is not without its vulnerabilities. As a natural outcome of the multiple axes of advance that one point, two faces prescribes, the PLAGF’s battlefield geometry creates a herculean task of deconflicting fires. The risk of fratricide and internal disorder because of poor direct fire control measures is compounded if the PLAGF attacks a decoy or a highly maneuverable unit. Indeed, one point, two faces was effective when PLA ranks were filled with battle-hardened soldiers, accustomed to operating with limited guidance and taking initiative, and thus the complex battlefield was not problematic. Today’s PLA is noted for its rigidity and inability to take independent action, so disrupting PLAGF command and control through persistent targeting of headquarters and C5ISR nodes will paralyze PLAGF formations, enabling exploitation of operational vulnerabilities inherent to centralized command structures.
The PLAGF’s anchoring of plans on enemy forces as opposed to terrain also presents numerous vulnerabilities. For the PLAGF to be successful, it must constantly conduct reconnaissance to adjust its own positions and schemes of maneuver in response to discovering BLUEFOR’s disposition. Destroying PLAGF reconnaissance assets and units will have an outsized impact and prevent PLAGF commanders from being able to plan as PLA cross-training is likely limited to simple tasks and weapon systems, as opposed to mission sets like reconnaissance. Additionally, defying the PLAGF’s expectations and refusing to be beholden to key terrain can significantly imbalance PLAGF commanders. Constantly shifting positions, maneuvering across marginal terrain, and even withdrawing from key terrain will frustrate PLAGF commanders’ plans for a set piece battle on their terms. Along that same vein, BLUEFOR commanders must know when to take key terrain and when to pursue withdrawing PLAGF units, due to the PLAGF’s penchant for deception.
The best way for BLUEFOR to counter the PLAGF is to solidify BLUEFOR’s exercise of mission command. The PLAGF invested heavily in unmanned systems and AI in hopes that technology would offset their soldiers’ lack of experience and initiative. BLUEFOR commanders then must forgo the ability to consistently communicate with higher headquarters and instead employ constant electronic warfare, creating a dead zone against the PLAGF and kicking their technological crutch from under them. BLUEFOR commanders must become comfortable with fighting in dispersed, constantly moving formations and must consistently demonstrate creativity when planning. The sheer numerical and logistical superiority that the PLAGF would have in a potential conflict means that it is generally more important for BLUEFOR units to continue being able to fight than to hold onto a piece of terrain. It is perfectly appropriate to use an orderly withdrawal or break contact to trade space for time waiting for reinforcements to arrive. To withdraw and refuse to give battle will frustrate PLAGF reconnaissance and planning, as their assumptions and estimations are based on maintaining contact with BLUEFOR.
Conclusion
The PLAGF has staked its modernization on the belief that technological advancement can substitute mission command and enable victory on the modern battlefield using historical tactics. The widespread effort to incorporate mechanized platforms, unmanned systems, and AI demonstrates the PLAGF’s intent to wed new capabilities to old principles rather than acknowledge vulnerabilities inherent to its rigid, top-down command culture and institute essential reforms. Herein lies vulnerabilities that US and allied ground commanders can exploit. By denying the PLAGF the ability to conduct reconnaissance, using marginal terrain instead of being beholden to key terrain, and fighting cohesively in dispersed, constantly maneuvering self-sufficient formations, BLUEFOR commanders can negate the PLAGF’s technological handicap. What remains to be seen is how new PLAGF doctrine and soldiers will respond to the harsh realities of modern near-peer combat while still struggling to forge leaders capable of exercising disciplined initiative in battle.
