Five Years After the U.S. Withdrawal: Rethinking Engagement in Afghanistan in an Era of Great Power Competition
Abstract
Five years have now passed since the United States withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in 2021, leading to the collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power. In the years since, the Afghan people have faced a series of destabilizing and largely unmitigated developments, including a worsening humanitarian crisis, increasingly restrictive policies on girls’ education, the forced return of approximately three million refugees, and ongoing conflict with Pakistan. Against this backdrop, this essay evaluates three policy options—status quo, maximum pressure, and pragmatic engagement—and finds that maintaining the status quo over the past five years has neither tempered Taliban governance nor advanced U.S. strategic objectives, while doing little to improve the well-being of the Afghan people. It then argues that pragmatic engagement provides the most viable path to advance U.S. interests, address humanitarian needs, and foster intra-Afghan and human rights dialogue. Finally, the essay identifies critical minerals as a potential area for engagement within a Zone of Possible Agreement and proposes the use of Bagram Airfield as an economic hub for mineral processing.
Introduction
Five years have passed since the 2021 withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which led to the collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power. “America’s longest war”—a short-term, military-led counterterrorism mission that morphed into a twenty-year nation-building exercise—failed to produce durable governance or security outcomes despite its significant cost in blood and treasure. Since the withdrawal, the Afghan people have faced a series of destabilizing events and adverse conditions: worsening humanitarian and economic crises; increasingly restrictive policies on girls’ access to education and women’s access to work; the U.S. termination of all foreign aid to Afghanistan; an escalating conflict with Pakistan; and the forced return of roughly three million Afghans from Iran and Pakistan, further taxing already strained domestic resources.
Despite these challenges, Afghanistan has thus far avoided the worst-case scenarios. The country has not experienced a major transnational terrorist attack originating from its territory, has not devolved into further internal conflict, and has not collapsed into a failed state. Yet, as the tragic events of September 11th demonstrated, a destabilized and isolated Afghanistan can pose serious problems to the region and the United States. While the conditions today may differ, the broader lessons remain: a close examination of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan over the past five years is necessary. What this approach has entailed, what it has achieved, and what trajectory it should take are crucial considerations.
Since 2021, U.S. policy has primarily relied on isolation and coercive measures. The U.S. has utilized a combination of sanctions, financial restrictions, and the withdrawal of aid assistance to exert pressure on the Taliban over human rights issues. These punitive measures have produced limited observable behavioral change in Taliban governance while contributing to the country’s economic and humanitarian deterioration, including the potential for mass starvation. As John Aylieff, the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Country Director for Afghanistan, describes, “‘The impact on women is nefarious,’ with the unthinkable becoming increasingly commonplace as families cut off from WFP assistance are “forced to sell their daughters into early marriage.’” In practice, the fusion of U.S. coercive measures and minimal diplomatic engagement has functioned less as a mechanism of leverage and more as the de facto abandonment of Afghanistan’s political, social, and economic future, harming the very populations it seeks to protect.
At the same time, China, Russia, and Iran have capitalized on the extended U.S. absence, expanding their regional influence through strategic investments in Afghanistan’s transit infrastructure and natural resource development. These shifting power dynamics are particularly relevant today, given the country’s proximity to the current U.S. war in Iran. Afghanistan thus remains a critical convergence point between regional instability and intensifying great power competition. Considering the significant implications of these dynamics for U.S. national security, the central question becomes not if the United States should engage with de facto authorities in Afghanistan, but how, such that it may preserve American interests and uphold its commitments to the Afghan people.
This essay argues that continued relative disengagement and reliance on coercive measures are counterproductive to both U.S. strategic interests and the needs of the Afghan people. It calls for a timely policy recalibration toward pragmatic Track 1 diplomatic engagement as a point of leverage to pursue national security objectives, support regional stability, advance the well-being of the Afghan people, and maintain strategic competition. The following is an analysis of the tradeoffs associated with three diverging policy options: Status Quo, Maximum Pressure, and Pragmatic Engagement. The essay then considers avenues for U.S.–Afghanistan engagement and offers forward-looking recommendations for implementing pragmatic engagement.
Three Policy Options
Option 1: Status Quo
This approach reflects the current posture adopted following the 2021 withdrawal, in which Afghanistan was largely deprioritized within U.S. foreign policy. Often described as a “wait-and-see” strategy, it is grounded in the assumption that deeper engagement risks unnecessary entanglement while diverting attention from higher-priority strategic concerns. Some proponents of this option have argued that after two decades of war, the United States has limited political will and capacity to shape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. Others contend that remote counterterrorism tools, such as intelligence-sharing and over-the-horizon strike capabilities, may be sufficient to manage terror threats without reengagement on the ground. Despite its appeal, the status quo approach relies on key assumptions that may not hold, while the associated risks are substantial, as outlined below.
First, the status quo does little to address Afghanistan’s worsening humanitarian and human rights crises. The 2021 power shift, combined with sanctions and frozen assets, has driven widespread poverty and food insecurity, with millions facing acute shortages and being effectively cut off from meaningful access to banking. A policy of limited engagement risks further destabilizing the population while fueling resentment toward external actors.
Second, the threat of terrorism remains a significant concern. Although the Taliban have pledged to prevent the use of Afghanistan territory by designated terror groups, and have largely made good on that promise, recent U.N. assessments indicate that organizations such as ISIS-K and Al-Qaeda are regrouping. As Chris Molino has noted, the evolving threat environment remains poorly understood, and a range of actors may benefit from continued instability in Afghanistan. Historical precedent reinforces these concerns. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, U.S. disengagement contributed to a failed state, civil war, and the rise of violent extremist networks, culminating in the September 11th attacks. Without sustained oversight or presence, violent extremist organizations may exploit gaps in effective governance to rebuild operational capacity.
Third, the status quo bolsters the regional influence of several powerful adversaries, namely China, Russia, and Iran. China, in particular, has moved quickly to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Beijing increasingly views Afghanistan as a strategic node within a broader Eurasian infrastructure network, offering both a land corridor to Iran and access to significant critical mineral resources, including lithium and rare earth elements. Afghan integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is already underway. These investments will not only deepen Afghanistan’s economic ties with China but could also sideline U.S. strategic interests, particularly in securing alternative supply chains for critical minerals. These developments position Beijing as a primary external partner for Afghanistan, enabling China to secure preferential access to resources while expanding its regional footprint.
Iran has also pursued economic and diplomatic cooperation with the Taliban, including proposals for regional trade corridors linking Afghanistan to Türkiye. These developments reduce U.S. leverage by offering viable alternatives to Western engagement while allowing the Taliban regime to more deeply integrate into authoritarian networks. Without sufficient engagement, the United States risks entirely ceding influence to a coalition of ideological adversaries. This issue has gained renewed urgency amid the U.S.–Iran conflict, which further demonstrates the strategic importance of preserving influence in the region. Maintaining even limited diplomatic and economic presence can help prevent Afghanistan from becoming fully aligned with adversarial powers.
Fourth, under the status quo, the United States is failing to leverage its convening power to help mitigate regional destabilizing dynamics, including the ongoing conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This oversight limits opportunities to encourage structured de-escalation mechanisms among key stakeholders. It also reduces the prospects for facilitating stabilizing initiatives—such as intra-Afghan dialogue—that could support longer-term political reconciliation. Essentially, engagement has not been leveraged sufficiently to advance critical issues.
In sum, the status quo offers short-term political, transactional, and operational convenience but carries significant long-term strategic and humanitarian risks. As such, its viability depends less on its immediate benefits than on whether its underlying assumptions about risk containment continue to hold.
Option 2: Maximum Pressure
A strategy of maximum pressure would involve significantly weakening the Taliban regime through intensified economic sanctions, financial isolation, and diplomatic coercion. Proponents argue that constraining access to resources will weaken the regime’s governing capacity, exacerbate internal divisions, and force concessions on issues such as human rights. This approach mirrors past U.S. policies toward states like Iran and North Korea, relying on economic and political pressure as the primary tools of influence. Some advocates also support incorporating intelligence or indirect military measures, including arming anti-Taliban resistance elements.
In practice, however, the effectiveness of maximum pressure in Afghanistan is limited by structural realities. Following the Taliban’s return to power, the United States froze more than $9.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets and imposed stringent financial restrictions. A maximum pressure strategy would expand these measures through secondary sanctions, tighter financial controls, and broader diplomatic isolation. The underlying assumption is that financial deprivation will translate into political leverage. This assumption is questionable.
Unlike more centralized economies, Afghanistan’s economic system is highly fragmented, with much of the population dependent on informal markets, remittances, and humanitarian aid. The Taliban has demonstrated an ability to adapt to sanctions by diversifying revenue streams, including illicit trade, taxation, and natural resource extraction. More importantly, it has deepened ties with regional actors willing to provide economic and diplomatic alternatives.
Beyond its limited coercive impact, maximum pressure, like the status quo, carries significant humanitarian risks. Further restricting financial flows and economic activity will deepen this crisis, pushing millions further into destitution and possibly mass starvation, while doing little to alter elite decision-making. As in other sanctioned environments, the burden of economic pressure falls disproportionately on the population rather than the governing authorities. In the case of Afghanistan, WFP data shows that women and girls are most vulnerable to hunger.
Diplomatic isolation, while intended to delegitimize Taliban rule, simultaneously reduces U.S. influence over developments on the ground. The Taliban have already demonstrated an ability to navigate isolation by strengthening ties with regional powers. China’s diplomatic engagement, including the appointment of Ambassador Zhao Xing, and Russia’s 2025 formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate, reflects a broader willingness among U.S. rivals to fill the vacuum left by Western disengagement. Over time, this dynamic risks normalizing alternative political and economic alignments that exclude the United States completely.
In strategic terms, maximum pressure offers limited upside. Sanctions are less effective in fragmented economies, diplomatic isolation reduces leverage, and humanitarian fallout undermines long-term stability, while increasing the risk of kinetic engagement. At the same time, the approach accelerates Afghanistan’s integration into alternative political and economic networks led by China, Iran, and Russia. Critically, the experience of the past twenty years, during which the United States not only applied sustained pressure but also engaged in open military conflict with the Taliban, demonstrates the limited effectiveness of a maximum-pressure approach.
While pressure may remain a component of a broader engagement strategy, overreliance risks deepening instability while diminishing U.S. influence. Moreover, a strict isolation framework ignores the reality that selective engagement has already been employed by U.S. actors at the Track 1.5 level when core interests are at stake. Instead, a sustained, strategic approach is required—one that balances pressure with structured pragmatic engagement to shape political outcomes more effectively.
Option 3: Pragmatic Engagement
In contrast to relative disengagement or the punitive logic of maximum pressure, a policy of Track 1 pragmatic engagement aims to address Afghanistan’s complex political, social, and humanitarian realities through measured diplomatic, economic, and security-based interaction. Pragmatic engagement does not equate to legitimization; rather, it reflects the reality that lasting stability in Afghanistan, which directly impacts U.S. and global security and the well-being of the Afghan people, requires ongoing, structured dialogue. Such engagement can serve as a crucial point of leverage by capitalizing on the convergence of otherwise competing priorities.
The foundations for pragmatic engagement have already been laid. Post-withdrawal interactions with Taliban representatives, particularly around the March 2025 release of George Glezmann and the March 2026 release of Dennis Coyle—described by Taliban authorities as a gesture of goodwill—demonstrate that pragmatic, interest-based dialogue has remained both possible and productive at the Track 1.5 level. At this level, former officials engage counterparts linked to governing authorities. This hybrid approach sits between informal Track 2 dialogue and formal Track 1 state-to-state diplomacy, enabling flexibility while maintaining strategic signaling.
At the same time, the United States has shown a degree of flexibility in its counterterrorism approach, notably by removing financial bounties on senior Taliban figures, including Sirajuddin Haqqani. De facto authorities in Afghanistan consider this gesture a means of reducing international isolation. Although Washington continues to raise legitimate concerns over human rights violations and counterterrorism commitments, these developments open the door to structured dialogue on security and economic cooperation, as an entry point.
While a step in the right direction, such efforts are fragmented and insufficiently institutionalized. The current limitation lies in their informality. Without elevation to Track 1 diplomatic channels, these endeavors lack the consistency, leverage, and policy integration required to shape longer-term strategic outcomes. A transition toward formal Track 1 engagement is therefore necessary to convert episodic diplomatic gains into sustained policy outcomes.
Most critically, structured engagement is vital for effectively addressing Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. With more than 22 million Afghans (45% of the population) reliant on emergency assistance, aid delivery at scale is not possible without some level of coordination with de facto authorities. Efforts to bypass de facto authorities entirely have proven operationally limited. A structured framework of engagement can establish safeguards to minimize aid diversion while ensuring that assistance reaches vulnerable populations. Beyond humanitarian relief, targeted economic measures—such as limited financial access or carefully structured investments—could contribute to stabilization and reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on U.S. rivals.
From a strategic perspective, pragmatic engagement is essential within the context of great power competition. Continued U.S. disinterest allows Beijing to further consolidate control over key supply chains—especially lithium and rare earth elements—while consolidating its military holdings across Central and South Asia. As General (Ret.) Frank McKenzie has cautioned, “bases [will] inevitably follow, as we have seen in Djibouti, and potentially in UAE.” Selective U.S. engagement can counterbalance these efforts by promoting alternative investment channels and maintaining a regional profile.
Pathways to Pragmatic Engagement
Pragmatic engagement depends on identifying and exploiting Zones of Possible Agreement (ZOPA)—overlapping areas of mutual interest and benefit where incremental cooperation is feasible despite deep political disagreement. In practice, these zones may emerge around humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism coordination, and economic development. A key ZOPA between the United States and Afghanistan is the development of Afghanistan’s vast reserves of critical minerals, such as lithium. These resources are of strategic interest to the United States due to their centrality in advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and myriad other commercial and industrial applications. Afghanistan possesses some of the world’s richest untapped mineral reserves, including sizable deposits of lithium, rare earth elements, copper, iron ore, and precious metals, but requires foreign direct investment to develop them.
This creates a clear basis for mutually beneficial engagement. For the United States, it offers a significant investment opportunity, particularly through public-private partnerships that can mobilize capital, technical expertise, and long-term development planning. It could provide preferential access to critical minerals, create a pathway for strategic re-engagement in the region without a military footprint, and help counterbalance China’s growing dominance in the global lithium supply chain. For Afghanistan, it represents a major opportunity for economic development, along with much-needed infrastructure investment, job creation, and revenue from mineral exports. This alignment of interests creates a pragmatic foundation, not only for bilateral cooperation, but also for encouraging intra-Afghan dialogue and multilateral cooperation that supports broader regional stability.
However, to make critical mineral development viable in a landlocked country like Afghanistan, establishing domestic processing capacity is essential. Without it, raw materials would need to be exported for refinement, significantly reducing their market value. A logical site for a processing hub is Bagram Airfield. Establishment of such a facility at Bagram could serve as a catalyst for pragmatic engagement by aligning U.S. strategic interests with incentives for in-country resource development. The installation has already received substantial U.S. investment, with billions of dollars spent on core infrastructure, including transportation networks and logistical capabilities, making it well-suited for conversion into a mineral processing and distribution hub. Its existing infrastructure and central location position it to support the extraction and initial processing of critical minerals like lithium.
Crucially, pragmatic engagement is not—and should not be—confined to security or economic objectives. Evidence from ongoing interactions suggests that incentivized engagement frameworks can be extended to broader social domains, including girls’ education, women’s access to work, intra-Afghan dialogue, and humanitarian protections. Taliban officials have at times signaled an openness to structured engagement and to continuing talks. While progress remains uneven and contested, structured pragmatic engagement can create points of leverage that isolation inherently excludes. Conditional cooperation, tied to incremental policy shifts, offers a more realistic lever for influencing decision-making on key issues than approaches rooted in coercion or disengagement.
Conclusion
Five years after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the combination of sanctions, restricted financial access, and limited engagement has neither meaningfully tempered Taliban governance nor stabilized Afghanistan’s trajectory, instead contributing to the sustained suffering of the Afghan people, particularly women and girls, who remain the most vulnerable stratum of Afghan society. Increased pressure is unlikely to change the regime’s behavior, as demonstrated over the past twenty years and, like the status quo, risks worsening instability and driving further alignment with U.S. adversaries.
The most viable path lies in pragmatic engagement: a structured approach that preserves U.S. leverage without conferring legitimacy on the current regime. This approach should balance humanitarian aims, counterterrorism cooperation, human rights issues, intra-Afghan dialogue, and strategic competition with rival powers, while avoiding both major reintervention and strategic abandonment. The United States is already practicing informal engagement successfully, if sporadically, through Track 1.5 channels. The challenge now is no longer whether to engage, but how to formalize and scale this engagement into a structured Track 1 approach capable of advancing both American interests and the well-being of the Afghan people.
The author would like to thank Sarah White for her research and editing contributions.
