The Decimation of Russia’s Specialized Troops and its Effects on the Ukraine War
During the full-scale invasion in Ukraine, Russia’s military (RuAF) has suffered significant losses not seen since the Second World War. Amassing an estimated 1.3 million casualties, numerous Russian units have been reconstituted, with some units conducting restructuring multiple times, with the decimation of brigades and corps.
Despite military reforms in 2008 and 2009, such as the organization of Motor Rifle Brigades and more top-heavy oversight by leadership, the ongoing war in Ukraine is seeing Russia amass significant casualties with little strategic objectives achieved in the last four years. In certain instances, the incremental gains for critical losses are at a pace slower than the Battle of the Somme.
Due to the significant losses of infantry, the RuAF have embedded special forces amongst motor rifle units. Russia’s paratroopers (VDV), special operators (Spetsnaz), and Marines (naval infantry) have also taken enormous losses, filling in frontline roles the RuAF’s elite are not used to. Because of the losses in specialized troops, Russia’s war will continue to have detrimental effects on its military’s regional force projection capabilities and ongoing operations in Ukraine.
Casualties Amongst Paratroopers
Russia’s paratroopers, also known as the VDV, are a premier fighting force within the Russian military. Throughout Russian military recruitment and propaganda videos for Western audiences, the VDV was featured frequently as Moscow’s key fighting force.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, the VDV was part of Russia’s success in Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria, as the paratroopers paved the way for larger contingency forces to secure key objectives such as the Second Battle of Grozny, the capture of South Ossetia, and the securing of Aleppo for the now-defunct Syrian Ba’athist Army.
Utilizing the VDV to try to secure a quick victory over Ukraine, the paratroopers were deployed to Kyiv’s Hostomel during the first days of the full-scale war on February 2022 in an objective to secure the airport for Russia’s main effort. However, Russian paratroopers would face a major disaster that became a motivational turning point for the Ukrainian military (AFU).
Initially expecting a limited resistance, the airborne forces instead faced a major ambush. Intertwined in a field of fire, Russian paratroopers would lose hundreds of personnel with little heavy equipment in support due to Ukrainian resistance which helped stall for Kyiv’s defense. Furthermore, VDV units took heavy casualties in fierce battles such as Avdiivka, Zaporizhzhia, Pokrovsk and others.
It is currently disputed over the exact number of Russian paratroopers that have been killed in Ukraine. As of 2023, the British Defense Intelligence documented a recorded address by Russian Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who stated8,500 paratroopers were wounded, and overall, about 50% of the 30,000 airborne troops were killed and injured. As of early 2025, over 3,162 VDV personnel have been confirmed to have been killed by BBC Russia, which tracks military funerals to confirm war dead.
Casualties Amongst Naval Infantry
Russia’s Naval Infantry, also known as its Marines, has been the RuAF’s crucial component for decisive coastal assaults in conventional warfare. Units such as the 40th, 61st, 155th, and 810th Naval Infantry Brigades have been at the forefront of Russian combat operations for the past century. In the modern era, Russia’s Naval Infantry gained combat experience in Syria as preparation for the inevitable full-scale war against Ukraine.
During the initial full-scale invasion, Russia’s Naval Infantry conducted amphibious assaults in Southern Ukraine in an effort to cut off and encircle Mariupol, which became an objective achieved, albeit with significant casualties. In Ukraine’s Donbas and Southern regions, the RuAF’s Marines have taken heavy casualties, resulting in several of their best Naval Infantry brigades being reconstituted on various occasions.
Russia’s elite 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has been reconstituted multiple times due to suffering high losses during battles in Mariupol, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kursk. Simultaneously, Russia’s elite 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has suffered catastrophic losses numerous times and is one of the most reconstituted units of the war thus far, going through restructuring upwards of eight times.
According to Mediazona, which tracks Russians killed in action by confirmed obituaries, Russia has lost a verified 2,218 Naval Infantry in four years of war. To put the 2,218 Russian Marines killed in four years, the United States lost an overall troop number of 2,459 in 20 years during the War in Afghanistan.
Casualties Amongst GRU Spetsnaz
Spetsnaz, which is a special operations forces department under Moscow’s foreign intelligence directorate (GRU), is Russia’s most elite and well-known tier one intelligence operators. GRU Spetsnaz are known for clandestine maneuvers, direct action, hostage rescue, sabotage, and reconnaissance operations.
Though being amongst Russia’s elite military, Spetsnaz are also infamous for botched operations that resulted in major Russian civilian loss of life, such as the 1996 Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye Hostage Crisis and the 2002 Moscow Theatre Siege. Disorganized operations, stemming from the top-heavy Soviet military doctrine that requires micromanagement, would be detrimental to GRU Spetsnaz operators in Ukraine.
According to the 2023 Pentagon leaks, out of the 900 initially Spetsnaz operators deployed to Ukraine, only 125 were able to return to combat as the other 775 were killed or wounded. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of GRU Spetsnaz killed in Ukraine due to the sensitive nature of tier one operators, but according to Mediazona, 1,007 ‘special forces’ have perished as of late 2025.
The Effects of Losing Specialized Troops in Ukraine and Beyond
Losing large amounts of their specialized troops over the past four years has already shown signs of future effects on Russian military operations and in current offensives in Ukraine today. With specialized forces having years of training to become ready for high-octane maneuvers, immediately replacing VDV, Naval Infantry, and GRU Spetsnaz comes with a price.
In late 2025 into January of 2026, for the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russia struggled to meet recruitment to replenish troop losses. Because of the urgent need for hasty offensives in large swaths of territory, recruits will be given minimal training. New Russian specialized troops will be no exception to rushed training, and it could lead to further wartime losses of critical operators that the Kremlin cannot afford to lose.
Secondly, with heavy losses taken within the VDV, Naval Infantry, and GRU Spetsnaz, the remaining specialized troops have become undisciplined and have conducted extreme measures due to wartime failures. Both the 155th and 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigades have been accused of war crimes, with Russian Marines reportedly using chemical substances and executing Ukrainian POWs, including decapitations. Russian paratroopers were also implicated in the Bucha Massacre in 2022, which saw hundreds of civilian executions.
Third, with the Soviet doctrine still being implemented, which emphasizes micromanagement at the highest level, field commanders of the VDV, Naval Infantry, and GRU Spetsnaz have little authority at the operational level. The lack of trust, mixed with heavy casualties in specialized troops, will continue to hinder progress on the battlefield for the RuAF.
Lastly, with major losses all around in the Russian forces, upwards of 1.2 million regular infantry could be forced to take up specialization roles. In contrast, the VDV, Naval Infantry, and GRU Spetsnaz could be forced into regular frontline roles, which benefits no one in the military. Infantrymen conduct roles specifically for them, while specialized troops do operations that are hard to replicate.
Conclusion
Decimation of Russia’s specialized troops between its Naval Infantry, paratroopers, and Spetsnaz, which is suffering from a high attrition rate in Ukraine, will not only take years to reconstitute, but also has its effects on the battlefield today. Initially hoping to secure a quick capitulation over Ukraine in 2022 by implementing specialized forces to clear and hold key objectives such as Hostomel and Mariupol, instead, the Kremlin now faces years of reconstruction from units that are key parts of Moscow’s force projection.
