Decisive Operations Without Consolidation: Venezuela’s Opposition and the Risks of Escalation
Washington increasingly views Nicolás Maduro not simply as an authoritarian ruler but as a hybrid threat—one who fuses repression with criminal enterprise to destabilize the hemisphere. His regime sustains narco-trafficking networks tied to the Cartel de los Soles and fuels mass migration that strains both US and regional borders, posing a direct challenge to hemispheric security.
Maduro as a Hybrid Threat: The Risks of US Escalation
Recent US unit deployments to the Caribbean, so far focused on interdicting (even precision-targeting) narco-speedboats, signal resolve but remain tactical demonstrations that do not alter the strategic balance. This raises the critical question: will Washington escalate to strikes on Venezuelan narco-infrastructure, or even move toward regime change?
Influential voices are pushing in that direction. Latin America scholar R. Evan Ellis has called for a modern Operation Just Cause—a decisive campaign to remove Maduro and dismantle his criminal networks, drawing on the 1989 precedent of Manuel Noriega’s ouster in Panama.[1] The Wall Street Journal has echoed this logic, warning that US warships “can’t be there merely to shoot at a few motor boats” and portraying Venezuela as the epicenter of hemispheric organized crime, with an opposition too fractured to succeed on its own.[2]
There has also been reporting in the US media that the Pentagon is preparing strike plans inside Venezuelan territory. It is unclear from the reporting if the targets would be limited to narco-infrastructure, or if they would include officials from the Maduro regime.[3]
Yet doctrine and history caution against confusing military capability with strategy. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency stresses that decisive operations cannot stand alone; they must be followed by a “clear-hold-build” process in which forces first clear insurgents, then hold territory through immediate security, and finally build governance to secure legitimacy:
“The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means.”[4]
This raises the hard question Washington cannot ignore: who would govern Venezuela the day after Maduro? The opposition has a 25-year record of bitter infighting, strategic missteps, and failure to deliver credible governance.
Its leaders frequently claim that billions in foreign investment are waiting in the wings—particularly for oil and natural gas—and that a revitalized energy sector will restart growth and stabilize the country.But a new government would not begin with investors rushing to Caracas; it would begin with a humanitarian emergency. Millions of Venezuelans would require immediate food, water, medicine, and security. If they lack the capacity to manage this crisis from day one, disorder will spread quickly.
Venezuela had mass poverty long before Hugo Chávez, and an oil rebound alone will not erase that inequality. More critically, the illicit economy—narcotics, contraband, illegal mining, and fuel smuggling—will persist, and criminals will continue to profit. Without deliberate plans to dismantle these networks and deliver social programs to the most vulnerable, even a new government risks being undermined by the same forces that sustained Maduro.
In Venezuela, striking Maduro without preparing for the aftermath could create not stability but a vacuum—one filled by criminal networks, armed colectivos, and foreign proxies.
Venezuela’s Crisis and the Perils of Unprepared Regime Change
Venezuela’s descent into a criminalized autocracy under Nicolás Maduro has turned it into a hemispheric threat, exporting instability through narco-trafficking, strategic migration flows, and transnational organized crime. Nearly eight million Venezuelans already live abroad, and while the pace has slowed from earlier years, the regime could leverage new surges as a pressure tactic, overwhelming neighboring states and straining regional stability.[5]
Despite economic collapse and international condemnation, the regime endures—sustained by repression, corruption, and a fractured opposition. For more than two decades, US policymakers balanced pressure on Caracas with restraint, viewing the regime as a costly nuisance rather than a strategic threat and unwilling to commit the resources required for decisive change. That calculation is now shifting.
The opposition is the critical weakness. From the failed coup of 2002 to the aftermath of the fraudulent 2024 election, it has shown courage but little unity or capacity to govern.[6] If the United States escalates—whether through military action or intensified sanctions—it risks unleashing chaos unless the opposition can demonstrate readiness to act now and plan for tomorrow. Mobilizing humanitarian aid, engaging regional allies, and articulating a credible governance blueprint are not optional—they are prerequisites for a stable transition.
Here the funding gap looms largest. Opposition leaders often assume that once Maduro falls, billions in assistance will flow. Yet no such commitments exist. The Trump administration has cut USAID, European governments remain hesitant, and multilateral lenders will not release funds without credible governance frameworks.
Unless the opposition can demonstrate competence and transparency now—and show how it would provide stability and order in the immediate aftermath—donors will hold back. The risk is clear: without legitimate financing, or a firm US commitment to billions in humanitarian assistance, illicit networks will fill the vacuum, pulling Venezuela toward a weak and chaotic narco-democracy rather than a stable transition.
My perspective is shaped by years in Caracas, where I engaged Chavista officials and maintained strong relations with opposition supporters over two decades. That experience reinforces a hard truth: revolutions without action in the present and preparation for the future do not bring liberation—they collapse into disorder. For US policy to succeed, Venezuela’s opposition must transform itself into a credible alternative, ready to govern the day after Maduro falls.
Theoretical Foundations: Governance as the Lynchpin of Regime Change
Regime change succeeds or fails on the question of governance—a lesson reinforced by both political science and US military doctrine. Samuel Huntington argued that democracy depends on legitimate institutions that deliver security, justice, and services; elections alone cannot sustain stability.[7] David Kilcullen’s “accidental guerrilla” theory warns that when state collapse occurs without governing capacity, the resulting vacuum is quickly exploited by insurgents and criminal networks—a danger acute in Venezuela’s criminalized autocracy.[8]
US doctrine echoes these insights. FM 3-24 emphasizes that security and aid must always serve the broader goal of fostering legitimate governance, not simply defeating adversaries.[9] Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 Stability Operations likewise stresses that successful transitions endure only when essential services are restored, the rule of law is established, and functioning institutions are rebuilt.[10] Applied to Venezuela, these principles illuminate the stakes: without a unified opposition prepared to govern, regime collapse would invite chaos.
Lessons from Regime Change: Governance Successes and Failures
History demonstrates the dangers of regime change without governance planning. In Iraq after 2003, dismantling the Baathist state fueled sectarian insurgency and long-term instability.[11] Libya in 2011 followed a similar trajectory: the fall of Muammar Qaddafi left a fragmented opposition unable to govern, and militias and foreign proxies quickly filled the vacuum.[12] Both cases underscore the peril of removing regimes without successors ready to secure order and provide essential services.
By contrast, other transitions reveal the dividends of preparation. Poland’s Solidarity and Czechoslovakia’s Civic Forum combined resistance with governance planning—crafting economic reforms, negotiating security transitions, and ensuring that democratic change in 1989 produced stability rather than disorder.[13] South Africa’s African National Congress, under Nelson Mandela, developed frameworks for power-sharing and institutional reform, helping avert civil war and stabilize the country during the 1994 transition.[14]
For Venezuela, these precedents carry a clear warning: collapse without preparation would open space for criminal networks and foreign actors such as Cuba (backed by Russia) to consolidate influence in the chaos.
Venezuela’s Opposition: Fractured Resistance, Unready for Governance
If Nicolás Maduro’s regime collapsed tomorrow, Venezuela would confront cascading crises. More than 80 percent of the population is food-insecure, the economy has contracted by over 60 percent since 2013, and nearly eight million people have fled.[15][16] Immediate humanitarian demands—food, water, electricity, and medicine—would overwhelm any successor, sparking unrest unless governance structures were rapidly established. The security environment is equally dire: pro-regime colectivos dominate neighborhoods, the military is deeply tied to organized crime, and foreign advisors from Cuba, Russia, and China remain entrenched, while loyalists control the judiciary and the state oil sector.
Amid this environment, the opposition remains fractured and unprepared. The 2002 coup collapsed within 48 hours, mass protests in 2014 and 2017 dissipated under repression, Juan Guaidó’s 2019 interim government faltered due to internal rivalries, and the fraudulent 2024 election left the Unitary Platform scattered.[17][18][19] My two decades engaging with opposition figures reveal a consistent flaw: bold resistance without cohesive strategy.
This disunity risks producing another collapse like Libya’s, rather than a Polish-style transition. For the United States, supporting an opposition without credible governance frameworks would be a strategic failure. Unity and actionable plans—covering humanitarian relief, security sector reform, and institutional rebuilding—are essential now to avert chaos and to convince Washington it has a partner capable of governing the day after Maduro falls.
Impact on US Policy and Regional Goals
The opposition’s weakness should be a red flag. Can they truly govern a fractured state? Washington need only recall recent regime-change precedents: removing regimes without capable successors risks collapse. Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn Rule” remains instructive: you break it, you own it.[20] If the United States moves to topple Maduro, it will inherit the hopes, needs, and grievances of all Venezuelans—both those inside the country and the nearly eight million displaced abroad. Meeting those expectations would be an immense undertaking.
The regional implications are just as sharp. Venezuela’s collapse has already strained Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and beyond.[21] Colombia in particular stands at the eye of the storm. Relations with Washington have deteriorated since the Trump administration revoked President Petro’s visa over his criticisms of US troops, and the bilateral agenda has steadily soured.[22] With drug certification now in question, a deeper crisis looms: if US intelligence identifies narco-infrastructure operating inside Colombian territory, does the target list expand? Any perception of US military action crossing into Colombia could rupture a security partnership that has been the backbone of hemispheric stability for decades.
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s instability threatens to unleash another surge of migration. Colombia already hosts millions of Venezuelans, stretching social services to the breaking point. The strain is magnified by the Trump administration’s decision to cut millions in USAID humanitarian assistance, leaving Bogotá with fewer tools to absorb new flows.[23] Left unmanaged, such pressures could destabilize not only Colombia but the wider region.
Layered on top of this is the unresolved economic question. Even if Maduro fell tomorrow, the illicit economy would persist. Without deliberate US and regional planning to help a new government replace those illicit revenues with legitimate ones, criminal networks will continue to thrive, undercutting any transition. Washington cannot afford to ignore this structural driver of instability.
Another layer of US strategy is seldom stated openly: pressure on Caracas is also pressure on Havana. Washington increasingly views the Maduro and Díaz-Canel regimes as fused—politically, economically, and in their shared machinery of repression. If Venezuela collapses, Cuba’s survival becomes far more tenuous, a prospect that would reverberate across the hemisphere.[24]
A failed transition in Venezuela would deepen every one of these vulnerabilities, while a stable and democratic transition could stabilize migration, bolster trade, and reinforce democratic norms.
For Washington, the stakes are clear: escalation without a capable opposition risks leaving behind not stability but chaos—an outcome that would leave Washington responsible for rebuilding what it helped topple, a modern reminder of Powell’s “Pottery Barn Rule.”
The Path Forward
Transforming Venezuela’s opposition from a movement of protest into a proto-government is essential if it is to present itself as a credible alternative to the Maduro regime. That transformation cannot wait until a transition appears imminent; it must begin with concrete, observable actions now.
Opposition leaders must demonstrate their capacity to relieve suffering, organize support, and sustain pressure in ways that tangibly improve Venezuelan lives. This requires working with international organizations to deliver humanitarian assistance both inside the country and across the diaspora. It requires organizing visible campaigns that impose reputational and political costs on regime enablers, such as Chevron and others who facilitate the flow of resources to Caracas. It requires sustained engagement in international forums and regional capitals, emphasizing that Venezuela’s crisis is not confined to its borders but destabilizes the hemisphere.
At the same time, the opposition must articulate a credible governance vision, one based on democratic values. This means publishing frameworks for humanitarian relief, security sector reform, and institutional rebuilding. It also means developing strategies for disarming colectivos and restructuring the armed forces, learning from the errors of Iraq where wholesale disbandment produced long-term instability. Building partnerships with free world allies—capable of providing technical and financial assistance while countering authoritarian influence from Cuba, Russia, and China—is part of the same requirement.
Critics will counter that such plans already exist but cannot be shared, lest the regime anticipate them. That argument is weak. Maduro’s intelligence services, with Cuban support, already penetrate opposition networks. Operational secrecy is appropriate for specific tactical details, but legitimacy is built on transparency of purpose. Venezuelans and international allies do not need to know operational timetables; they need to see evidence of competence: how aid will be delivered, how institutions will be rebuilt, how security forces will be restructured. These are not secrets that compromise operations; they are the minimum requirements of a credible alternative government. Without them, claims of hidden preparation resemble evasion more than prudence.
Only by combining visible action in the present with preparation for tomorrow can the opposition build the credibility required to lead a transition. For the United States, conditional support is critical. Recognition, aid, and resources should be tied to evidence that the opposition is not only planning for the future but acting in the present. Quiet assistance—building capacity in exile—is one way to prepare them for the moment when opportunity arrives.
Conclusion
Venezuela stands at a crossroads. Maduro’s eventual fall may be inevitable, but without preparation it will not bring freedom—only chaos. From the coup of 2002 to the fraud of 2024, the opposition has repeated the same mistake: resistance without readiness. More troubling still, it has failed to act decisively in the present, leaving Venezuelans without meaningful relief from their suffering.
This is the missing piece of US policy. History shows that revolutions without governance planning collapse into tragedy. Doctrine reinforces the same lesson: tactical victories mean little if they are not followed by political consolidation. If Washington chooses escalation without ensuring that a capable opposition can govern the day after, Venezuela risks becoming another case of premature intervention unraveling into long-term instability.
The choice before both Washington and the Venezuelan opposition is stark—yet not strictly binary. One option is that Maduro remains, and the cycle of repression continues.[25] Another is that the opposition prepares, proves it can govern, and leads Venezuela out of crisis. But there is also a third path: the opposition takes power unprepared, services collapse, shortages of food and medicine worsen, and millions more Venezuelans flee. That outcome would be indistinguishable from defeat, handing the region both a humanitarian catastrophe and a strategic vacuum for authoritarian rivals to exploit.
The future therefore hinges not merely on removing a regime, but on ensuring that those who seek to replace it can govern, consolidate, and secure the peace that Venezuelans desperately deserve.
Endnotes
[1] R. Evan Ellis, “Finally the Endgame in Venezuela?” R. Evan Ellis, PhD. 16 September 2025, https://revanellis.com/finally-the-endgame-in-venezuela.
[2] “What Does Trump Want in Venezuela.” Wall Street Journal. 19 September 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-venezuela-cartels-nicolas-maduro-d374cef7?mod=Searchresults&pos=1&page=1.
[3] Ryan King, “US preps for attacks against drug lords deep inside Venezuela as tensions flare: report.” New York Post. 27 September 2025, https://nypost.com/2025/09/27/us-news/us-preps-for-attacks-against-drug-lords-deep-inside-venezuela-as-tensions-flare-report/.
[4] US Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014: p. 35.
[5] “Global Report 2024 – Situation overview, Venezuela Situation” UNHCR. June 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/Venezuela%20GR2024%20Situation%20Summary%20FINAL%20v3.pdf.
[6] Brian A. Nelson, The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chávez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. New York: Nation Books, 2009.
[7] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
[8] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
[9] US Army and US Marine Corps, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 15 December 2006: pp. 1-21, para. 1–113.
[10] US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07: Stability Operations. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016: pp. I–2.
[11] Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
[12] Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
[13] Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. New York: Random House, 1990.
[14] Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994.
[15] “Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in Venezuela’s Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System.” Human Rights Watch. 5 May 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/05/05/punished-protesting/rights-violations-venezuelas-streets-detention-centers-and.
[16] “Venezuela Displacement Crisis.” USA Mission for IOM, UN Migration. Accessed 30 September 2025, https://usaforiom.org/venezuela-displacement-crisis/.
[17] World Report 2014: Venezuela. New York: Human Rights Watch. N.d., https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/venezuela.
[18] World Report 2024: Venezuela. New York: Human Rights Watch. N.d., https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/venezuela.
[19] Anthony Faiola and Rachelle Krygier, “Juan Guaidó Promised to Save Venezuela. A Year Later, the Flame He Lit Is Petering Out. His U.S. Backers Are Weighing Their Options.” Washington Post. 17 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/juan-guaido-promised-to-save-venezuela-a-year-later-the-flame-he-lit-is-petering-out-his-us-backers-are-weighing-their-options/2019/12/17/48a18186-1495-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html.
[20] Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004: p. 150.
[21] Virginia Bramlett, “Venezuela’s Political Crisis Deepens, Threatening Regional Stability and Markets.” The Financial Analyst. 6 August 2024, https://thefinancialanalyst.net/2024/08/06/venezuelas-political-crisis-deepens-threatening-regional-stability-and-markets/.
[22] Chris Megerian, “US revokes visa for Colombia’s president after he urges American soldiers to disobey Trump.” AP News. 27 September 2025, https://apnews.com/article/gustavo-petro-colombia-visa-trump-disobey-orders-ebca5169a8323ef087b709c5b8dc69b1.
[23] Christina Noriega, “Trump Aid Freeze Is Undermining His Immigration Policy.” Foreign Policy. 14 May 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/14/us-aid-cuts-colombia-venezuela-migrants-trump-immigration/.
[24] Sintia Radu, “If Venezuela Falls, So Does Cuba, Experts Say.” US News & World Report. 11 July 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-07-11/cubas-dependency-on-venezuela-makes-it-vulnerable-to-economic-turmoil.
[25] In fact the repression will likely get even worse as regime supporting AI systems begin to be fielded. See Ron MacCammon, “The Countdown to Venezuela’s Digital-AI Authoritarian Future: Two Clocks in a Strategic Race.” Small Was Journal. 2 September 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/02/the-countdown-to-venezuelas-digital-ai-authoritarian-future-two-clocks-in-a-strategic-race/.
