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A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

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11.26.2024 at 11:00pm
A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32 Image

In today’s complex security environment, America faces a new era of strategic competition from authoritarian adversaries that wield power unconventionally. The rise of what we term the “Dark Quad” – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – necessitates a recalibration of our approach to global stability and national security. A National Irregular Warfare Strategy is no longer merely an option; it is a critical imperative to counteract the broad and multi-faceted threats posed by these actors and achieve a level of overmatch beyond simple hard power measures. The U.S. must embrace irregular warfare as a central pillar of its strategy to safeguard democracy, deter aggression, and promote freedom globally. It must achieve overmatch, not just in traditional hard power, but in its global influence and legitimacy.

Unlike traditional warfare, irregular warfare leverages indirect, asymmetric methods to achieve strategic outcomes. Our adversaries have become adept at waging campaigns that exploit vulnerabilities within the United States and our allies – deploying cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, lawfare, and proxy warfare to achieve their objectives. This approach seeks not only to erode our influence but to reshape the global order in their favor without triggering full-scale military conflicts. The U.S. must respond with equal adaptability and precision, using irregular warfare as an agile tool to counter these threats. This strategy enables us to confront adversaries without the risks associated with direct military engagement, ensuring that we maintain the initiative while avoiding escalation.

The proposed strategy outlined in this directive is based on Ronald Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 32 (National Security Strategy) (NDSS 32) from 1982. It will provide the U.S. with a cohesive and proactive framework to counter irregular threats. It integrates political, economic, and technological measures designed to undermine adversarial influence while strengthening our allies and partners. By focusing on information warfare, cyber capabilities, economic pressure, and the support of non-state actors, the U.S. can operate in the “gray zone” where our adversaries thrive. This approach not only defends our interests but also upholds the global norms that our adversaries seek to dismantle because they have worked so well for America and like-minded countries.

Implementing a National Irregular Warfare Strategy acknowledges the lessons of history while adapting them to present-day realities. Just as the Cold War strategy of containment combined economic, diplomatic, and irregular measures to counter the Soviet threat, so too must today’s strategy employ a wide array of non-conventional tactics to counter the ambitions of authoritarian regimes. The irregular domain is where the U.S. must be prepared to compete and win, and a national strategy will provide the vision and structure necessary to operationalize these efforts.

Ultimately, a National Irregular Warfare Strategy is about resilience and readiness. It will ensure that we are equipped to counter threats that are evolving and complex, leveraging our strengths and partnerships to maintain a world order that favors freedom and security over coercion and control. It will focus on our own resilience and readiness while challenging our allies and partners to invest more in theirs.

The following is a recommendation for a modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare.

Definition of Terms

Joint Definition:

 Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfighting, August 2023)

 Army Definition: 

Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (Army Publication FM 3-0, Operations, October 2022)

Congressional Description:

Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” (National Defense Authorization Act of 2017)

National Guidance

  1. Counter the Department of Defense designated “pacing threat:” China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve Chinese Communist Party objectives.
  2. Apply irregular warfare in support of strategic competition in the gray zone versus the “Dark Quad” (China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea) and violent extremist organizations.

NSDD XX for Irregular Warfare

  1. Strategic Objectives:

    • Undermine Adversaries’ Influence: Use political, economic, and military measures to weaken the influence of adversarial states, e.g., the axis of tyranny or totalitarians or the “Dark Quad” (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) and violent extremist organizations (VEO) in key regions, especially where they challenge U.S. interests.
    • Support Proxy and Partner Forces: Bolster U.S. allies and non-state actors through financial, military, and intelligence support to enable them to fight against adversaries.
    • Limit Adversaries’ Strategic Expansion: Use hybrid warfare (a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics) to delay or disrupt the ability of adversarial states to project power in regions of U.S. interest.
  2. Political and Diplomatic Warfare:

    • Information and Influence Activities (IIA): Conduct global information campaigns aimed at discrediting the legitimacy and policies of adversarial regimes, or “Dark Quad” and VEOs, using media, social media platforms, and influence through cultural, political, and economic channels.
    • Exploitation of Internal Divisions: Identify and exploit ethnic, political, or social tensions within adversarial states to foment dissent and civil unrest. Focus on leveraging non-state actors and dissidents to undermine political cohesion.
    • Cyber Warfare: Develop and execute cyber disruption campaigns to disable critical infrastructure, financial systems, and communication networks within adversarial nations.
    • Reinforce Internal Unity: Assist friendly states and state-like entities to build their national unity and domestic resilience through arms sales, military assistance, public information. Do the same at home by emphasizing the things that make us Americans and de-emphasizing the things that divided us domestically.
  1. Support for Proxy Forces and Non-State Actors:

    • Covert Action Programs: Expand the U.S. capability to conduct covert actions in partnership with local resistance or insurgent groups who oppose authoritarian or adversarial regimes. These include support for anti-Russian or anti-Chinese or Anti-Iran or anti-North Korea resistance in key regions.
    • Arms Transfers and Training: Provide weapons, funding, and training to insurgent groups or nations that challenge adversarial powers. This includes anti-aircraft (counter drone) weapons, cyber capabilities, and irregular warfare training for partner forces. Request Congress revise Title 10 and Title 22 authorities to allow support at the “speed of strategy.”
    • Special Operations Forces (SOF): Deploy U.S. SOF to train, advise, and assist local forces in unconventional warfare tactics, such as resistance, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, and psychological operations where appropriate.
  1. Cyber and Technological Warfare:

    • Offensive Cyber Operations: Use cyberattacks to degrade the ability of adversarial nations to coordinate military and political operations, sow confusion, and undermine the regime’s domestic control.
    • Cyber Exploitation: Infiltrate adversarial networks to collect sensitive intelligence, disrupt critical infrastructure, and undermine military command and control systems.
    • Disinformation Campaigns: Deploy cyber capabilities to spread disinformation, sow internal dissent, and create political and social unrest within adversarial states.
  1. Economic Warfare:

    • Economic Sabotage and Sanctions: Expand the use of economic sanctions and sabotage efforts to undermine adversarial economies, focusing on key sectors like energy, technology, and finance.
    • Energy Disruptions: Support covert actions to disrupt energy supplies critical to adversarial nations, particularly in regions where energy dependency is high, such as Russia’s gas supply to Europe.
    • Trade Disruption: Use economic leverage to disrupt key trade relationships that benefit adversaries while bolstering the economic ties of U.S. allies.
    • Strengthen the Dollar: Take active measures to strengthen the dollar as the global currency and prevent adversary promotion of trade in other currencies.
  1. Military Support and Deterrence:

    • Conventional and Unconventional Force Mix: Leverage U.S. military superiority by integrating conventional force projection with unconventional warfare capabilities to deter adversarial actions.
    • Forward Presence of SOF Units: Increase the permanent presence of designated SOF units in strategic regions to enable irregular warfare missions. These units should be tasked with unconventional warfare, foreign international defense, psychological operations, and civil military operations, and support to intelligence collection.
    • Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Intensify PSYOP campaigns to shape perceptions, undermine adversarial military morale, and influence global public opinion against adversarial powers.
  1. Psychological and Information Warfare:

    • Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications: Develop an extensive public diplomacy apparatus that communicates the values and benefits of the U.S.-led international order while countering adversary narratives. This includes direct messaging aimed at foreign populations.
    • Cultural Influence: Increase U.S. cultural and ideological influence in regions at risk of falling under adversarial influence by promoting pro-democratic ideas and values through media, education, and public diplomacy efforts.
    • Exposing Corruption and Human Rights Abuses: Highlight corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses in adversarial states to diminish their domestic and international legitimacy.
  1. Coalition Building:

    • Regional Alliances: Strengthen regional alliances and partnerships (e.g., NATO, QUAD, AUKUS) and create new coalitions to counter adversarial influence. These coalitions should provide both conventional and unconventional support for countering adversaries.
    • Support to Multinational Resistance Movements: Build networks of resistance groups and sympathetic states to mount coordinated political and military pressure on adversaries.
  1. Planning and Flexibility:

    • Develop and implement a national level interagency campaign capability.  Establish a national level standing joint interagency command responsible for irregular warfare training, education, and force development (less the counterterrorism mission).  Employ Joint Interagency Task Forces responsible to the NSC for irregular warfare operations. Employ a continuous assessment and evaluation process to support NSC oversight of campaign plan execution.
    • Dynamic Response Teams: Establish rapidly deployable, interdisciplinary teams (including intelligence, cyber, and special operations forces) capable of responding to irregular warfare crises or opportunities.
    • Escalation Control: Ensure that all irregular warfare actions are coordinated with broader U.S. strategic goals and are designed to avoid uncontrollable escalation into full-scale conventional conflicts.
    • Lead with our values rather than retreating behind them: Remove or loosen restrictions on military and security engagement with countries and forces accused of human rights violations and coup d’etat. These post-cold war relics only serve to cede influence to our adversaries. Instead continue to engage and lead with our values to privately criticize and teach the values of democratic security and civilian leadership models.
  1. Implementation:

  • Institutionalize Irregular Warfare:
    • Doctrine and Training: Develop and integrate irregular warfare doctrine into military training programs across all branches.
    • Dedicated Units: Establish dedicated irregular warfare units within the military to specialize in unconventional operations.
  • Operationalize Irregular Warfare:
    • Interagency Coordination: Enhance coordination between the Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, and other government entities to streamline irregular warfare efforts by establishing interagency task forces to campaign to achieve strategic objectives.
    • Rapid Deployment: Maintain rapid deployment capabilities for irregular warfare units to respond swiftly to emerging threats.
    • Long Term Deployment and Force Stationing: Provide designated forces for long duration presence and operations in specified operational areas to be prepared to and when directed conduct irregular warfare operations.
  • Sustainment:
    • Resource Allocation: Ensure adequate funding and resources are allocated to sustain irregular warfare operations.
    • Continuous Assessment: Regularly assess and adapt strategies based on the evolving threat landscape, assessment of assumptions, and operational feedback.
  1. Integration with NSDD-32’s Principles:

    • Prevention of Strategic Nuclear Escalation: Irregular warfare should be conducted below the threshold of direct military confrontation with nuclear-armed states, relying on deniable, covert operations and asymmetric/gray zone conflicts.
    • Reinforcing Deterrence: While engaging in irregular warfare, maintain and enhance the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from escalating to the nuclear level in response to unconventional challenges.
    • Global Force Projection: Use irregular warfare to project U.S. influence globally, especially in regions where direct military intervention would be too costly or politically sensitive.
  1. NSC Tasking:

  • Using Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56 – the Management of Complex Contingency Operations) as a guide develop one comprehensive campaign plan to conduct irregular warfare in support of the US National Security Strategy. Include one annex for each member of the “Dark Quad”: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as well as for violent extremist organizations).

Conclusion:

This irregular warfare strategy, grounded in the principles of NSDD-32, offers a blend of political, economic, and military actions designed to counter modern adversaries. By integrating both traditional and contemporary elements of irregular warfare, the U.S. can maintain strategic superiority while mitigating the risks of full-scale conflict.

About The Author

  • David Maxwell

    David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

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