Lessons of Asymmetry from Ukraine and Iran in Conflict
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine and latest US-Israel-Iran wars have one common denominator, an element of asymmetry between the hostile sides. Conventional understanding presumes that a weaker side will adopt and employ unconventional tactics to gain strategic effect to deny political objectives, thereby diluting the capabilities of superior forces and gaining an edge, even as they face persistent battlefield damage. To this end, both Ukraine and Iran have so far shown an optimal level of adaptation and learning while demonstrating a will to fight their militarily superior adversaries.
Iran and Ukraine have demonstrated why military power alone cannot become the metric and basis to achieve victory in war. So far, three key themes of asymmetry have been evident in Ukraine’s and Iran’s warfighting strategies: material and political cost asymmetry for coercion; terrain and technology to shape tactics; and beyond the battlefield measures to shape strategic outcomes. As a result, creating a bargaining leverage against a superior adversary has become the final arbiter of asymmetric strategy. The bargaining leverage created by the weaker party, in turn, helps shape political victory over a stronger adversary, exposing the gap between pre-war objectives and post-conflict dynamics.
Imposing Unequal Costs for Coercion
The use of drones, loitering munitions, and missiles have become critical in targeting an adversary’s infrastructure. Ukraine and Iran’s cheap drone production has enabled their militaries to deploy concentrated mass against the air defenses of Russia and US allies in the Middle East. Consequently, both Kyiv and Tehran have been able to generate coercive effects through influencing decision-making calculus, especially through drone and missile capabilities, by hitting targets deep inside their adversary’s territory. Simultaneously, Ukraine’s resilience against Russian attacks has denied Russia the space to translate battlefield advantage into political success. Kyiv has not surrendered and has kept up with its offensive drone strikes targeting major Russian cities while rejecting Moscow’s political demands. Iran, on the other hand, created a second-order coercion vis-a-vis US policymakers by targeting military bases such as the Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, as well as airports in Dubai, Kuwait, and the Ras Laffan Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) complex meant for the extraction and processing of natural gas in Qatar.
Terrain, Tactics, and Technology
Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), land-based missile strikes, and cyber disruption against the Russian military to bridge material asymmetry. Primarily, Ukraine has implemented asymmetric adaptation in the naval domain through emulating denial tactics through the use of drones and missiles to target Russian naval infrastructure, thereby creating a contested maritime environment for Russia. Iran has utilized its geography to impose a strategic blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, aiming to trigger horizontal escalation against the vertical escalation intertwined with US military response. Horizontally, Iran has escalated by targeting the assets of US allies across the Middle East. Vertically, Iran has raised the value of targeted assets by striking Gulf energy infrastructure to raise costs for the United States. Tehran has largely deterred any adversarial naval forces from approaching the Strait of Hormuz by deploying sea mines and massive firepower. As a result, the stoppage of oil and gas supplies has strained regional players and US allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Iran’s strategy of both vertical and horizontal escalation has affected US policymakers by affecting their cost-benefit calculus to sustain the conflict for a longer period.
Beyond the Battlefield Effects
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran shifted the center of gravity beyond the battlefield to produce a coercive effect in terms of material and psychological costs on the US and its allies through the disruption of economic and energy supply chains. Furthermore, Iran’s dispersal of its strategic assets, including approximately 440 kg of 60 percent enriched Uranium, military command centers, and munitions has helped sustain its campaigns against US forces, denying Washington a clear sense of victory.
Ukraine, likewise, has utilized the information space and access to the wider Western community to build its case against Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine. These information campaigns have also manifested well in intensifying and reinforcing the Russian military’s land-based attacks and nuclear threat to European security. As a consequence, European nations have been more inclined to provide military assistance to bolster Ukraine and their own defenses against Russia.
Taken together, these measures have helped offset the military advantage enjoyed by the US and Russia over Iran and Ukraine. The element of asymmetry has shifted from a military-dominant battlefield into a multi-domain campaign of statecraft, primarily in economic and political domains. Iran compelled the US through the targeting of its allies in the Middle East and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt oil and gas supply chains. Ukraine has become a fulcrum of collective Western political and military will against challenging Russia, which constrains Moscow’s plausible options.
Conclusion
Asymmetry rewards the weaker party if it is able to organize capabilities, terrain, and political objectives with a way of warfighting that creates effects beyond the battlefield. The cases of Ukraine and Iran reflect campaigns against superior militaries, in fact, two formidable powers in the international system. The structural condition of power asymmetry reinforces the pre-existing anomaly in the theory and conduct of warfare — the anomaly being that superiority in capabilities alone cannot guarantee political victory. States need a strategic but innovative approach to either embrace or develop countermeasures against an asymmetric approach from a well-organized yet materially weaker adversary. In asymmetric conflicts, a weaker party may achieve political victory against a stronger counterpart, even from a military stalemate or defeat. Moreover, lessons regarding determinism centered on capabilities, limited scope of the battlefield, and exhaustion from prolonged warfare in the context of asymmetric warfare remain quintessential. Therefore, in a conflict, what matters most is breaking an opponent’s will and imposing both political and psychological costs upon an adversary. To impose political and psychological costs, a strategic approach marked by four elements: adaptation, flexibility, innovation, and scalability against time become key. These elements should look beyond technology and material capabilities to adopt a more holistic and realistic approach to the planning and conduct of warfare.
