From Washington to Tehran: Rally-Around-the-Flag Effects in an Age of Regional Conflict
Abstract:
This article examines how the 2026 Iran conflict generated different forms of rally-around-the-flag effects across the United States (US), Iran, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It argues that wartime cohesion is not automatic but depends on how societies perceive the origins, legitimacy, and costs of conflict, producing outcomes that range from patriotic mobilization and regime resilience to political backlash and strategic fatigue. The cases demonstrate that external pressure often strengthens, rather than weakens, domestic cohesion, complicating assumptions about coercion, deterrence, and regime vulnerability.
Why Rally-Around-the-Flag Effects Matter
Among the most enduring political effects of war and international crisis is the phenomenon known as the “rally around the flag” effect. This phrase describes a sudden increase in public support for national leaders, governing institutions, and state policy when a country faces an external threat. In periods of missile attacks, invasion fears, terrorist violence, sanctions pressure, or major diplomatic confrontation, societies that may otherwise be politically divided often display temporary unity. Citizens who previously criticized their government may mute dissent, opposition parties may soften attacks, and broader public discourse can shift toward solidarity, patriotism, and collective survival.
For scholars of international relations and security studies, this concept matters because it complicates assumptions about coercion. States frequently believe that military strikes, punitive sanctions, or sustained pressure will weaken an adversary internally.
However, history repeatedly shows that external pressure can generate the opposite result. Instead of collapse, target states may experience renewed cohesion. Instead of protests, they may witness patriotic mobilization. Instead of elite fragmentation, leaders may gain political breathing room. In strategic terms, misunderstanding the rally effect can produce costly miscalculations.
Understanding the Logic of the Rally Effect
The modern academic discussion of rally-around-the-flag dynamics is often associated with political scientist John Mueller, who studied surges in presidential popularity in the United States during foreign crises. Although the concept emerged from democratic case studies, the underlying logic applies far more broadly. Human communities under threat may often prioritize security over disagreement. When sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national dignity appear endangered, domestic disputes can become temporarily secondary.
This reaction is driven by several overlapping forces.
First, there is the psychology of threat perception. External danger tends to sharpen in-group identity while reducing tolerance for internal division. External aggression often activates a powerful in-group versus out-group dynamic in which citizens subconsciously prioritize collective survival over partisan grievances, while criticism of leadership risks being perceived as indirectly aiding the enemy.
Second, political symbolism becomes more potent during a crisis. Flags, military sacrifice, historical memory, and narratives of resistance can unify populations emotionally.
Third, governments usually gain disproportionate influence over information flows in wartime. State media, emergency messaging, and national security framing often crowd out alternative voices.
Finally, there is a social conformity dimension. In moments of national danger, citizens may fear appearing disloyal or irresponsible if they publicly criticize leadership.
Importantly, rally effects do not require genuine affection for a regime. Citizens may remain dissatisfied with corruption, economic hardship, or repression, while simultaneously rejecting foreign pressure. One can oppose their domestic government while also opposing foreign bombing campaigns. Crucially, rally effects tend to be strongest when the triggering event is sudden, dramatic, and clearly linked to foreign aggression. They are usually weaker in ambiguous crises or in conflicts where the government is widely perceived as the initiator rather than the victim.
The Rally Effect Is Not Automatic: The United States as a Counterexample
Rally-around-the-flag effects do not emerge uniformly, nor do they guarantee political gain for leaders who initiate conflict. The United States under President Donald Trump offers an important contemporary counterexample. In the 2026 war with Iran, the Trump administration did not enter a defensive war imposed on the United States. Rather, it engaged in what can reasonably be described as a war of choice, undertaken alongside Israel after months of coordination and amid strong Israeli pressure for joint military action.
That distinction matters analytically. Rally effects tend to be strongest when populations perceive their country as the victim of an unprovoked attack rather than as the initiator of a discretionary conflict. In the US case, the political returns to Trump appear to have been weak or even negative. Rather than producing a durable wartime surge in support, the conflict appears to have lowered his approval ratings and intensified public concern over his judgment, temperament, and priorities. A Reuters/Ipsos poll published on April 21 found Trump’s overall approval at 36 percent, the lowest of his term, while only 36 percent approved of his handling of the Iran war. On economic issues, only 26 percent approved of his handling of the cost of living.
This episode also reinforced a broader limitation of rally effects in economically sensitive democracies. Even when leaders seek to project strength through escalation, support can erode quickly if citizens associate the conflict with rising fuel prices, shipping disruption, inflation, or broader economic uncertainty. In modern consumer societies, many voters ultimately judge war through household economic costs rather than geopolitical symbolism alone.
Far from generating a classic national rally, the conflict appears to have reinforced public frustration with an administration already vulnerable on economic grounds.
The contrasting understandings of what constitutes “victory” further complicated the absence of a strong US rally effect. For the Trump administration, military success was measured largely through the physical degradation of Iranian infrastructure and coercive pressure on Tehran. Iran, by contrast, framed success differently: not necessarily as battlefield superiority, but as the ability to absorb US strikes, survive external pressure, and resist what it portrayed as an unjust war imposed from abroad. This asymmetry mattered politically. While Iran emphasized endurance and resistance, many Americans evaluated the conflict in light of rising gasoline prices, inflation, and broader economic uncertainty.
The war also exposed fractures within Trump’s own political coalition. Rather than unifying the MAGA camp, the Iran conflict tested one of the core promises that had helped sustain Trump’s appeal: that he would avoid costly new wars in the Middle East and focus instead on domestic renewal. Elements of the America First movement viewed the war as a betrayal of that pledge. This matters for the broader theory of rally effects. A leader may still receive partisan loyalty from core supporters during wartime, but that is not the same as a broad-based national rally. In Trump’s case, support among committed Republicans remained stronger than among independents or Democrats, yet the overall pattern suggests a thin and polarized wartime backing rather than a genuine cross-societal closing of ranks.
How Rally Effects Vary Across Political Systems
The rally effect is often easiest to measure in democracies because opinion polls, elections, and open media environments provide visible indicators. Leaders can experience dramatic but temporary surges in approval during war or a national emergency. The United States, after the September 11 attacks, remains one of the most cited examples of such effects, as President George W. Bush saw an extraordinary rise in public support as the country united in shock and anger.
Nonetheless, democratic rally effects are often fragile. If wars become prolonged, casualties increase, or the original rationale loses credibility, public unity can erode rapidly. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how early support for military action can give way to fatigue, polarization, and criticism.
In other systems, rally dynamics may be less visible through conventional polling but no less real. They may appear through reduced protest activity, increased nationalist rhetoric, volunteer mobilization, public ceremonies, and a decline in overt elite dissent. External pressure gives such governments an opportunity to recast themselves as defenders of the homeland rather than objects of domestic criticism. At the same time, wartime unity can be weaponized to marginalize dissenting voices as irresponsible or even disloyal. Following 9/11, for example, critics of the Iraq invasion were at times portrayed as insufficiently patriotic, illustrating how security crises can narrow debate and weaken public scrutiny of major policy decisions.
The UAE: A More Organic Form of Cohesion
The UAE presents a different and, in some ways, more organic case. Unlike the United States and Israel, the UAE was not a belligerent in the conflict and did not participate in any offensive military action. Rather, it remained outside the war while focusing on protecting its territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Yet it became a target of Iranian retaliation after the US—Israeli campaign expanded, with attacks affecting critical infrastructure and generating widespread concern across the Gulf. This distinction is crucial: in the Emirati case, public cohesion was not generated by support for a discretionary war initiated by the state, but by a shared experience of vulnerability in the face of external attack.
This also gave the UAE’s social response a different character than a more tightly stage-managed form of wartime mobilization. The country’s population includes a large expatriate majority drawn from more than 200 nationalities. In this setting, any visible rally effect was not simply a matter of citizen nationalism. It also reflected the fact that citizens and non-citizens alike found themselves exposed to the same missile and drone threats, relying on the same protective infrastructure, and subject to the same uncertainty regarding airspace, workplaces, and daily life. To be sure, the war generated anxiety within parts of the expatriate community. Some foreign residents temporarily left the country or relocated family members abroad during periods of heightened tension, while sectors such as tourism, hospitality, and food and beverage experienced economic disruption and job losses linked to reduced travel and commercial uncertainty. Parts of the Western media also questioned whether the “Dubai model” of globalization, coexistence, and economic openness could endure amid sustained regional conflict.
Unlike democratic systems, where rally effects are commonly measured through opinion polling, elections, or approval ratings, public cohesion in the UAE must be assessed through alternative indicators. These include participation in official solidarity campaigns, expressions of support for national institutions across digital platforms, compliance with emergency measures, levels of public confidence in state communications, and the absence of visible social unrest during periods of heightened threat. Initiatives such as the National Pledge campaign, widespread public endorsement of the UAE’s defensive posture, and residents’ willingness to continue working, studying, and conducting business despite missile threats provided indirect but important indicators of societal resilience.
What makes the UAE particularly interesting is that the rally effect was not primarily built around support for a war effort, as was the case in the United States, Israel, or Iran. The UAE was not a participant in offensive military operations and therefore lacked the political incentives to justify a military campaign. Instead, public cohesion emerged around confidence in state capacity, air-defense effectiveness, crisis management, and the continuity of daily life. In that sense, the Emirati experience more closely resembled a rally around societal resilience than a rally around war itself.
At the same time, the UAE government adopted stricter measures regarding online and social media content related to attacks, alleged attacks, or unverified wartime rumors, arguing that false information and manipulated footage could generate unnecessary panic and undermine public security. Critics viewed some of these measures as restrictive, while supporters argued they reflected the realities of modern information warfare in an era of AI-generated content, disinformation, and rapid online rumor amplification.
For that reason, the UAE case can be described as a benign or organic version of the rally effect. The cohesion that emerged was less about ideological mobilization than about shared exposure to security risks, trust in state capacity, and a practical recognition that all residents, Emirati and non-Emirati alike, were in the same boat. Despite visible anxiety and some outward migration, a large proportion of expatriates remained in the country, continued working remotely or in adapted formats, and publicly expressed confidence in the UAE’s crisis-management capabilities. Social media influencers and residents frequently posted images and videos emphasizing that daily life, commercial activity, and public services remained largely functional despite the regional conflict. Although some critics accused such messaging of reflecting coordinated communication efforts, its observable effect was to reinforce broader themes of reassurance, continuity, confidence in state institutions, and the perception that daily life remained largely functional despite the regional conflict. In security terms, this kind of response can strengthen national resilience by deepening confidence in emergency institutions and reinforcing calm public compliance without theatrical nationalism.
Iran and Israel: War as a Brake on Protest Politics
The contrast between Iran and Israel is especially striking because both societies had witnessed serious demonstrations and sharp criticism of their governments before the war. In Iran, months of economic distress, inflation, and grievances over governance had generated visible unrest. However, once foreign strikes began, there was no comparable mass anti-regime uprising. This is a textbook rally-around-the-flag dynamic, though in Iran it was reinforced by repression as well as nationalism. External attack narrowed the space for protest, at least temporarily. Citizens who may have opposed the state on economic or political grounds were less likely to mobilize publicly while the country was under bombardment.
This does not mean that pre-war grievances vanished. Rather, war suspended and displaced them. The regime could more easily portray dissent as irresponsible, destabilizing, or aligned with foreign enemies.
The Iranian case also illustrates the difficulty of measuring public opinion during wartime. Authorities imposed significant restrictions on information flows, including temporary internet disruptions and tighter controls over media coverage, making independent assessments of public attitudes challenging. As a result, much of the commentary available internationally originated from members of the Iranian diaspora, opposition activists, and dissidents residing abroad, many of whom openly favor political change or regime replacement.
At the same time, opposition to the Iranian government does not necessarily translate into support for foreign military intervention. Many Iranians who are critical of the regime nevertheless remain wary of American or Israeli military strikes, fearing economic collapse, national fragmentation, or prolonged instability. This helps explain why external attacks may generate temporary nationalist reactions even among citizens dissatisfied with their leadership. In such circumstances, public sentiment often becomes divided between opposition to the government and opposition to foreign coercion.
Israel presents a related but distinct pattern. Before the war, the country had already experienced sustained demonstrations over governance, leadership, and the direction of the state. Wartime conditions altered the political atmosphere. External threats elevated the salience of security over domestic division, while public debate became more focused on deterrence, military necessity, and national defense. Anti-government criticism did not disappear entirely, but it was partially overshadowed and reframed by the emergency environment. The Israeli case, therefore, illustrates not the elimination of protest but its temporary subordination to a wider security crisis.
The Israeli case also highlights how rally effects can intersect with electoral politics and leadership survival. Prior to the conflict, Prime Minister Netanyahu faced significant domestic criticism over governance, judicial reform, and security failures. The confrontation with Iran temporarily shifted public attention back toward national security, an area where Netanyahu has often sought to portray himself as uniquely experienced and credible in the past. Wartime conditions, therefore, provided a degree of political breathing space and helped re-center public debate around external threats rather than internal divisions.
However, the rally effects do not necessarily provide unlimited political capital. As the conflict expanded across multiple fronts, including Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, the question became whether continued military operations would reinforce perceptions of strong leadership or generate concerns about strategic overreach. More recent tensions between Netanyahu and President Trump over the future direction of Iran policy suggest that the previously unified US—Israeli approach may be showing signs of strain.
If public perceptions shift from national defense toward concerns about the costs, duration, and objectives of multiple overlapping conflicts, wartime solidarity can gradually erode. The Israeli experience, therefore, illustrates both the political benefits and potential limits of rally-around-the-flag dynamics.
How Long Can the Effect Be Sustained?
The rally-around-the-flag effect is rarely permanent. It is usually strongest in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, when fear, uncertainty, and emotion are highest. The opening days or weeks of war often produce the sharpest surge in unity. Over time, however, practical concerns and political realities reassert themselves to the forefront.
Its durability depends on casualty levels, economic resilience, military performance, elite cohesion, narrative credibility, and the perceived stakes of the conflict. If a government can claim tactical success while limiting social pain, the rally effect may endure for months. If the conflict is framed as existential, it may endure even longer.
But prolonged wars expose structural weaknesses. Inflation, shortages, displacement, mobilization fatigue, and battlefield setbacks gradually undermine wartime solidarity. Citizens who initially tolerated hardship begin asking whether the costs remain justified. If victory appears elusive, the emotional unity of the opening phase often gives way to strategic exhaustion.
The contrast between the UAE, Israel, Iran, and the United States demonstrates that not all rally effects are created equal. In Israel and Iran, wartime unity was closely linked to support for ongoing military operations and the framing of existential security threats. In the United States, the effect was weakened by perceptions that the conflict was a discretionary war and by concerns over its economic consequences. In the UAE, by contrast, cohesion was less tied to support for military action and more closely associated with confidence in national resilience, crisis management, and societal continuity. The result was a less ideological and arguably more pragmatic form of collective solidarity.
Recent diplomatic developments also suggest that the transition from wartime mobilization to conflict resolution is rarely straightforward. Even where Washington and Tehran appear willing to explore a framework for reducing tensions, the durability of any arrangement depends on whether key regional actors perceive it as compatible with their security interests. Continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon and broader disagreements over the future regional security architecture illustrate how unresolved security concerns can sustain elements of the wartime narrative. As a result, rally-around-the-flag dynamics may gradually weaken, but they rarely disappear entirely during sensitive negotiation periods.
Security Implications
For security planners, the rally effect carries several major implications:
First, it raises the risk of strategic miscalculation. States may initiate coercive campaigns believing pressure will destabilize the adversary, only to discover that the target has become more politically cohesive. For example, Israeli and American pressure on Iran was partly expected by some observers to deepen internal unrest, yet wartime conditions instead appeared to narrow visible space for anti-regime protest.
Second, rally effects can strengthen hardline factions. Moderates and reformists often lose influence during a crisis because compromise becomes politically dangerous. In Israel, periods of conflict have often strengthened security-first narratives and reduced political room for centrist or conciliatory voices advocating restraint.
Third, domestic repression can intensify under the cover of a national emergency. Governments may justify censorship, arrests, or surveillance as wartime necessities. In Iran, authorities have historically used external threat environments to justify tighter controls on media, dissent, and public assembly. Public fear and wartime euphoria can also weaken oversight mechanisms, enabling governments to expand executive authority, accelerate emergency legislation, or increase defense spending with limited debate or scrutiny.
Fourth, simultaneous rally effects on opposing sides can trap leadership. If the publics in rival states become more nationalistic at the same time, compromise becomes harder because concessions are framed as surrender. During the 2026 Iran-Israel war, hawkish sentiment in both countries complicated ceasefire politics and made de-escalation more politically sensitive.
The challenge often persists even after active combat subsides. The subsequent US—Iran diplomatic track, supported by mediators such as Oman, Qatar, and Pakistan, demonstrated that leaders who benefited from wartime unity may later struggle to justify compromise to domestic audiences. Concessions that may be strategically necessary for de-escalation can be portrayed by opponents as abandoning wartime sacrifices or undermining national dignity. In this sense, rally effects can outlast the battlefield and continue shaping the political environment in which negotiations occur.
Finally, a state under attack may become more risk-acceptant rather than more cautious. Leaders backed by wartime solidarity may escalate, believing that society will absorb the costs. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration’s strong domestic backing helped create political space for wider military campaigns beyond Afghanistan, most notably Iraq.
Conversely, leaders may also become reluctant to pursue compromise if they fear appearing weak after having mobilized public opinion around themes of resistance, deterrence, or national sacrifice. This can create a paradox in which the same public unity that strengthens a state’s resilience during war later constrains its diplomatic flexibility during peace negotiations.
Taken together, these cases show that rally-around-the-flag effects are highly contingent on how war is perceived domestically. In the United States, Trump’s war of choice with Iran appears to have produced only a weak and polarized rally while worsening approval ratings and aggravating tensions within the MAGA coalition. In the UAE, by contrast, social cohesion emerged more organically from shared exposure to attack despite the state not being a principal initiator of the conflict. In Iran and Israel, war dampened or redirected pre-existing protest movements by shifting public attention from domestic grievances to national survival and external threat.
The recent US-Iran conflict also demonstrates that rally-around-the-flag effects are shaped not only by battlefield outcomes but by differing political understandings of endurance, sacrifice, and victory itself. A state may suffer extensive military damage yet still portray survival and resistance as strategic success, while the initiating democracy may experience domestic fatigue and political backlash despite achieving tactical military superiority.
