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The Rising Tide of Dissent in China

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01.05.2026 at 06:34am
The Rising Tide of Dissent in China Image

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long maintained a facade of unyielding stability under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but beneath this veneer lies a simmering undercurrent of public discontent. Data from the China Dissent Monitor (CDM), a project by Freedom House, reveals a marked escalation in dissent events during 2025, particularly in the third quarter (July-September). This surge, driven predominantly by economic grievances, underscores vulnerabilities in the CCP’s governance model and raises questions about potential flashpoints for broader unrest. This analysis explores how everyday protests could evolve into more organized challenges to authority.

Despite a temporary funding freeze in early 2025 that disrupted operations, the CDM resumed data collection and reported a total of 12,331 dissent events since June 2022 by the end of September 2025. For Q3 2025 alone, the project logged 1,392 events—a 45% increase over the 937 recorded in Q3 2024. This marks the sixth consecutive quarter of year-on-year growth, signaling a persistent upward trajectory in public expressions of grievance.

While comprehensive quarterly breakdowns for Q1 and Q2 2025 are not publicly detailed in the latest reports, likely due to the aforementioned operational hiatus, the cumulative data indicates robust activity throughout the year. For instance, economically motivated protests related to education spiked to 87 incidents in the first nine months of 2025, more than double the annual average of about 40 seen in 2023 and 2024.

 

The overall total from the end of Q3 2024 (7,377 events) to the end of Q3 2025 (12,331) implies approximately 4,954 additional events in the intervening period, encompassing Q4 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025. By subtracting Q3 2025’s 1,392, that leaves roughly 3,562 events for Q4 2024 through Q2 2025, suggesting an average of about 1,187 per quarter, which is consistent with the escalating trend.

 

Actors, Issues, Tactics, and Targets

The 2025 data highlights economic distress as the dominant driver. In Q3 2025, workers led 38% of protests, followed by property owners (29%) and rural residents (15%). Other groups, including parents, students, investors, consumers, and ethnic/religious minorities, contributed to the diversity of voices. Key issue areas of dissent in China encompassed a range of economic and social grievances, prominently featuring education-related protests with 168 economically driven incidents recorded since June 2022, including 87 in the first nine months of 2025 alone; these primarily involved 99 cases of unpaid wages for school construction, 41 instances of school closures or mergers that mostly impacted primary schools, and 28 cases of overdue teacher benefits.

 

School safety concerns also drove significant unrest, with 128 protests documented since September 2022 that were frequently larger in scale (13% involving hundreds or thousands of participants) and subject to higher rates of repression in over 50% of cases. Persistent housing and land disputes continued to fuel discontent, as homeowners demonstrated against stalled development projects while rural residents challenged land grabs. Meanwhile, consumer and investor complaints have risen steadily since early 2023, with at least one-third of these events encountering repression.

 

Tactics evolved in 2025, with “threat-to-jump” incidents reaching 307 total since 2022, disproportionately in Guangdong (37%, or 113 events). This method, once mainly used by workers, expanded to homebuyers and small-business owners, reflecting desperation amid economic slowdowns. Other tactics include rallies, strikes, petitions (xinfang), and banner-hanging, with collective actions often bypassing local authorities to appeal centrally despite prohibitions.

 

Targets primarily include local governments, schools/education authorities, property developers, and private companies. Repression rates remain high, with police monitoring, arrests, and violence common, especially for large-scale or multi-participant events. Geographically, Guangdong led with 16% of Q3 2025 events, followed by Henan, Hunan, Hebei, and Shandong. Urban centers like Shenzhen (43 threat-to-jump cases) emerge as hotspots, potentially due to industrial legacies and migrant worker concentrations.

 

The 2025 surge stems from intertwined economic woes such as a real-estate collapse, demographic declines (falling birth rates leading to school closures), and fiscal strains on local governments, which divert education funds to balance budgets. Policies like “nearby enrollment without exams” exacerbate inequities, fueling “school district house” disputes and migrant child exclusions. Amid a sluggish post-COVID recovery, these grievances amplify, with schools becoming symbolic battlegrounds for broader dissatisfaction.

 

If trends continue, 2025’s data suggests potential for escalation via larger protests, geographic clustering (e.g., Guangdong), and tactical innovation (threat-to-jump spreading awareness via social media). The regime’s transnational repression of overseas critics further indicates paranoia about domestic spillover. This underscores opportunities for narrative and information warfare or support to civil society, exploiting internal fissures without direct confrontation. In sum, China’s 2025 dissent wave, as captured by CDM, is a barometer of regime fragility. As Xi Jinping consolidates power, ignoring these signals could invite the very instability the CCP fears most.

Expert Commentary from our Editor-at-Large, Col. (Ret.) David Maxwell:

Some basic questions about social unrest and and potential resistance:

When economic grievances become routine and widespread, what turns them into coordinated political challenges, and what keeps them fragmented despite shared hardship?

If the regime relies on local repression and censorship, what happens when local fiscal strain makes the state less able to buy compliance and more prone to overreact?

If outside actors see “opportunity” in internal fissures, where is the line between strategic messaging and actions that provoke backlash, tighten repression, and harm the very people dissenting?


“The China Dissent Monitor (CDM) collects and shares information about the frequency and diversity of dissent in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In response to an information gap created by media restrictions and risks associated with collecting information about protest and dissent from within the PRC, CDM aims to provide an accurate picture of dissent in the country as well as preserve information about that dissent. The project prioritizes capturing offline collective action in public spaces, though cases of less public and online dissent are also included to illustrate diversity among dissent actions. Sources for the CDM database have included news reports, civil society organizations, and PRC-based social media, as well as the application of a machine-learning algorithm developed by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Doublethink Lab. CDM is operated by Freedom House, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that works to create a world where all are free.”

Methodology

Defining Dissent

This project uses a definition of dissent that contains two components: necessary and sufficient conditions. For an act to be included in the CDM database, it must meet a minimum set of necessary conditions defined as follows:Actors (or a single actor) within the People’s Republic of China voice grievances, assert rights, or advance their interests or the public interest in contention with the interests of political authorities, social authorities, or social structures.

This project’s conceptualization of dissent aims to capture, first and foremost, bottom-up action. We seek to document the ways in which those with less power in a given context contend with the powerful in that context.

In addition to meeting the necessary conditions above, for an act to be recorded in the CDM database, it must have at least one of the following sufficient conditions:

  • Non-institutional means.
    • Modes of action that are not recognized by authorities as official channels through which to voice grievances or resolve disputes. Institutional channels include lawsuits, official government hotlines, and complaints filed through the Bureau of Letters and Visits (信访局). Non-institutional means can include many modes of actions, including street demonstrations or hanging banners in public, public performance, voicing grievances or disputes in online spaces, or non-cooperation with authorities. However, an action via institutional means may be considered dissent if it results in, or is likely to result in, reprisal—e.g., a lawsuit filed against government officials that leads to state reprisal against the plaintiff or family members.
  • High visibility.
    • In many cases, the actor intends the act of dissent to be seen by others in their community, nationally, or even internationally in order to spread the information to a greater number of people or to generate greater pressure for authorities to make concessions. Greater visibility usually makes the act more contentious in the eyes of authorities because it raises the costs of inaction or generates more discussion about something that contravenes their interests. For example, a group of homebuyers may privately meet with a representative from a developer to express discontent about the failure to complete construction on their apartment according to an agreement, and there would be minimal consequence for the developer to ignore the complaint if few others know about it. But if the homebuyers hang banners outside the developer’s office stating the same complaint, the company (as the more powerful actor) would consider this act more contentious because others will learn about their misconduct and increase pressure for them to act.
  • Virality of online speech.
    • If speech online is more widely shared, then it increases the number of people exposed to a grievance or pressure for the target of dissent to act. Similar to the previous point, this makes the act more contentious from the perspective of authorities. For example, in April 2022, authorities censored online references to the PRC national anthem after certain lyrics (“起来!不愿做奴隶的人们”) from the anthem were widely reposted as a way for people to express dissent against the government’s strict Covid lockdown policies.
  • Actual reprisal by state or non-state actors.
    • A clear indicator that an authority perceives an act as contentious is the use of reprisals against the dissenting actor. Examples of reprisals include violence, detention, abduction, intimidation, criminalization or other lawsuits, denial of livelihood, or the threat of any of these measures.
  • Risk of reprisal.
    • Even when reprisal has not yet occurred, it may be clear that an act carries considerable risk of reprisal. This risk is often contextual and may be determined based on similar recent acts, the situation in a given community, or the actor’s background and reputation.
  • Censorship of a topic or speech.
    • Similar to the two points above, censorship by authorities is an indication that authorities consider an issue or act to be in contention with their interests. For example, if authorities widely censor online speech about a student that alleged sexual assault by a teacher, people who subsequently post online in support of the student or demanding remedy may be considered dissenting.

There are some types of acts that may look similar to dissent or involve contention but that will not be included in the CDM database:

  • Acts conducted by state actors or that support authorities.
    • As the purpose of this project is to document how those with less power are contending with the powerful, pro-state activism does not meet the definition of dissent. For example, government-organized rallies, pro-state banners, or pro-state demonstrations. This exclusion includes speech espousing a position that is not in contention with authorities. For example, an online post that states the government is not harsh enough toward human rights activists, or a post that supports a lawsuit filed by a powerful company against individuals. However, this exclusion does not apply to individual government officials or workers who engage in dissent against the state or other authorities.
  • Acts that specifically espouse violence against individuals.
    • The CDM project is primarily concerned with recording acts of dissent and protest, not violence. Additionally, within the context of dissent, this project recognizes fundamental human rights. While it includes the rights to free expression and public assembly, it also includes the rights to life and bodily integrity. If the main purpose of an act is to espouse or commit violence against individuals, then it violates those rights and will not be recorded. This exclusion does not apply when violence is not the main intention of the act but occurs incidentally or in defense, such as demonstrators reacting to police violence. This exclusion does not apply to damaging property or entering property without permission, assuming the act meets conditions of dissent described above.

Verification

The CDM project is documenting dissent in an environment where dissent is systematically repressed and information about it often censored. We are unable to verify all dissent events with the same level of evidence or same degree of certainty. To maintain the credibility of findings, CDM confronts this problem through transparent verification tiers. Every entry in the database is assigned a tier rating based on type and amount of evidence.

  • Tier 1: Strongest evidence.Readers are provided ample evidence with which to verify the event. This tier includes two types of evidence: (a) primary documentation of the dissent with proof of the date that it occurred (e.g., photo/video of offline dissent); (b) report from a news or civil society organization.
  • Tier 2: Moderate evidence.Readers are provided some evidence with which to verify the event. This tier includes: (a) we can provide at least two sources confirming the event occurred (e.g., two online posts describe the event without); (b) a trusted partner confirmed the event through at least two sources, but we cannot publicly share the source, a link, or documentation for safety reasons.
  • Tier 3: Least evidence.Readers have minimal ability to directly verify the event themselves. This tier includes: (a) we can provide one source confirming the event occurred (e.g., one online post about the event without photos); (b) a trusted partner confirmed the event through one source, but we cannot share the source, a link, or documentation for safety reasons.

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