How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy

Introduction

Unlike what many believe, denuclearization of North Korea is extremely unlikely.

Therefore, instead of continuing unsuccessful strategies such as diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions, the U.S. and South Korea should take a new approach, establishing South Korea as the 10th nuclear power and subsequently withdrawing the U.S. troops from Korea. This new strategy benefits the U.S., South Korea, and ultimately the world in multiple ways. Most importantly for the U.S., withdrawing and reallocating roughly 28,000 troops from Korea will save billions of taxpayer dollars. Moreover, it enhances America’s homeland security as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea will remove or nullify one of North Korea’s justifications for possessing a nuclear capability: that Americans in the region are a national security threat to the North. South Korea also benefits by becoming a nuclear power, with its security no longer dependent upon the funded presence of the U.S. military.

Background 

Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945, Korea was split in half at the 38th parallel with the U.S. in the south and the Soviet Union in the north. Consequently, the Republic of Korea (ROK), was established in the south, backed by the U.S., while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) supported by the Soviet Union emerged in the north. Eventually, political tensions between the two states resulted in the Korean War (1950-53) which ended in an armistice. Despite the ceasefire between the two Koreas, tensions persist to this day. North Korea still seeks to unify the peninsula by force and considers the South its main adversary. However, North Korea’s efforts to communize South Korea failed, leaving its economy impoverished, while the South’s market economy surpassed the North’s stagnating command economy. North Korea, realizing its precarious fate based on its severe economic and diplomatic disadvantages against the South, chose nuclear armament.

Today, North Korea’s nuclear weapons may be the most significant threat to East Asia’s peace which became operational in 2006 following its first nuclear test. By the 2020s, the DPRK’s nuclear power has advanced to an extent where its ballistic missiles are capable of reaching the U.S. homeland according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The DPRK, by leveraging its nuclear weapons, aims to prevent conventional military attacks or invasions from its perceived adversaries, specifically the U.S. The U.S. has invaded multiple countries such as Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that none of the countries invaded by the U.S. had a nuclear deterrent capability.

Thus, North Korea understands that its national security concerns, specifically from the threat of a U.S.-led military attack or invasion, can only be dealt with through the development of a credible nuclear deterrence capability. The recent U.S. raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities would have solidified North Korea’s existing beliefs that nuclear weapons are imperative for deterrence purposes. The DPRK knows that it can deter any military threats from the U.S. and South Korea as nuclear wars are not worth the risk. Hence North Korea can assure its own survival by possessing a nuclear weapon. 

Unlikelihood of Denuclearization

North Korea’s denuclearization remains an unrealistic outcome. Benjamin Young, a Stanton Foundation Nuclear Security Fellow at RAND states, “the denuclearization of the DPRK is a pipedream at this point and it is not consistent with reality on the Korean peninsula”. As the DPRK became more isolated, a consequence of Juche (self-reliance) ideology combined with its communist economy, it set a pathway to exacerbate North Korea’s human rights issue. North Korea keeps itself distant from international interventions, thus repeatedly suppressing its own population through crimes against humanity. Kim’s atrocities have brought up global level human rights concerns that have even entailed targeted sanctions on North Korea, further jeopardizing the country’s economy. Amidst its precariousness, North Korea will likely pursue stronger deterrence to shield itself from what it perceives as potential military interventions by the West. Therefore, for Kim Jong Un, denuclearization implies surrendering the regime’s sovereignty, given the fate of non-nuclear states that faced U.S. intervention. In fact, Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s supreme leader and a dictator, knows what has happened to countries that surrendered their nuclear capabilities in exchange for security guarantees. Ukraine is an ongoing example. As national security correspondent Greg Myre states, “Ukraine possessed nukes when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991 and then gave them up”. The Budapest memorandum, signed by the U.S., the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine, sought to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s non-aggression. Nevertheless, Russia, having no concerns of being threatened by Ukraine with nuclear weapons, invaded it in 2022. Similarly, Russia’s nuclear weapons worked in favor of Putin as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not result in the west’s military intervention. This again proves the deterrence theory.

Even before the Russo-Ukraine war, Dr. David Lai pointed out in his 2012 article, Busting the Myths About the North Korea Problem, that it is unlikely that the U.S. can either negotiate or pressure its way to North Korea’s denuclearization. Dr. Lai argues that because the “United States does not have any effective means to influence North Korea”, pressures using every aspect of [the] DIME model had minimal effect on Kim’s regime. Given the patterns that nuclear-capable countries have shown, it is extremely unlikely that North Korea will give into western demands of denuclearization. Without nuclear capabilities, North Korea will be left with no effective method of deterrence against its adversaries, meaning its regime will likely collapse. Given this reality, U.S. policy should pivot from pursuing denuclearization to managing stability on the peninsula.

Declining Operational Effectiveness of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)

The U.S. and the ROK have been maintaining an alliance ever since the mutual defense treaty of October 1953. Certainly prior to North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, USFK troops stationed in South Korea alongside a sizable ROK military deterred North Korea’s military aggressions. 

However, such a conventional approach is now outdated for two reasons. The first is due to the declining merit of the USFK. Given America’s new stance on the DPRK’s nuclear power due to the infeasibility of denuclearization, the value of USFK may diminish. Historically, both the U.S. and ROK forces held various joint military exercises in efforts to pressure North Korea’s way to denuclearize. They clearly have not been effective given North Korea’s ongoing nuclear tests and will be even less so in the future given the U.S.’ new stance on the North’s nuclear power. 

The second reason is the South Korean government’s changing stances on the North. South Korea holds a presidential election every five years, meaning its administrations’ political leanings may change from right wing to left wing in less than a decade. Contrasting South Korea’s right wing party that is generally pro-U.S. and anti-PRC/North Korea, the left wing has been relatively sympathetic to the North. Hence changes in South Korea’s administrations are reflected in the ROK military’s varying degree of cooperation during  joint exercises. Therefore, due to inconsistencies of the level of military pressure on the DPRK, the conventional approach was already ineffective.

Accordingly, the ROK public has been losing confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Unsurprisingly, according to a RAND article, “there is growing public demand in South Korea for the indigenous development of nuclear weapons”. Foreign data also support RAND. For instance, according to the Korea Institute for National Unification, a South Korean governmental agency, the ROK public opinion supporting South Korea’s indigenous nuclear weapons ranged from 60~71% from 2021 to 2024. This implies that even the ROK public recognizes the shortcomings of conventional deterrence amidst ongoing nuclear threats from the North and recent American non-interventionist stances. Hence, it is necessary for both the U.S. and the ROK to consider an alternative method that is far more effective, not only in terms of enemy deterrence, but also for the sake of its respective national interests. 

USFK’s presence has not been effective enough to denuclearize the North. Given the U.S.’ changed stance on viewing the DPRK as a nuclear power, the USFK’s merit will likely decline even further. The North, having been used to USFK’s presence for decades and virtually recognized by the U.S. as a nuclear power, may no longer consider USFK as a threat. Under such conditions, maintaining USFK could result in a serious profligation of limited U.S. defense resources.

The presence of the U.S. military in South Korea cost the U.S. a staggering $13.4 billion from 2016 to 2019, more than $3 billion per year.

The Ideal Course of Action 

In efforts to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats, the most viable option for South Korea is to develop its own nuclear capabilities, thereby achieving credible parity. Subsequently, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea will mitigate the risk of confrontation. As realists would argue, peace is maintained through strength. Wars occur when aggressors believe they could gain power using force of arms against weaker states. Therefore, once South Korea is nuclear-capable, North Korea will be considerably deterred from aggressive behaviors, let alone invasion. This is consistent with the nuclear deterrence theory that nuclear weapons prevent conventional wars as established above.

The ROK already overwhelms the DPRK in every category of DIME. North Korea is internationally isolated, contrasting globally engaged South Korea. Economically, South Korea’s nominal GDP is almost $1.8 trillion while the North staggers at roughly $18 billion. Finally, the ROK military consistently ranks in the top ten while the DPRK ranks below thirtieth. Therefore, from a realist approach, the chances of war in Korea will significantly decrease once South Korea becomes a nuclear power and USFK withdraws from Korea. In fact, in an Asia-Pacific analysis article, Why the U.S. should withdraw its troops from Korea, the author claims that “Pyongyang naturally sees [ROK and the U.S.] with which it is still at war rehearsing for invasion”. This means that the presence of the USFK in South Korea is aiding the DPRK propaganda and its justification behind its aggressions towards the south.

By removing the USFK that aggravates North Korea, “Washington could allow Pyongyang to take real steps toward normalized relations and even long-term peace with South Korea and the United States, removing threats to U.S. safety and prosperity”. It will also significantly weaken North Korea’s justification behind its aggressions, thereby naturally reducing the chance of a kinetic war. 

This benefits both the U.S. and South Korea. First, the U.S. can reallocate the defense budget of more than $3 billion per year in Korea to other vital sectors such as border security while being freed from unnecessary conflicts with North Korea. This is consistent with President Trump’s America First Priorities and America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State that prioritize core American interests above foreign countries. The U.S. already is overstretched globally. The great-power competition with the PRC, the Middle East, and the war in Ukraine is pushing America’s bandwidth. Just because the U.S. has the strongest military in the world does not mean it should be used as a global police force. Financial burdens and diplomatic costs of maintaining a global coalition, coupled with the stag hunt problem among allies with differing interests, make this approach suboptimal for the U.S.

Furthermore, multilateral security policy does not align with the current Trump administration’s objectives of non-interventionist diplomacy. Through the delegation of diplomatic and security concerns surrounding North Korea to South Korea, by supporting its nuclear armament, the U.S. could reallocate its military resources and efforts to more crucial areas.

Potential options include promoting further investments towards military space capabilities to achieve space superiority over adversaries, bolstering strategic maritime chokepoints in the South China Sea for PRC deterrence, and stationing military units along the southern border. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. will also become free from the unnecessary risks of the DPRK nuclear attack upon the USFK withdrawal. With no U.S. military presence in the South, North Korea now has no justification to attack the U.S. After all, the Korean conflict is ultimately an issue for the two Koreas with the U.S. only involved to support its ally ROK. There is no reason for the U.S. to sacrifice its human and capital resources on behalf of its ally from an America First approach. Through prioritization of own interests and non-interventionist stances, the U.S. can mitigate the risks of armed conflicts in East Asia.

South Korea also benefits by achieving true self defense while freeing itself from an expenditure of $1.13 billion to the U.S. for its military presence in Korea. Although the risks of regional nuclear proliferation may rise following South Korea’s nuclear armament, the benefits of the U.S. terminating its expensive involvement with a prolonged foreign conflict will outweigh the downsides of such risks. Furthermore, it is difficult to assert that South Korea’s nuclear armament will likely lead to a nuclear proliferation given its international standing and alignment with Western powers. Many countries that are comparable to South Korea’s degree of economic development are already nuclear powers. South Korea’s nuclear armament may even reinforce America’s agenda of the PRC deterrence. Historically, the tensions between the PRC and the ROK have always been high. There is even rhetoric in South Korea which argues that China is seeking to threaten its sovereignty through election interference and online propaganda. Therefore, South Korea’s anti-PRC sentiments coupled with its nuclear capacity can completely revolutionize geopolitical balancing in East Asia. As a reliable U.S. ally, nuclear-capable South Korea will deter China’s conventional aggressions which satisfies U.S. objectives with no direct American involvement, minimizing economic and diplomatic risks for the U.S.

Others may voice concerns as Japan and Germany’s pursuit of nuclear armament following that of the ROK. However, such an outcome is unlikely. Both countries’ constitutions forbid their nuclear armament. Furthermore, with the presence of U.S. troops in Japan and Germany unchanged, the two countries are unable to use the ‘weakened national defense’ as their reasons for nuclear armament.

Conclusion

Over the past two decades, the U.S. and the ROK have employed various methods such as diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, and combined military exercises to force Kim Jong Un to surrender his nuclear power which all came short of making significant progress. Experts point out that the DPRK’s denuclearization is an unrealistic outcome, and the Trump administration acknowledges the situation. Therefore, the U.S. is now trending in a way that recognizes North Korea as a nuclear power.

Hence the best course of action to mitigate armed conflict in East Asia is to employ non-interventionist deterrence methods. If South Korea becomes nuclear-capable, it will effectively deter future aggressions from the North. Simultaneously, the USFK withdrawal from South Korea will nullify the North’s justifications behind its nuclear threats and may even provide an improved framework for U.S.-DPRK diplomacy long term. Meanwhile, South Korea’s nuclear power will be more than enough to deter China, coupled with its strong military.

Overall, the U.S. will benefit by getting a step closer to achieving the America First policy. Reallocation of America’s resources from the ROK to U.S. national security could result in enhanced military space capabilities, improved naval deterrence against the PRC, and a more secure southern border. America will better promote its interests while freeing itself from risks of North Korea’s nuclear threats.