Cartel drone attacks growing exponentially in Mexico, Colombia

A recent report by Fox News highlights a phenomenon that’s long been on the radar of irregular-warfare scholars but is now stepping into plain view: criminal organisations in Latin America are rapidly advancing their use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) — not just for smuggling, reconnaissance or logistics, but for attacks. The article cites the dramatic uptick of drone-borne threats in Mexico and Colombia.

At the same time, a panel convened by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) addressed this evolving challenge under the title “Countering the Criminal Drone Threat in the Americas.” On that panel, Robert Bunker — Editor of SWJ’s El Centro and ASU Research Fellow — dissected how organised crime is not simply borrowing drones, but adapting the technology, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) typically associated with insurgents and non-state militant groups.

Why this matters

1. From novelty to normalisation. It’s not just one-off incidents. Latin America has moved from smuggling drones to weaponised drone use — including explosive payloads, FPV (first-person view) strike drones, and drone swarms (or at least the concept of them).  The CSIS commentary puts it bluntly: criminal networks are “strategically adopting commercial drone technologies.” 

2. The character shift in non-state actors. From Bunker’s framework of non-state militant groups, we see the character of the actor changing: while the nature may remain (an irregular, hierarchical organisation engaging in violence outside the state’s monopoly), the character – in terms of narrative, resource mobilisation, and technological embedding — shifts when the drone becomes a tool of attack or terror, not merely smuggling. In short: the cartels are fighting like insurgents.

3. The operational implications for states and military planners. The border zone and the hinterlands of Latin America may currently face the brunt of the threat, but the implications ripple outward. Cheap commercial drones plus modest adaptation mean the barrier to entry is low. States cannot assume the current threat ends at the border. The panel emphasised the urgent need for doctrine, counter-UAS systems, and inter-agency and regional cooperation. 

Key take-aways for policy and research

• Adaptation happens fast. The migration of weaponised drone tactics from war zones (e.g., Ukraine) into the hands of organised crime means time for reaction is limited. The Atlantic Council, for example, documents how cartels may have sent operatives to learn FPV drone tactics abroad. 

• Drone usage blurs benchmarks. When criminal organisations begin to employ strike-capable UAS with precision targeting, the line between insurgency, terrorism, and organised crime becomes harder to draw. For researchers of irregular warfare this matters: the typology of actor and tool shifts.

• Counter-UAS is not just tech. The CSIS event stressed that detection, legal/regulatory frameworks, airspace management, regional partnerships and rules of engagement are as important as any jammer. The UAS threat is as much about the legal/operational environment as it is about the hardware.

• Narrative and legitimacy become even more critical. As criminal actors deploy drones, they not only target rivals and state forces—they target perceptions. The use of drones changes the narrative of vulnerability, surveillance and control. That connects directly with the character of non-state militant groups in ways that speak to my thesis: nature may be constant, but character evolves through tools, narrative and environment.

What SWJ’s audience should watch

• Increased documentation of explosive-dropping drones and the emergence of FPV kamikaze drones in cartel arsenals. 

• Growing investment by criminal organisations in counter-drone systems, signal jamming capability, and drone training (sometimes abroad) to defeat law enforcement and rival drone efforts. 

• A shift in state responses: we may see more domestic policy urgency, cross-border coordination, inclusion of drone threats in irregular warfare/insurgency studies, and perhaps the diffusion of military UAS counter-doctrine into the domestic law-enforcement sphere.

• For military/irregular warfare educators: relevance of drones as force multipliers for non-state actors means curriculum and scenario-building must adapt (e.g., workshops, wargames, foresight sessions should incorporate non-state drone use, training, adaptation loops, and counter-measures).

Fox News report on cartel drone attacks (via Border Report)

CSIS event: “Countering the Criminal Drone Threat in the Americas”